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*Samuel Houston*

Samuel Houston  
1802-1863

# HISTORY OF TEXAS

FROM

ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1685

TO

ITS ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1846

*Anderson K.*  
BY H. YOAKUM, Esq.

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II.

WITH AN EXTENDED APPENDIX



REDFIELD

34 BEEKMAN STREET, NEW YORK

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## DEDICATION.

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TO PETER W. GRAY, ESQ.

DEAR SIR: I have now completed the second volume of a HISTORY OF TEXAS, which, with the first, gives some account of the principal events connected with the settlement and occupation of the country by the European race, from the first landing of immigrants, on the 18th day of February, 1685, to the annexation of Texas to the United States, on the 4th of July, 1845.

In the compilation of this volume, the materials were so abundant, that the great difficulty was, to select the most prominent and connected facts, so as not to make the volume too ponderous, nor to break the unity of the story. In all this you will doubtless find errors, but—I have done the best I could, and hope you may find it sufficiently interesting to peruse it.

Texas has a noble and romantic history. It is to be found in her state papers, and in the letters, journals, and memoranda, of those who took part in her affairs. Having devoted much time to the study of these valuable documents, I speak

advisedly on this subject. When our public authorities shall think proper to have them collected, arranged, and published, as other states have done, they will form a work of which Texas may well be proud.

With many thanks to kind friends for valuable historical papers, and more especially to yourself for many facts and suggestions, I am very truly your friend,

H. YOAKUM.

SHEPHERD'S VALLEY, TEXAS, *February 26, 1855.*



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# HISTORY OF TEXAS.

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## CHAPTER I.

THE consultation reassembled at San Felipe de Austin, on the first of November, 1835; but, for want of a quorum, they did not organize until the third day of the month. There were present fifty-five members, representing the thirteen municipalities of Texas.\* Their session continued till the 14th of that

\* Municipality of *Bevil*: John Bevil, S. H. Everitt, Wyatt Hanks.

*San Augustine*: William N. Sigler, A. Huston, A. E. C. Johnson, Henry Augustin, A. Horton, A. G. Kellogg.

*Nacogdoches*: Sam Houston, James W. Robinson, Daniel Parker, William Whitaker.

*Columbia*: John A. Wharton, J. S. D. Byrom, Edwin Waller, Henry Smith.

*Austin*: Wylie Martin, Randal Jones, Thomas Barnett, Jesse Burnham, William Menefee.

*Liberty*: Henry Millard, Claiborne West, George M. Patrick, J. B. Woods, A. B. Hardin.

*Harrisburg*: Lorenzo D. Zavala, M. W. Smith, William P. Harris, John W. Moore, C. C. Dyer, David B. Maeomb.

*Matagorda*: R. R. Royal, Charles Wilson.

*Mina*: D. C. Barrett, R. M. Williamson, J. S. Lester.

*Washington*: Asa Mitchell, Elijah Collard, Jesse Grimes, Philip Coe, Asa Hoxey.

*Gonzales*: W. S. Fisher, J. D. Clements, George W. Davis, James Hodges, William W. Arrington, Benjamin Fuqua.

*Viesca*: S. T. Allen, A. G. Perry, J. G. W. Pierson, Alexander Thompson, J. W. Parker.

*Tenehaw*: Martin Parmer. — *Journal of Consultation.*

month, during which period they were industriously engaged in organizing a provisional government, and providing means for its support. Branch T. Archer,\* the president of the assembly, opened its business in an appropriate address. The general council, which had, up to that time, exercised the authority of government, surrendered it to the consultation. A committee of twelve, of which John A. Wharton was chairman, was appointed to prepare a *declaration* of the causes which impelled the Texans to take up arms. A like committee, of which Henry Millard was chairman, was appointed "to draw up and submit a plan or system of a *provisional government*."

On the 7th, the consultation, after much discussion, adopted the declaration.† It was not one of independence, but of adherence to the constitution of 1824. It is likely that the entire body saw that the end would be independence; but they deemed it prudent to move slowly, and first unite all parties in the revolution. The great object of the leading men was, that their actions should be approved by the world. They feared that a precipitate declaration of independence would not meet that approval. Texas needed sympathy and aid. By a defensive course, she would obtain it. Such was the policy of her leaders, and time has shown its wisdom. They expected also to induce some of the other Mexican states to follow their example in declaring their adherence to the federal constitution, but in this they were not successful. There was, in some parts of Mexico, a feeble response in favor of liberty, but the bayonets of Santa Anna reduced it to silence. It may also be observed

\* Dr. Archer emigrated to Texas in 1831. For a sketch of his history, see Foote's History of Texas, vol. ii., p. 12.

† Journal, p. 51. The committee first reported in favor of a declaration of independence. It was adopted, and then reconsidered. "How the convention will decide is uncertain, but the probability is in favor of the constitution as a matter of policy only, as all agree we must go, sooner or later, for independence."—*J. W. Robinson to Frost Thorn, November 3, 1835.*

that, in November, 1835, public opinion in Texas was hardly prepared for a change so sudden.

The ordinance "establishing a provisional government" was completed on the 13th day of November, 1835.\* It is the earliest specimen of Anglo-Saxon law ever enforced in Texas. Its provisions were few, and such as the emergency required. It created a governor, lieutenant-governor, a council, to be elected from the consultation (one from each municipality), a provisional judiciary, a commander-in-chief, &c.

The consultation adjourned, to meet at Washington, on the 1st day of March, 1836; providing, however, that the governor and council should continue to exist as a provisional government until its reassembling. The commander-in-chief was declared to be such "of all the forces called into public service during the war;" and he was "to be subject to the governor and council." These provisions are more especially referred to here, because of the discord and misfortunes resulting therefrom.

Two days before the adjournment of the consultation, they elected Henry Smith governor† and James W. Robinson lieutenant-governor of Texas. Smith was chosen by a majority of nine votes over Stephen F. Austin. It was at first intended that Austin should be governor;‡ but his services being more needed as a commissioner to the United States, he was spared the misfortune of being the first governor of Texas. Robinson had no opposition. Sam Houston was elected commander-in-chief, with but one dissenting voice. Messrs. Branch T. Ar-

\* Journal, p. 42.

† Henry Smith was a native of Kentucky. He emigrated to Missouri, and thence to Texas. He was of moderate height, quite fleshy, of fine social qualities, racy and interesting in conversation, not easily irritated, but extremely obstinate in maintaining his opinions.

‡ J. W. Robinson to Frost Thorn, November 3, 1835: MS.

cher, William H. Wharton, and Stephen F. Austin, were duly chosen commissioners to the United States. Messrs. A. Houston, Daniel Parker, Jesse Grimes, A. G. Perry, D. C. Barrett, Henry Millard, Martin Parmer, J. D. Clements, R. R. Royal, W. P. Harris, E. Waller, and W. Hanks, were the council elected out of the consultation, to remain and co-operate with Governor Smith in carrying out the organic law.\*

In addition to other important matters, it was provided that "there should be a regular army created for the protection of Texas during the present war." To give aid and assistance in organizing this army, in adopting rules for its government, and in providing the *personnel* and *materiel*, General Houston remained in attendance on the governor and council until the 16th of December, when he was ordered to remove his headquarters to Washington.

To return to the Texan army at Concepcion. The entire Texan force at this point was at least a thousand men. After remaining at Concepcion until the 2d of November, the army marched, by way of the powder-house, on the slope of a gentle ridge, east of the San Antonio river, near to its head, and camped on the east bank. Here they remained for four or five days, keeping up a constant patrol around the town. From intelligence received, it was supposed that General Cos would surrender upon demand. Although the information was not very reliable, yet, as he had been greatly straitened by the siege, and his supplies were cut off, it was deemed of sufficient importance to make the attempt. Accordingly, the Texan army was marched to the west side and down the San Antonio river, and the entire force displayed on an eminence, some

\* The members of the council were constantly changing. On the first day of the meeting, we find the municipalities of Jefferson and Victoria, for the first time, represented.

fifteen hundred yards from the public square. The demand for a surrender was then made, and promptly refused. The Texans thereupon took position at the "Old Mill," a half-mile or more north of the public square, on the west bank of the San Antonio river.

The city of San Antonio is situated on the San Antonio river and San Pedro creek. These streams at the city are about six hundred and fifty yards apart; but, on the east side of the place, there is a remarkable bend in the river, enclosing about twenty-five acres, into which the town also extends. Opposite this bend, on the east bank of the river, is the ancient mission of the Alamo. The country around San Antonio is generally a level prairie, more undulating, however, on the west than on the east side of the river. There is an eminence west of the town, toward the Alazan; and another above the old mill, but not sufficiently near or elevated to command the town, except with twelve or eighteen pounders. The river, about sixty feet wide, is in most places fordable. It seldom rises or falls, but sends forth a constant stream of the purest water. The lowness of its banks and the levelness of the grounds offer great facilities for irrigation; hence the ditches, running down on both sides of the river, and between the two streams, not only answer the purpose of fertilizing the land, but also for defence. As no advantage could be gained by either party in location, the chief benefit must result to the besieged from the buildings and ditches. The houses, of thick stone walls, were very strong. The public square of San Antonio is divided by the church and some other buildings into two; or, rather, the original square, or military *plaza*, was first laid off and improved in 1716, having on its east side the church, and the offices of priests and officers. In 1731, was laid off the main square, or *Plaza of the Constitution*. Along the north side of these squares, runs

through the centre of the city the main street, which is prolonged east of the river to the *Garita*, or Look-out, used also as a powder-house, about one and a quarter miles from the town. At the crossing of the river by this street was a bridge, the only one then on the river.

While the Texan army was hanging about the town, Cos was not idle. Ugartachea was despatched to Matamoros for reinforcements; breastworks were thrown up at the entrance of every street into the square; and, on an open lot, on the north side of the military plaza, was erected a redoubt. The venerable church was also brought into the service, and artillery mounted behind the parapet on its roof. The Mexican force in the place was at this time about eight hundred men, with sufficient artillery to defend the different points fortified. The Texans had but five pieces, of small calibre. Previous to the departure of the Texan army from Concepcion, a council of war had been called by Austin, to consider the propriety of an immediate assault upon the town. It was concluded that it could be made, and the place taken, but at a greater sacrifice of men than the Texans could afford to bear; hence a regular siege was ordered.

“I am afraid,” says Austin, writing to Captain Dimit, on the 2d of November, “that our future operations will be tedious and prolonged, owing to the strength of the fortifications at this place, of which we have certain information. Whether the army can be kept together long enough to await the arrival of reinforcements, and the necessary supply of heavy battering-cannon and ammunition, I am sorry to say, is somewhat uncertain.”

Various attempts were made to entice the enemy beyond his walls. On one occasion, a detachment of one hundred and ninety Texans marched up within the range of the Mexican



six-pounders; on another, Colonel Thomas J. Rusk, at the head of forty cavalry, took a position within three hundred yards of their walls, and remained there twenty minutes: still they could not be drawn from their works.\* It was the opinion of Austin, on the 14th of November, that the enemy could not long hold out.† To lessen their consumption of provisions, the Mexicans sent off three hundred of their horses to Laredo; but they were overtaken and captured, about forty miles from San Antonio, by a detachment under Travis.‡ The poor condition of these horses indicated the wants of the besieged. But Cos, awaiting his reinforcements, still held out. Occasional conflicts between the outposts and scouts of the two armies constituted the only subjects of interest in camp for several days. Volunteers, always impatient while inactive, had manifested this feeling in the camp before Bexar. They found amusement and interest in catching the exhausted cannon-balls of the enemy, and throwing them back; they also derived some pleasure from scouting-excursions of two or three days' continuance. But, in spite of all this, the besieging force was continually decreasing; so that, by the 14th of November, they did not number six hundred men.

One of these scouting-parties, that had been down on the Medina, returned about ten o'clock on the morning of the 26th of November, leaving "Deaf Smith" behind. It was known that Ugartachea was expected in Bexar, and this scout had been on the look-out for him. It happened that on that morning, General Cos had sent out a party of over a hundred men on the old Presidio road, to cut grass for the horses. Having supplied themselves with forage, they were on their way back, and about five miles from town, when Deaf Smith discovered

\* Rusk to Houston, November 14, 1835: MS.

† Austin to Houston, November 14, 1835: MS.

‡ Foote, vol. ii., p. 126.

them. About two o'clock in the evening he reached the Texan camp, and reported what he supposed to be Ugartachea, with a guard, bringing funds to pay off the Mexican army—for it was understood in the Texan camp that such was his mission. Immediately the cry of “Ugartachea!” resounded along the lines; and all who could, prepared to go in pursuit of him. It may be proper to state here that on the 25th (the day before), Austin, having received news of his appointment as commissioner to the United States, resigned his command of the army, and Colonel Edward Burleson had just been elected to succeed him. Colonel James Bowie, with about a hundred mounted men, set out in a gallop, in advance. Shortly after, the remainder of the army, with the exception of a suitable guard, followed. They met the enemy about a mile from the town, on their return. Bowie, with the advance, charged upon them, when they took a position in the bed of a dry branch. The movement of the Texans had been seen from the town, and the besieged marched out to defend the foraging-party, bringing with them two pieces of artillery. Just as Bowie charged the right of the foraging-party, the besieged came up on the left. Bowie now turned his attention to the latter, and for a short time the battle was well sustained. The enemy, however, retreated as they fought. The main body of the Texan force coming up meanwhile, charged on the foraging-party, drove them from the bed of the dry branch, and took position in it. After the last charge, the enemy retreated yet more rapidly—still, however, continuing the fight until they reached the town, when the Texans formed in a ravine, but shortly afterward returned to their camp. The Mexican loss in this confused, running fight, was about fifty killed and several wounded. The Texans had none killed, two wounded, and one missing. The enemy lost about seventy head of horses, taken by the victors.

The history of this affair, known as the "Grass-Fight," has been greatly confused. The official account is hardly intelligible. Kennedy has confounded it with another occurrence, of the 8th of the same month, which happened on this wise: A party of thirty-two men, under the command of Captain William Austin (a cousin of Stephen F.), went out, on the day in question, in search of Ugartachea. When arrived at the place where the "Grass-Fight" afterward occurred, one of their number, House, was accidentally killed. The party went on, sending back Lynch for another party, to bring in House's body. Fifty men were accordingly despatched for that purpose. As they were returning with the body, they were attacked by about two hundred and fifty mounted Mexicans. The Texans took post in a gulley, and continued the fight successfully, till they were reinforced from their main camp, when the enemy were driven in, with a loss of some fifteen or twenty killed and wounded. The Texans lost none.\*

After the capture of Goliad by Collingsworth, General Austin directed that it should be retained and defended. A detachment from Bay Prairie, and also another from the Nueces, were sent to reinforce the place, making the number of its defenders, under the command of Captain Philip Dimit, upward of eighty effective men. This reinforcement enabled Captain Dimit to despatch thirty-six men, under Captain Westover, to the attack of the Mexican force at Lipantitlan, a small place above San Patricio, on the Nueces. The Mexican force, consisting of twenty-one men, with two pieces of artillery, surrendered without a contest on the 3d of November; and, upon agreement that they would not bear arms against Texas during

\* Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 133. Report of General Burleson to the Provisional Government, November 27, 1835. The accounts given of the "Grass-Fight," and of the affair of the 8th, are derived from statements of those engaged in them, and are considered reliable.

the war, the prisoners were set at liberty. The Texans remained at Lipantitlan until the next evening, when they set out on their return to Goliad. As they were crossing the Nueces, and when about half of them had passed the river, they were attacked by about seventy of the enemy. After a severe contest of half an hour, in which some twenty of the Mexicans were killed and wounded, they retreated, leaving the Texans masters of the field, the latter having only one man wounded.\*

The news of these successes spread over the country through the agency of the committees of safety, and cheered the Texans in their struggle. The same intelligence, reaching the United States, kindled a flame of sympathy everywhere. At New York, Cincinnati, Louisville, Nashville, Macon, Huntsville, Natchitoches, Mobile, New Orleans, and other places, funds were raised, and *emigrants* fitted out in squads, companies, and battalions. True, there were, in all these places, icy spirits, who had no sympathy, and who condemned Texas for not submitting to Santa Anna. Such men, if they really knew the wrongs inflicted on Texas, and those greater wrongs with which she was threatened—had they lived in the time of the American Revolution, would have opposed it also. It ill became a country like the United States, still red with the blood of her rebellion against George III., to blame Texas for going into the contest with Mexican despotism. The former revolted because of *taxation without representation*. The wrongs of Texas were so much greater, that she did not even complain of the absence of that right! Mexico complained to the United States that the revolted Texans “were daily obtaining from New Orleans assistance of all kinds, in men, munitions, and arms, in silver and soldiers, who publicly enlist in that city,

\* Journal of the Council, pp. 8, 84; Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 132.

and carry with them arms against a friendly nation.”\* There was no law in the United States to prevent public meetings, or to prohibit the transmission of funds or arms to other countries; nor was there any law to prevent persons from leaving the United States, provided they did not organize and array their forces within her limits. President Jackson was not the man to shrink from any official duty, however painful; but, as an individual, he could not but feel an interest in a struggle like that in which Texas was engaged: and what he thought, he spoke. It can not be denied that in some instances the law was violated, and that organized bodies of men did leave the United States; but the sympathy for the cause of the Texans was almost universal, and no one made it his business to advise prosecuting officers of these movements. They came—they aided Texas; she gave them a home, and many of them remained within her limits. The Lafayettes, the Pulaskis, and the Kosciuskos of Texas, will be kindly remembered, not only throughout her borders, but wherever liberty has friends.

After the departure of General Austin, the besieging army before San Antonio came very near being broken up. This threatened dissolution originated from a projected enterprise against Matamoras, with the hope of obtaining the co-operation of a large force of Mexican liberals. Dr. James Grant, an Englishman, some time before domiciliated about Monelova, and one of the legislators dispersed by General Cos, was the cause of this movement. He published an account of the supposed condition of the interior of Mexico—representing that Alvarez was active in the south, and had taken Acapulco; that Guzman and Montenegro had an army of twenty-one hundred liberals in the state of Guadalaxara; that Puebla, with the

\* Monasterio, Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, to the Secretary of State of the United States, November 19, 1835.

governor at its head, had refused to publish the centralizing decree of the 3d of October, and the people were rising *en masse* to defend their liberties; that Valladolid had protested in the strongest terms, and was raising her civic militia; that Oajaca had made a like protest, and was also preparing for defence; that Zacatecas was ready to take the first opportunity to avenge her wrongs; so also was Durango; and that Tamaulipas and New Leon would rise the moment *an attack was made on Matamoras*, and San Luis Potosi would instantly follow. These, with the further representations—made, no doubt, honestly by Grant—that Santa Anna was sadly distressed for want of funds to carry on his despotic plans, and that his army was scattered and could not be safely united,\* served to turn the heads of many of the leading men of Texas. It was supposed that they had only to show themselves on the right bank of the Rio Grande, when the whole of Mexico would rally around them! They never reflected that, since 1832, the Texans had become a by-word of reproach in Mexico, and that all parties there denounced them as “perfidious, ungrateful disturbers.” As this first thought of a campaign against Matamoras was the cause of great confusion, and some bloody tragedies, its progress, maturity, and final catastrophe, will deserve a more especial notice; but such notice will appear more properly in a subsequent page.

Mention has already been made of the New Orleans *Grays*, two notable companies, afterward so distinguished for their valor and sacrifices in the cause of Texas. The first news of the Texan Revolution was received in New Orleans on the 13th of October, 1835. The same evening a meeting was held at Bank’s Arcade. William Christy, a noble and valuable friend to Texas, presided. Ample funds were raised. Just as the

\* Letter of James Grant, November 13, 1835.



meeting adjourned, Adolphus Sterne, of Nacogdoches, stepped on the platform, and made known that Texas wanted *men* as well as money; and that, as a Texan agent, he had that day purchased fifty muskets, which would be distributed to those who would go with him to Texas. On the suggestion, names were called for, and two companies immediately raised, the one commanded by Captain Robert C. Morris, and the other by Captain Breese. The Texan committee dressed them in gray uniforms, and they departed for the theatre of war—the first named by way of the gulf, the other by way of Natchitoches. The appearance of Breese's company at Nacogdoches had a fine effect on the Cherokee Indians, a large number of whom were then in town. Their fine uniform caps and coats attracted the notice of the chief Bolles. He inquired if they were *Jackson's* men. "Certainly they are," said Sterne. "Are there more coming?"—"Yes," was the reply. "How many more?" asked Bolles. Sterne told him to count the hairs on his head, and he would know. In twenty minutes the Indians had all left the town!\* The "Grays" reached San Antonio in time to participate in its capture. Morris, of the first Grays, was promoted to the rank of major, and William G. Cooke appointed to his place as captain.

On the 29th of November, Major Morris informed General Houston that two hundred and twenty-five men, nearly all from the United States, had determined to set out the next morning from Bexar, for Matamoras, and thence into the interior; that their accounts from Mexico were of the most encouraging character; that they expected to be joined by a hundred or a hundred and fifty more, then on their way from the United States; and that they expected in the end to be joined by from five to eight thousand men, who were awaiting them. He further

\* Statement of the late Adolphus Sterne.

stated that those who would leave Bexar with him, if disappointed in marching on Matamoros, would immediately return to the United States. Such was the hopeless state of things, on the last days of November, before Bexar. But, about that time, the idea of storming the place had got a hold in camp. The Texan force was then not more than eight hundred, including the Grays, Captain Peacock's company from Mississippi, and Captain English's company from eastern Texas—so much had the forces of the besiegers diminished by the impatience of the volunteers. The hope of active operations, however, detained the troops for some days.

On the morning of the 3d of December, 1835, Messrs. Smith, Holmes, and Maverick, who had been detained under surveillance in Bexar since the affair at Gonzales, made their escape, and reached the Texan camp. From information given by them as to the strength of the place, a call was made for volunteers to attack it at four o'clock the next morning. The plan of assault proposed that three hundred volunteers should be led into the town in three divisions: the first, under Colonel Jack, to take and occupy the house of José Angel Navarro; the second, under Lieutenant Sommervell, to take and occupy the house of Antonio de la Garza; and the third, under Major Morris, to take and occupy the house of Veramendi. Deaf Smith, John W. Smith, and Hendrick Arnold, were to act as guides to the respective divisions.

During that day and night, all was preparation and impatience for the hour to march. A serious conference was in session in General Burleson's quarters, which closed by a proclamation that the descent on the town was postponed! The burst of disappointment and indignation which followed this announcement can be better imagined than described. A general parade was ordered for ten o'clock on the morning of the



4th. Many of the companies refused to turn out. The causes assigned for postponing the attack were, the absence of Arnold, one of the guides, together with an opinion that the besieged had received notice of the intended assault.


About two o'clock in the afternoon of the 4th of December, an order was issued to raise the siege, and to set out for La Bahia at seven o'clock that evening. "It was then," says an eye-witness, "that the scene was wholly indescribable, and serious apprehensions were entertained that our camp would become the theatre of blood." But, in the meantime, Arnold, the absent guide, had returned; and Lieutenant Vuavis, of the Mexican army, who had deserted the night before, came up. The latter was conducted forthwith to headquarters, and underwent a strict examination. He stated that the garrison was in a tumult, and much dissatisfied; and, further, that the enemy had no suspicion of the intended descent that morning. He also stated that the strength of the place had been exaggerated. On receipt of this information late in the evening of the 4th, Colonel Benjamin R. Milam, at the suggestion of some persons, cried aloud, "*Who will go with old Ben Milam into San Antonio?*" The reply was a shout from the officers and men then assembled around the quarters of General Burleson. They were ordered to fall into line, and, after a partial organization, Milam was promptly elected to the command, and notified the men to meet him, early after dark, at the old mill—there to complete their arrangements. All this transpired in the presence of General Burleson, and with his approbation. They met at the old mill, and formed the attacking party in two divisions: the first under the immediate command of Colonel Milam, assisted by Colonel Nidland Franks of the artillery and Major R. C. Morris of the Grays, with Messrs. Maverick, Cooke, and Arnold, as guides; the second under the command

of Colonel Frank W. Johnson, assisted by Colonels James Grant and William T. Austin, with Deaf Smith and John W. Smith as guides. General Burlleson was waited on, and requested to hold his position till the result of the attack on the town was known, which he cheerfully agreed to do. Colonel J. C. Neill was directed to make a feint on the Alamo, to divert the enemy's attention while Milam was marching into the place. There were three hundred and one men that made the descent, composed mostly of parts of the companies of Captains York, Patton, Dickinson, English, and Ward, in the first division, under Milam, and of the companies of Cook, Breese, Peacock, Swisher, and Edwards, in the second division, under Johnson.

On the morning of the 5th of December, about twenty minutes before daylight, the assault was made on the town. Colonel Neill, making an earlier start, had crossed the river, descended toward the Alamo, and opened a fire upon it, completely diverting the enemy's attention. This he continued till he heard the report of the guns in the town, when he withdrew to the camp. The division of Milam marched in a direction a little south of west to the entrance of *Acequia* street (so named from the ditch running on its west side); while, at the same time, that of Johnson advanced to the entrance of *Soledad* street. These two streets from their entrance run south for a thousand *varas* to the main *plaza*—the first entering the square on the northwest and the other on the northeast corner. At these points of entrance into the square the enemy had erected breastworks and batteries, so as to command them. Milam's division took possession of the house of De la Garza, and Johnson that of Veramendi. These houses were nearly opposite, on the east side of each of the two streets, and about a hundred yards from the main square. In approaching the Veramendi

EXPLANATIONS

- |                            |                          |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| A. Old Mill                | G. Redoubt               |
| B. House of Veramendi      | H. Quinta                |
| C. House of de la Garza    | I. Priest's House        |
| D. Main Plaza              | J. Antonio Navarro House |
| E. Military Plaza          | K. Zambrano Row          |
| F. Powder House or Lookout | L. Mexican Redoubt       |



**SAN ANTONIO & ITS ENVIRONS**

Taken from actual Survey. Illustrating the storming of the Town by the Texans under Col. Milam.



house, a sentinel fired upon the column, which was returned with effect by Deaf Smith. This aroused the Mexicans in the town. The fire from the town and the Alamo soon became tremendous. The Texans had taken with them two pieces of artillery, a twelve and a six pounder. The former was dismounted, and, for want of a cover for the other piece, it was but little used. So well directed was the enemy's fire, that, for a time, the Texans could not cover their lines, or keep up a safe communication between the two divisions. They relied, however, upon their rifles, with which they slackened the enemy's fire, and silenced the artillery within range of their pieces. During the 5th, the Texans had one killed, and two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, and twelve privates, wounded.\* These were sent back to the camp.

The night of the 5th was occupied by the Texans in strengthening their works, and opening a communication between the two divisions. The enemy kept up a constant fire during the night, which slackened somewhat toward daylight. They were also engaged in placing armed men on the tops of the surrounding houses, and in strengthening their defences. The Texans at length succeeded in opening a safe communication between their two divisions. This they did under a raking fire from the enemy's battery at the entrance of Soledad street.

At daylight, on the morning of the 6th of December, the enemy were discovered to have occupied the tops of the houses between the Texans and the *plaza*, and to have cut loopholes in the parapet-walls crowning the buildings. From these points

\* Among the wounded were Lieutenant John L. Hall, of the first Grays, and Deaf Smith. These wounds were received on top of the Veramendi house, whither some ten or fifteen had ascended to get a view of the enemy. Finding their position untenable, they descended through the roof. A writer in the 'Texas Gazette' of September 8, 1849, says Lieutenant Hall was not of the party. That officer himself states that he was.

they opened and kept up during the day a brisk fire of small-arms ; at the same time a steady fire of artillery was maintained from the town and the Alamo. The greatest danger to the Texans was in passing from one building to another. A detachment of Captain Crane's company, under Lieutenant William M'Donald, with others, advanced under a severe fire and took possession of the house to the right and somewhat in advance of the Garza house. This extended the Texan line westward, and toward the military plaza. At the same time, the assailants were strengthening their works, and returning the fire of the enemy. They also succeeded in mounting their cannon, with which they did some execution. The communication between the two divisions of the assailants was strengthened. During this, the second day of the attack, the Texans had five wounded. The night of the 6th was occupied by the enemy in keeping up a languishing fire, in opening a trench on the Alamo side of the river, and in strengthening their batteries on Main street, leading from the plaza to the Alamo. The Texans were engaged in strengthening their lines.

On the morning of the 7th, the enemy opened a brisk fire from the trench constructed the night before ; also of artillery and small-arms from other positions. By eleven o'clock that day, the deadly fire of the Texan rifles had silenced that from the trench, and also from some of the Mexican artillery. The only house between the Garza house and the buildings on the plaza was about midway, but back from the street. About noon, the gallant Karnes advanced with a crowbar, under a heavy fire from the enemy, and forced an entrance. Captain York's company followed, and held the position. In the evening the fire of the Mexicans became active from all their works. Colonel Milam, in passing from his position to that of Johnson at the Veramendi house, was instantly killed by a rifle-shot in



the head. He fell just as he entered the yard. In his death, Texas lost a commander and a soldier whose place could not be easily supplied.\* The Texans, however, felt a new incentive to avenge his death. They immediately set on foot a party to take possession of the house of Antonio Navarro, situated on the north side of Main street, one block west of the main plaza, but commanding a portion of the military plaza, and the Mexican redoubt on the second block west of the main square. The party consisted of portions of the companies of Captains Llewellyn, English, Crane, and York. They advanced from the house taken by Karnes, and forced an entrance. The enemy endeavored to retake it by firing through loopholes made in the roof; but the Texans returned the fire through the same loopholes, and drove them off.

Immediately north of and adjoining the Navarro house, fronting on Flores street, stood a row of buildings known as the "Zambrano Row." The taking of these buildings was part of the work of the 8th of December. The morning was cold and wet, and but little was done. About nine o'clock, however, the same party who had taken the Navarro house, being reinforced by the Grays, commenced the attack. The row consisted of a series of rooms, separated by thick partition-walls. These walls were pierced, and thus the Texans advanced from room to room. The enemy disputed every inch of the ground, and kept up a tremendous fire of artillery during the day. At last, however, they were forced to abandon the row. During this time, a small reinforcement, under Lieutenant Gill, came in from the camp of General Burleson. The Mexicans, in order to produce a diversion, sent out a party of about fifty men from the Alamo toward the Texan camp, but they were quickly driven back by the fire of a six-pounder. After dark, on the

\* Milam was buried where he fell.

8th, the occupants of the Zambrano row were reinforced by the companies of Captains Swisher, Alley, Edwards, and Duncan. Thus the Texans had, in fact, the command of the north-west portion of the enemy's main defences.

On the night of the 8th, a further advance was made. On the north side, and opposite the centre of the main plaza, stood a strong building known as the "Priest's House." It commanded the plaza, and its capture was considered the crowning work of the assault. Just before midnight, a party of about a hundred men, destined to attack this place, set out from the Garza house. In passing an out-building connected with the wall around the yard of the priest's house, they were exposed to a heavy fire from the Mexicans occupying that out-building; but by a rapid movement the assailants reached the wall, broke it down, drove the enemy from his position, entered the priest's house, secured and strengthened the doors and windows, and commenced cutting loopholes. The fire of the enemy had by this time become general, and was kept up with artillery and small-arms until nearly daylight. Finding the Texans unpleasantly near them, they did not wait for daybreak to see the effect of their rifles from the loopholes in the priest's house upon the main plaza, but retreated to the Alamo. At half-past six o'clock, on the morning of the 9th, General Cos sent in a flag of truce, expressing a wish to capitulate.

General Burleson, having received notice of the flag, proceeded to the town; and by two o'clock, on the morning of the 10th, the articles of capitulation were concluded. Cos and his officers were permitted to retire with their arms and private property, upon their word of honor that they would not in any way oppose the re-establishment of the constitution of 1824; the Mexican convict-soldiers were to be taken beyond the Rio Grande; all public property belonged to the victors;



such of the troops as wished to remain, or leave the Mexican army, had the liberty of doing so. Commissioners were appointed to carry the articles into effect.

It is proper here to state that during the attack, notwithstanding General Burleson had out a constant patrol, Ugartachea made his way into San Antonio with five hundred convicts, guarded by a hundred regular infantry. This force, added to the eight hundred previously there, made an aggregate of fourteen hundred. The number of the enemy killed has been variously estimated: it probably did not exceed a hundred and fifty. The Texan loss was trifling, though they had several wounded.

Among the occurrences of the assault, it may be stated that on the same evening of the death of Milam, the officers assembled and conferred the command on Colonel Frank W. Johnson, who had the high honor of raising the flag of victory over the walls of Bexar. The reinforcement of convicts brought in by Ugartachea were conducted in chains, and their fetters were only taken off when they were introduced within the lines. Such men added nothing to the Mexican strength, but served only to hasten the consumption of the scanty provisions of the besieged. After the occupation of the priest's house by the Texans, the town was fairly in their possession. They were in a position, as soon as daylight appeared, to clear every battery on the plaza. The terms of the capitulation were, then, humane. It is true the enemy could have held out for some time in the Alamo, but they had no provisions. The Texans agreed to furnish them with a supply at a fair price, and their sick and wounded were permitted to remain behind, and were duly cared for. Thus the humanity following the victory was more glorious than the victory itself, and was a noble lesson of moderation in the hour of triumph, which the enemy failed

to learn.\* Twenty-one pieces of artillery, five hundred muskets, together with ammunition, clothing, &c., fell into the hands of the victors.

On the 14th, General Cos left the town with eleven hundred and five troops, the remainder having abandoned his flag. He encamped that night at the mission of San José. The next day he set out for the Rio Grande, to report to Santa Anna, his distinguished relative and superior, the rebellious character of the Texans, and their obstinacy in battle. General Burluson, who, although opposed to the attack, when it was begun did all he could to contribute to its success, on the 15th retired to his home, leaving Colonel Johnson in command at the Alamo, with a sufficient force to maintain it. The remainder of the army dispersed. Thus was Texas again free from the footsteps of the enemy.

We will now return to the stirring events in the civil department of government, following the adjournment of the consultation. Governor Smith, with the council, his advisers, had much to do, and with but slender means. Texas was poor; and the truth of history is only vindicated in saying that, but for the means supplied by the generosity of individuals in the United States, she could hardly have sustained herself against the power of Mexico. True, her own people were heroes, and able and willing to do all that men ever did or could do; yet they must have food and raiment, arms and munitions. The ravages of war had called them from their fields and shops, and they were producing nothing. What her wealthier citizens could give, was given freely. The people of San August-

\* The account of the storming of San Antonio is taken from the official reports of General Burluson, of the 14th of December, 1835; of Colonel Francis W. Johnson, of the same date; from the "Emigrant's Guide" of January 16, 1836; the "State Gazette" of September 1, 8, and 15, 1849; and from the statements of several of those engaged in the contest.

tine and Nacogdoches subscribed several thousand dollars in money, besides provisions, horses, clothing, and whatever else they had. D. H. Vail, treasurer of the people of Natchitoches, sent on in wagons the large subscriptions of that place. Such was the enthusiasm there, that the Mexican consul tore down his sign, placed his foot upon it, and declared for Texas. Mobile sent at one time two thousand dollars. The committee at New Orleans were also sending forward repeated supplies. The receivers of public moneys in Texas promptly delivered over the funds to the provisional government.\*

On the 15th of November, Governor Smith sent in to the council his message. He talked very plainly to the members of that body. He told them to commence by summoning to their assistance moral courage, and to throw around them the shield of honesty. He advised them to adopt the most prompt and energetic measures in behalf of the army; to furnish the necessary provisions; to provide for fortifying the unprotected seaport and frontier towns, to which end he recommended the formation of a corps of engineers. He also advised the granting of letters of marque and reprisal, to blockade the ports of the enemy: this he believed could be done with foreign capital and enterprise. He recommended the raising of a company of rangers, to overawe the Indians, and prevent them from becoming the allies of the Mexicans; also the protection of the civilized Indians in the "just and equitable title" which they were generally understood to have in their lands; he recommended the appointment of foreign agents, to be clothed with special powers to procure aid for Texas; also the establishment of a tariff, and the appointment of revenue-officers; also the regulation of the postoffice, and approving the appointment of John Rice Jones as postmaster-general, made by the council

\* Journal of the Council, p. 9, *et seq.*

previous to the meeting of the consultation ; also the organization of the militia ; the appointment of a treasurer ; and, finally, the location of the seat of government.\*

The council proceeded to distribute their labors by the appointment of committees on the army, navy, finances, Indian and state affairs. They appointed Charles B. Stewart secretary to the governor, John W. Moore army-contractor, and Thomas F. M'Kinney special agent to borrow one hundred thousand dollars on account of Texas. In this last act of the council, of the 24th of November, appeared the first germ of discord between Governor Smith and that body. It will be remembered that the consultation, previous to its adjournment, had appointed Messrs. S. F. Austin, W. H. Wharton, and B. T. Archer, agents of Texas to proceed to the United States, and transact such business in her behalf as might be deemed necessary. These agents were shortly to set out on their mission. Governor Smith deemed it improper in the council to anticipate the action of these agents by the appointment of a special agent to do in part what they could better effect. Nevertheless, the council unanimously passed the act over his excellency's veto.†

For the further organization of the government, the council elected two judges for each municipality, and also commissioners to organize the militia.‡ It likewise elected Joshua Fletcher treasurer. On the 26th of November, P. B. Dexter, the secretary of the council, resigned, and that body chose E. M. Pease his successor.||

\* Journal of the Council, p. 13.

† *Ib.*, p. 50.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 57.

|| Elisha M. Pease, the present worthy governor of Texas, was from Connecticut. He had some time previously settled at Bastrop, and took an active part in the first revolutionary meetings there. He was quite young, but such was his conduct and solid worth, that he soon attracted the attention of the public.

On the 27th of November, the financial committee made an able report, exhibiting the resources of Texas. They saw plainly enough that money, as well as patriotism, was necessary to sustain the war. They estimated the territory of the province at a quarter of a million of square miles, and the population at fifty thousand souls. They stated that only ten millions of acres of this vast domain was appropriated. They recommended a tax on this land; also a tax of one dollar per head on slaves. As a more speedy and available source of revenue, they recommended a duty on foreign tonnage. The export of cotton was estimated at sixty thousand bales: the tonnage, they supposed, would amount to the same. They proposed a duty of two and one eighth dollars per ton; also an export duty on cotton of one quarter of a cent per pound. They also recommended a duty of fifteen to thirty *per centum* on imports. These sources of revenue would, in due time, have answered every legitimate want. But, at that moment, the wants of Texas were pressing, and could not be postponed: hence a loan presented the most obvious, nay, the only plan of relief.\*

Stephen F. Austin reached San Felipe on the 29th of November. On the following day he presented his respects to the governor and council, and awaited only his instructions to depart for the United States. The subject of his instructions had some time before been brought to the notice of the council by Governor Smith, but still they were not prepared. On the 4th of December, he again reminded them that everything depended on the despatch of these agents, and urged them to suspend other business till the instructions were made out. At length, on the 6th of December, the council, by an ordinance, authorized the governor to give the necessary instructions. In

\* Journal of the Council, p. 63.

the meantime, William H. Wharton declined the appointment of commissioner, preferring a position in the army; but his services as an agent were deemed too important, and he was finally induced to go.\* The commissioners shortly afterward set out for the United States. Before leaving, however, they made an application to General Houston to appoint two agents to proceed to New Orleans, to procure provisions, ammunition, &c.; they being subject to the direction of the commissioners. They recommended the names of A. Huston and John A. Wharton for this trust. Accordingly, on the 8th of December, General Houston appointed the agents named.†

About this time the Texans received the news of the unfortunate result of an expedition fitted out at New Orleans against Tampico. It was gotten up under the auspices of General Mexia, one of the republican officers in Mexico, who abandoned Santa Anna when the latter declared for the centralists. Mexia advised the expedition, and declared the capture of Tampico the most fatal blow that could be given to the operations of Santa Anna against Texas. Some liberal contributions had been given to the cause by persons in New Orleans; the schooner "Mary Jane" was chartered, and on the 6th of November, 1835, she sailed for Tampico, having on board some one hundred and thirty men. Two thirds of these were Americans, the others mostly French and Germans. There is little doubt that most of the men were deceived as to their destination, but supposed they were sailing to Texas as *emigrants*. The vessel proceeded on her voyage until the 12th, when it was made known to those not in the secret that there was on board the craft a general with his staff, whose design was to act in con-

\* Journal of the Council, p. 108.

† Austin and Archer to Houston, December 7, 1835. Orders to A. Huston and John A. Wharton, December 8, 1835: MSS.



cert with the Texans, and he desired them to join him. The land being then in sight, and the vessel standing in, it was announced that they were before Tampico. Through the instrumentality of Captain Hawkins,\* an aid to Mexia, some were induced to join him. The schooner was taken in tow by a steamboat, but they soon ran aground, when, night coming on, they found the water breaking over the vessel. They succeeded, however, in getting to the shore, on which they all safely landed that night and the following morning. The fort at the bar, after a slight conflict, surrendered to Mexia, and his command were then occupied in drying their clothing. On Sunday evening, the 15th, arms were placed in the hands of the passengers. It was expected that the Mexicans would rally in large numbers around the standard of Mexia, but in this they were greatly deceived. The cry of "*Viva Santa Anna, y mueron los estrangeros!*" was alone heard in the streets. Their main dependence was upon this expected native force; but only fifty Mexicans joined them. So, being thus disappointed, they failed in their enterprise. General Mexia and a portion of his small force escaped in a vessel to the Brasos. Thirty-one were captured, of whom three died in the hospital; the remaining twenty-eight were condemned by a court-martial, and shot at Tampico, on the 14th of December following.†

\* Charles Hawkins, at an early age, went into the United States navy, where he was appointed midshipman, and then lieutenant. Resigning his commission during the Mexican Revolution, he entered the naval service of that country, and became a terror to the Spanish shipping in the West Indies. After the treaty of Cordova, in 1821, he resigned his commission in the Mexican service, and became captain of a steamboat on the Chattahoochie river. When the Texan war broke out, he came to New Orleans and joined General Mexia. After the disastrous Tampico expedition, he came with Mexia to Texas, bringing the torn Tampico flag, and joined the army before San Antonio just after the surrender of Cos. This same torn flag was afterward displayed while the Texan army was at Groce's, but was soon removed, as *ominous*. — *Telegraph*, September 8, 1838.

† Edward, p. 262, *et seq.*; Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 154.

Among the Mexican population of Texas there was a want of union. The most of them were in favor of the constitution of 1824, but a difference of race and treatment induced many of them to side with the enemy. John N. Seguin, of an ancient Mexican family residing on the river, a few miles below San Antonio, at the head of a company of *rancheros*, joined the Texan standard in October, 1835; and was of much service, especially in giving notice of the designs of the enemy. Colonel José Maria Gonzales, a Mexican of distinction and influence, and formerly of the army of Mexico, applied for leave to enter the Texan service, with a number of his countrymen. The permission was granted, and an outfit of five hundred dollars was voted him from the humble treasury of the republic. He issued a stirring address to his people, which had the good effect of drawing out some, and neutralizing others.\* Colonel Sandoval, who had been so handsomely captured at Goliad by Collingsworth, also applied for permission to join the Texan army; but the council, deeming him too recent a convert to be intrusted with arms in their ranks, ordered that he and those captured with him should be sent to San Augustine for safe keeping: for want of means, however, they were not sent.

As early as the month of November, the enemy had upon the Texan coast the "Bravo" and "Montezuma," two small vessels-of-war, charged with the importation of recruits and stores for Texas. These vessels were quite annoying to the revolutionists, and efforts were made to fit out like armed vessels to repel them. On one occasion, the schooner "Hannah Elizabeth,"

\* Address of Gonzales, December 10, 1835: "*Mejicanos*," says he, "*la voz de Libertad salió de entre las ruinas en que la perfidia mas maldita sepultara la constitucion de nuestra patria. En Tejas se ha tremolado el estandarte de la federacion, y los hijos de Mejico no pueden ser indiferentes á tan augusto reclamo.*" It would have been well had Gonzales sustained this sentiment. We shall hear of him again in the *federal* campaign of 1839.



freighted with cannon, arms, and ammunition, intended for the Texan service, and an adventure of goods and provisions belonging in part to Peter Kerr, sailed from New Orleans for Matagorda. Kerr was himself on board, as were likewise José M. J. Carbajal and Fernando de Leon, the latter two having charge of the other freight. She was discovered, pursued, and run aground, at Pass Cavallo, by the Bravo. In the chase she had thrown overboard her cannon and ammunition. She was boarded by a prize-crew, consisting of Lieutenant Mateo and eleven men, from the Bravo; and Carbajal, De Leon, and some others, were transferred as prisoners to that vessel. Shortly after, the Bravo was driven off by a *norther*. In a day or two afterward, the citizens of Matagorda, having received notice of the wreck, purchased and armed the schooner "William Robbins," placed her under the command of Captain Hurd, and, with a small force on board, commanded by Captain S. Rhoads Fisher, retook the stranded vessel, and made the prize-crew prisoners. This was all very well; but they went further, and appropriated to themselves the goods and provisions, allowing Kerr to retain his part on payment of half their value! But Kerr, being unable to do this, got none.\* Governor Smith, being duly advised of these proceedings, took occasion, in a special message, to reprehend them severely.

\* Fisher's statement, December 17, 1835. Poor Kerr! this was but the beginning of his troubles. He was shortly afterward, greatly against his will, made to play a conspicuous part in the Texan Revolution, as we shall see. It is only a short time since he received from the United States treasury, under the award of the "mixed commission," some remuneration for his adventure on the "Hannah Elizabeth."

## CHAPTER II.

AT the beginning of the Texan Revolution, the country was unusually well represented by men of talents. In proportion to the population, few countries ever equalled it. The stirring events in prospect, offering a fine field for ambition and adventure, had drawn many hither. Soon after the organization of the provisional government, and even during the sitting of the consultation at San Felipe, some discontent was manifested by those who did not obtain what they claimed as their share in the distribution of offices. To such a height did this feeling rise, that an open rupture was threatened. On one occasion, a desperado entered the council-hall, while the council was in session, and ordered the members to dissolve and go home. But, on the 19th of December, a more serious movement was made. A meeting was called at San Felipe, at which Wylie Martin presided. Mosely Baker introduced a series of resolutions, declaring the existing authorities not equal to the crisis; that the officers and the members of the council were worthless and imbecile; and that it was necessary forthwith to reorganize the government and give it a more energetic administration, in order to save the country from ruin. This was the substance of the resolutions, which were supported by the mover in an eloquent speech of an hour—for he was one of the most able as well as restless and ambitious men in Texas. The effect of

the speech was manifest: the concourse wavered, and the continuance of the government seemed doubtful.

Sam Houston replied to Baker, and answered his objections to the existing government. He said he was astonished to hear such a manifestation of discontent at a time when the least division in their ranks would be fatal to their cause and the cause of liberty; that it was true their temporary system of government was not perfect in all its parts, yet it would answer the present emergency; and he could not but denounce as a fratricide and miscreant any one who, at a period so critical, would interpose an obstacle to the authorities then in power. This was followed by strong personal allusions. At the close of the discussion, the mover of the resolutions tore them up, declaring that he washed his hands of the whole matter.\*

General Houston had remained at San Felipe, to give aid and advice in organizing the army, and in framing such measures as were intimately connected therewith. Among these were—an ordinance to establish a corps of rangers; an ordinance to raise a regular army; † an ordinance to regulate the militia; an ordinance appointing a commissary; ‡ and ordinances to purchase munitions, provisions, clothing, &c., for the army and the defence of the coast. || The regular army was to consist of eleven hundred and twenty men, to be enlisted for two years, or during the war. After the passage of this law, and the appointment of the necessary officers, the commander-in-chief despatched the latter on recruiting-service to the different points; notifying them that each enlisted soldier should be entitled, in addition to the pay and rations allowed by the United States, to a bounty of six hundred and forty acres of land.

\* Statement of Dr. B. B. Goodrich: MS. "Emigrant's Guide," Jan. 2, 1836.

† Order and Decree, p. 20, *et seq.*

‡ *Ib.*, p. 32.

|| *Ib.*, p. 34, *et seq.*

The recruiting-officers were to report at headquarters by the 25th of February following.\* General Houston then issued a proclamation, calling for aid, and reciting the past events and the then present condition of Texas and her wants.† Governor Smith, on the 16th of December, ordered him, as soon as circumstances would permit, to establish his headquarters at Washington, on the Brasos, until further orders, and to exert his efforts to organize the army; but circumstances prevented his departure until the 25th of December.

The news of the first successes at San Antonio, and a call for immediate supplies of men and munitions, was met by the governor and council with a corresponding spirit. Thomas J. Rusk and J. W. Fannin were appointed—the first to proceed east, the other west of the Trinity—to collect reinforcements, to purchase and procure ammunition, provisions, and other necessaries, with power to press such articles as were needed by the besiegers.‡ These agents immediately set out in the discharge of their duties, but victory anticipated them; though the fruit of their labors was still necessary for the army.

On the return of General Mexia from his unfortunate expedition to Tampico, he applied to the provisional government to assist him in an expedition to the interior of Mexico, with the view of carrying the war into the enemy's country. The council passed an ordinance, directing William Pettus, contractor for the volunteer army, with the advice of Thomas F. McKinney, to make the necessary provisions for General Mexia, and that the latter report his plan to the provisional government.|| The governor vetoed the resolution, informing the council that he had no confidence whatever in the co-operation of General

\* S. Houston to Captain A. Turner, December 5, 1835: MS.

† Appendix No. I. — Document 5.

‡ Resolution of December 10, 1835.

|| Ordinances of Council, December 6, 1835, p. 57.

Mexia; that he had no doubt of his intention to make a descent on the seaports west of Texas, for the purpose of robbing, in order to recruit his own desperate fortunes, but he could see no possible good that would result therefrom to Texas; that it would be unwise to incur the expense of fitting him out, without any guaranty, or control over his conduct, or even knowing his plans: in short, the governor thought it bad policy to fit out or trust Mexicans in any matter connected with the interests of Texas; for, in the end, he was satisfied they would prove inimical and treacherous.\* The council, however, passed the ordinance, notwithstanding the veto, and a copy was despatched to General Mexia. But in a short time afterward they passed a resolution requesting his co-operation with the army before Bexar, and sent him notice thereof. He was then at Columbia, and declined joining the Texans before Bexar—stating that he could not risk his military character by taking a command under the provisional government of Texas, as Viesca was not governor. He stated that his plan was to go to Copano, and join to his force two hundred Mexicans then at Palo Blanco; and thence take Matamoras, if possible. This response served much to moderate the ardor of the council, and they gently withdrew their aid from General Mexia.† Thus Texas was finally rid of a man of more pretension than worth, and whose indecision might have endangered her high purposes.

A difference between the governor and council has already been intimated. The origin and progress of this difference, so painful and destructive in its consequences, require a special notice. Dr. James Grant, it will be remembered, originated the project of an expedition to Matamoras. His domicil was in Coahuila, where he had a splendid estate. He had never

\* Journal of the Council, p. 132.

† *Ib.*, pp. 174, 195.

resided in Texas; it was not his home. His feelings, his interests, and his efforts, were all in favor of the old union of Coahuila and Texas. True, he was at the siege of San Antonio, and fought gallantly there, and was severely wounded on the first day; but he fought against Cos, who had driven him from the legislative hall of Monclova, and not for the cause and right of Texas. He therefore had a motive in carrying the war to Matamoras, and thence into the interior of Mexico, that he might return to his princely domains at Parras. Among the volunteers and adventurers at San Antonio he was incessantly painting in lively colors the rich spoils of Tamaulipas, New Leon, Coahuila, and San Luis Potosi, the facility of the descent, the cowardly nature of the inhabitants, and the charming beauties of the valleys of the San Juan, the Sabinas, and the Santander.

This was enough: the bold and fiery spirits who had just driven twice their number from the strong walls of Bexar and the Alamo, were ready to go. They wanted but a leader and a cause. The authority of Texas was invoked.\* The governor was prudent, and preferred to follow the landmarks laid down by the consultation. The council was otherwise. This body, changing almost daily, contained but few of the original members, and the change had not been for the better, in either wisdom or integrity. They had ceased to feel any responsibility for their official conduct.

The council had created the office of judge-advocate-general, and had elected D. C. Barrett, one of their own body, to fill it. They had also chosen Edward Gritton to the office of collector of revenue for the important port of Copano. Governor Smith refused to ratify these appointments, and, in his message of the 17th of December, gave his reasons. In regard to Gritton,

\* Appendix No. I.—Document No. 16.



he said it was well known that he first made his appearance in Texas as the secretary and travelling-companion of Colonel Almonté, who was an avowed spy, sent to Texas by Santa Anna; that Gritton was an Englishman, and by adoption and long residence a Mexican, allied to the enemy by affinity and commerce; that he had never joined the Texan army, and the governor had ever considered him a spy, and hoped the council would make a better selection. As to D. C. Barrett, he was infinitely more severe. He alleged that he had forged an attorney's license, in North Carolina; that he had taken fees on both sides of a cause as an attorney; that he had passed counterfeit money knowingly; that he had embezzled the funds furnished himself and Gritton as an outfit, when sent on an embassy to Cos, the previous summer, without going to their intended destination, or reporting their proceedings. These were some of the caustic charges preferred by his excellency against one of the leading members of the council. They were scandalous if true, and more so if false. He not only gave them as reasons for refusing to commission the nominee, but asked the council to fix a day for the proof of the charges, and it should be made, in order to expel the obnoxious member.\* The council sustained their member: they declared that the governor had no right to object to their appointments; that the charges against Barrett were partly beyond their jurisdiction—the others they denounced as untrue; and required the governor forthwith to issue commissions to the two nominees.

Thus the contest became personal; and the council, already enthusiastic on the subject of the Matamoras expedition, began to devise ways and means to carry it on without the concur-

\* I have before me the original message, endorsed by the secretary, "read in secret session, December 20, 1835, and ordered to be placed on file, and not entered on the journals of the house. December 25, 1835." See Journal of the Council, pp. 205, 206.

rence or aid of the governor. Two members of the military committee engaged in a correspondence with the most adventurous spirits at Bexar, to start the enterprise there.\* This, added to the influence and eloquence of Dr. Grant, soon resulted in an organized plan.

After the capture of Bexar, the troops, having nothing to do, became restless; and it was deemed necessary, in order to retain the volunteers, that they should be engaged in some enterprise. On the 20th of December, there were about four hundred men at Bexar, seventy at Washington, eighty at Goliad, and two hundred at Velasco, making a total of seven hundred and fifty men—besides several companies who were on their march to the different places of rendezvous.†

Before detailing further the movements in Texas, we will refer to those of the enemy. General Cos retreated to Laredo, where he was shortly afterward joined by General Sesma with a thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. Another army was concentrating at San Luis Potosi, to be commanded by Santa Anna in person. The news of the fall of Bexar had astonished and united Mexico. All parties became eager to wipe from the Mexican eagle the stain inflicted by the surrender of Cos. The letter of Grant, of the 13th of November, had already reached the country of the enemy, and preparations were making at Matamoras, under the command of General Urrea, not only to defend that place, but to advance upon Goliad. The Texans were, however, unadvised of these preparations.

On the 17th of December, Governor Smith directed the commander-in-chief to make a demonstration upon Matamoras; or at least to secure Copano, and harass the enemy in that direction. Houston, on the same day, issued an order to Colonel James Bowie, then at Goliad, to proceed to raise, if possible,

\* Appendix No. I.—Document No. 16. † Journal of the Council, p. 203.



a sufficient force, and march upon Matamoras; but, if he could not succeed in that enterprise, at least to secure and hold the most eligible point on the frontier, and use all the means in his power to annoy the enemy. Bowie was selected for this expedition because of his distinguished valor and prudence, his accurate knowledge of the country, and also of the people among whom he was to march; but, as it happened, the order did not reach Colonel Bowie, as he left Goliad for Bexar a short time before it arrived at the former place.\*

The intended expedition against Matamoras was based entirely upon the expected co-operation of the Mexicans; and their support at least depended upon Texas remaining true to the constitution of 1824. This was impossible: the scenes of Concepcion and San Antonio had entirely destroyed the last feeling of regard for that celebrated document. The cry of "Independence!" had already made itself heard in the settlements, and every day its voice grew stronger. It was idle to suppose for a moment that the Mexicans in the interior of the confederacy would assist Texas in breaking the shackles that bound her to them.

Captain Philip Dimit, in command at Goliad, on the 2d of December wrote a strong letter in favor of the expedition to Matamoras, promising the co-operation of the republicans of Tamaulipas: yet, so sudden was the change of feeling, that on the 20th of that month the troops and people of Goliad, with Captain Dimit at their head, affirmed their independence, and published a solemn declaration to that effect! In that racy and spirited document they disclaim all hope of co-operation from any portion of the Mexicans, and fully exhibit the tone of the Texans at that time. "We have indulged sympathy," say they, "for the condition of many whom we vainly flattered

\* Appendix No. I. — Documents Nos. 8 and 16. See also Appendix No. II.

ourselves were opposed, in common with their adopted brethren, to the extension of military domination to the domain of Texas. But the siege of Bexar has dissolved the illusion. Nearly all their physical force was in the line of the enemy, and armed with rifles. Seventy days' occupation of Goliad has also abundantly demonstrated the general diffusion among the creole population of a like attachment to the institutions of their ancient tyrants. Intellectually enthralled, and strangers to the blessings of regulated liberty, the only philanthropic service which we can ever force on their acceptance is that of example. In doing this, *we need not expect or even hope for their co-operation.*"

They despatched their declaration to every municipality in Texas, and also to the council at San Felipe. In the latter body it was referred to the committee on the judiciary and affairs of state, who reported (and the report was adopted by the council) that the declaration was premature; that it jeopardized the community, and tended to destroy the government.\* The council succeeded in having its further circulation suppressed. Thus they endeavored to restrain the feeling of independence that had already occupied the public mind.

During the stay of the commander-in-chief at San Felipe, and while waiting for certain documents relative to the organization of the army, he was engaged in placing troops and provisions at proper points. Colonel A. Huston, the quartermaster-general, having been despatched to New Orleans, he appointed Lieutenant William Eaton assistant quartermaster-general, and directed him to take post at Velasco, and notify all troops arriving at the mouth of the Brasos, if they came in armed vessels, to proceed to Copano, and take position at Refugio; if the vessels should not be armed, then to land at Matagorda,

\* Journal of the Council, p. 259.

and proceed by land to Goliad.\* He addressed like instructions to the Texan military agents at New Orleans in regard to the shipment of provisions.† Thus he was concentrating his forces on the frontier at Refugio and Goliad, and storing provisions and munitions at Copano and Matagorda. At the same time, A. G. Kellogg, assistant quartermaster-general, was stationed at Gaines's ferry, on the Sabine, with directions to furnish supplies to volunteers coming by land.‡ Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Neill was ordered to take command of the town and district of Bexar, and to superintend the recruiting-service at that station.¶ Colonel William B. Travis, of the first regiment of infantry, was ordered to San Felipe, to recruit; and Colonel J. W. Fannin was ordered to Velasco for a like purpose, and also to take the command there.

On the 25th of December, the commander-in-chief removed his headquarters to Washington. Here he met Colonel Wyatt with two companies of volunteers, numbering eighty men, from the state of Alabama. About the same time arrived at San Felipe Major William Ward, of the state of Georgia, with three companies, comprising a hundred and twelve men. They were ordered to the west.§ Captain Ira Westover was ordered to Goliad, to relieve Captain Dimit.

On the 30th of December, General Houston wrote to Colonel Fannin, informing him that all volunteers were ordered to Copano, there to remain until they had orders to advance; and directing that no campaign be undertaken without orders; that he would be there by the earliest moment at which the cam-

\* Houston to Eaton, December 21, 1835: MS.

† Same to D. B. M'Comb, A. Houston, and John A. Wharton, December 18, 1835: MS.

‡ Same to Kellogg, December 21, 1835: MS.

¶ Same to Neill, December 21, 1835: MS.

§ Governor Smith to Houston, December 31, 1835: MS. Captain Irwine to same, December 23, 1835: MS.

paign should open ; and at the same time he requested Colonel Fannin, if possible, to report in person at headquarters as soon as practicable. These despatches were sent by Captain G. W. Poe, of the general's staff, who was directed, while at Velasco, to ascertain the exact number and description of the forces and of the munitions and provisions there, and report the same to headquarters.\*

These were the dispositions made, with a view to meet the enemy early in the spring. In fact, the news of the contemplated attack upon Matamoras having reached Mexico, that point was already well guarded by the enemy, and reports were constantly received in Texas of their advance east of the Rio Grande.

We will now return to the council. On the 25th of December, Mr. Hanks, from the military committee, made a report, recommending that Colonel Fannin be ordered to proceed forthwith to the west and take command of the regular and auxiliary troops ; and that Colonel Travis be ordered to the same destination, with all the troops he could bring into the field ;† also that the commander-in-chief be requested to concentrate the forces at Goliad or Copano. This report was laid upon the table. It, however, showed the disposition of the military committee to substitute themselves as commanders-in-chief of the army. On the next day the council appointed Sam Houston, John Forbes, and John Cameron, commissioners to treat

\* The writer has before him the original orders to Colonel Fannin. They are each endorsed by some one — "Left in my hands by Fannin." Extract from these orders : "It is ordered that the volunteers remain in possession of the station [Copano] until such time as they will receive orders to advance, which will be at the earliest possible day — at the same time consulting the comfort of the troops, and the successful issue of a campaign. Let no campaign be undertaken without orders." — *Houston to Fannin, December 30, 1835.*

† "If possible, I wish you to report in person at headquarters, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this order." — *Same to same, December 30, 1835.*

† Journal of the Council, p. 202.

with the Cherokee Indians and their associate bands, and authorized the governor to give the commissioners detailed instructions.

On the 3d day of January, 1836, the council received and referred a communication from Colonel Francis W. Johnson, for himself and others, for authority to proceed to Matamoras.\* This application was based on a movement begun at San Antonio; for, on the evening of the 30th of December, Dr. Grant, with some two hundred volunteers, without any authority or command, after pressing the property of the citizens of Bexar, and helping themselves to such munitions, &c., at that town, as they desired, set out on the march to Matamoras. The committee on military affairs reported in favor of the expedition, and, among other reasons for its adoption, they said the taking of Matamoras would deprive the enemy of the revenue of that place, estimated pretty highly; that it would give employment to the volunteers until a regular army, sufficient for the protection of the country, could be raised and organized; and that it was necessary to sustain the volunteers, who had already set out under Grant, for, if they were defeated, the result might be fatal to Texas.† As these contemplated movements required some supply of provisions, the council appointed commissioners to examine two small schooners, the "William Robbins" and the "Invincible," belonging to Messrs. M·Kinney and Williams, with a view to purchase them, and use them as vessels-of-war, to protect the transfer of provisions by water along the western coast of Texas.

On the 5th of January, a select committee of two—Messrs. Barrett and Clements—were appointed to wait on Colonels Fannin and Johnson with the resolutions respecting the expedition to Matamoras, and learn their views on the subject.

\* Journal of the Council, p. 247.

† *Ib.*, p. 250.

The latter having concurred in the resolutions,\* they were taken up for consideration ; but, for want of a quorum, they were not immediately acted on. In the meantime, Colonel James Bowie exhibited to the council his orders of the 17th of December, 1835, and took leave of them. This body immediately appointed a committee to wait on him, and obtain a copy of his orders, which copy was obtained and filed.†

At length, on the 7th of January, 1836, Colonel F. W. Johnson having declined to participate in the Matamoras expedition, the council unanimously adopted resolutions appointing J. W. Fannin *agent* to raise, collect, and concentrate, at or as near the port of Copano as convenience and safety would admit, all volunteer troops willing to enter into an expedition against Matamoras, wherever they might be found, at the mouth of the Brasos, city of Bexar, or elsewhere—whether in Texas, or arriving in Texas ; and, when thus collected and concentrated, to *report* either to the commanding general, or to the governor, *or council*, as he might prefer ! He was further empowered to call upon any public agent for provisions, stores, &c. ; also to borrow not exceeding three thousand dollars, at a rate of interest not above ten per cent. ; and also, on the concentration of said forces, to hold an election for a commander and other officers ; that, when all this should be done, the said agent, if he deemed it practicable to take said place, should make a descent upon Matamoras or such other place as he might deem proper. To carry these powers into execution, J. W. Fannin was authorized at pleasure to appoint special agents under him, and give them such power as he might think proper, not exceeding his own.‡

\* Journal of the Council, pp. 262, 263.

† *Ib.*, p. 266. Appendix No. I.—Document No. 8.

‡ Journal of the Council, p. 273.



The second article of the *organic law* of the 13th of November, under the military head, declared that the major-general should be commander-in-chief of all the forces called into public service during the war; he to be subject to the orders of the governor and council. The ordinance thus appointing Colonel Fannin to this agency was therefore a clear violation of the organic law. It excluded the commander-in-chief and also the governor from the command or control of this expedition. Calling him an *agent*, did not alter his functions; and authorizing him to report alone to the council, was a virtual usurpation of the authority given to the governor and the commander-in-chief. And the further authority given to Colonel Fannin, to delegate his powers to other agents, was a consummation of folly. The fruits of such an expedition, raised under such auspices, might be foreseen. The council was aware of the governor's opposition to its views, and endeavored to carry them out without his consent. To obtain the "Invincible," and get his sanction to the ordinance for that purpose, the council represented that the Mexican vessel, the "Montezuma," was in Galveston bay, and required the immediate use of that ship to drive it out or take it.

At length, the governor received a communication from Colonel Neill, commandant at Bexar, informing him of the defenceless and destitute condition of that place, caused by the action of Dr. Grant and his followers before their departure for Matamoras. He despatched a message to the council, on the 9th of January, full of bitterness and reproaches. He charged that body with acting in bad faith, and some of the members with positive corruption and dishonesty. "Look around upon your flock," said his excellency, with more feeling than good taste; "your discernment will easily detect the scoundrels. . . . Let the honest and indignant part of your council drive



the wolves out of the fold." With such epithets as these did he regale them, and concluded his message by assuring them that, unless they publicly retracted their error, all intercourse between them would cease at twelve o'clock the next day.\*

The governor was very deliberate in sending this message. He notified the council beforehand, and requested that it might be read in secret session. As soon as the message was read, a committee of five was appointed to take that document into consideration; and Lieutenant-Governor Robinson was deputed to confer with the governor, and endeavor to produce a reconciliation. No agreement having taken place, the committee reported strongly on the 11th, and their report and resolutions were unanimously adopted. They resolved that the governor be forthwith ordered to cease the functions of his office, and be held to answer to the general council upon certain charges, a copy of which was to be furnished him in twenty-four hours; that all public functionaries be notified of his deposition; and, in short, that his message be returned to him, with a copy of their proceedings thereon. Thus was brought to a crisis the quarrel between the governor and his council. The council was guilty of usurpation, and the governor of great imprudence. The disagreement was not only ruinous to Texas in her then critical condition, but was well calculated to bring her into public scandal and reproach among civilized nations.

On the 6th of January, Governor Smith ordered the commander-in-chief "to repair to Bexar, or such other point on the frontier as he might deem most eligible, and establish his headquarters; also to establish such subordination, and place the army in such situation, as to commence active operations by the earliest day possible; and, in the meantime, to annoy and injure the enemy as much as circumstances would permit."

\* Journal of the Council, p. 291.

In pursuance of this command, Houston on the same day issued an order, directing all the troops on the frontier to hold themselves in readiness to march against the enemy at the earliest notice; at the same time the requisite supplies were ordered to Copano. After appointing Colonel Travis superintendent of the recruiting-service, and requesting the attendance of Colonels Thomas J. Rusk, J. K. Allen, and A. Horton, at headquarters, the commander-in-chief set out for the west on the 8th of January.

The quarrel between the governor and his council gave rise to two parties, and other questions that came up in the affairs of the country were seized upon and made instrumental to party views. The council had called a meeting of the convention, to assemble at Washington, on the 1st day of March;\* and had fixed the 1st of February as the time for the election of delegates thereto. The anticipated action of the convention was a subject of warm discussion between the citizens and the candidates. Those who favored the Matamoras campaign, naturally fell into the opposition to a declaration of independence, as that step would cut off all hope of co-operation on the part of the Mexicans west of the Rio Grande. General Houston, previous to his departure for the western frontier, expressed himself fully on that point. "I now feel confident," says he, "that no further experiment need be made, to convince us that there is but one course left for Texas to pursue, and that is, an unequivocal declaration of independence, and the formation of a constitution, to be submitted to the people for their rejection or ratification."†

It is, however, proper to state that other gentlemen of high respectability and influence in Texas took a different view of

\* Orders and Decrees, p. 76.

† Sam Houston to John Forbes, January 7, 1836.

the subject. The idea of a great republic, composed of the eastern Mexican provinces, had got a hold on the minds of a large number. This scheme had taken deep root among many at Nacogdoches, and throughout eastern Texas. "When I arrived here," says Colonel Henry Millard, in a letter dated Nacogdoches, January 14, 1836, "they were in a fine state of successful experiment, as they imagined, and, by the arrival of Dr. Cameron and some others from the west, new prospects and new views seemed to be opened to them, or at least were publicly expressed. Some of those persons represented that Colonel F. W. Johnson had marched to Matamoras at the head of three hundred men, who had declared for the constitution of 1824, and were determined not to unite with or be under the command of any officer appointed by the provisional government, unless they chose to do so; and that they had an understanding with officers and influential men in three or four of the adjoining Mexican states, who were to meet them with men and money to prosecute the war: and that those states were to form a single grand state separate from the Mexican government. This plan suited well the great land-speculators."

These were the sentiments of many leading men in Texas, and thus did they connect their views with the Matamoras expedition. General Houston met on the route a letter from Colonel Bowie, dated the 10th of January, informing him that Dr. Grant had arrived some days before at Goliad, and would leave the next morning (the 11th) for Matamoras. The delay of Dr. Grant appears to have been caused by the absence of Colonel F. W. Johnson, who had come by way of San Felipe, to have the expedition legalized. He declined going in with Fannin, probably because he desired a more independent command. At all events, his forces and those of Grant wanted more privileges than the law allowed them. After some hesi-

tation, the council gave him a sort of *carte blanche*,\* and he proceeded to join Dr. Grant.

At this time much dissatisfaction existed among the volunteers. Major Wyatt refused to have anything to do with the expedition without orders from headquarters. Captain Dimit, the commandant at Goliad, was on bad terms with the volunteers from Bexar, and for a good reason: Dr. Grant, without law or order, had seized his *caballada* of horses. The volunteers left at Bexar held a mass meeting on the day after Dr. Grant's departure, somewhat denunciatory of his course in jeopardizing the safety of the place by taking from it two thirds of its defenders, and also the clothing, ammunition, and provisions, intended for the winter supply of the garrison.† Colonel Gonzales, a former Mexican officer, but now fighting under Texan colors, had left Bexar about the 25th of December, with some one hundred men, and had not since been heard from.‡

\* Journal of the Council, p. 315; also Appendix No. I.—Document No. 16. Extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Governor Robinson, dated January 8, 1836: "This moment a letter has been received from General S. F. Austin, from Velasco, from which point he has at last sailed. This is a long letter. He advises, among other things, that we form a state government upon the basis of the declaration of the 7th November last, as one of the Mexican states; and also that the headquarters of our army ought to be at Goliad; and that we form an auxiliary corps to the Mexican army under General Mexia." General Austin doubtless had not then been informed of the position of Texan affairs and the character of Mexia. On the 17th of January, he wrote to D. C. Barrett: "The last news from Vera Cruz and Tampico is, that 'the federal party have united with Santa Anna against Texas.' This leaves us but one course, which is, an absolute declaration of independence. Such a measure is expected and called for by the people of the United States, from one end of the Union to the other."—*Written from New Orleans.* And, ten days before that, in a postscript to a letter to General Houston, after stating that, from the last accounts from Vera Cruz, he had learned that the federal party had united with Santa Anna to invade Texas, he says, "This, of course, leaves us no remedy but one, which is an *immediate declaration of independence.*"—*Austin to Houston, January 7, 1836.*

† Telegraph and Texas Register, January 23, 1836.

‡ James Bowie to Sam Houston, January 10, 1836: "Some dark scheme has been set on foot to disgrace our noble cause. I shall leave with Captain Blount

In addition to this desertion of Bexar, the sick and wounded there were left naked and hungry.

General Houston, having reached Goliad on the 16th of January, ordered the command of Major R. C. Morris to take up the line of march for the mission of Refugio on the next day at ten o'clock. On the 17th, he despatched Colonel Bowie, with thirty men, to Bexar, with a letter to Colonel Neill, desiring him to demolish the fortifications at that place and bring off the artillery, as it would be impossible to hold the town with the force there.\* "In an hour," says Houston, in a letter to Governor Smith of the 17th of January, "I will take up the line of march for Refugio mission, with a force of about two hundred effective men, where I will await orders from your excellency. I do not believe that an army of such small force should advance upon Matamoras, with a hope or belief that the Mexicans will co-operate with us. I have no confidence in them. The disaster of Tampico should teach us a lesson to be noted in our future operations. . . . I would myself have marched to Bexar, but the 'Matamoras fever' rages so high, that I must see Colonel Ward's men. You can have no idea of the difficulties I have encountered. Patton has told you of the men that make the trouble. Better materials never were in ranks. The government and all its officers had been misrepresented to the army."

It may be proper to state that the order to Colonel Neill to demolish the Alamo, and retire with the artillery, was induced by the information received from that officer on the 17th, advising of the approach of one thousand of the enemy to reduce the place. The commander-in-chief not only despatched Bowie

in an hour, and shall reach Goliad by daylight, and put a stop to Grant's movements." So wrote Bowie.

\* Order to Bowie, January 17, 1836.

to that point, but relieved Captain Dimit from the command at Goliad, and ordered him to raise a hundred men, if practicable, and repair to San Antonio. Captain Wyatt was left in command at Goliad until he could be relieved by the regulars, when he was ordered to proceed to headquarters with the force under him.

The letter to Colonel Neill was duly received by that officer; and, in reply, he stated that he could not remove the artillery for want of teams, and therefore did not demolish the fortifications of the place. The volunteers at Bexar had been promised their pay monthly, which not receiving, they gradually abandoned the service, until there were but eighty troops left. Governor Smith, on being informed of this fact, removed Colonel Travis from his position as superintendent of the recruiting-service, and despatched him, with a small force, to Bexar. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel Neill retired to his home. Colonel Travis called for five hundred more troops, "mostly regulars."—"Militia and volunteers," said he, "are but ill suited to garrison a town." He also asked for money, provisions, and clothing. "Enthusiasm," he justly remarked, "may keep up an army for a few days, but *money*, and money alone, will support an army for regular warfare."\* None of these things had the commander-in-chief to give. The council had authorized Colonel Fannin to borrow money for his expedition: they had not applied the first dollar to the recruiting-service. The letters from the recruiting-officers all complain that they can not succeed without funds. Colonel Travis had been improvidently removed from its superintendence, thus destroying all hope of filling the ranks of the regular army. The council had also, by its conduct, commended Dr. Grant in stripping the sick and wounded at Bexar of the blankets needed to cover

\* Travis to Houston, January 17, 1836: MS.



them, and, according to the account of Surgeon Pollard, of the medicines requisite for their recovery !

On the 8th of January—the day on which the commander-in-chief set out for the west—Colonel Fannin issued a proclamation, calling upon the volunteers from “Bexar, Goliad, Velasco, and elsewhere,” and ordering them to rendezvous at San Patricio between the 24th and 27th of that month, and report to the officer in command. He himself proposed to sail with the fleet from Velasco on the 18th, and invited all to go on board who desired to keep the war out of Texas. On the 10th, Colonel Johnson issued a like proclamation, calling his the *federal* volunteer army, marching for the country west of the Rio Grande, under the flag of 1824.\*

The country between the Texan settlements and the Rio Grande is about one hundred and fifty miles wide, extending in length from the coast to the great mountains in the direction of Santa Fé. It is an undulating prairie, almost entirely destitute of timber. The Nueces and Rio Frio furnish the only permanent supply of water throughout this wide waste. This “*Zahara*” formed a sort of natural barrier between the Texan settlements and those of Mexico on the Rio Grande. The town of Matamoras, situated on the right bank of that river, a few miles above its mouth, was the fruit of a commerce that had sprung up between the United States and the northeastern provinces of Mexico subsequent to the Mexican Revolution. The only Mexican town on the left bank of the river was Laredo, situated about one hundred and twenty miles above Matamoras. It sprang into existence in 1805, as being the crossing and resting place of Governor Herrera, when he brought on his contingent from New Leon to aid in driving General Wilkinson from the left bank of the Sabine.

\* See both proclamations in Foote, vol. ii., p. 185.



The Irish colony at San Patricio had pushed the Texan settlements along the coast to the banks of the Nueces. This was the nearest point to Matamoras. But San Patricio was poor, and unable to furnish anything for the subsistence of an army. To carry on offensive operations against Mexico from Texas, would require a considerable capital invested in provisions, clothing, munitions, and means of transportation. To transport these articles by sea would have been quite uncertain, as the navigation was dangerous, and the intercourse between the two arms of attack would be rare. Looking at all these difficulties—added to the fact, then fully ascertained, that Texas had no friends in Mexico—it was madness to persevere in the expedition.

General Houston, having reached Refugio, ascertained that there were no breadstuffs either there or at Copano, as he had directed in his orders of December 30th and January 6th. He remained at Refugio to await the arrival of Major Ward and Captain Wyatt—the latter being relieved at Goliad by Lieutenant Thornton and twenty-nine regulars. On the evening of the 20th of January, Colonel F. W. Johnson arrived at Refugio. On the 21st, and previous to receiving notice of his arrival, the general-in-chief issued an order to organize the forces as they reached Refugio, agreeably to the “ordinance for raising an auxiliary corps” to the army. Colonel Johnson then called upon him, and made known to him the resolution of the council of the 14th of January. So soon as he was made acquainted with the mission of Colonel Johnson, and also with the powers granted to Colonel Fannin, he could not be mistaken as to the object of the council, which was, to supersede him. He also received an intimation that that body had deposed Governor Smith. Under these circumstances, General Houston had but one course to pursue: the management of the

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expedition being thus taken out of his hands by the council, he returned to Goliad, and thence to Washington, where he made a full report of what had occurred to Governor Smith.\* As the consultation had created an executive and a council, to act until the new convention assembled, he did not see that either had the power to destroy the other. His reports were accordingly made to Governor Smith.

The Texan commissioners to the United States concluded a loan on the 11th day of January, 1836, of two hundred thousand dollars, payable ten per cent. in cash, and the balance in instalments. On the 18th of January, they negotiated another loan of fifty thousand dollars, entirely in cash. For these successes they were indebted to Colonel William Christy, of New Orleans, to whom, above all other men out of Texas, is she indebted for the favorable prosecution of the war of independence. These funds enabled the Texan agents to throw into the country, at a critical moment, such supplies as kept the army together.†

The consultation, on the 13th day of November, 1835, entered into a solemn declaration, to which each member signed his name, setting forth that the Cherokee Indians and their twelve associate bands had derived their just claims from the government of Mexico to the lands lying north of the San Antonio road and the Neches, and west of the Angelina and Sabine rivers; that the governor and council, immediately on its organization, should appoint commissioners to treat with said Indians, and establish the definite boundary of their territory, and secure their confidence and friendship; that they would guaranty to the Indians the peaceable enjoyment of their rights

\* Appendix No. I. — Document 16. — Report of January 30, 1836.

† Copy of contract of loan, January 11, 1836. Letter of Colonel Christy, January 18, 1836.

to their lands; that all surveys, grants, and locations, made within those limits after the settlement of the Indians, are and of right ought to be utterly null and void.\* These were among the solemn pledges made by the delegates of all Texas to the Indians; and in pursuance of which, as we have seen, the governor and council appointed Messrs. Houston, Forbes, and Cameron, to treat with them. Moreover, this became the more necessary, as the emissaries of Mexico were already among these Indians, striving to obtain their aid in the contest with her revolted province.

On the return of Houston from Refugio, he received from the governor a furlough till the 1st of March. In the paper (dated January 28) granting this, the latter says: "Your absence is permitted in part by the illegal æcts of the council, in superesding you, by the unauthorized appointment of agents to organize and control the army, contrary to the organic law, and the ordinances of their own body. In the meantime, you will conform to your instructions, and treat with the Indians." In pursuance of the commission and instructions of the governor, Messrs. Houston and Forbes proceeded to Bowles's village, and on the 23d day of February, 1836, entered into a treaty with the Indians, in accordance with the solemn declaration of the consultation of the 13th of November, 1835.†

At the beginning of the year 1836, Mexico contained eight millions of inhabitants. Of these, four millions were Indians; two millions were *mestizos*, or a mixture of Indians and Spaniards; one million two hundred thousand were creoles of pure Spanish blood; six hundred thousand were mulattoes, and a mixture of Indians and negroes; one hundred thousand were

\* Journal of Consultation, p. 51.

† See the treaty, and other valuable documents connected therewith, in "Documents on Indian Affairs, submitted to the Texan Congress by the President," November 15, 1838.

negroes ; ten thousand were natives of Spain ; and the remainder were foreigners of different countries. From this it will be seen that Indians and mestizos form the bulk of the population. The Indians, however, have not increased in number for three centuries. Were it not for her bad government, Mexico would be one of the most productive countries in the world. Sugar, coffee, cotton, wheat, maize, and, in fact, all the productions of the temperate and equatorial zones, would grow there in luxuriance. Horses, cattle, sheep, &c., of excellent quality, can be raised there at a trifling expense. Common laborers could be procured at twenty-five cents per day ; mechanics, however, received much higher wages. The pay of the infantry soldier was one dollar and twenty-five cents per day ; of the cavalry, two dollars : but out of this they purchased their own food and clothing, the government furnishing only arms and ammunition. As the government sold to them their rations and clothes, the soldiers were generally in debt ; and, as their supply of provisions was often deficient, they were as frequently compelled to make it up by robbery. Hence the march of Mexican troops, even in their own country, was anticipated with horror by the people along the route. Such were the people, who, guided and stimulated by Santa Anna, were about to bring forth all their power against the fifty thousand colonists who, since 1821, had been filling the extensive territory of Texas.

General Santa Anna, the Mexican president, having determined to lead the invading army in person, reached Saltillo in January, where for a time he made his headquarters. On the first of February, he set out for the Rio Grande, by way of Monclova, with a force of six thousand men. He reached the river on the 12th, where he halted till the 16th, waiting for the troops to come up, and to make suitable preparations for

crossing the uninhabited prairies which lay between him and Bexar. While tarrying at Guerrero, he was engaged in dictating to the central government his views as to the policy to be pursued toward Texas when it should be reduced. His plan was as follows: to drive from the province all who had taken part in the revolution, together with all foreigners who lived near the seacoast or the borders of the United States; to remove far into the interior those who had not taken part in the war; to vacate all sales and grants of land owned by non-residents; to remove from Texas all who had come to the province, and were not entered as colonists under Mexican rules; to divide among the officers and soldiers of the Mexican army the best lands, provided they would occupy them; to permit no Anglo-American to settle in Texas; to sell the remaining vacant lands at one dollar per acre—allowing the French to buy only five millions of acres, the English the same, the Germans somewhat more, and to those speaking the Spanish language without limit; to satisfy the claims of the civilized Indians; to make the Texans pay the expenses of the war; and to liberate and declare free the negroes introduced into the province.\*

General José Urrea, late governor of the state of Durango, who had joined Santa Anna at Saltillo, was ordered to advance from that point to Matamoras, where he united his forces with others there awaiting him. He reached the latter place on the 1st of February, and remained there till the 18th. Learning that Grant and Johnson were at San Patricio, with a force of two or three hundred men, Urrea set out with three hundred and twenty infantry, three hundred and thirty cavalry, and one four-pounder, in pursuit of them. After a severe

\* Santa Anna to Tornel, Minister of War and Marine; headquarters, Guerrero, February 16, 1836.

march, during which he lost six of his men, who perished with the cold and rain, he arrived at San Patricio on the 27th of February, at three o'clock in the morning.\*

The army raised by Santa Anna was not brought together without difficulty. The number of mules and horses for purposes of transport, and the great amount of baggage, were extraordinary. In addition to this, a great number of women followed the camp; but for what purpose they were permitted, unless to take care of the plunder, we are not informed. Every means was resorted to in order to supply the army. According to a letter of Major Morris, an inventory of each person's property was taken, upon which *one per cent.* was demanded every twenty days!†

The next in command to Santa Anna was General Vicente Filisola, by birth an Italian, but for many years a citizen of Mexico; and, in addition, were Generals Sesma, Gaona, Tolsa, Andrade, Woll, and Cos, all of whom were ordered to concentrate with their commands before San Antonio. At noon, on the 23d of February, the invading army reached the height north of the Alazan—the place where, twenty-three years before, the republicans under Gutierrez had gained a signal victory over the adherents of Spain.

To return to the Texans, and the steps they were taking to resist this well-appointed army. At the beginning of the war in 1835, they had shown remarkable zeal and activity in providing for their defence; but, having driven the enemy utterly out of Texas, they returned to their homes and private affairs. The news of the fresh invasion had spread over the country; the officers of the army, the governor, and the council, had re-

\* *Diario Militar del General José Urrea, durante la Primera Campana de Tejas.* Durango: 1838.

† Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 179.



spectively issued their proclamations, and set forth their handbills; but a lethargy had come over the people. They seemed to disregard all the warnings and invitations to fly to the field. Among the causes to which their apathy may be attributed, were—an exaggerated report of the number of volunteers that had already come and were on the way from the United States; incredulity as to the fact of the invading army; exhaustion from the toils and privations of the previous year; and, finally, the paralyzing effect of the quarrel between Governor Smith and his council.

After the governor's suspension by that refractory body, an effort was made to force from him the executive records; but he stoutly resisted, and retained possession of them. He did what he could in the discharge of his duties; the council did likewise; but there was no official intercourse between them. They proceeded against his secretary for contempt. The latter appeared before them, and alleged in his justification that the office of governor was created by the consultation, as was likewise the council, and that therefore he could not recognise any other government.\* The defence, however, was of no avail: they fined him twenty-five hundred dollars! In answer to their mandate for the papers, Governor Smith declared that he would defend them with force; and, in retaliation, sent a writ to the lieutenant-governor, Robinson, for certain papers which he held.†

The two parties almost daily inflicted upon the public some explanation or handbill; but the people, soon apprehending the true state of the case, began to conclude, with Secretary Stewart, that both being creatures of the consultation, neither had the right to dismiss the other. The council, seeing this, began to leave, one by one; and, from the 18th of January, they never

\* Journal of the Council, p. 338.

† *Ib.*, p. 351.



had a quorum, until, by the meeting of the convention in March, they were relieved from a natural death.

But the fruit of this quarrel was fast ripening, and gallant men, who had come hundreds of miles to hold up the arms of Texas against a powerful enemy, were compelled first to partake of it. As one among many instances of confusion produced by this discord, John A. Wharton, one of the military agents, despatched to New Orleans for provisions, having arrived at Velasco on the last of January with a supply, was ordered by Colonel Fannin to proceed with them to Copano, while the commander-in-chief had directed them elsewhere! "I shall await with them," writes Wharton, "at Matagorda. I do this because I believe that, to execute your previous orders, and proceed to Copano, would not meet your present wishes. . . . I enclose an original copy of Colonel Fannin's orders for them. I perceive that there are more commanders-in-chief than one." Thus matters stood, and for which there could be no relief until the meeting of the convention on the first of March.

The consultation had provided that the council should pass no laws, except such, as in their opinion, the emergency of the country required.\* Besides the decree to raise a regular army, they passed another to organize a corps of rangers, which was much needed, especially on the northwestern frontier, to protect the country from the Comanche and other Indian tribes; also another, authorizing the commander-in-chief to accept the services of five thousand auxiliary volunteers; and yet another important act, authorizing and commissioning Thomas J. Chambers to raise an army of reserve. This law, accompanied by an advance, on the part of General Chambers, of ten thousand dollars in behalf of Texas, was very essential. Besides these

\* Journal of Consultation, p. 43.

provisions, they made others organizing the courts, the treasury, and the navy; and still others in regard to the municipal affairs of the state—thus laying the foundation upon which subsequent legislative bodies have built up what is called the “Texas System.” Taking these measures as a whole, and looking to the circumstances under which they were framed, the rule of civil polity was good. The most important duties of the governor and council were, to provide ways and means for the support of the army. Had they attended more to these, instead of interfering with the command and movement of the troops, of which they were ignorant, the country would perhaps have suffered less, and not been witness to fields of slaughter.

## CHAPTER III.

WE have seen the preparations of the contending forces, and have followed Santa Anna, with a well-appointed army, to the walls of Bexar, and Urrea to San Patricio. We have seen Travis, with some thirty men, sent by Governor Smith to the former place, and Bowie despatched by Houston with a like number from Goliad. One other worthy is yet lacking to take part in the death-struggle at the Alamo. David Crockett was a Tennessean. His education, which consisted mostly in the fearless use of the rifle, he had himself acquired in the then unsettled forests of West Tennessee. Having strong natural powers of mind, he was elected to the state legislature, and subsequently as representative to Congress. But he did not comprehend the machinery of the federal government. The rules of Jefferson's manual were to him as mysterious as the Delphian oracle. Hence his efforts in the house of representatives were abortive, and so notoriously so, that he was not returned. The struggle then pending in Texas was more to his taste, and he came to take part in it.

Don Augustine Viesca and his secretary, Don Irala, having made their escape from Mexico, sought an asylum in Nacogdoches. They were received by the citizens with open arms, not only because of their adherence to republican principles, but because of the high offices they held in the late government

of Coahuila and Texas. A sumptuous table was spread for them in the large hall of Major Nixon, and they had sat down, with the citizens, on the 5th of January, 1836, to partake of it. It was then announced that David Crockett had arrived in town, on his way to the Texan army. A committee was forthwith despatched to wait on him and bring him to the feast. His appearance in the hall was greeted with three hearty cheers. He added greatly to the pleasure of the company by his numerous and quaint stories.\* Having declared his intention to become a citizen of Texas, he proceeded to the office of Judge Forbes, to take the oath of allegiance. He refused, however, to subscribe to it, until that clause requiring him to "bear true allegiance to the provisional government of Texas, or any future government that might be thereafter declared," was so interlined as to make it read "any future *republican* government."† Having settled these points, he set out with a few companions for the seat of war, and reached the Alamo in time to reap a rich harvest of its glory and blood.

Before proceeding to narrate the stirring military events in the west, it is proper that we should witness the birth of the new republic; for, up to the 2d day of March, 1836, every officer was bound by his oath, and both officers and citizens by allegiance, to the Mexican federal constitution of 1824.

The Texan convention met on Tuesday, the 1st day of March, at Washington, on the Brasos, and organized by electing Richard Ellis president, and H. S. Kimball secretary. On the following day the delegates solemnly declared the political connection of Texas with Mexico for ever at an end, and, as the representatives of the people of Texas, constituted her a free, sovereign, and INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC, fully invested with all the rights and attributes which properly belong to independent

\* "Emigrant's Guide," January 16, 1836.

† Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 192.

nations. The causes set forth in that document, as producing the separation, were truthful enough, and such as would justify any nation, under like circumstances, in taking a similar step.\* The convention wisely took no time to look into the merits of the controversy between Governor Smith and his council, but passed it by, and proceeded to divide out the work of framing a constitution for the new republic. Other matters, however, claimed immediate attention. The threatening attitude of Santa Anna required that Texas should not only have an army to oppose him, but that such army should have a commander-in-chief. Accordingly, on the 4th of March, on motion of James Collingsworth, Sam Houston was unanimously chosen to that responsible office, his authority extending over the regulars, volunteers, and militia, in the field. On the 6th, he received his instructions, submitting the point of his headquarters to his own judgment.† The more energetic organization of the militia also required attention. The convention made all able-bodied males, between seventeen and fifty years of age, subject to military duty. One individual was appointed for each municipality, to form a list of all such within his boundary. The names were to be drawn until the number, at any time called for, was obtained; and those so drawn were bound to serve,

\* For a list of the delegates, see Appendix No. III. "Notwithstanding the cold weather, the members of the convention met to-day [Tuesday, March 1], in an unfinished building, without doors or windows. In lieu of glass, cotton cloth was stretched across the windows, which partially excluded the cold wind. . . . On motion of George C. Childress, a committee, consisting of Messrs. George C. Childress, Colin M'Kinney, Edward Conrad, James Gaines, and Bailey Hardiman, were appointed to prepare and report a Declaration of Independence, with directions to report as speedily as possible."—*Notes of Colonel William F. Gray.*

"Wednesday, March 2, 1836. — The convention met pursuant to adjournment. Mr. Childress, from the committee, reported a Declaration of Independence, which he read in his place. It was received by the house, committed to a committee of the whole, reported without amendment, and unanimously adopted, in less than one hour from its first and only reading."—*Ib.*

† Collingsworth and Ellis to Houston, March 6, 1836.

under the severest penalties—for a term, however, not exceeding six months.\* To increase the number of volunteers, and encourage those already in the service, lands were promised. To all such then in the service, and who should so continue during the war, were granted twelve hundred and eighty acres; for six months' service, six hundred and forty acres; for three months' service, three hundred and twenty acres; and for all who should thereafter enter the service, and continue in it six months, and during the war, nine hundred and sixty acres.† Such were the inducements offered.

The convention, through its president, sent forth to the people of the United States a stirring address, appealing for sympathy and aid.‡

The constitution was adopted by the convention on the 16th, but was not signed till the following day. It was thoroughly republican. Its provisions were a combination of the principles in the federal and state constitutions of the Union. It provided for a president, vice-president, and a Congress of two houses; and, for immediate purposes, it established a government *ad interim*. This was the more necessary, as the constitution was to be submitted to the popular vote. The form of the temporary government was in accordance with the constitution. This labor being concluded, the convention proceeded, on the 16th of March, to elect the several officers provided for in the temporary arrangement.|| David G. Burnet§ was chosen

\* Ordinance of the Convention of March 12, 1836.

† *Ib.*, March 17, 1836.

‡ *Ib.*, March 16, 1836.

|| Journal of the Convention, March 16, 1836: MS.

§ "David G. Burnet, the provisional president," says Kennedy, an impartial writer, "was the son of a physician in Newark, New Jersey, who, in 1775, abandoned his profession, and devoted himself to the cause of the American Revolution. . . . Mr. Burnet was educated for the legal profession; and a writer in a respectable American periodical states that he was long a resident of Ohio, where he is remembered as a man of unblemished reputation, courteous man-

president, Lorenzo de Zavala vice-president, Samuel P. Carson secretary of state, Bailey Hardiman secretary of the treasury, Thomas J. Rusk secretary of war, Robert Potter secretary of the navy, and David Thomas attorney-general. The oath of office was immediately administered to these persons, and they entered upon their several duties. On the following day the convention adjourned.

Among the provisions of the constitution of the republic was one introducing the *common law* as the rule of decision in criminal cases; and requiring its introduction, with modifications, in civil proceedings. Another provision introduced the political division of the state into convenient counties.\* These, with the establishment of well-known common-law offices, removed almost every vestige of former dynasties; so that one afterward immigrating into Texas, with the exception of occasional jarring from the limited partnership between husband and wife, and forced heirship, would feel as free and familiar with the institutions of his new home as he did in the state of his origin, in the American Union.

General Houston was present at the convention, having been returned as a delegate from Refugio; and, deeming his authority *in fact* superseded by the action of the council, he had ceased to act as commander-in-chief of the army. The Declaration of Independence required a new appointment, for his

ners, and intellectual attainments. My own short acquaintance with Mr. Burnet gave me a very favorable impression of his character. In the affairs of Texas he has always been distinguished by calmness and moderation, and has not unfrequently been exposed to censure for declining to keep pace with popular impatience. This prudence and forbearance, united with firmness and perseverance, well qualified him to fill the difficult post to which he had been called by the convention."—Vol. ii., p. 195. President Burnet, in entering upon the duties of his office, delivered, in his usual happy style, an inaugural address, replete with good advice and cheering hopes. He was elected over Samuel P. Carson by a majority of seven votes. Zavala had no opposition.

\* Constitution of the Republic of Texas, Article IV., Sections 11, 13.



former oath of office was under the constitution of 1824, and in obedience thereto.

During the sitting of the convention, the country was greatly excited and filled with gloomy apprehensions. Every effort was made to hasten troops to the west, to relieve Travis and Fannin from their supposed perilous position, but with little avail. Some one or two hundred effective men hung about the hall of the convention, and no inducement could start them toward the west till the adjournment of that body. On the day before General Houston received his final instructions, a member introduced a resolution requesting that he would immediately set out for the army, or resign. Houston, in reply, stated that if the gentleman would withdraw the resolution, he would say that "he purposed to set out for the army on the next morning, and would gladly have his company." The resolution was withdrawn, but the mover did not go to the army.\* Accordingly, on the 6th of March, the commander-in-chief, after placing Colonel Collingsworth in command of the forces at Washington, set out for the west, accompanied only by Colonel George W. Hockly, of his staff, and one or two others.

It is proper that we now return to the operations of the enemy. It will be remembered that Santa Anna reached the Alazan at noon, on the 23d day of February; and Urrea arrived at San Patricio before dawn on the morning of the 27th. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Santa Anna marched into San Antonio.† The Texan guard in the town retired in good order to the Alamo. Colonel Travis, in anticipation of an attack, had done what he could to strengthen the walls, and provide means for defence. The Alamo, though strong, was built for a mission, and not for a fortress. The walls are thick, but of

\* Statement of Dr. B. B. Goodrich: MS.

† Almonté's Journal.

plain stone-work, and without a redoubt or bastion to command the lines of the fort. The main wall is a rectangle, one hundred and ninety feet long, and one hundred and twenty-two feet wide. On the southeast corner was attached the old church, a large building, and containing the magazine and soldiers' quarters. Adjoining this on the east side was the stone *cuartel* for horses. About midway of the east side of the main wall, but within it, was a two-story stone building; the upper story being used for a hospital, and the lower one for an armory, soldiers' quarters, &c. There were four pieces of artillery mounted on the side toward the town, and a like number facing the north; two on the side of the church, and four to defend the gate which looked toward the bridge across the San Antonio river. The place was supplied with water from two aqueducts running on either side of the walls.\* But Travis was greatly deficient in men, provisions, and ammunition.

Santa Anna immediately demanded a surrender of the Alamo and its defenders, without terms. The demand was answered by a shot from the fort. The enemy then hoisted a blood-red flag in the town, and commenced an attack. It was intended to be by slow approaches, for at first the bombardment was harmless. Travis sent off an express with a strong appeal for aid, declaring that *he would never retreat.*† Early

\* Letter of G. B. Jameson, with plot and description of the Alamo, January 18, 1836.


† "COMMANDANCY OF THE ALAMO, BEXAR, February 24, 1836.

"FELLOW-CITIZENS AND COMPATRIOTS: I am besieged by a thousand or more of the Mexicans under Santa Anna. I have sustained a continued bombardment for twenty-four hours, and have not lost a man. The enemy have demanded a surrender at discretion; otherwise the garrison is to be put to the sword, if the place is taken. I have answered the summons with a cannon-shot, and our flag still waves proudly from the walls. *I shall never surrender or retreat.* Then I call on you in the name of liberty, of patriotism, and of everything dear to the American character, to come to our aid with all despatch. The enemy are receiving reinforcements daily, and will no doubt increase to three or four thousand in four or five days. Though this call may be neglected, I am determined

R E F E R E N C E .  
 Entry of the Mission .  
 Carrel or Prison .  
 Convent .  
 Church Chapel Vestry .  
 Walls 33 inches thick .

G R O U N D P L A N  
 O F T H E  
**A L A M O**  
 in 1835-6 .

Scale 100 Ft. or 36 Vas. p. In .  
 Variat 9° 45' East .





on the 25th, Santa Anna in person crossed the river with the battalion de Cazadores of Matamoras, with a view of erecting a battery in front of the gate of the Alamo. Travis made a strong resistance, and the Mexicans were reinforced by the battalion of Ximines. The enemy, according to their own account, lost in this action, which continued until the afternoon, eight in killed and wounded.\* They, however, succeeded that night in erecting their battery, being protected by some old houses between the gate of the Alamo and the bridge. It was three hundred yards south of the place. They also erected another, the same night, near the powder-house, or *Garita*, a thousand yards to the southeast; and posted their cavalry at the old *Casa Mata* on the Gonzales road, toward the east. At night, Travis burnt the straw and wooden houses in the vicinity of the fort.

Early in the morning of the 26th, there was a slight skirmish between a portion of the Texans and the enemy's cavalry stationed east of the fort. A *norther* having sprung up on the previous night, the thermometer fell to thirty-nine degrees above zero. Meanwhile, Santa Anna had received reinforcements, and now enlarged his guard, the sentinels being placed nearer the fort. The Texans sallied out for wood and water, without loss; and at night they succeeded in burning some old houses north-east from the fort, and near a battery erected by the enemy on the Alamo ditch, about eight hundred yards distant.†

to sustain myself as long as possible, and die like a soldier who never forgets what is due to his own honor and that of his country. Victory or death!

“W. BARRET TRAVIS, *Lieutenant-Colonel commanding.*”

“P. S.—The Lord is on our side. When the enemy appeared in sight, we had not three bushels of corn. We have since found, in deserted houses, eighty or ninety bushels, and got into the walls twenty or thirty head of beeves.

“T.”

\* *Almonté's Journal.* Travis's account of this action, directed to General Houston, seems to have been lost, or cut off by the enemy.

† *Almonté's Journal.* Travis to President of the Convention, March 3, 1836.

During all this time the Mexicans kept up a constant firing, but with little effect. On the 28th, they erected another battery at the old mill, eight hundred yards north, and attempted to cut off the water from the fort. The Texans were engaged in strengthening their works, by throwing up earth on the inside of the walls.

It is proper here to state that Travis wrote on the 23d to Colonel Fannin, then at Goliad, making known his position, and requesting him to march to his relief. The letter reached Goliad on the 25th. Fannin set out on his march for Bexar on the 28th, with three hundred men and four pieces of artillery, leaving Captain Westover in command at Goliad, with about a hundred men. But he had only proceeded two hundred yards, when one of his wagons broke down, and, having but one yoke of oxen to each piece of artillery, he was compelled to double his teams in order to get them, one at a time, across the river. Besides, his only provisions consisted of a tierce of rice and a little dried beef. A council of war was therefore held, when it was determined to return to Goliad,\* which was accordingly done.

The intelligence of Fannin's departure for Bexar was received by the enemy at the latter place the same day on which he started; and, before the council of war, above alluded to, was closed, on the 29th, General Sesma, with detachments of cavalry and infantry, was on his march to meet him.

On the morning of the 1st of March, thirty-two gallant men from Gonzales were safely conducted by Captain John W. Smith into the Alamo, making the effective force under Travis one hundred and eighty-eight men. The bombardment of the fort still continued. The Texans, being short of ammunition, fired but seldom. In the evening, however, they struck the

\* Fannin to Lieutenant-Governor Robinson, February 29, 1836.



house occupied by Santa Anna in Bexar with a twelve-pound shot. On the 2d, the attack was still maintained. The Texans continued the fight as their means and strength would allow. On the 3d, the enemy erected a battery on the north of the fort, and within musket-shot. Travis addressed a last appeal to the president of the convention, setting forth fully his position and determination. He stated that the "blood-red banners which waved on the church at Bexar, and in the camp above him, were tokens that the war was one of vengeance against rebels." Perhaps by the same courier he sent the affecting note to his friend in Washington county: "Take care of my little boy. If the country should be saved, I may make him a splendid fortune; but if the country should be lost, and I should perish, he will have nothing but the proud recollection that he is the son of a man who died for his country."\* On that day, J. B. Bonham, who had gone as express to Fannin for aid, returned and made his way safely into the fort at eleven o'clock in the morning. At night the Texans made a sally, and had a skirmish with the Mexican advance.

The enemy continued the fire on the 4th; but few shots were returned from the fort. In the afternoon, Santa Anna called a council of war, to advise on the question of assaulting the place. After much discussion, "Cos, Castrillon, and others, were of opinion that the Alamo should be assaulted *after* the arrival of the two twelve-pounders expected on the 7th. The president, General Ramirez, Sesma, and Almonté, were of

\* In a letter of Travis, dated the 3d of March, and furnished me by Jesse Grimes, Esq., he says: "I am still here, in fine spirits, and well to do. With one hundred and forty-five men, I have held this place ten days against a force variously estimated from fifteen hundred to six thousand; and I shall continue to hold it till I get relief from my countrymen, or I will perish in its defence. We have had a shower of bombs and cannon-balls continually falling among us the whole time, yet none of us have fallen. We have been miraculously preserved."



opinion that the twelve-pounders should not be waited for, but the assault made."\* Santa Anna, without making a public decision, determined upon an assault, and made his preparations accordingly. His troops then in Bexar exceeded four thousand in number, the most of whom had been refreshed during the time they had spent there. The Texans, on the contrary, were worn down by incessant watching and labor within their walls.

On Sunday morning, the 6th of March, a little after midnight, the Alamo was surrounded by the entire Mexican army. The cavalry were placed without the infantry, to cut them down if they offered to give way. The latter were provided with scaling-ladders. The enemy, thus forming a circle facing the fort, advanced rapidly under a tremendous fire from the Texan rifles and artillery. Just at daylight the ladders were placed against the walls, and an attempt made by the enemy to enter the fort, but they were driven back by the stern defenders within. Again the charge was sounded, and a second effort made to reach the top of the walls, but again the assailants were repulsed. For a few minutes there was a pause. By the presence, threats, and promises, of Santa Anna, a third assault was made, and with more fatal success. The enemy, reaching the tops of the ladders, wavered and fell; but their places were supplied by the hundreds pressing onward and behind them on each ladder. At length, killed, cut down, and exhausted, the Texan defenders did not retreat, but ceased to keep back the Mexicans. Instantly the fort was filled by the latter. The survivors within the walls still continued to do battle. They clubbed their guns, and used them till they were nearly all cut down. It is said that a few called for quarter, but the cry was unheeded. One would suppose that admira-

\* Almonté's Journal.

tion for such unequalled heroism would have saved these few. Travis and Crockett fell—the former near the western wall, the latter in the corner near the church—with piles of slain around them. It had been previously agreed on by the besieged that the survivor should fire a large quantity of damaged powder in the magazine. Major Evans, the master of ordnance, was shot as he attempted to perform that last high duty to his country. Colonel Bowie, who had been for some days sick in his bed, was there butchered and mutilated!

Thus fell the Alamo and its heroic defenders; but before them lay the bodies of five hundred and twenty-one of the enemy, with a like number wounded. At an hour by sun, on that sabbath morning, all was still; yet the crimson waters of the aqueduct around the fort resembled the red flag on the church at Bexar! The defenders of Texas did not retreat, but lay there in obedience to the command of their country; and in that obedience the world has witnessed among men no greater moral sublimity.

Those in the fort that survived were, Mrs. Dickinson (wife of Lieutenant Dickinson, who fell in the defence), her child, a negro-servant of Colonel Travis, and two Mexican women of Bexar.\* The bodies of the Texans, after being stripped and subjected to brutal indignities, were thrown into heaps and burnt! The most of them were Americans, many of them colonists, who emigrated to Texas under the assurance of the colonization laws that their rights and liberties should be protected. The Mexicans in Bexar were mostly hostile: only three of them were among the defenders of the Alamo.

\* Account furnished by Mrs. Dickinson. Telegraph, March 24, 1836. Statement of Antonio Perez, on the evening after the battle. Perez gives the number of the Mexican killed and wounded as stated: it seems to be most reliable, as he remained several hours after the storming. He says Travis killed himself. This is hardly credible.

The enemy's victory was complete, yet his force was as sixteen to one, and his loss in slain nearly three times the entire number of the defenders. From the known character of Santa Anna, he doubtless rejoiced. Believing the war at an end, and Texas at his feet, he so announced it in his despatches to his subordinates at home. And the authorities and people there believed it, and so congratulated him. "With pleasure do I sincerely congratulate your excellency," observes José M. Ortis Monasterio, secretary of state, in a letter from Mexico, dated the 22d of March, "for the brilliant triumph achieved over the perfidious colonists by the national arms under your command. This terrible lesson will be to us fruitful in prosperous results; besides, it will teach the sympathizers among our evil-disposed neighbors not to contend against your military talents, and the valor and decision of the brave soldiers who have covered themselves with honor in an assault so heroic. Providence is propitious to us, and has destined your excellency to be the savior and preserver of the republic. Glorious with these titles, and ever patriotic, your excellency has garnished your temples with laurels of unwithering fame."\* Almonté, only three days before the storming of the Alamo, viewed the Mexican success there as effectually ending the war; for, in his journal of the 3d of March, he says he wrote to Mexico, directing his letters to be sent to Bexar, and that before three months the campaign would be terminated.†

Having refreshed his troops, and provided as he could for his numerous wounded, Santa Anna laid down the programme for future operations, to be conducted by General Filisola, his second in command; after completing which, he proposed to

\* This was one of the letters afterward taken from the courier by Deaf Smith, and the "savior and preserver of the *republic*" never had the pleasure of reading it.

† See also Filisola's Defence, p. 8.

return to Mexico. Accordingly, on the 11th of March, he ordered Generals Sesma and Woll, with six hundred and seventy-five infantry, fifty dragoons, two six-pounders, and eight days' rations, to march to San Felipe, on the Brasos, and thence to Anahuac by way of Harrisburg. At the same time he directed Colonel Juan Morales, with two battalions of about four hundred men, one mortar, one eight and one twelve pounder, and a month's rations, to proceed to Goliad. Before he decided as to the further disposition of his forces, he received information from General Urrea, at San Patricio, that he was on his march to Goliad, and that Fannin was there fortified, with about five hundred infantry and fourteen pieces of artillery, and would defend the place. He also received intelligence from General Sesma that the Texans were twelve hundred strong on the Colorado, and disposed to defend the passage of that river. To meet this unexpected resistance, Santa Anna directed General Tolsa, with two battalions and forty dragoons, with a month's rations, to aid Sesma; and Colonel Montoya, with the regular militia of Tres Villas and Queretaro, a twelve-pounder, and like rations, to assist Urrea. The orders given to these officers were to shoot all the prisoners taken!\* Another detachment of Mexicans, under General Gaona, was to march to Nacogdoches, with like orders; but its departure was postponed, to await the issue at Goliad.

Colonel F. W. Johnson, having received his authority from the council, repaired with Dr. Grant to San Patricio, where they established their headquarters. With a force varying from seventy-five to one hundred and fifty men, they sent out parties to scour the country west to the Rio Grande. On one occasion they captured a small party of Mexicans under Captain Rodriguez. These they afterward released. At the time

\* Filisola's Defence, pp. 8, 9.

General Urrea marched upon San Patricio, Grant was absent on a scout, with about fifty men, leaving some forty in San Patricio. Urrea took the latter completely by surprise, and, though they fought long and vigorously, they were overpowered by numbers, and put to the sword.

After this victory, Urrea sent out scouts in search of Grant. At length, on the 1st of March, getting news that he was on his return, the Mexican commander set out at dark to meet and surprise him. At a creek called *Agua Dulce*, about twenty-six miles below San Patricio, the enemy formed an ambush. They were divided into two parties for the purpose of surrounding Grant—the one commanded by Colonel Garay, and the other by Urrea himself. Between eight and nine o'clock, on the morning of the 2d of March, Grant came up, and was completely surprised and defeated. He was wounded and taken prisoner. While his followers were slaughtered, he was detained a captive, that the enemy might have the benefit of his services in attending to their numerous wounded.\* Of the entire command under Johnson and Grant at San Patricio, five only—Johnson, Tone, Beck, Toler, and Miller—were so fortunate as to escape,† and these were engaged in the affair at the town.

While Dr. Grant was in San Patricio, curing his own wound, and carefully ministering to the wants of the wounded of the enemy, he was promised that, so soon as he recovered, and those under his care were convalescent, he should have a passport to leave the country without molestation. The captain left in command of the town, after the departure of Urrea, secretly despatched eight men in search of a wild horse. The animal was captured about three weeks after the battle of the

\* *Diario Militar del General José Urrea.*

† Fannin to Lieutenant-Governor Robinson, March 1, 1836.

2d of March. Grant was now brought forth, and, by order of the captain, his feet were strongly bound to those of the horse, and his hands to the tail. "Now," said the captain, "you have your passport—go!" At the same moment the cords by which the *mustang* was tied were severed. The fierce animal, finding his limbs unfettered, sprang away with great violence, leaving behind him, in a short distance, the mangled remains of poor Grant! Nothing can be added to this simple statement of facts.\*

To return to Colonel Fannin. On reaching Refugio, thirty miles below Goliad, he learned through Major Morris, who had gone on to San Patricio with Johnson and Grant, of the advance, in force, of the Mexicans. This suspended the contemplated march on Matamoras. Fannin now took steps to concentrate his troops at Goliad, and endeavored to have the advance at San Patricio withdrawn; † but the latter, holding an independent authority from the council, refused to retreat. Having taken post at Goliad, and obtained a supply of provisions, he went to work to repair that place. He complained much, and with justice, of the apathy of the Texans in not turning out more willingly to meet the enemy at the frontier, and stated the fact that he could not find a half-dozen Texans in his ranks. It is proper also to state that, although Fannin was a colonel in the regular army of Texas, he was, on the 7th of February, elected to that rank, and Major Ward lieutenant-colonel, of their united volunteers. ‡

\* Statement of the death of Dr. James Grant: MS. General Urrea, whose diary is said, by a writer in the "Democratic Review" (1838, p. 305) to be "a publication marked by all the blunt honesty of the soldier," is worthy of very little credit. He says Grant was killed in the action of the 2d of March. It is to be regretted that there is so little light on this portion of Texan history. Urrea's character is that of an intriguing, cruel, and false man. His conduct toward his own comrades, as well as toward the Texans, proves him so.

† Fannin to Lieutenant-Governor Robinson, Feb. 7, 1836. ‡ *Ib.*, Feb. 8, 1836



The improvements on the fort, which Fannin named *Defiance*, consisted in blockhouses, picketing, ditching, filling in with earth and stone, &c., and mounting necessary artillery for its defence; all of which was done under the immediate direction of Lieutenant Chadwick of the engineers. Between the middle and last of February the troops at Goliad suffered for both provisions and clothing. In some instances they were compelled to mount guard barefooted. We have already seen the fruitless effort made by Fannin on the 28th of February to march to the relief of Travis at San Antonio—an effort which failed for want of provisions and means of transportation. He therefore returned to the fort, and was again occupied in improving his defences.

Colonel Fannin's position had for some time been peculiarly unpleasant. He was aware of the fact that for him to remain in his exposed situation, so far from aid in men and *materiel*, and in the face of so strong an enemy, was not the policy of the commander-in-chief; yet his orders from Lieutenant-Governor Robinson were, "to not make a retrograde movement, but await orders and reinforcements."\* Thus, between these conflicting authorities, this noble man and the gallant troops under his command were about to become victims.

Hearing of the advance of the Mexicans upon Refugio, Colonel Fannin sent Captain King with twenty-eight men to remove some families yet at the mission. King reached there on the 12th of March, but seemed to have delayed his departure until the advance of Urrea's cavalry came up. He then took position with his small force in the mission, and kept the enemy at bay until he could send a messenger to Fannin at Goliad. The messenger reached the latter place about midnight on the 12th, and Fannin immediately despatched Colonel Ward with a hun-

\* Fannin to Robinson, February 21, 1836.



dred men to his relief. Ward arrived at the mission on the evening of the 13th.\* In the meantime, Urrea, then on his march to Goliad, received news of the resistance made by King, and on the 13th despatched Captain Pretalia, with a company of cavalry, to keep the Texans engaged till he could come up with the main body.† The latter reached the mission at daybreak on the 14th, but Ward had got into the mission.

Meanwhile, General Houston, on his arrival at Gonzales, despatched Captain Desauque with an order to Colonel Fannin, dated the 11th of March, commanding him, as soon as practicable after the receipt of the order, to fall back upon Victoria, on the Guadalupe, taking with him such artillery as could be brought off with expedition, previously adopting measures to blow up the fort before leaving its vicinity.‡ This order was received by Colonel Fannin on the morning of the 14th,|| who immediately despatched an express to Ward, stating the nature of Houston's order, and requiring him to return with all haste to Goliad. Fannin also sent out parties for teams and carts, and commenced dismounting and burying several of his guns. On the same day, he sent a note to Colonel A. C. Horton, at Matagorda, requesting him to join him as early as possible with the two hundred men under his command. This note fell into the hands of General Urrea; but Horton joined Fannin on the 16th with twenty-seven mounted men.

To return to the mission of Refugio. Colonel Ward gave orders to set out on the march to rejoin Fannin on the following morning (the 14th) at daybreak. When the morning

\* Statement of Captain John Shackelford; Foote, vol. ii., p. 228. Letter of Samuel G. Hardaway, dated "Macon, June 6, 1836."

† Urrea's Diary.

‡ Appendix No. I. — Document No. 19.

|| Statement of Captain Shackelford. The letter of Colonel Fannin intercepted by Urrea, and published in his diary, shows that Houston's order was received on the morning of the 14th.

dawned, however, it was believed, from the report of one of the sentinels, that the Mexicans were in large force in the neighborhood. To satisfy themselves on this point, Captain King was sent out with thirteen men to ascertain the fact. Shortly afterward a firing was heard in the direction King had taken. Ward with his command advanced rapidly till they found themselves in front of six or eight hundred of the enemy. Ward again retreated to the mission. The church was an old stone building, in ruins, but strong. Three sides of it were, however, exposed to an assault. The fourth side was formed by a stone wall, one hundred and fifty feet in length, used as a place of burial, and containing many tombs: from the end of this wall the ground descended. Captain Bulloch's company of thirty-five men were placed in the churchyard to protect the mission from an assault in that direction. The remainder of Ward's command barricaded the church, made loopholes, and otherwise prepared for defence. General Urrea now ordered a charge, at the same time bringing up a four-pounder to batter down the door. The Texans waited till their rifles could take effect, when they opened such a fire, that the enemy, after repeated charges, broke and fled.\* During this affair, which lasted nearly all of the 14th of March, the Mexicans lost about

\* Urrea smoothes over this retreat quite handsomely: "The enemy, though at first confounded by the movement, opened a lively fire upon our infantry, the greater part of whom, being recruits from Yucatan, could not sustain it, and fell back, nor could my exertions avail to bring them forward again; and their native officers, who, a few moments before, had been all boasting and arrogance, disappeared in the most critical moment! These soldiers, with few exceptions, do not understand Spanish; and the officers, unacquainted with their *patois*, found it difficult to make them understand the word of command. The infantry having fallen back upon a house and courtyard situated at fifteen or twenty paces from the church, I ordered a part of the cavalry to alight, in order to inspire them by their example; but all would not do. The cavalry alone was unequal to carry the place. The moment was urgent; and I ordered a retreat, which, however, could not be effected with the order that disciplined troops would have maintained."

two hundred in killed and wounded: the Texan loss was only three severely wounded!

The enemy having retreated to their camp, some five or six hundred yards distant, had posted sentinels around the mission. At night the Texans, finding their ammunition nearly exhausted, determined to retreat; but, as they could not remove their wounded, they resolved first to leave them a supply of water. Accordingly, after dark, the whole Texan command marched to the spring, about four hundred yards distant, dispersed the enemy's guard stationed there—killing four of them—supplied themselves with water, filled the gourds of their wounded comrades, and bade them a last farewell.

Colonel Ward with his forces then set out on their retreat, and, marching through the woods and swamps, where the enemy's cavalry could not follow, they reached the San Antonio river on the third day. On the second day, however, a few of the men left the command in search of water, but did not again join it. The next morning, the 19th, Ward crossed the river, and resumed the march in the direction of Victoria. That evening they heard the firing between Fannin and Urrea, apparently about ten miles distant. They endeavored to reach the combatants, but, darkness coming on, they found themselves in the Guadalupe swamp, where they spent the night. On the following morning, in emerging from the river-bottom into the prairie, they were attacked by some five hundred of the enemy's cavalry. The Texans fired about three rounds, when, their powder being entirely exhausted, they retreated into the swamp, where they passed the night. The next day, the 21st, Ward set out again toward Victoria, where he and his command surrendered to the enemy as prisoners-of-war.

To return to Captain King. He had been sent out, on the

\* Letter of Samuel G. Hardaway, June 6, 1836.

morning of the 14th, to reconnoitre ; but his return to the mission being cut off, he attempted to reach Goliad. He lost his way, however, and found himself, after two days' march (on the morning of the 16th), only three miles from the mission, in an open prairie, and his ammunition wet. Under these circumstances, he was surrounded, and obliged to surrender, previous to which one of his men was mortally wounded. In six hours afterward, Captain King and his command were shot, on the road to Goliad, about a mile from the mission, and, being stripped of their clothing, were left a prey to wild beasts !\*

General Urrea took possession of the " Old Mission " on the morning of the 15th. He found there only the three wounded Texans, who were soon despatched, and thrown out, to give place to his own wounded. Leaving these under the care of Colonel Vara and a small command, he sent the whole of his disposable cavalry in pursuit of Ward, and set out himself with the advance, consisting of two hundred horse and foot, on the morning of the 16th, toward Goliad, sending a reconnoitring party still ahead of his advance. †

Colonel Fannin, receiving no news from his first express to Ward, sent a second, and then a third, who were perhaps all taken by the enemy. It was only on the 18th that he first received any account of Ward. On the 17th, Colonel A. C. Horton, who had come in the day before from Matagorda, was ordered to reconnoitre the enemy. On his return, he reported a large force of them a few miles from the fort, marching slowly and in good order. Colonel Fannin immediately had the cannon dug up and remounted, expecting an engagement that night or the next morning. During the night of the 17th, the guard was doubled. The enemy were seen hovering about the place on the 18th, and in some force on the left bank of the

\* Kennedy, vol. ii, p. 201.

† Urrea's Diary.

San Antonio river, near the old mission. Colonel Horton was sent over with such mounted force as he could collect, and made a furious charge upon the party at the mission. The latter retreated to the timber, and, being there supported by their infantry, Colonel Horton fell back in good order. Captain Shackleford volunteered to go over with his company to the aid of Horton; but just as they were about to commence the attack, the guns from Fort Defiance caused the enemy to make a precipitate retreat.

Having determined on his retrograde movement the next morning, Fannin made his arrangements accordingly. Before day, Colonel Horton and his twenty-eight horsemen were in the saddle, and proceeded on the Victoria road. The way being reported clear of the foe, the fort was dismantled, the buildings burnt, and the Texan force, about three hundred strong, set out early. It was ten o'clock, however, before the rear-guard had crossed the San Antonio river. Much time was consumed in getting the artillery up the banks; besides, a cart broke down, and its load had to be distributed among the other wagons. Still they advanced in good order, and as briskly as the ox-teams and the freight would permit. At length, after a march of six or eight miles toward the waters of the Coleta, Colonel Fannin ordered a halt, to graze and rest the oxen, and refresh the troops. Fannin had all along committed the error of entertaining a too great contempt for the enemy. Captain Shackleford remonstrated against the halt until they should reach the Coleta, then five miles distant, but he was overruled. "Colonel Fannin and many others," says the gallant captain, "could not be made to believe that the Mexicans would dare follow us."\*

\* The account of the battle of the Coleta is taken mostly from the notes of Captain Shackleford, and from a narrative published by Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 203.

After a halt of an hour, the march was resumed. Colonel Horton with his cavalry was sent in advance, to examine the Coleta crossing. Shortly after resuming the march, two of the enemy appeared, as if coming out of the timber bordering on the Coleta, about a mile distant, and rather to the rear and right of the Texan army; then four more appeared, and finally three hundred and fifty cavalry emerged from the same quarter, and advanced rapidly with the view of cutting off the Texans from the skirt of timber about a mile or more in front. "Our artillery," says Captain Shackelford, "was ordered to open on them, and cover our rear. About this time we discovered a large force of infantry emerging from the same skirt of woodland at which their cavalry had first been seen."

Fannin attempted to reach the timber in front, but the rapid approach of the enemy determined him to prepare immediately for battle. They were in an open prairie, the nearest timber being that in front. The breaking down of an ammunition-wagon also hindered them from advancing to an eminence near by; they were therefore compelled to form in a depression in the plain, six or seven feet below the surrounding surface. The Texans were compelled to form in an oblong square, the artillery being judiciously posted. The enemy's cavalry coming up within a quarter of a mile, dismounted, and fired a harmless volley with their *scopettes*. Thus they continued to advance and fire. Colonel Fannin, with great coolness, repeated to his men the order "not to fire." By this time all the Texan infantry sat down, leaving the artillerists and Colonel Fannin alone standing. The Mexican cavalry having now come within one hundred yards, the command was given, and the Texans opened a fire with rifles, muskets, and artillery. About this time Colonel Fannin received a wound in the fleshy part of the thigh. While engaged with the enemy's cavalry on their right



flank, the Texans found the Mexican infantry, one thousand or twelve hundred strong, advancing on their rear and left flank. Coming within range, they fired a volley, and charged bayonets. They were received by a piece of artillery, Duval's riflemen, and some other troops, whose fire cut them down with great slaughter. This Mexican infantry was the celebrated Tampico regiment. They fell down in the grass, and occasionally raised up to shoot; but whenever they showed their heads, the Texan rifles generally took them down. A body of the enemy's cavalry then made an attempt upon the Texan rear; but, at a distance of sixty yards, they were so well received with double canister charged with musket-balls, and by the riflemen, that they fell by scores, and made a sudden retreat, choosing to return afterward on foot.

The conflict had by this time become general. The Texans having no water to sponge their cannon, they became so hot they could not use them, but were forced to rely wholly on their small-arms. With these they continued the fight most manfully from one o'clock until sundown. At dusk, the Campeachy Indians (who could not well understand the word of command at the mission of Refugio) were placed in the high grass, about thirty yards from the Texan lines, from which they poured a destructive fire; but so soon as it was sufficiently dark for the Texans to see the flash of their guns, they seldom flashed twice from the same point. Among those wounded was Harry Ripley, a son of General Ripley, of Louisiana, a youth of eighteen years. He had his thigh broken. Mrs. Cash (who was with the Texan army), at his request, helped him into a cart, and fixed a prop for him to lean on, and a rest for his rifle. Thus he continued the fight until another shot broke his right arm. Such was the spirit of the Texans at the battle of the Coleta.



A little after dark, General Urrea drew off his troops. The Texans lost during the day seven killed, several mortally and sixty badly wounded. The enemy's loss must have been five times as great. Urrea's force in the action was estimated at twelve hundred infantry and seven hundred cavalry. The Texans, exclusive of Colonel Horton's mounted force, were about two hundred and seventy-five in all. Horton, having gone on in advance to examine the pass of the Coleta, had dismounted with his men. So soon as they heard the firing between the contending parties in their rear, the word "To horse!" was given, when the party galloped back to the prairie. Here they had a full view of the engagement; and, seeing the Texans very nearly surrounded by so large a force of the enemy, Horton's lieutenant, *Moore*, objected to any attempt to reach their comrades by penetrating the Mexican lines, alleging that they would all be cut to pieces. Immediately he dashed off in another direction, taking with him nearly all the party. Colonel Horton, being thus left with so few men, had no other alternative than to retire also. He therefore retreated to Victoria.\*

The description of the battle of the Coleta, as it appeared just after one of those attempts to charge in the evening, is thus given by an eye-witness: "The scene was now dreadful to behold. Killed and maimed men and horses were strewn over the plain; the wounded were rending the air with their distressing moans; while a great number of horses without riders were rushing to and fro back upon the enemy's lines, increasing the confusion among them: they thus became so

\* Such were the statements made to Captain Shackelford by his lieutenant, Francis, and Joseph Fenner, a private of his company, who were with Horton. "I candidly believe," says the captain, "even with the whole of his force, he never could have cut his way through such an immense number of Mexican cavalry."

entangled, the one with the other, that their retreat resembled the headlong flight of a herd of buffaloes, rather than the retreat of a well-drilled, regular army, as they were."

The enemy took position for the night in the skirt of woods in front. The Texans were occupied in forming a breastwork of earth, carts, wagons, and packs. "It has been often asked," says Captain Shackelford, "as a matter of surprise, why we did not retreat in the night. A few reasons, I think, ought to satisfy every candid man on this point. During the engagement, our teams had all been killed, wounded, or had strayed off; so that we had no possible way of taking off our wounded companions. Those who could have deserted them under such circumstances, possess feelings which I shall never envy. I will mention another reason, which may have more weight with some persons than the one already given. We had been contending for five hours, without intermission, with a force more than seven times larger than our own;\* had driven the enemy from the field with great slaughter; and calculated on a reinforcement from Victoria in the morning, when we expected to consummate our victory."

Captain Shackelford does not inform us why they expected aid from Victoria; at all events, none came. On the other hand, the reinforcement sent to the enemy from Bexar, consisting of five hundred men under Colonel Morales, with three

\* It is probable that the enemy's strength was over-estimated in the battle of Coleta. This was the last action in which Urrea was engaged in Texas. On the 24th of April his force, including the troops sent to him under the command of Colonel Juan Morales, was only eleven hundred and sixty-five. If to these we add the detachments by him left at Copano, sixty; mission of Refugio, five; Goliad, one hundred and seventy-four; Matagorda, one hundred and eighty-nine; and Victoria, forty — the total is sixteen hundred and thirty-three. Making allowance for the slain of the enemy at the Coleta, and the wounded in that and previous engagements who had recovered, it is probable that his force did not exceed seventeen hundred, or at farthest eighteen hundred, at the battle of Coleta. — *Filisola's Defence*, p. 30.

pieces of artillery, and of which Urrea had received notice on the 18th, arrived in the Mexican camp at half-past six on the morning of the 20th. Early on that morning, Urrea displayed his whole force in the most imposing manner, together with his pack-mules and artillery. The fire of the latter commenced, but without effect. They kept out of the range of the Texan riflemen, who reserved their fire for close quarters. After the Mexicans had discharged a few rounds, they raised a white flag, but it was soon taken down. The Texan wounded had "suffered agonies for want of water." Their officers held a consultation, and it was the opinion of a majority that they could not save the wounded without a capitulation. The unexpected appearance of artillery in the ranks of the enemy likewise conduced to this conclusion, for the Texan breastwork was only intended to resist small-arms.

The Texans now raised a white flag, which was promptly answered by the enemy. Major Wallace and Captain Chadwick went out, and in a short time returned and reported that General Urrea would treat *only* with the commanding officer. Colonel Fannin, though lame, went out, assuring his men that he would make no other than an honorable capitulation. He returned in a short time, and communicated the terms of the agreement which he had made with Urrea. They were in substance as follows:—

1. That the Texans should be received and treated as prisoners-of-war, according to the usages of the most civilized nations.
2. That private property should be respected and restored; but that the side-arms of the officers should be given up.
3. That the men should be sent to Copano, and thence, in eight days, to the United States, or so soon thereafter as vessels could be procured to take them.
4. That the officers should be paroled, and returned to the United States in like

manner.\* General Urrea immediately sent Colonel Holzinger and other officers to consummate the agreement. It was reduced to writing in both the English and Spanish languages, read over two or three times, signed, and the writings exchanged in "the most formal and solemn manner."†

The Texans immediately piled their arms, and such of them as were able to march were hurried off to Goliad, where they arrived at sunset on the same day (the 20th). The wounded, among whom was Colonel Fannin, did not reach the place till the 22d. At Goliad the prisoners were crowded into the old church, with no other food than a scanty pittance of beef, without bread or salt. Colonel Fannin was placed under the care of Colonel Holzinger, a German engineer in the Mexican service. So soon as Fannin learned how badly his men were treated, he wrote to General Urrea, stating the facts, and reminding him of the terms of the capitulation.

On the 23d, Colonel Fannin and Colonel Holzinger proceeded to Copano, to ascertain if a vessel could be procured to convey the Texans to the United States; but the vessel they expected to obtain had already left that port. They did not return till the 26th. On the 23d, Major Miller, with eighty Texan volunteers, who had just landed at Copano, were taken prisoners and brought into Goliad by Colonel Vara. Again, on the 25th, Colonel Ward and his men, captured by Urrea, as has already been stated, were brought in.

The evening of the 26th passed off pleasantly enough. Colonel Fannin was entertaining his friends with the prospect of returning to the United States; and some of the young men, who could perform well on the flute, were playing "Home,

\* It is stated somewhat differently by others; but the position, intelligence, and high character, of Dr. Shackelford, induce me to follow his "Notes." See Kennedy, vol. ii., p. 209.

† See Appendix No. IV.

sweet home." How happy we are that the veil of the future is suspended before us! At seven o'clock that night, an order, brought by an extraordinary courier from Santa Anna, required the prisoners to be shot! Detailed regulations were sent as to the mode of executing this cold-blooded and atrocious order. Colonel Portilla, the commandant of the place, did not long hesitate in its execution. He had four hundred and forty-five prisoners under his charge. Eighty of these, brought from Copano, having just landed, and who as yet had done no fighting, were considered as not within the scope of the order, and for the time were excused. The services of four of the Texan physicians—that is, Drs. Joseph H. Bernard, Field, Hall, and Shackleford—being needed to take care of the Mexican wounded, their lives were spared. So likewise were four others, who were assistants in the hospital.\*

At dawn of day, on Palm Sunday, March 27th, the Texans were awakened by a Mexican officer, who said he wished them to form a line, that they might be counted. The men were marched out in separate divisions, under different pretexts. Some were told that they were to be taken to Copano, in order to be sent home; others that they were going out to slaughter beeves; and others, again, that they were being removed to make room in the fort for Santa Anna. Dr. Shackleford, who had been invited by Colonel Guerrier to his tent, about a hundred yards southeastwardly from the fort, says: "In about half an hour, we heard the report of a volley of small-arms, toward the river, and to the east of the fort. I immediately inquired the cause of the firing, and was assured by the officer that 'he did not know, but supposed it was the guard firing off their guns.' In about fifteen or twenty minutes thereafter, another such volley was fired, directly south of us, and in front.

\* Messrs. Bills, Griffin, Smith, and Skerlock.

At the same time I could distinguish the heads of some of the men through the boughs of some peach-trees, and could hear their screams. It was then, for the first time, the awful conviction seized upon our minds that *treachery* and *murder* had begun their work! Shortly afterward, Colonel Guerrier appeared at the mouth of the tent. I asked him if it could be possible they were murdering our men. He replied that 'it was so; but he had not given the order, neither had he executed it.'"

In about an hour more, the wounded were dragged out and butchered. Colonel Fannin was the last to suffer. When informed of his fate, he met it like a soldier. He handed his watch to the officer whose business it was to murder him, and requested him to have him shot in the *breast* and not in the *head*, and likewise to see that his remains should be decently buried. These natural and proper requirements the officer promised should be fulfilled, but, with that perfidy which is so prominent a characteristic of the Mexican race, he failed to do either! Fannin seated himself in a chair, tied the handkerchief over his eyes, and bared his bosom to receive the fire of the soldiers.

As the different divisions were brought to the place of execution, they were ordered to sit down with their backs to the guard. In one instance, "young Fenner rose on his feet, and exclaimed, 'Boys, they are going to kill us—die with your faces to them, like men!' At same moment, two other young men, flourishing their caps over their heads, shouted at the top of their voices, 'Hurrah for Texas!'"

Many attempted to escape; but the most of those who survived the first fire were cut down by the pursuing cavalry, or afterward shot. It is believed that, in all, twenty-seven of those who were marched out to be slaughtered made their



escape; leaving three hundred and thirty who suffered death on that Sunday morning.\*

The dead were then stripped, and their naked bodies thrown into piles. A few brush were placed over them, and an attempt made to burn them up, but with such poor success, that their hands and feet, and much of their flesh, were left a prey to dogs and vultures! Texas has erected no monument to perpetuate the memory of these heroic victims of a cruel barbarism; yet they have a memorial in the hearts of their countrymen more durable than brass or marble.

Colonel Fannin doubtless erred in postponing for four days the obedience to the order of the commander-in-chief to retreat with all possible despatch to Victoria, on the Guadalupe; and also in sending out Lieutenant-Colonel Ward in search of Captain King. But these errors sprang from the noblest feelings of humanity: first, in an attempt to save from the approaching enemy some Texan settlers at the mission of Refugio; again, in an endeavor to rescue King and his men at the same place; and, finally, to save Ward and his command—until all was lost, but honor.

\* Number of prisoners at Goliad, on the 27th of March, according to

Portilla .....	445
Major Miller's command.....	80
Physicians and attendants .....	8
Escaped from the slaughter .....	27=115
Number who suffered death.....	330

Names of those who escaped, according to Dr. Shackelford:—

*New Orleans Grays*: William L. Hunter, William Brannon, John Reese, David Jones, B. H. Holland.

*Huntsville Volunteers*: Bennett Butler, Milton Irish.

*Mustangs*: William Morer, John C. Duval, William Mason, John Holliday, John Van Bibber, Charles Spain, ——— Sharpe.

*Burke's Company*: Herman Eremby, Thomas Kemp, N. J. Devany.

*Horton's Company*: Daniel Martindale, William Hadden, Charles Smith.

*Red Rovers*: Isaac D. Hamilton, D. Cooper, L. M. Brooks, William Simpson.

*Company not recollected*: N. Hosen, William Murphy, John Williams.



The "public vengeance" of the Mexican tyrant, however, was satisfied. Deliberately and in cold blood he had caused three hundred and thirty of the sternest friends of Texas—her friends while living and dying—to tread the winepress for her redemption. He chose the Lord's day for this sacrifice. It was accepted; and God waited his own good time for retribution—a retribution which brought Santa Anna a trembling coward to the feet of the Texan victors, whose magnanimity prolonged his miserable life to waste the land of his birth with anarchy and civil war!

## CHAPTER IV.

SANTA ANNA, having received intelligence of the capture of Fannin and his command, was still more confirmed in the idea that the war in Texas was ended, and in his determination to depart for the capital. With this view, he ordered General Urrea to scour all the country between Victoria and Galveston, his left wing to be sustained by the command under General Sesma. On the 24th of March, General Gaona set out for Nacogdoches with the two battalions, two four-pounders, twenty frontier dragoons, and fifty convicts, set apart for his command, the whole amounting to seven hundred and twenty-five men. These several commanders had strict orders to shoot all the prisoners taken!\*

As the dictator considered his army unnecessarily large to complete what remained to be done in Texas, he ordered that the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel Juan José Andrade—the property belonging to the battalions of Guerrero, Matamoras, and Ximines, to the regular militia of Queretaro, and to the first battalion of Mexico—also the artillery which existed in the general quarters and that had been brought from Mexico, and likewise the thirty-two hired wagons—should be got ready to leave on the first of April for San Luis Potosi. As for himself, he proposed to set out immediately—going by

\* Filisola's Defence, p. 9.

sea from Copano or Matagorda to Tampico, and thence by land to San Luis Potosi.

General Filisola, on whom the chief command would now devolve, looking around at his approaching responsibility, discovered that no impression had as yet been made upon the colonists; and that those already conquered, at so great a cost, were mostly volunteers only, but lately arrived in the country, while the main body of Texans was still intact. As the measures of Santa Anna did not accord with the views of Filisola, the latter took frequent occasion to intimate his opinions as to future operations. His suggestions, however, had no effect; but knowing that Santa Anna paid great respect to any representation of Colonel Almonté, he went in search of that officer; and, with the map of Texas before them, he observed to Almonté that, after leaving garrisons at Bexar, Goliad, and Copano, the remaining forces should keep together until they had beaten the main body of the Texans. This advice, accompanied by a timely letter from General Sesma, dated from the right bank of the Colorado, on the 15th of March, induced Santa Anna to suspend the return of the cavalry to Mexico, and to direct General Sesma, by an order, dated the 25th of March, to change his course, after crossing the Colorado at Bastrop, to San Felipe. He also commanded General Urrea to pass the Colorado at Matagorda, and march to Brasoria—thus concluding to concentrate his forces, and to finish in person the few remaining military operations necessary to the reduction of Texas. On the 29th of March, two battalions, with five pieces of artillery, and a month's rations, under the command of Colonel Amat, set out from Bexar for Gonzales; and, on the 31st, Santa Anna and his staff, with General Filisola, departed on the same road.\*

\* Filisola's Defence, pp. 10, 11.

To return to the Texans. General Houston arrived at Gonzales, at four o'clock in the afternoon, on the 11th of March.\* Previous thereto, Colonels Burleson and Neill had been using the most earnest and patriotic efforts to raise a force for the relief of Travis.† It was Houston's intention to combine the forces of Fannin and Neill, and march to the aid of Travis; and he so ordered on the 9th, in advance of his arrival at Gonzales.‡ The news received there of the fall of the Alamo, changed his purpose, and he therefore despatched the order to Colonel Fannin to retreat to Victoria, sending one third of his troops to Gonzales.

On the 12th of March, in pursuance of orders, Colonel Neill made a report of the number of troops at Gonzales, and they were found to amount in all to three hundred and seventy-four

\* Appendix No. I. — Document No. 21.

† It is proper to state that Captain John W. Smith, after conducting the thirty-two Texans from Gonzales to the Alamo, returned on the 4th of March, and started again on the 7th with fifty more from the same point; but it was too late. — *Smith to the President of the Convention, March 7, 1836.*

‡ I find, in the handwriting of Colonel G. W. Hockley, a memorandum dated "Burnham's, Colorado, March 9, 1836," as follows: "This day a letter was forwarded by return express from this place to Colonel J. C. Neill, commanding at Gonzales, ordering the original to be forwarded to Colonel Fannin, commanding at Goliad, and a copy to be kept, as follows: 'Colonel Fannin to march immediately with all his effective force (except one hundred and twenty men, to be left for the protection of his post), to co-operate with the command of Colonel Neill, at some point to be designated by him, to the relief of Colonel Travis, now in the Alamo. Colonel N. to recommend a route to Colonel F. from Goliad to the point of co-operation. Colonel F. to bring two light pieces of artillery, and no more; fifty muskets, with thirty to forty rounds ball-cartridge for each. Both to use immediate despatch — Colonel F. with ten days' provisions.'

"A letter to General Burleson, requesting him to unite with Colonel Neill in recommending the route — forming battalion, or regiment, according to the number of troops at Gonzales."

Colonel Neill, in a letter to Houston, dated Gonzales, March 10, 1836, says: "I have received with great satisfaction your communication of the 9th inst. . . . I shall forward your communication to Colonel Fannin by express, agreeably to your instructions, giving him due time to concentrate his forces with mine at the time and place I shall designate." Of course, this movement would have been too late.

effective men.\* They had not two days' provisions; many were without arms, and others destitute of ammunition.† To remedy these defects as far as possible, and place the troops in a state of organization, orders were issued for an election of field-officers of the volunteers on the 13th, and requiring all volunteers who should come into camp to attach themselves to some company. A camp was formed on the east bank of the Guadalupe, and the organization extended to the lowest division of the company. At the same time, Captain Larrison was despatched to Victoria for fifty kegs of lead and one thousand pounds of powder, for the use of the army.‡

It was on the night General Houston reached Gonzales, that two Mexicans brought the first news of the fall of the Alamo, and the death of all its defenders. The scene produced in the town by these sad tidings can not be described. At least a dozen women with their children, in that place alone, had thus been left widows and orphans. In fact, there was scarcely a family in the town but had to mourn the loss of one or more of its members. "For four-and-twenty hours," says Captain Handy, "after the news reached us, not a sound was heard, save the wild shrieks of women, and the heart-rending screams of their fatherless children. Little groups of men might be seen in various corners of the town, brooding over the past, and speculating of the future; but they scarcely

\* "A consolidated report of the troops now under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Neill, as received at headquarters, Gonzales, March 12, 1836:—

"Captains, 8; first lieutenants, 8; second lieutenants, 5. . . . . 21

"Quartermaster's sergeant, 1; sergeants, 25; corporals, 13; musicians, 1; privates, 313 . . . . . 353

"Aggregate . . . . . 374

"Twenty-five of the above as yet unorganized.

"Lieutenant H. S. STOFFER, *Acting Adjutant*.

"J. C. NEILL, *Lieutenant-Colonel of the Regular Army of Texas*."

† Appendix No. I.—Document No. 22.

‡ Order to R. R. Royall, March 13, 1836.

spoke above a whisper. The public and private grief were alike heavy. It sank deep into the heart of the rudest soldier.\* To soften as much as possible the unhappy effect of the intelligence, Houston caused the two Mexicans to be arrested and kept under guard, as spies.† The fact that Travis had agreed to fire signal-guns, and that none had been heard since the Sunday previous, confirmed the statement made by the Mexicans; yet, in order to ascertain the truth of the matter, Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, and R. E. Handy, were despatched to Bexar, or as near to that place as they could safely go, to learn the facts, and return in three days.‡ After proceeding about twenty miles, they met Mrs. Dickinson, with her child, accompanied by Sam, the servant of Travis, and Ben, a free negro, the servant of Almonté. Mrs. Dickinson brought with her a boasting proclamation of Santa Anna, which she had received from the hands of General Sesma, then at the *Cibola*, on his route, with the advance of the enemy, to Gonzales. Mrs. Dickinson having fully confirmed the intelligence brought by the two Mexicans, Karnes, who was mounted on the best horse, returned in haste to Gonzales with the information and the proclamation of Santa Anna, while Smith and Handy remained to escort her to the Texan army.

Captain Karnes reached Gonzales between eight and nine o'clock on the night of the 13th. The intelligence brought by him produced a general panic. Since Santa Anna first approached San Antonio, the American settlers had been removing eastward; and, as he advanced into the country, and developed his bloodthirsty disposition, the emigration became more hasty and universal. At length, with the departure of Sesma

\* R. E. Handy to J. J. R. Pease, 1836.

† Appendix I.—No. 21.

‡ Handy to Pease. Houston to Collingsworth, March 13, 1836. Captain Handy is mistaken as to the date.



from Bexar with his advance of seven hundred and twenty-five men, the emigration became a flight, not of a part, but all—men, women, children, and servants—some carrying with them their goods and stock, others leaving everything. The volunteers in the Texan army, seeing their wives and relatives exposed to the vandalism of the Mexican soldiery, were constantly leaving—some with and some without permission—to look after and conduct to a place of safety those who were so near and dear to them. This was a natural result of their exposed situation. The Texan commander, not having a sufficient force to repel the enemy before he reached the settlements, and being without artillery and munitions, was compelled to fall back. The information brought by Mrs. Dickinson had, moreover, magnified the force under Sesma.

Having determined on a retreat, General Houston and his forces set out before midnight on the 13th, leaving behind his spies, who were reinforced by some volunteers from Peach creek. It may be stated, as a proof of the poverty of the *materiel* in the Texan army, that, when they set out on their retreat, they had in camp two public wagons, two yoke of oxen, and a few poor horses!\* The flying citizens had carried with them every species of conveyance. The Texan army reached the Navidad on the 14th, where they rested one day, while a guard was sent back for a widow woman and her children, whose residence, being off the road, was passed without knowledge of her. Some of the party who had remained behind at Gonzales conducted the family on to the army, while the three spies before named, and Reese, remained to burn the town. It was set on fire in many places at once, so that the flying inhabitants, looking back, saw the light of their burning dwellings. By early dawn the place was reduced to ashes, and its

\* Appendix I.—No. 22.

only inhabitants were the four faithful Texan spies previously mentioned.\*

Houston, having decided to make the Colorado the line of defence, despatched his aide-de-camp, Colonel William T. Austin, to the Brasos for artillery,† and marched to Burnham's, on the right bank of the Colorado. He reached this point on the evening of the 17th. His force had by this time increased to six hundred men, including a rear-guard, who were bringing with them some families.‡

There had, up to this time, been some twenty who had left the Texan army without permission, and, as they travelled eastward, spread over the country such exaggerated accounts of the large force of the enemy, their unheard-of cruelties, and the small numbers of the Texans, that the panic became universal and overwhelming. The voice of sorrow and despondency that came from the flying inhabitants touched the hearts of the small band who had ventured everything in this last effort for life and liberty. It did more—it prevented volunteers from coming from the east. The panic, as it travelled in that direction, had greatly increased. Citizens east of the Neches believed their danger more imminent than those west of the Trinity. Hence, able-bodied men were retained to defend families and neighborhoods. To add to the terror and distress, particularly in eastern Texas, there were some bad

\* Handy to Pease.

† "ARMY ORDERS. — Major William T. Austin is hereby appointed volunteer aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief of the army of Texas; and will proceed immediately to the mouth of the Rio Brasos (or such point as the stores of the army may be), and make a requisition upon Colonel John A. Wharton for seven pieces of artillery, say six and nine pounders — six of the former and one of the latter calibre — and an abundant supply of grape and canister shot; and forward the same to headquarters on the Colorado river, near Burnham's. . . . Major Austin will obey this order with all possible despatch, and report to the commander-in-chief.

"CAMP ON LAVACA, *March 15, 1836.*"

‡ Appendix I. — No 23.

men who spread false alarms for the sake of plunder. It was understood, and perhaps with some truth, that all Americans, whether combatants or not, were to be driven from the country, and that the women brought by Santa Anna with his army were to join his soldiers in forming the advance of a Mexican population that was to occupy the province.

“It pains my heart,” says the commander-in-chief, writing to the chairman of the military committee—“it pains my heart that such consternation should have been spread by the few deserters from camp. . . . Our own people, if they would act, are enough to expel every Mexican from Texas. Do let it be known that, on close examination, and upon reflection, the force of Santa Anna has been greatly overrated. . . . If you can, by any means, soothe the people, and get them to remain, they shall have notice, if I deem it necessary. Let them entertain no fears for the present. We can raise three thousand men in Texas, and fifteen hundred can defeat all that Santa Anna can send to the Colorado.”\*

The Texan army remained two days at Burnham's, waiting for the families to pass safely over, when it also crossed to the left bank, and, marching down the river, took position opposite Beason's. Here they remained until the 26th, awaiting the arrival of artillery and reinforcements. It is true that most of the reports made of the advancing force of the enemy overrated their numbers. The first body, under Sesma and Woll, was seven hundred and twenty-five; the second, under General Tolsa, which probably reached the Colorado about the time the Texans took position opposite Beason's, numbered some six hundred—making an aggregate of thirteen hundred and twenty-five, of which ninety were cavalry, with two six-pounders. Yet it was understood in the Texan camp that they had

\* Appendix I.—No. 23.

at least twice that number on the right bank of the river, with heavy reinforcements coming up. At all events, without artillery and ammunition, it would not have been prudent to hazard a battle when there was so much at stake. Such was the view taken of the matter by the commander-in-chief, and he was fully supported by the convention. "It is deemed useless," says the president of that body, in his letter of the 16th of March, "to suggest to you the importance of giving all possible information, in various directions around you through the country, of the movements of the enemy, and to retard his progress as far as practicable without hazarding a battle, without a tolerable certainty of victory. But annoy him in situations which will admit of it, so as to save your men until a force can collect to enable you to make a successful attack upon him."

The troops that were expected from eastern Texas did not come. As early as the 5th of March, General Houston had despatched Major John Forbes, of his staff, to Velasco, to act with Colonel John A. Wharton, the adjutant-general, in forwarding troops and munitions-of-war to the army, directing that supplies and munitions should be sent no farther south than Dimitt's landing.\*

Colonel William T. Austin, in pursuance of orders, proceeded directly to Brasoria, and applied to Colonel Wharton for the required artillery and grape and canister. That officer was then on his way to the army with one hundred and fifty troops from Velasco, and informed Colonel Austin that he had already sent all the guns suitable for field-service, consisting of two six-pounders and one mortar, with shot and shells, to Bell's landing, and would take them to the army. At the same time the adjutant-general sent Colonel Austin to Velasco,

\* Order to Forbes, March 5, 1836.

to forward munitions and stores to Bell's landing.\* Previous to leaving Burnham's, orders were despatched to all points west of the Colorado, directing that families should be in readiness to move east of that stream, and that stock of all kinds should be driven over it.

The government *ad interim*, on entering upon the discharge of its functions on the 17th of March, exerted itself to increase the force under the Texan flag. President Burnett issued a strong appeal to the people east of the Brasos, expressing grief and surprise that, under the influence of idle rumors, they were leaving their homes, and, by the circulation of false news, preventing others from repairing to the standard of their country, where alone their homes and families were to be defended.† At the same time a resolution was taken to remove the seat of government to Harrisburg. Agents were likewise sent eastward to quiet the public mind, and two thirds of the militia were called into service.‡ Colonel Rusk, the secretary of war, was untiring in his efforts to forward supplies of all kinds. At the ferry at Washington he stationed an officer, with orders to let no man pass eastward who had a rifle, and to take by impressment and forward to the army all the powder, lead, and horses, he could.§ These were strong measures, but such as the times required.

On the 20th of March, Captain Karnes, with five men, met with and defeated a party of twelve Mexicans at Rocky creek,

\* Letter of William T. Austin, April 15, 1842; order of John A. Wharton to William T. Austin, March 18, 1836.

† Proclamation of the 18th of March, 1836. Extract of a letter from Captain John W. Smith, dated San Felipe, March 18, 1836: "I find many wagons and carts with lone families, and three or four men with them, and many of them single men. If possible, an arrangement should be made, and the committees of safety or some other authority should stop and compel to return to the army all persons not having a passport."

‡ Rusk to Houston, March 19, 1836.

§ *Ib.*, March 20, 1836.

twelve miles west of Beason's, killing one, taking another prisoner, and capturing three horses.\* In addition to the protection of the crossing at Beason's, forces were stationed above at Mosely's, and at the *Atasco sito* crossing below. The force at Mosely's captured and sent to headquarters, on the 23d, three more of the enemy. From a separate examination of these prisoners, it was ascertained that the main body of the troops under Sesma were near the west bank of the river. The Texan force was at this time over seven hundred strong, in high spirits, under strict discipline, and anxious to meet the foe. The enemy had taken his position on the west bank of the river, on an elevation near the Robertson crossing, about two miles above Beason's. At that crossing the river was fordable; and the Texan commander placed there a detachment of about one hundred and fifty men under Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman and Captain Patton, aide-de-camp. This force was intended as a guard to the ford, and also as an ambuscade, should the Mexicans endeavor to pass the river. They did make an attempt to send over fifty of their cavalry, but one of the guard having indiscreetly fired at them as they were going into the water, they retreated, and made no further attempt at that point.

With a view to meet the enemy, Captain Karnes was sent over the river with one hundred and fifty troops, fifty of whom were mounted, with orders to station the foot in a ravine parallel to the route to the Mexican camp; then to proceed with the mounted force, to draw out the enemy, and retreat. The orders were obeyed: the Mexicans fired a discharge of grape at the Texan cavalry, but did not advance. Karnes, not deeming it prudent to march nearer against so large a force, recrossed the river without effecting anything.

\* Appendix I. — No. 25.



It was the intention of the Texan commander to cross over at Beason's on the night of the 27th of March with all his force except a camp-guard, and attack the enemy on the south and east of his camp. But, on the evening of the 25th, Peter Kerr brought the disastrous though not altogether unexpected news of the defeat and surrender of Fannin and his command at the Coleta, and the capitulation of Ward and his forces near Dimitt's landing. This intelligence was most unfortunate, and produced a chilling effect upon the army. To allay in some degree its effects, Kerr was arrested and placed under guard, as a publisher of false news, and a spy. This, together with the fact that the artillery expected had not arrived; that the check already given to Sesma had doubtless induced him to send for reinforcements; that the defeat of Fannin would leave Urrea at liberty to come to the relief of Sesma; that the defeat of the advance under the latter would serve only to concentrate the Mexican army, which, with its various corps thus united, could overrun Texas in spite of the force then in the field to resist it—these considerations induced the Texan commander to retreat, hoping for a more favorable occasion to decide the fortunes of the infant republic in a battle. It was his policy to keep the enemy divided, and, when the blow was given, to strike at a vital part. The small army under his command was the last hope of Texas, and the prize too important to be hazarded without a certainty of success.

In announcing this retreat to the government, General Houston says: "I held no councils of war. If I err, the blame is mine."\* That reinforcements would arrive, he had every reason to expect. The government, having reached Harrisburg on the 22d, informed him the next day that "orders were in execution for the mustering into service of two thirds of the

\* Appendix I.—No. 30.

militia of the country. "These," said the secretary of war, "with the aid from the United States, will, if you can hold the enemy in check long enough for their concentration, present an insurmountable barrier to the progress of the enemy into the country."—"One great object should be," observes the secretary of war, in a letter of the same date, "to hold him in check until reinforcements and supplies can reach you. Every means has been put into requisition for the purpose of forwarding on both."

On the evening of the 26th, the army commenced the retreat in good order. It was, however, a subject of regret that the houses of Messrs. Burnham and Dewees, on the left bank of the Colorado, were burnt by the Texan picket-guard, on the approach of the enemy. The Texan forces, after a march of five miles, halted for the night at a lake in the prairie. As they left the woods skirting the Colorado, they were reinforced by the three companies of Captains Amasa Turner, William S. Fisher, and Richard Roman, under the command of Major John Forbes of the staff, who, after untiring exertions, and the cheerful aid of the people on the route, had succeeded in conducting them safely from the mouth of the Brasos. Never was a reinforcement more welcome. The companies, however, were small, the aggregate being only one hundred and thirty men. On the 27th, the army resumed its march, and reached the timbers of the Brasos; and, on the 28th, it arrived at San Felipe, on the west bank of that river.

To provide for the protection of the new line of defence, Colonel Edward Harcourt was ordered to proceed to Velasco, or some eligible position on the coast or below Columbia, and fortify it, having placed at his disposal such resources as he could find there. Captain Mosely Baker was directed to take post with his command on the east bank of the Brasos, oppo-

site San Felipe, and obstruct the passage of the enemy. All troops coming from below were ordered to fall back to the Brasos;\* at the same time, Colonel A. Huston was directed to remove the public stores from Coxe's point to Galveston bay, and Colonel J. Morgan to defend the island.†

At San Felipe some discontent arose as to the future movements of the army, some wishing to march below and others up the river. The commander-in-chief proceeded up the Brasos, and, crossing Mill creek, encamped. The rains had set in, and the roads became exceedingly bad, and marching toilsome to the troops. It rained all night. The soldiers, having but few tents or coverings, suffered severely. The commander-in-chief spent the night sitting on his saddle, with a blanket over him, and his feet on a piece of wood.‡

On the evening of the 31st of March, after a most fatiguing march, the Texans reached the Brasos timber opposite Groce's. Here they encamped in a secure position, having excellent water in a lake immediately in advance of them, and within three fourths of a mile of the timber. The steamboat "Yellowstone," Captain Ross, then at Groce's ferry, and nearly loaded with

\* Orders to Harcourt and Baker, March 28, 1836. Letter of Captain M. W. Smith, March 28, 1836. In pursuance of the last-named order, Captain Smith took post at Thompson's ferry, at Fort Bend.

† Rusk to Houston, March 28, 1836.

‡ With few exceptions, neither officers nor men had any tents during that severe campaign. Houston's baggage consisted of a pair of saddle-wallets, carried by his servant, and containing his official papers and a change of linen. As to a military chest, the army had none at all. The only moneys used by the general during the campaign were two hundred dollars of his own private funds. As an incident of those times, while the army was crossing the Colorado, a woman was found sitting with another female on a log near the river. Her husband had fallen in the Alamo; she had no resources, no protector, or means of conveyance. Houston, learning her condition, furnished her out of his slender means fifty dollars. He saw no more of her. In after-years, when Texas had become a state of the American Union, she wrote to him, stating that she had laid out his donation in the purchase of cattle, the increase of which had made her family independent.

cotton, was pressed into the public service, and was afterward found to be almost indispensable. On the 31st, the soldiers buried the only one of their comrades who died a natural death during the campaign. After remaining a day at this point, the army marched into the Brasos "bottom," nearer the river, where it remained until the 13th of April. The river having overflowed its banks, the water surrounded them, and left them on an island.

On the 2d of April, Colonel Zavala joined the camp, bringing information that a visit might soon be expected from Colonel Rusk, the secretary of war. About the same time, eighty volunteers from the Red-river lands arrived. Houston was occupied for some days in reorganizing his army, and restoring it to that discipline and round of camp-duty which had been somewhat neglected during the retreat from the Colorado. At San Felipe, on the 29th of March, on the supposed approach of the Mexicans, the citizens fired the town, and burnt it to ashes. This, though without orders, was only anticipating the enemy.\*

While the Texan army was lying in the Brasos bottom, Houston, through the spies, learned the movements of the enemy. A more efficient corps of spies was never attached to any army. They hung about the enemy's camp, and watched all his movements.† Yet it is somewhat remarkable that the

\* Appendix I. — No. 36.

† Deaf Smith went out one day, early in April, in search of the enemy. His sight had become dim, and, for better observation, he took with him young Chenowith. The Mexicans had collected a large number of cattle, and sent them on in advance of their army, in the direction of San Felipe. The spies came in sight of them, and Smith, relying upon Chenowith's eyes, returned and reported a large number of the enemy as an advanced guard. This produced quite an excitement in the Texan camp, until the arrival of "Jim Wells," who, having better eyes and less fancy, reported them truly. Deaf Smith was much hurt, and declared that Chenowith should go with him no more. As a spy, Smith was inimitable. He rode a good horse, and had the faith to believe that no other steed could keep up with him. But, if overtaken, he would turn and fight, and with a coolness, courage, and judgment, that were irresistible.

Texans did not certainly ascertain, until the night of the 19th of April, that Santa Anna was with the invading army.

Colonel Rusk, the secretary of war, left Harrisburg on the 1st of April, to join the army. Previous to his departure, he issued a last strong appeal to the people of Texas to march to the defence of the country.\* His arrival in camp was most welcome, for he was a safe adviser, and a firm and able friend of Texas in her struggle.

We now return to the operations of the enemy. It will be remembered that Santa Anna had directed a general movement of his forces in the direction of San Felipe. Had he persevered in this combination, it would have been well for him; but past victories, a flying enemy, and an impatience to hear any opinion contrary to his own,† inspired him with a false confidence, which ended only in his ruin. General Sesma succeeded, four days after the retreat of Houston from the Colorado, in transporting a portion of his army across that river. Of this fact he advised Santa Anna, at the same time giving him notice that the river was greatly swollen, and the means of crossing it very scarce. On the 2d of April, Santa Anna arrived at the Guadalupe, which he found likewise very high. He immediately crossed, with his staff and a picket of cavalry, on a raft; and, leaving General Filisola to attend to the passage of the remainder of the army, he hurried on to join General Sesma, at the Colorado. On the 5th of April, he reached the *Atasco sito* crossing of that river. Here he directed General Woll to remain and construct rafts for transporting across the stream the artillery, wagons, and forces, under Filisola, and, with the division under Sesma and Tolsa, proceeded to San Felipe, where he arrived on the 7th of April.‡

\* Address of the Secretary of War, March 31, 1836.

† Filisola's Defence, p. 11.

‡ *Ib.*

On the 2d of April, Houston sent out Major Patton with a detachment to reconnoitre the enemy. On the 3d, he reinforced Captain Mosely Baker with Captain Kimbrough's command, and directed Captain Baker to require all persons at his camp to enroll themselves as volunteers, and none to leave it without express permission.\* These were strong measures, but the emergency was pressing.

About this time, the idea began to prevail, not only in the Texan camp, but with the government at Harrisburg, that the enemy would not cross the Brasos, but would attempt to fall down and get possession of the coast and seaports. To meet this state of things, orders were given through Colonel A. Huston, quartermaster-general, and Colonel W. D. C. Hall, to remove all the stores and munitions from Coxe's point, Matagorda, Velasco, Bell's landing, and Columbia, to the east end of Galveston island. The means of doing this were quite limited, for all the vessels had been engaged by merchants and emigrants who were retiring with their effects.†

The extent of alarm and confusion arising from the flight of the citizens was at this time most distressing. Samuel P. Carson, the secretary of the navy, writing to President Burnett from Liberty, says: "I have issued orders to two different persons—one for Trinity and one for the Neches—to press boats, &c., to aid the people in crossing. The panic has reached this place, and the people are all leaving Trinity from the opposite (west) side, and preparations making by many on this. The river is rising rapidly, and I fear by to-night it will be impassable for any kind of carriage. The 'slues' on this side are belly-deep. There must be three hundred families—

\* Order to William H. Patton, April 2, 1836. — *Army Orders, April 3, 1836.*

† Letter of A. Huston, April 1, 1836. Letter of Captain J. M. Allen, March 31, 1836.



I know not the number of wagons, carts, carriages, &c. Destruction pervades the whole country. I must speak plainly—the relations existing between us, and the responsibility which rests on us, make it my duty. Never till I reached Trinity have I *desponded*—I will not say, *despaired*. If Houston has retreated, or been whipped, nothing can save the people from *themselves*: their *own* conduct has brought this calamity on them! If Houston retreats, the flying people may be covered in their escape. He must be advised of the state of the waters, and the impossibility of the people crossing.”\*

At the same time, Captain Morehouse, with a detachment of volunteers and regulars, was conducting a number of families from Matagorda to Columbia. In fact, on every road leading eastward in Texas, were found men, women, and children, moving through the country over swollen streams and muddy roads, strewing the way with their property, crying for aid, and exposed to the fierce *northers* and rains of spring. The scene was distressing indeed; and, being witnessed by the small but faithful army of Texans, whose wives and families they were, thus exposed and suffering, nerved their arms and hearts for the contest then not distant.

It was on the 7th of April that Major Wylie Martin received, through his spies, indirect information that Santa Anna was with the advancing army of the enemy. This intelligence was immediately sent from Martin's camp (on the east bank of the Brasos, opposite Fort Bend) to Houston.† From all the discoveries that could be made through the spies, Houston believed that the enemy had crossed the Brasos below his position, and so expressed himself to Secretary Rusk, suggesting

\* Letter of April 4th. Transmitted to Houston by the acting secretary of war, by order of the president.

† The information was given by a free negro, by the name of Wilson. Martin's letter, April 7 1836; Almonté's Journal, April 9.

the propriety of crossing likewise.\* Colonel Rusk concurred in this view; and the passage accordingly commenced at ten o'clock on the morning of the 12th. The river being very high, the steamboat "Yellowstone" and the yawl were the only means of transporting the army, cattle, and baggage. By one o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, all was safely landed on the eastern bank, and the troops took position at Groce's.

The conclusion that the enemy had crossed the Brasos was correct. Santa Anna, arriving at San Felipe on the 7th, endeavored to pass the river at that point; but he was received with such determined resistance by Captain Mosely Baker and his command, that, after contending for two days, he abandoned the attempt, and set out with four companies of infantry and fifty cavalry in search of another crossing. It was on the evening of the 9th that they left San Felipe. After a march of sixteen miles, they reached the San Bernard a little after midnight, and sent out a scout to reconnoitre the ferry at Fort Bend. The scout having returned, Santa Anna again proceeded on his march, and arrived at nine o'clock, on the night of the 10th, in the neighborhood of Fort Bend. At two o'clock on the following morning, the Mexicans set out again, all on foot—leaving their cavalry and baggage behind—to surprise the guard at the river before daylight; but, mistaking the dis-

\* The following order shows that the enemy's arrival at San Felipe was immediately known in the Texan camp:—

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 7, 1836.*

"ARMY ORDERS.—The advance of the enemy is at San Felipe. The moment, for which we have waited with anxiety and interest, is fast approaching. The victims of the Alamo, and the manes of those who were murdered at Goliad, call for *cool, deliberate* vengeance. Strict discipline, order, and subordination, will insure us the victory.

"The army will be in readiness for action at a moment's warning. The field-officers have the immediate execution of this order in charge for their respective commands.

"SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief.*

"GEORGE W. HOCKLEY, *Inspector-General.*"

tance, the early dawn found them a mile from the river. Thus frustrated, Santa Anna placed his men in ambush.

On the 12th, shortly after sunrise, the enemy appeared in force opposite the camp of Major Wylie Martin, at Thompson's ferry. They opened a heavy fire on the small force of forty-six men on the east bank, which continued until the afternoon. Very early on the 12th, Martin had sent three men to Morton's crossing, to sink a small boat which had been left for the use of five families there. Before they arrived, a negro had taken the boat and crossed over to the western bank. The negro, was captured by the enemy, and conducted them to the boat. A sufficient number of Mexicans having passed over to disperse the families there, did so after a short contest. Major Martin, hearing the firing, despatched Lieutenant Jones with ten men to learn the cause. By the time they reached there, one hundred and fifty of the enemy had effected a crossing. Thus Major Martin, being overpowered, retreated toward the main army.\* Having possession of the ferry, Santa Anna sent an express to Sesma to advance to that point.

Houston had given orders that all the means of crossing along the river should be secured or sunk, and that all the cattle should be driven to the east side; believing that, by thus delaying the Mexicans, they would fall short of provisions. Such, in fact, was the case, as the advance had only half ra-

\* Report of Major Martin, April 13, 1836. The Mexican account of this affair is somewhat different. In fact, as the small boat was concealed above Morton's ferry, there is little doubt but, as Almonté states, some of the enemy crossed in it, and slept on the left bank of the river on the 11th, without being discovered. When the enemy reached San Felipe, Almonté rode up in advance, and called out to the Texans on the east side, "Bring over that boat—the Mexicans are coming!" This was said in good English; and the enemy cannonaded Baker's breastworks for some time, but still did not get the boat. — *Memoranda of Rev. A. J. McGown*. It was a successful ruse on the part of the Mexicans to keep up a firing at Thompson's ferry, while they were crossing at Morton's, three miles distant.

tions of bread. On the 11th of April, the effective force of the Texan army was five hundred and twenty-three men, exclusive of detachments at the different crossings. When it was ascertained that the enemy had passed the river, orders were immediately sent to all these detachments to concentrate at Donoho's, three miles from Groce's, on the 16th. It was at Donoho's that the road from Groce's to Harrisburg crossed that from San Felipe to eastern Texas.

Affairs had now reached a crisis, as was obvious to all. That a conflict would soon occur was devoutly desired, perhaps by the enemy as well as the Texans. Santa Anna, having crossed the Brasos at Fort Bend, proceeded, on the 14th of April, with a force amounting to a little over seven hundred men, and one twelve-pounder, on the road to Harrisburg,\* where he arrived on the 15th.†

On the day that Santa Anna reached Harrisburg, his army was sufficiently scattered for its destruction in detail. Urrea was at Matagorda, with some twelve hundred men; Gaona lost in the country between Bastrop and San Felipe, with seven hundred and twenty-five; Sesma at Fort Bend, with about one thousand; and Filisola between San Felipe and Fort Bend, with nearly eighteen hundred more. These, with the exception of the troops stationed in Bexar, Goliad, Copano, Matagorda, &c., constituted the force of the enemy in Texas—numbering originally about seven thousand five hundred men, but reduced by killed and disabled to some five thousand five hundred.

When information was received of the enemy having crossed the Brasos, it was not known but they would advance on the

\* Filisola's Defence, p. 11.

† Almonté's Journal. Filisola says on the 16th; but as Almonté was with Santa Anna, and kept a diary, he ought to know.

road from San Felipe to eastern Texas ;\* hence the concentration of the Texan force at Donoho's.

As the Texans were crossing the Brasos, they were reinforced by two six-pounders, known as the "*Twin-Sisters.*" These notable pieces of artillery, for the good they did in the cause of Texan independence, deserve some further notice. A meeting was held in Cincinnati, Ohio, in 1835, for the purpose of aiding Texas in her struggle. On the suggestion of Robert F. Lyttle, it was concluded to furnish these two pieces of "hollow ware." A committee was chosen to carry out the resolution ; and through the instrumentality of William M. Corry, Willis Tatan, Pulaski Smith, David Bolles, and others, the cannon were manufactured, mounted, supplied with shot at the foundry of Messrs. Greenwood and Webb, and despatched to New Orleans ; thence, by the Texan agents, to Brasoria. To this point General Houston sent twice for them ; but the want of means for transportation, the wretched condition of the roads, and ultimately the proximity of the enemy, made it hazardous to forward them by that route. They were then shipped by Colonel A. Huston, the quartermaster-general, on board the schooner "*Pennsylvania*" to Galveston island, and thence to Harrisburg. At this place, horses were pressed to haul them, and they were started on the 9th of April, under care of Captain Smith, to the army.† They were placed in

\* "FORT BEND, April 8, 1836.

"This very moment two men arrived from toward San Felipe, who say the enemy must be, by this time, in that town, in full force. They state that one division of the enemy has passed above, pointing the head of their column for Nacogdoches ; the other column below, aiming for Matagorda." — *Major Wylie Martin to General Houston.*

† Letter of A. Huston, April 1, 1836. Letter of David Thomas, acting secretary of war, April 10, 1836. Letter of Elijah Slack, March 23, 1854. Captain Smith was a brother-in-law of Colonel Rusk. It is said the *Twin-Sisters* are now at Baton Rouge, in the service of the United States. Texas ought to have them, and could doubtless obtain them by asking.

charge of Colonel Hockley, who kept them in efficient order. Texas will never cease to be grateful to Cincinnati for that valuable present.

It is proper here to state, in order to bring up the current of events in this busy period of Texan history, that the authorities had managed, through the kindness of good friends, to pick up a small navy of three vessels, viz. : the *Invincible*, Captain L. Brown; the *Brutus*, Captain Hurd; and the *Independence*, Captain Hawkins. These vessels were not idle, but were of infinite service to Texas in preventing the enemy from receiving supplies. In the first days of April the *Invincible* sailed on a cruise off Brasos Santiago, and fell in with the *Montezuma*, Captain Thompson. After a fight of two hours, the Mexican vessel was driven on shore, and left in a sinking condition. After repairing his rigging (the only injury he received), Captain Brown stood out from the harbor, and fell in with the brig *Pocket*, from New Orleans to Matamoros, freighted with flour, lard, rice, and biscuit, for the Mexican army, under contract with a house in the former city. The *Pocket* was brought into Galveston. From letters found on board, it was ascertained that Santa Anna's object was to secure the seaports, and place a thousand men on Galveston island.\* All this information was communicated to Houston about the time he crossed the Brasos river. This intelligence, and the near approach of the enemy, determined the government to fortify Galveston island. For this purpose, several pieces of artillery were brought from the seaports south; and the *Independence* was detained in the bay to aid in commencing the work. The citizens there volunteered their assistance, and placed themselves under the command of Colonel Morgan.

The acting secretary of war, in his letter to the commander-

\* Letters of David Thomas, acting Secretary of War, April 7 and 8, 1836.



in-chief of the 12th of April, after referring to the fact that the enemy had crossed the Brasos at Fort Bend, says: "There is nothing to stop his march to this place [Harrisburg], or Galveston, in twenty-four hours. There are a number of families here and in the neighborhood, who came here under the belief that they would be safe, who are now exposed to the attack of the enemy. You have assured the government that the enemy should never cross the Brasos: they have relied on your assurance, but they find your pledges not verified, and numberless families exposed to the ravages of the enemy. The country expects something from you; the government looks to you for action. The time has now arrived to determine whether we are to give up the country, and make the best of our way out of it, or to meet the enemy, and make at least one struggle for our boasted independence. The government does not intend to control your movements; but it is expected that, without delay, you will take measures to check those of the enemy."

This letter was received by the commander-in-chief on the 13th, at a moment when he was pressed by business, and making his arrangements for offensive operations. He, however, considered the taunts and suggestions in the secretary's letter as gratuitous, because he was harassed with difficulties which the government could not appreciate. His answer, under the circumstances, was mild,\* and went into a summary of past events. There was hardly a time during the campaign when the enemy's force was not ten times as great as his own—a well-appointed army, composed mostly of veteran troops, supplied with artillery, arms, and munitions, and commanded by a general who, up to that period, had never known defeat. The Texan army, on the contrary, was a hasty collection of farmers, paid and fed upon promises, poorly armed, and with

\* Appendix I.—No. 42.

every variety of weapon, and up to that time without a single piece of artillery. Add to this that their wives and children, objects dear to them, were homeless wanderers—flying, without food or shelter, unprotected by the stalwart arm of their natural defenders from the ravages of a barbarous foe—and we must admire the sagacity and address that kept so many of them together so long. Half a generation has passed away since that campaign, and a thinking world, which in the end always comes to a just conclusion, has stamped its progress and termination as heroic.

Complaints have been made of the apathy of eastern Texas, as though the people of that section did not love their country as well as those of the west. We should first look at their condition, and have the same understanding of affairs that they did, before we condemn. It was known to them that General Gaona, with a well-appointed division of the Mexican army, was on his way to Nacogdoches, with orders from Santa Anna to shoot all who were taken with arms in their hands, and to drive the others out of the country. His route lay along the frontiers, passing the Trinity at the upper or Camanche crossing.\* The order directing him to change his course to San Felipe was unknown to the Texans. The country through which he marched was thronged with Indians, already stirred up by the emissaries of the Mexicans, and naturally disposed to join them; for it is to the credit of the latter that they had ever excelled the Americans in kindness toward the aboriginal tribes. Of their motive for this we need not stop to inquire. The people of eastern Texas, then, felt that their danger was imminent. This apparent danger was increased by the threats

\* In old times, there were three well-known crossings on the Trinity: first, the *upper* crossing, at the present town of Magnolia—the oldest road in Texas; second, the *middle* crossing, at Robbins's ferry, established in 1689, by De Leon; and, third, the *lower* crossing, at Liberty, established in 1805.

and movements of the Indians. To ascertain the facts, the committee of vigilance at Nacogdoches despatched agents to the Indians. C. H. Sims and William Sims, who were sent to the Cherokees, reported them to be hostile, and making preparations for war; that they were drying beef and preparing meal, and said they were about sending off their women and children; that they had murdered Brooks Williams, an American trader among them; that they said a large body of Indians, composed of Caddoes, Keechies, Ionies, Twowokanics, Wacoos, and Camanches, were expected to attack the American settlements; that the Cherokees gave every indication of joining them; that the number of warriors embodied on the Trinity was estimated at seventeen hundred; and that Bolles, the principal Cherokee chief, advised the agents to leave the country, as there was danger. M. B. Menard, who was sent to the Shawanec, Delaware, and Kickapoo tribes, reported that, while these tribes were friendly, they had been visited by Bolles, who urged them to take up arms against the Americans.\*

With these facts before them, the committee of vigilance and the people of Nacogdoches were ready to credit the rumor that the combined Mexicans and Indians were already within a few miles of the town. On the 9th of April, the *alcalde*, Hoffman, ordered every able-bodied Mexican, within the municipality of Nacogdoches, to take up the line of march to the army within ten days, or to cross the Sabine. The companies of Captains Ratliff, Smith, and Chesher, on their way to the army, were detained, to aid in protecting the place.† Such was the supposed emergency, that horses were pressed into the public service for the use of the civic forces. Judge Quitman, with

\* Depositions of William Sims, C. H. Sims, and M. B. Menard, taken before Henry Raguét, chairman of the committee of vigilance, April 11, 1836.

† Order of R. A. Irion, commandant of the municipality, April 14, 1836.

a few companions, coming into the town, was called upon to give his aid in protecting the families on their way to the Sabine, which he cheerfully agreed to do.\*

In answer to Houston's strong appeal to the people of eastern Texas to turn out and hasten to his assistance, three companies, commanded by Captains Ratliff, Smith, and Cheshier, with an aggregate of two hundred and twenty men, were ready to set out on the march for headquarters as early as the 9th of April; but on account of the supposed pressing danger at Nacogdoches, as previously mentioned, they were detained till the 16th before they marched. In a few days more, a like number were ready to leave. But all this aid was too late. "The citizens of Nacogdoches," says Henry Raguet, chairman of the committee of vigilance, under date of the 17th of April, "were induced to believe, only a few days since, that the enemy in large force was within a few miles of this place. Under this belief, the volunteer companies, commanded by Captains Cheshier, Ratliff, and Smith, were detained until yesterday. In addition to the cause above stated, Rumor, with her thousand tongues, had created the belief that the Mexicans of this municipality were embodying themselves for the purpose of attacking the Americans. This committee have taken every means in their power to allay the panic, and, if possible, to bring men to their sober senses. When the committee found themselves

\* Judge Quitman's letter is as follows:—

"HALF-MILE FROM TOWN.

"*To the Officers in command at Nacogdoches:*

"GENTLEMEN: I am here, with sixteen tolerably well-armed men. We are on a tour of observation only, but ready to assist in the retreat of your women and children. It would be, in my opinion, without any good result to stand against vastly superior numbers in defence of the town. If you will join us with all your armed force, we will aid you in covering the retreat of your families to the Sabine. Let us hear of your determination as soon as possible.

"Respectfully, JOHN A. QUITMAN."

This letter was written about the 12th of April.

in possession of the facts in relation to the disaffection of the Mexicans, they took prompt measures to prevent a rupture, which threatened serious consequences to the welfare and safety of our citizens; and they are happy to state that the difficulty has been most happily terminated."

Thus the affairs in eastern Texas had disappointed the government as well as the commander-in-chief: for, if the latter had made pledges that were not verified, the government had done the same. The levy of two thirds of the militia never came. The supply of arms, provisions, &c., only reached the Texan army after it had crossed the Brasos. While neither possessed the power of ubiquity and omnipotence, neither could be responsible for matters beyond their control. It is perhaps enough to say—and truth will justify so much—that, under all the circumstances, both parties did what they could for their adopted country. She was poor; her people were poor—and not only so, but deeply distressed. Their affairs were such, and so dark was the cloud hanging over them, that they could not afford merely to *check* the enemy: it was essential that he should be *whipped*. Texas could not survive two battles: the work had to be done in one, and well done.\*

Among other difficulties with which Texas had to contend was the presence of a considerable number of persons of no country or sympathy—treacherous to all—who were busily engaged in spreading alarm, and increasing the public confu-

\* "After the army had crossed the Brasos, the companies below, in pursuance of orders, joined the main body at Donoho's. Houston rode along their lines, and, in a short address, said that 'he had been blamed by some because the Texans were not permitted to meet the enemy; but that, so soon as circumstances would permit it to be done to advantage, we should have it to our satisfaction.' I remember it well, from the fact that there was in the ranks a large man, by the name of Harman, celebrated for his good nature and good humor, who, in answer to this speech, said, 'General, let it be an easy-going fight!'—*Memoranda of Rev. A. J. M'Gown.*

sion. To this list should be added a class of a still worse character, who fattened upon the stolen plunder of the flying inhabitants. Then there were others, in the Mexican interest, who were spies in the Texan ranks. Of these several classes, many arrests were made, and their persons secured until the danger was over. It is not unlikely that some were thus confined who ought not to have been. Among those arrested was Colonel Ellis P. Bean. He had been appointed a member of the committee of vigilance of Nacogdoches, but, as it appears, took no part in their affairs. At the beginning of the war, in the fall of 1835, he had applied to Colonel John Forbes to place him in arrest, the better to enable him to draw his pay as colonel in the Mexican army; but Colonel Forbes declined to do so, unless for some offence. It appears that in April, 1836, some report had come into circulation relative to an alleged correspondence of Bean with the enemy, which induced the secretary of war to order his arrest. As the truth of the report was very questionable, he was ordered into custody, and detained only as a Mexican officer and alien of the republic.\* But when the enemy retreated, nothing further was heard on the subject.

\* Houston's order to D. A. Hoffman, for the arrest of Colonel E. P. Bean, April 13, 1836. There is little doubt but Bean's real feelings were in favor of the Texans. In 1833, while he was commandant at Nacogdoches, he addressed the following letter to Houston:—

“ February 4, 1833.

“ *From the Commander of Nacogdoches:*

“As it appears that it is the wish of the citizens of this country that you should be a member of the committee [the convention of 1833 he refers to], to form this eastern part into a state—formerly governed by Coahuila—I feel myself willing to support you so far as my military orders will permit me to do.

“Your obedient servant, E. P. BEAN.

“General Houston.”



## CHAPTER V.

As has been stated, Santa Anna, at the head of more than seven hundred men, with a twelve-pounder, reached Harrisburg on the 15th of April. The last communication from the war department at that town was dated on the 14th. The president and vice-president had gone to look after their families on the 13th; Colonel Potter had been for some time at Galveston, attending to the affairs of the navy; Colonel Rusk was in the army; the secretary of state had been some time sick, east of the Trinity: so that the attorney-general and secretary of the treasury were the only cabinet officers left at the seat of government.\*

As to his future course, the commander-in-chief had kept his own counsel. He had already notified the army to be in readiness for action; and Colonel Rusk, with whom he advised and consulted in all matters, gave notice, in his proclamation of the 13th of April, that the Texans had taken up the line of march to meet the enemy: yet the determination of the commander-in-chief was only known to the secretary of war. On the morning of the 15th, Major Martin and his command, being worn out and exhausted with fatigue, were directed to conduct the families, that were flying from the seat of war, to Robbins's ferry; while the main army, augmented by the detachments

\* David Thomas to Sam Houston, April 14, 1836.

that had come in, set out rapidly for Harrisburg. The prairies were wet, filled with quicksands, and almost impassable. The prospect was gloomy indeed, and the troops were much dispirited; yet they were encouraged in seeing the commander-in-chief put his shoulder to the wheels to assist the wagons through the mud. On that day they marched entirely through the prairie, and encamped at Mrs. M'Carely's, at the first timber. As the army left Donoho's, a negro, who had been captured and then released by the enemy, brought General Houston a message from Santa Anna, to the effect that "he knew Mr. Houston was up there in the bushes; and, so soon as he had whipped the land-thieves, down there, out of the country, he would come up and smoke him out!"

There was at that time a considerable number of disaffected persons on the coast, east of the San Jacinto; and it was an important object with Houston not to allow the Mexicans to have communication with them, as they would thereby obtain supplies of provisions and gain information. They would also, by such means, be enabled to control the Indians on the lower Trinity. With a view to anticipate any intercourse between the enemy and these Indians, Houston had engaged Messrs. Hubert and Rankin, Indian agents, to sound the Cooshatties on the question of giving the Texans aid. They promised to furnish ninety warriors. Just before the army set out for Harrisburg, the commander-in-chief sent Captain Jacob H. Sheppard with a "talk" to the Indians, and an order to the agents to bring on the warriors.\* It is sufficient to say here, that the Indians wished to see which side was successful before they

\* Notes of J. H. Sheppard. Captain Sheppard says: "Just as I was leaving the general's quarters, I said, 'Where will I find you, general?' He said: 'Tell all the people you may see, captain, that I am determined to fight, the first chance; and, if I should meet with a reverse, I will be sure to make noise enough for you and the Indians to follow me.'"

turned out. But if the enemy had succeeded in opening an intercourse with the Indians, they might have rallied every tribe in eastern Texas, and thus surrounded and cut off the small army under Houston; and not only so, but closed the Texas campaign with a tragedy more bloody than the one with which it opened.

To prevent this disastrous result, a forced march was made by the Texans from Donoho's to Harrisburg. They reached the bayou, opposite the town, on the 18th, a little before noon. Here they remained that day, partly to rest—for they were greatly fatigued—and partly to procure information. Deaf Smith, Karnes, and others, were sent over to reconnoitre. The former, about dark, brought into the camp two captives whom he had taken on the road leading west from Harrisburg—the one a Mexican courier bearing despatches to Santa Anna, the other a guard. From the spies it was ascertained that the Mexican advance had marched down Buffalo bayou, crossing Vince's bridge; and, having burnt Harrisburg, had passed down in the direction of the bay. From the Mexican courier\* they obtained the mail directed to Santa Anna, from which they learned the important fact, before suspected, that the dictator himself was with the advance, and that they had him cut off from the main body of his troops. By reference to the topography of that locality, it was seen that he must necessarily return by Vince's bridge, or cross Buffalo bayou, just below the Texan camp, at Lynch's, at the mouth of the San Jacinto. In either way he was cut off from the main body of his army. The Texans derived the further information that Santa Anna was requested, by the government at home, to give protection with his troops to the surveyor and commissioner, appointed

\* This was a Mexican officer, an extraordinary courier, who had come on from the city of Mexico. — *Juan J. Andrade to Santa Anna, April 9, 1836.*

on the part of Mexico, to run the boundary-line between Texas and the United States, according to the treaty between the two nations, and for which purpose Colonel Pedro Garcia Condé was appointed surveyor, and Colonel Almonté commissioner.\* A letter from General Filisola to Santa Anna gave the information that the chief's order as to the disposition of certain forces was received, and would be obeyed. This was supposed, as afterward proved to be the fact, to refer to reinforcements ordered by Santa Anna.

These despatches being read,† General Houston determined to cross the bayou early on the morning of the 19th, and go in pursuit of the enemy. Orders were consequently given to Colonels Burleson and Sherman to have three days' rations prepared, and like orders for repairing a boat two miles below, on the bayou. The troops were formed on the morning of the 19th, and addressed by the commander-in-chief and the secretary of war. The presence of Santa Anna with the enemy's advance was also made known to them. The baggage and wagons, and two or three hundred sick and non-effectives were left in charge of Major M-Nutt, on the left bank of the bayou. Houston then despatched a letter to Henry Raguet, advising him that they were about to meet Santa Anna; that they had looked in vain for help from eastern Texas; that it was then

\* Monasterio to Santa Anna, March 23, 1836.

† Some explanation of the manner in which Deaf Smith captured and brought in two prisoners, is necessary. It is given as related by the general himself. Smith came in, greatly fatigued, and somewhat exasperated. He repaired to the general's quarters, and said he wished to have a little talk with him. Said he: "General, you are very kind to these Mexicans; I like kindness, but you are too kind—you won't allow me to kill any of them! If a man meets two of the enemy, and is not allowed to kill either, by the time he takes one and ties him, the other gets off so far, that it is very fatiguing on a horse to catch him; and I wish you would let me manage things in my own way." Houston told him not to be cruel, but that he must be his own judge of the necessity of securing such of the enemy as might be taken by him. Smith nodded his head—for he was a man of few words—and retired.

the part of wisdom, growing out of necessity, to encounter the enemy; that no previous occasion justified it; that they were going to conquer; that the troops were in fine spirits, and, though the odds were against them, they would use their best efforts to fight the enemy to such advantage as to gain the victory.\*

\* Appendix I.—No. 43. Colonel Rusk also sent out the following address, to which the commander-in-chief added a postscript:—

WAR DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, HARRISBURG. *April 19, 1836.*

“TO THE PEOPLE OF TEXAS—*Fellow-Citizens*: Let me make one more appeal to you to turn out, and rally to the standard of your country. The army reached here yesterday late in the day. Our scouts arrested three of the Mexicans—one captain, one a *corréo* [express-rider], direct from Mexico, and another a servant. From the prisoners we learn many interesting facts. Santa Anna himself is just below us, and within the sound of the drum—has, we understand, only five hundred men. We are parading our forces for the purpose of marching upon him. He has a reinforcement of about one thousand men upon the Brasos, about forty miles from here. A few hours more will decide the fate of our army: and what an astonishing fact it is, that, at the very moment when the fate of your wives, your children, your honors, your country, and all that is dear to a freeman, are suspended upon the issue of one battle, not one fourth of the people [men] of Texas are in the army! Are you Americans? are you freemen? If you are, prove your blood and birth by rallying at once to your country's standard! Your general is at the head of a brave and chivalrous band, and throws himself, sword in hand, into the breach, to save his country, and vindicate her rights. Enthusiasm prevails in the army; but I look'round and see that many, very many, whom I had anticipated would be first in the field, are not here.

“Rise up at once, concentrate, and march to the field!—a vigorous effort, and the country is safe! A different course disgraces and ruins you; and what is life worth with the loss of liberty? May I never survive it!

“Your fellow-citizen, THOMAS J. RUSK, *Secretary of War.*”

*April 19, 1836.*

“We view ourselves on the eve of battle. We are nerved for the contest, and must conquer or perish. It is vain to look for present aid: none is at hand. We must now act, or abandon all hope! Rally to the standard, and be no longer the scoff of mercenary tongues! Be men, be freemen, that your children may bless their fathers' names!

“Colonel Rusk is with me, and I am rejoiced at it. The country will be the gainer, and myself the beneficiary. Liberty and our country!

“SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief.*”

The above are the last papers written by these gentlemen previous to the battle of the 21st, so far as the writer knows.

The army proceeded on its march, taking only the cavalry-horses, and those needed for the "*Twin-Sisters*" and an ammunition-wagon. The measles having broken out in the camp, caused the large number of sick that were left behind. Advancing to the ferry, they found the boat not repaired, notwithstanding which they proceeded to cross. Thirty pioneers, under Captain Wood, first passed over. The commander-in-chief went with the second boat. Colonel Rusk remained to assist in the crossing, and none labored more ardently to effect that object. A raft of plank was used to facilitate the passage. The horses were caused to swim across the bayou below the ferry. Before sundown the whole force had passed over without accident, and took up the line of march down the right bank of the bayou, and on the enemy's trail.

After advancing twelve miles, the Texans halted at one o'clock on the morning of the 20th, at a beautiful spot in the prairie. At this time they were aware that the Mexicans had not crossed the San Jacinto, but it was not known exactly where they were. In fact, they had passed near the ferry at Lynch's on the 16th. The Texans, being greatly exhausted by incessant labor and marching, threw themselves on the ground without refreshment, and slept.

We must here notice the narrow escape of President Burnet. On the 13th, as has been stated, he left Harrisburg, to provide for the safety of his family. On the same day he brought them to New Washington, below Lynch's, on the bay, with a view to facilitate their passage, if necessary, to Galveston. On the next day the president set out on horseback for Harrisburg; but learning on the way that the Mexicans were there, he returned on the morning of the 16th, in the steamer "*Cayuga*," to New Washington. It was understood that the boat, which was crowded with families, and bound for Ana-



huac, was to return the next morning to take off those at New Washington. On the morning of the 17th, after breakfast, and while they were preparing for the steamboat, the Mexican cavalry came suddenly on them. They hastily got into a small boat, and had not rowed more than forty yards from the shore, when the enemy dismounted; but they fortunately made their escape.\*

At dawn of day, on the 20th, the Texans were aroused by a tap of the drum—for the *reveillé* was forbidden—and resumed their march down the bayou. After proceeding about seven miles, they halted for breakfast. While it was in preparation, the scouts came in, and announced that they had given chase to those of the enemy, until they discovered his advance coming up the bay. The Texans, without taking breakfast, made a forced march down the bayou, in order to arrive at Lynch's ferry before their opponents. An advance of thirty or forty of the Texans proceeded rapidly to the ferry, where they arrived by ten o'clock in the forenoon, and found a like number of the enemy there, with a substantial new flat-boat,† loaded with provisions for the Mexican army. It was doubtless some of the plunder of Harrisburg or New Washington. The enemy's guard fled at the approach of the Texan advance; the boat and provisions were taken, and sent up the bayou, three fourths of a mile to the rear of the Texan camp, which was established there, along the right bank of the bayou, in a skirt of timber. This supply of provisions was most fortunate, as the Texans had no other during that and the following day.

The Texan camp was protected by the timber, and a rising ground running parallel with the bayou. The camp extended

\* Letter of Dr. George M. Patrick, March 26, 1838.

† It was said that this boat had been constructed by some recreant Americans for the enemy.

some five hundred yards, and about its centre the skirt of timber reached nearly to the top of the rise in front. On either side of this centre the summit of the elevation was composed of prairie. The infantry, about two hundred, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Millard, were stationed in this neck of timber, extending toward the top of the rise; and the "*Twin-Sisters*," under Colonel Neill, were placed on the elevation, immediately in front of Millard. The first regiment of riflemen, under Colonel Burleson, formed the right wing; and the second, under Colonel Sherman, composed the left. The cavalry was stationed in the centre, and in rear of the infantry. In front of the centre of the Texan camp, some three or four hundred yards distant, was a cluster of timber; also in front and to the left of the centre, about one hundred yards distant, was another cluster of timber. Elsewhere in front the field was prairie.

The Texans, having established their camp, formed for battle. While they were doing this, the Mexican artillery (one twelve-pounder), having advanced to the first-named cluster of timber, opened upon them. After firing about an hour, without doing any other damage than wounding Colonel Neill, the enemy sent forward a detachment of infantry, armed with *escopetas*, into the nearest wood. Being discovered there, Colonel Sherman applied for leave to charge on them with the Texan cavalry, in all eighty-five men. Permission was given, and the charge made; but, as the Mexicans were in the wood, nothing was effected, and the cavalry returned without damage.

Shortly after this, a large portion of the enemy's forces advanced rapidly, in column, from the point occupied by their artillery to within a hundred and fifty yards of the Texan cannon: the latter opened on them, when they wheeled and fell back precipitately. This retreat was answered by a shout

from the Texan ranks that would have alarmed less timid spirits. The Texans did not pursue them, but the "*Twin-Sisters*" kept up a fire on them till they got out of danger, doing them some damage. The enemy withdrew to a position near the bank of the San Jacinto river (or bayou, for it was below their junction), about three fourths of a mile from the Texan encampment, where they commenced to fortify.

In the evening, about an hour before sunset, Colonel Sherman asked permission of the commander-in-chief to take the cavalry and reconnoitre. The general at first objected, but on reflection consented, ordering him strictly not to go within musket-shot of the enemy, or provoke a conflict, but to advance as near as he otherwise could to ascertain their position: and for this reason—that the precipitate retreat of the enemy after their charge that day had infused the finest feeling into the Texan army, and he was unwilling that any disaster in a partial engagement should disturb that feeling.

The cavalry set out, and continued to advance, receiving a volley from the left of the enemy's infantry, and, after a sharp rencontre with their cavalry, retired. In the meantime, the infantry under Colonel Millard, Colonel Burleson's regiment, and the artillery, had advanced to aid the cavalry, if necessary. In this affair, the Texan cavalry acquitted themselves handsomely; and among the most distinguished of their number was Mirabeau B. Lamar, who, joining the army at Groce's, fell into the ranks, and soon earned an enviable reputation as a soldier.\* The Texans had two wounded, one mortally and the other severely; they also lost several horses. The loss of the enemy was doubtless more considerable.†

\* Foote, in his "Texas and the Texans," has given a lively sketch of General Lamar, vol. ii., p. 284.

† Foote, in his account of this affair, has placed Colonel Sherman in the attitude of attempting a *ruse*, by which to bring on a general battle, contrary to

Both armies having retired to their quarters, the evening passed off, and with it the excitement of the day. The Texans, being hungry and fatigued, after eating, obtained a refreshing sleep. The enemy in the meantime completed his breastwork of trunks and baggage. Thursday, the 21st of April, was a clear, fine day. Early in the morning, the Texan commander-in-chief directed Colonel Forbes, the commissary-general, to furnish Deaf Smith with one or more axes, and to have them at a certain place. At the same time, he sent for Smith, and directed him not to go out of the line of sentinels that day without special permission, as he had particular business for him of a secret character.\*

About nine o'clock that morning it was discovered that a considerable force, under General Cos, was advancing from the direction of Vince's bridge toward the enemy's camp. As it was seen by the Texans, it was believed to be a reinforcement to Santa Anna. The commander-in-chief, although his spies had brought information of the arrival of the reinforcement, not caring that it should be at that time known, suggested that it was a *ruse* of the Mexicans; that they had marched round from their left wing, and were returning, with a view to make the impression that they were reinforced.†

About noon, or a little before, the commander-in-chief was waited on by several of the officers, suggesting a council of war. He assented to the proposition, and it was informally

the wishes and orders of the commander-in-chief; and has represented him as getting Colonel Millard to march his command to a ravine, and Captain Poe to keep up his fire on the enemy's cannon, &c., as if he had assumed the command of the army, and the commander-in-chief had become a subordinate! This charge of insubordination and deceit is unworthy of Colonel Sherman. — Vol. ii, p. 298, *et seq.* It was a chief object with Houston to conceal from the enemy the number of his forces, and not to attack him while on the alert.

\* Statement of Colonel John Forbes.

† Statement of Colonel George W. Hockley.

held immediately,\* consisting of Colonels Burleson and Sherman, Lieutenant-Colonels Millard, Somerville, and Bennett, and Major Wells. The question was laid before them, "Whether they should attack the enemy in his position, or await an attack from him in theirs." The two last-named officers were in favor of an attack on the enemy in his position: the others were in favor of awaiting an attack from him. The reasons given for the latter opinion were—that the Texan camp was admirably situated for defence; that the Mexicans were fortified in their encampment; that it was defended by veterans, well disciplined; and that an attack upon them through an open prairie, with undisciplined militia, armed mostly with rifles, was unprecedented. The council was then dismissed.

Deaf Smith and a companion† whom he had been directed, in the morning, to select, were now sent for, and secretly despatched, with the axes, to cut down Vince's bridge, and burn it—the commander-in-chief saying to Smith, as he departed, that the grass, which he then beheld before him so beautiful in the prairie, would be crimsoned before his return, unless he was speedy.

Bray's bayou runs into Buffalo bayou at Harrisburg, on the right bank. Five miles farther down toward the bay, over Vince's bayou, is Vince's bridge. It was crossed by both armies on their downward march, and was the only passway by land, especially at that season of the year, to the Brasos. After the main body of the Mexican reinforcement under General Cos had passed Bray's bayou, and while the rear-guard was crossing over, the wagoners and some others of the Texan

\* In a sketch of Houston, published at Washington city, by John T. Towers, it is stated that this council of war assembled on the grass, under a post-oak tree. The present account of it is mostly taken from a statement made by Colonel Joseph L. Bennett (one of the members of the council), September 17, 1841.

† Understood to be Mr. Reeves.


camp-guard near Harrisburg, hearing the noise, paraded under the command of Wagon-master Rhorer, made a forced march to the bayou, and gave them a volley, which so alarmed them, that they turned and fled toward the Brasos, scattering and leaving their baggage on the road. The wagoners thereupon crossed over, and gathered quite a supply.

It is proper to state here, that, so soon as the reinforcement under Cos was seen to come in, Karnes and Smith had been sent to their last place of encampment, to ascertain, from the number of camp-fires and other signs, the probable strength of this auxiliary force. They returned and reported privately, as they had been directed, about five hundred and forty men.

Shortly after the departure of Smith and Reeves to destroy the bridge, Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett was sent through the camp to ascertain the state of feeling among the troops. He reported them all enthusiastic, and in fine spirits. It was now nearly three o'clock in the afternoon. The Mexicans were dull and heavy, the higher class of them enjoying their *siesta*. Santa Anna admits that he himself was asleep.\* Houston, having formed his plan of battle, submitted it to the secretary of war, who approved of it. He then ordered the troops to parade, which they did with alacrity and spirit. The locality

\* See his "Manifesto." He handles the point most delicately: "All I can be responsible for is physical debility, for after having marched the whole of the previous day, and spending the night in watching, and the morning on horseback, I yielded to repose, which I was unfortunately induced to prolong in consequence of the delay of General Cos's troops. As general-in-chief, I had fulfilled my duty, by disposing everything on the field, and issuing the necessary orders; as a man, I yielded to the insurmountable necessity of nature, which can not, I think, be charged as a crime against any general, or me—much less when it took place at mid day, underneath a tree, and in the camp itself; a proof that I did not abandon myself immoderately to that which, after all, is but a comfort, a balm, or gentle tribute to human nature, with which the greatest men have been unable to dispense, not excepting *him*, the great military exemplar of our age: and yet for this they were not accused of rashness, and want of foresight, and due caution."





Open Prairie

Road to New Washington

LAKE ANNA MARIA  
FRANCISCO

C A L I F O R N I A

SAN JACINTO BATTLE-GROUND.



of the Texan camp afforded ample opportunity to form in order of battle without being seen by the enemy. Burleson's regiment was placed in the centre; Sherman's on the left wing; the artillery, under Hockley, on the right of Burleson; the infantry, under Millard, on the right of the artillery; and the cavalry, under Lamar (whose gallant conduct the day before had won him this command), on the extreme right. The enemy's cavalry was on his left wing; his centre, which was fortified, was composed of his infantry, with his artillery in an opening in the centre of the breastwork. He had extended his extreme right to the river, so as to occupy a skirt of timber projecting out from it.

The Texan cavalry was first despatched to the front of the enemy's horse, to draw their attention; while the remainder of the army, which had advanced in column to the cluster of timber three or four hundred yards in front, was deploying into line. The evolution was quickly performed, and the whole force advanced rapidly and in good order. The secretary of war, at the request of the general-in-chief, took command of the left wing. While the Texans were thus advancing, Deaf Smith rode at the top of his horse's speed to the front, and informed Houston that Vince's bridge was destroyed. The general announced it to the line. The "*Twin-Sisters*" now advanced to within two hundred yards of the Mexican breastwork, and opened a destructive fire with grape and canister. Sherman's regiment commenced the action upon the Texan left. The whole line, advancing in double quick time, cried, "*Remember the Alamo!*"—" *Remember Goliad!*"—and, while approaching the enemy's works, received his fire, but withheld their own until within pistol-shot. The effect of this fire on the enemy was terrible. But the Texans made no halt—onward they went. On the left, they penetrated the woodland:

the Mexicans fled. On the right, the Texan cavalry charged that of the enemy: the latter fled. In the centre, the Texan artillery advanced to within seventy yards of that of the Mexicans, but ceased to fire, for Burleson's regiment and Millard's infantry had stormed the breastwork, took the enemy's artillery, and were driving them back.

In fifteen minutes after the charge, the Mexicans gave way at all points, and the pursuit was general. Some of them fled to the river, some to the swamp in their rear, others toward Vince's bridge, but the largest portion perhaps to a clump of trees not far to the rear, where they surrendered. Such was their consternation, and so sudden their defeat, that their cannon was left loaded, and their precious moveables untouched; those that were asleep, awoke only in time to be overwhelmed; those that were cooking their dinner, left it uneaten; those that were playing *monté*, left the game unfinished. The morass in the rear and right of the enemy's camp, and into which so many of the fugitives fled, presented an awful scene. Men and horses, dead and dying, formed a bridge for the furious pursuers. The Texans, having no time to load their guns, used them as clubs. So with their pistols; they then had recourse to their bowie-knives, and finally to the weapons of the fallen enemy. It is said that Deaf Smith, after announcing to Houston the news of the destruction of the bridge, threw himself into the midst of the enemy, and, after breaking his own sword in combat, coolly took another from one he had slain, and continued the work of death. "The commander-in-chief," says the secretary of war in his report, "acted with great gallantry, encouraging the men to the attack, and heroically charged, in front of the infantry, within a few yards of the enemy." It was here that he received a severe wound in his ankle, and had his horse shot two or three times.

The pursuit of the enemy's cavalry continued to the site of Vince's bridge. Karnes led in this pursuit. He discovered in advance of him a Mexican officer in a splendid uniform, and mounted on a beautiful black charger. Being well mounted himself, he had a desire to capture him, and went in pursuit. Perhaps such a race was never before seen in Texas. Karnes, unable to gain on the fugitive, supposed he would take him at the destroyed bridge. The officer, reaching the bayou, saw that the bridge was gone, but, making no halt, plunged down the steep descent into the water; and, as Karnes rode up on the right bank, to his utter astonishment he saw his foe climbing the almost perpendicular wall on the other!

At dark the pursuit of the flying enemy ceased. The prisoners taken were conducted to the Texan camp, placed under guard, and supplied with provisions. A suitable guard was also left at the Mexican camp. The wounded of both armies were as well provided for as the circumstances would permit. After the excitement of the battle had somewhat subsided, Houston found that his wounded limb had swollen; his boot was cut off, and such attention paid to the wound as could be procured to alleviate the pain.\*

The main body of the prisoners were taken that night. At their head was the cheerful and philosophical Almonté. With him it appeared only a scene in life's drama. Conversing fluently in both English and Spanish, he threw a charm over all with whom he came in contact. At a time so trying to his comrades, he proved himself a true descendant of the brave

\* See reports of General Houston and Colonel Rusk, Appendix I., Nos. 44 and 45. The writer has before him perhaps twenty accounts of this battle and its incidents, half of which have been published. The foregoing seems to be a fair deduction of the facts from them all. The accounts vary considerably, from the fact that no one of the eye-witnesses, however impartial, could himself see the tenth part of what occurred during the 20th and 21st.



Morelos, and worthy of a better fate than that accorded to his noble sire.

The aggregate force of the Texan army in the battle was seven hundred and eighty-three; that of the enemy was perhaps twice the number. The Mexicans lost six hundred and thirty killed, two hundred and eight wounded, and seven hundred and thirty prisoners; besides a large quantity of arms and great numbers of mules and horses taken, together with their camp-equipage, and the military chest, containing twelve thousand dollars. The Texan loss was only eight killed\* and twenty-five wounded!

On the morning of the 22d, detachments were sent out to scour the country toward Harrisburg, for the purpose of taking prisoners. A party of five, having reached Vince's, continued the search down Buffalo bayou. One of them, James A. Sylvester, while in the act of shooting a deer, discovered a Mexican pursuing his course toward the bridge. He called his companions, and they rode up to the fugitive, who had fallen down in the grass, and thrown a blanket over his head. They called to him to rise, but he only uncovered his face. They repeated the request for him to rise two or three times, when he did so. He advanced to Sylvester, and shook hands with him, at the same time kissing his hand. He inquired for General Houston: they said he was in camp. They then asked

\* Texans killed: Dr. William Motley, aide to the secretary of war; First-Lieutenant J. C. Hale, 2d regiment; Second-Lieutenant George A. Lamb, 2d regiment; First-Sergeant Thomas P. Fowl, 2d regiment. *Privates*: Lemuel Blakely, 1st regiment; ——— Cooper, 1st regiment; A. R. Stevens, 1st regiment; ——— Trask, 2d regiment (on the 20th). — *Official return.*

Among the Mexican killed were, General Castrillon, Colonel Batres, Colonel Mora, Colonel Trevino, Colonel José M. Romero, Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Aguirre, and Lieutenant-Colonel Castillon.

Among the prisoners taken were, General Santa Anna, General Cos, Colonel Almonté, Colonel Bringas, Colonel Oeepedes, Colonel Portilla, &c.



him who he was. He said he was a private soldier. Seeing the fine studs on the bosom of his shirt, they pointed toward them. He then said he was an aide to Santa Anna, and burst into a flood of tears. They reassured him. He was dressed as a common soldier, and had no arms. He exhibited to them a letter from Colonel Almonté. As he complained of not being able to walk, he was placed on one of their horses, and conducted to the camp\* by some of the party, Sylvester going in another direction.

The distinguished prisoner—for it was Santa Anna—was handed over to Colonel Forbes, at the guard-lines; and, exhibiting to him a letter addressed to “Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna,” desired to be conducted to General Houston. Colonel Hockley at that time passing by, the matter was referred to him; and they both concluding that it was Santa Anna, conducted him to headquarters. On the way, the Mexican prisoners exclaimed, “*El presidente!*”

Houston was lying on a mattress, under an oak which he had made his headquarters, with his wounded limb in an easy position,† and had fallen into a gentle slumber. Being awakened, the captive chieftain said to him, “I am General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, and a prisoner-of-war at your disposition.” Houston looked at him, and by a motion of his hand directed him to a tool-chest, where he could sit down. He did so, leaning forward, and pressing his sides with his hands. Colonel Forbes was then despatched for Santa Anna’s private secretary, in order to identify his chief. He was brought; and, in the meantime, Colonel Rusk and others came up. Santa Anna asked for opium. A piece of about five grains was

\* Letter of James A. Sylvester, sergeant in Captain Wood’s company.—*Telegraph of August 2, 1836.*

† Statement of Colonel Forbes.

handed him, which he swallowed. He immediately proposed to enter into negotiations for his liberation ; but General Houston answered him that it was a subject of which he could not take cognizance, inasmuch as Texas had a government, to which such matters appropriately belonged. Santa Anna observed that he disliked to have anything to do with civilians ; that he abhorred them, and would much rather treat with the general of the army. “And,” continued he, “general, you can afford to be generous ; you are born to no common destiny—you have conquered the Napoleon of the West.” General Houston and Colonel Rusk both assured him that no negotiations could be opened until the cabinet assembled. General Houston then asked him how he expected to negotiate under the circumstances that had occurred at the Alamo. About this time, Colonel Almonté, who had been sent for, arrived ; and, after salutations between him and his chief, the latter replied that “General Houston knew that, by the rules of war, when a fortress, insufficient to defend itself, was summoned to surrender, and refused, and caused the effusion of human blood, the vanquished, when it was taken, were devoted to execution.” General Houston replied that “he knew such to have been the rule at one period, but he thought it now obsolete, and a disgrace to the nineteenth century. But,” continued Houston, “General Santa Anna, you can not urge the same excuse for the massacre at Goliad : *they* capitulated, were betrayed, and massacred in cold blood !” Santa Anna replied : “If they ever had capitulated, he was not aware of it. Urrea had deceived him, and informed him that they were vanquished ; and he had orders from his government to execute all that were taken with arms in their hands.” Houston rejoined : “General Santa Anna, you are the government—a dictator has no superior.”—“But,” answered Santa Anna, “I have the order



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EJERCITO  
DE  
OPERACIONES.

E. S.

Suplicado

Habiendo ya por tardes tenido un encargo de  
degradar la boca Div. g. ibava i mis inme-  
diaciones, ha resultado con un perjuicio de  
guerra a los intereses, habiendome guardado  
todas las consideraciones posibles: en tal concepto,  
prevengo a V. E. orden al Sr. Jacinto An-  
manuel p. P. P. de lo que se espera ordenes, lo mismo  
q. de verificación V. E. en las copias q. tiene a sus  
ordenes, previniendo al mismo al Sr. Verea,  
se retire en su Div. a Guadalupe Victoria,  
pues se ha acordado con el Sr. Don Juan, un  
comunicación, para se arreglen algunas  
negociaciones q. hagan con la guerra p.  
siempre.

Quere V. E. dignarse p. la manutención  
del Ejército, q. sea luego guerra ya a las  
ordenes de V. E. en los Cuadros de Regaños  
a Matamoros, y otros q. deben existir  
en esta punta y N. de M., ademas de las



White mil. P. p. Brown stars in air. P. P. A.  
V. de Beaman in paper.

Spores of *Stropharia* *albona*, cum  
phlo. v. P. in octas *Stropharia*, *Stropharia*  
in contubernium, in cornu mar. & fructus in  
parvicia.

Sp. p. *Stropharia* *albona* in  
P. *Stropharia* *albona* in paper.



of our Congress to treat all that were found with arms in their hands, resisting the authority of the government, as pirates.\* And Urrea has deceived me. He had no authority to enter into any agreement; and, if I ever live to regain power, he shall be punished for it."

After a pause, Houston asked him if he did not desire some refreshment, as he supposed he was exhausted. He said he did. He was then asked if he desired to have his tents, baggage, staff, servants, &c. He replied that he would gladly have them. Colonel Almonté was thereupon directed to select them; and the prisoner's quarters were established near Houston's favorite tree, where he had his headquarters.

General Houston, previous to Santa Anna's retirement from the audience, stated to him that he must forthwith write an order to his second in command to evacuate Texas, and fall back to Monterey. His despatch, though not to the extent asked, is as follows:—

"ARMY OF OPERATIONS.

"EXCELLENT SIR: Having yesterday evening, with the small division under my immediate command, had an encounter with the enemy, which, notwithstanding I had previously taken all possible precautions, proved unfortunate, I am, in consequence, a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. Under these circumstances, your excellency will order General Gaona with his

\* Here are the decrees referred to by Santa Anna:—

"1. Foreigners landing on the coast of the republic, or invading its territory by land, armed, and with the intention of attacking our country, will be deemed *pirates*, and dealt with as such, being citizens of no nation presently at war with the republic, and fighting under no recognised flag.

"2. All foreigners who shall import, by either sea or land, in the places occupied by the rebels, either arms or ammunition of any kind for their use, will be deemed *pirates*, and punished as such.

"I send you these decrees, that you may cause them to be fully executed.

"TORNEL.

division to countermarch to Bexar, and wait for orders. Your excellency will also, with the division under your immediate command, march to the same place. The division under command of General Urrea will retire to Guadalupe Victoria. I have agreed with General Houston for an armistice, until matters can be so regulated that the war shall cease for ever.

“Your excellency will take the proper steps for the support of the army, which from this time remains under your command, using the moneys lately arrived from Matamoras, the provisions on hand there, as well as those at Victoria, and also the twenty thousand dollars withdrawn from Bexar, and are now in that treasury.

“I hope your excellency will, without failure, comply with these dispositions—advising me, by return of the courier, that you have already commenced their execution. God and liberty!

“Camp at San Jacinto, April 22, 1836.

“ANTO. LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

“To his Excellency DON VICENTE FILISOLA, *General of Division.*”

Santa Anna, at the same time, addressed another despatch to General Filisola, charging him to instruct the commandants of the several Mexican divisions not to permit any injury to be done to the inhabitants of the country: also, at the same time, a third note, directing Filisola to order the military commandant at Goliad to set all the prisoners, taken at Copano (as before related), at liberty, and send them forthwith to San Felipe de Austin.

These orders were despatched by Deaf Smith. The troops under Filisola had been encamped on the eastern bank of the Brasos. They could not be made to believe the report of the first fugitive from the battle-field of the San Jacinto; but when,

an hour afterward, a second one come in, orders to retreat were given, and they recrossed the river.\*

The 22d day of April was the first *free* day in Texas. Before then, her people had declared their independence, but now they had won it in a noble contest. The victory was physically and morally complete. The blow was given at the proper time, and in a vital part. In looking back at the events of the campaign, we can see no time when it could have succeeded so well. Providence seemed in every way to favor the result. It was a full retribution for past outrages. Santa Anna had presided over a feast of blood at the Alamo; he had ordered a second at Goliad; and he was made to behold another at San Jacinto. The Texans had their revenge. At that time, a thousand troops were on the way to reinforce their army; but it was so ordered that they should do the work themselves. At the period of the battle, the feeling in the United States was most intense. An agent of Texas, writing from New Orleans after the action, but before the receipt of the intelligence, says: "News received here, from every part of the United States, is very cheering. The cruelty of the Mexicans, and

\* Of this large invading force brought by Santa Anna into Texas, but few ever reached their homes. We have learned something of those that came from Yucatan. It was in the winter of 1835 that Santa Anna ordered a levy of eight hundred men from that state for the invasion of Texas. These men were torn away, by military force, from their families and occupations, to go on the campaign. The sudden use of harsh means, and the indignities offered them, filled them with despair (for the Yucatecos are greatly attached to their homes). They entered into a conspiracy against their officers; but it was discovered, and General Toro (a brother-in-law of Santa Anna) sent to Merida for a troop of Mexican cavalry, who disarmed them, and forced them in small companies to embark for Vera Cruz, where they were again supplied with arms, and incorporated with the invading army. It was a portion of this body of poor Indians that performed the bloody work at Goliad. From starvation, and the incidents of war, there were not so many as fifty of them that ever returned to see their wives and children! It was this cruelty in carrying away her citizens that exasperated Yucatan against Mexico, and caused her afterward to declare her independence. — *Letter of George Fisher, May 3, 1842.*

their disgraceful treachery, have caused a general burst of indignation from North to South. Fifty men leave here to-day by way of Galveston. General Felix Huston leaves Natchez, on the 5th of May next, with from five to seven hundred men. He will be accompanied by Rezin P. Bowie, brother of Colonel Bowie, who fell in the Alamo. They will march through lower Louisiana, directly to Harrisburg, or wherever your headquarters may be established. Fifty men have left Philadelphia; and, by the latest papers, I see that a county and town meeting has been called for the relief of Texas. A meeting has also been called in Baltimore. Men are gathering in Tennessee and Kentucky; and, in short, in every part of the United States, the barbarity of the enemy has harrowed up the hearts of all Americans, and a storm is gathering, the thunders of which will reach the centre of Mexico. The whole American press is in our favor. . . . In case our arms are successful, I hope our soldiers will not allow their passions to urge them to acts of barbarity, and thus deprive us of the immense moral strength we now possess in the sympathy and respect of all civilized men. Such acts, on the part of the Mexicans, have injured them more than our arms could have done; and retaliation on our part, I fear, would be equally fatal to Texas. I am happy in assuring you that you possess many warm friends in the United States, and that the prudent course you have pursued has inspired universal confidence as to the eventual result of the war. It is sincerely wished that a doubtful engagement will not be risked by you, as a very short time must give you force enough to place the contest beyond hazard.”\*

The Texan cabinet, after having dispersed at Harrisburg, reassembled at Galveston island.† The news of the arrival of

\* Edward Conrad to Sam Houston, April 30, 1836.

† President Burnet to the People of Texas, No. 1. Five successive papers,

the Texan army at the former place reached the officers of the government at Galveston about the 19th of April, yet they received no further intelligence from the army until the 26th. On that day, and previous to the reception of the news, an order was sent to Houston, if he considered it inexpedient to risk an engagement, and a retreat was *inevitable*, to march the army to Galveston.\* But the intelligence of the victory, which shortly afterward reached the government, assured it that a retreat was not necessary: and, with the news of this splendid achievement, came a special request from Colonel Rusk to President Burnet to repair to the camp at San Jacinto. Arriving there about the first of May, he was informed of the armistice† agreed to by Houston and Santa Anna, the object of it, and the consequent orders issued by the latter to Filisola on the 22d.

The effects taken in the battle of the 21st were first disposed of. The property was ordered to be sold, and the distribution of the proceeds and of the enemy's military chest were decreed by the government to be divided between the officers and men. Of the entire amount—eighteen thousand one hundred and eighty-four dollars and eighty-seven cents—three thousand dollars addressed by President Burnet to the people of Texas, appeared in so many successive numbers of the "Telegraph and Texas Register," commencing September 6, 1836, and throw much light upon the events of that period. They will be referred to by numbers.

\* "DEPARTMENT OF WAR, GALVESTON, April 26, 1836.

"TO GENERAL SAM HOUSTON: If you consider it inexpedient to risk an engagement with the enemy, and consider a retreat *inevitable* from the position you now occupy, you are hereby ordered to march with the army under your command to the nearest and most convenient point to this island, giving information of the same to this department, when transports will be sent forthwith to cross the troops to this island.

"WARREN D. C. HALL, *Acting Secretary of War.*"

† President Burnet calls it a *treaty*. Santa Anna was distinctly informed by both Houston and Rusk that the Texan government alone could *negotiate*; and the former so understood it. The treaty-making power had been, by the convention, specially delegated to the *civil* government.

lars were by the troops unanimously voted to the navy, and the balance distributed according to the decree.\* A poor pittance to those gallant men!—but it was all they received for many a day.

The government now proceeded to negotiate with Santa Anna. “Among the first incidents to that discussion,” says President Burnet, “and before any regular cabinet meeting was had, was the presentation to me of the protocol of a treaty, in pencil, comprising seven or eight articles, by Mr. Rusk, the secretary of war.”† These, being drawn out in form, were

\* Decree of the President and Cabinet, May 3, 1836. Official Report of John Forbes, Commissary-General.

† Address No. II. As this was the first treaty made by the new republic, a reference to its origin may not be improper. It is found in the following extract of a letter from Houston to Rusk, dated

“HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP SAN JACINTO, May 3, 1836.

“I have not the pleasure to know on what basis the executive government contemplate the arrangements with General Santa Anna, but I would respectfully suggest that, so far as I have been enabled to give my attention to the subject, the following points should have some weight:—

“The recognition of the independence of Texas should be a *sine qua non*.

“The limits of Texas should extend to the Rio Grande, from the mouth, pursuing the stream to its most northwestern source, and thence northeast to the line of the United States.

“Indemnity for all losses sustained by Texas during the war; commissioners to be appointed to ascertain the fact—one Mexican, one Texan, and one American.

“The guaranty to be obtained from the United States for the fulfilment of the stipulation on the part of the contracting parties.

“General Santa Anna to be retained as a hostage, with such other officers as the government may think proper, until they are recognised or ratified by the Mexican government.

“Immediate restoration of Texan or Mexican citizens, or those friendly to the cause of Texas, who may have been retained, with their property.

“Instantaneous withdrawal of all the Mexican troops from the limits of Texas.

“All property in Texas to be restored, and not molested by the troops, or marauders, in falling back.

“Cessation of all hostilities by sea and land.

“A guaranty for the safety and restoration of Mexican prisoners, so soon as the conditions shall be complied with.

“Agents to be sent to the United States, to obtain the mediation of that government in the affairs of Mexico and Texas.”—*New Orleans Bulletin*, July 12, 1836.



presented as the basis of a treaty. After considerable discussion in the cabinet, it was found that a minority of that body were opposed to making any treaty with the Mexican president. As he was a prisoner, they urged, with reason, that such a treaty would not be binding. Again, they said, though with less reason, that such had been his barbarity at Goliad and elsewhere, that he ought to be tried and put to death. But, happily, better and nobler counsels prevailed; and it was concluded by the majority that the best interests of Texas would be promoted by entering into a fair and honorable treaty with the distinguished captive, stipulating always for the absolute independence of Texas.

During this discussion, it became necessary to remove to other quarters. Accordingly, in a few days, the president and cabinet, with Santa Anna and most of the Mexican officers who were captives, took passage on the steamer "Yellowstone" for Galveston. But the entire want of accommodation at this point induced a second removal, to Velasco. Here the negotiations were continued. As Santa Anna desired that the *projet* of the treaty which had been submitted to him should be divided into a *public* and a *secret* treaty, his wishes were granted; and the two treaties were made and signed at Velasco, on the 14th of May, 1836.

The *public* treaty provided for the cessation of hostilities between the two armies; for the speedy retirement of the enemy's forces beyond the Rio Grande; for the protection of private property on their march; for the restoration of property taken by the Mexicans; and that the Texan army do not advance nearer the retreating army than five leagues. The *secret* treaty provided that Santa Anna would give his orders that, in the shortest possible time, the Mexican troops should leave Texas; that he would prepare matters in the cabinet of Mexico

for the reception of Texan commissioners, and that by negotiations all differences might be adjusted, and the independence of Texas acknowledged; that a treaty of commerce, amity, and limits, should be established, the boundary of Texas not extending beyond the Rio Grande; and that Texas should provide for the prompt return of Santa Anna to Vera Cruz, to enable him to perform his engagements.\*

Such were the provisions of the two treaties, written in English and Spanish, and signed in duplicate by Santa Anna on the one part, and by the president *ad interim* and three of the cabinet on the other. It is proper to state here, that General Houston's wound having disabled him from active service, Thomas J. Rusk was placed in command of the army, under the rank of a brigadier-general; that, in consequence, Mirabeau B. Lamar succeeded Rusk in the war office; and owing to the sickness of Samuel P. Carson, the secretary of state, James Collingsworth succeeded him; and by the accidental death of David Thomas, the attorney-general, Peter W. Grayson was appointed to fill that vacancy. Messrs. Lamar and Potter were the only opponents of the arrangement with Santa Anna.

These treaties, for reasons that will appear hereafter, were not popular in Texas; but time has shown that President Burnet and his cabinet acted wisely. The rash and imprudent course suggested by the opposition would have rendered Texas obnoxious to the charge of inhumanity, aroused and united the dormant spirit of Mexico, and—what was of priceless value to Texas—deprived the latter of the active sympathies of the

\* See Appendix No. V. The first proposition for establishing the limits of Texas was made by Jesse Grimes, in the convention at Washington: it proposed the boundary afterward allowed. Houston, after leaving Washington to take command of the army, had written back to James Collingsworth, chairman of the military committee, to offer a resolution declaring Texas a portion of Louisiana. The convention, however, took no action on the question of limits.



Daguerre-type by Brady

Engraved by

*Thomas I. Rust*

Redden & Babster  
New York



civilized world. No nation has ever suffered for being humane and generous. In the nineteenth century, public opinion is worth everything; it is more than an armed host; nor can any nation long resist it. At that moment, when the eyes of the world were upon the deliberations of the Texan government, on Buffalo bayou, the slightest acts of cruelty or inhumanity on her part would have withered her hopes for ever. But, thanks to her good fortune and rising prospects, her better counsels prevailed; and, by those treaties, she won a brighter and more glorious victory than that of San Jacinto—a victory over herself and her own passions. From the remotest times, the world has groaned under the tread of conquerors; but how few have learned the nobler lessons of humanity!

In point of time, we will now return to other events. As has already been stated, the alarm in eastern Texas, consequent upon the approach of the invading army, subsided about the 16th of April. General Gaona, at the head of a motley host of Mexicans and Indians, did not *débouche* from the forests of the upper Trinity, but was making his way from Bastrop to San Felipe. Bolles, the Cherokee chief, indignant at the supposed suspicion of his good faith and pacific intentions, sent in his denial. Accordingly, the forces destined for the Texan army set out on the march. On the 22d of April, three companies left Robbins's ferry on the Trinity, and on the 23d two others followed for the same destination.\* These, in addition to those coming from the United States, would soon have presented a formidable army. But the news of the victory anticipated and turned many of them back. Despatches were sent to eastern Texas, notifying them that the enemy were retreating for the purpose of concentrating, directing the troops to

\* Letter of George P. Diggs, Acting Assistant Quartermaster-General, April 23, 1836.



turn out, and also desiring the people to plant corn.\* Those who had fled returned rapidly with their families to their deserted homes—very many, however, only to behold their dwellings in ashes, and their stock and other property destroyed. Such are the ravages of war—such the price a nation pays for its liberty.

The intelligence of the victory of San Jacinto spread over the United States with unexampled rapidity, and was received with rejoicings, bonfires, public meetings, and congratulations, not surpassed by the demonstrations attending the triumph at New Orleans. It was their own offspring contending for the rights, and showing the spirit of the mother, that gave them so much joy. It must not be supposed, however, that Mexico beheld this kindred feeling and sympathy with any kind of patience. But the government of the United States took early steps to preserve its neutrality. On the receipt of the news of the battle at Gonzales, in 1835, letters were sent to the district attorney of the United States at New Orleans, and to the governor of Louisiana, requesting the vigilant suppression of any movements in violation of the neutral obligations of the United States. Two days after these instructions were despatched, Señor Castillo, the Mexican *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, gave information of some contemplated military movements at New York and New Orleans in favor of Texas.† The secretary of state, in reply to this,‡ had an interview with Señor Castillo, and explained to him the nature of the laws and institutions of the United States on this subject, and stated to him the views of President Jackson in the matter. On the same day the secretary of state addressed letters to the district

\* Secretary of War to the Troops and People of the East. Houston to the same: April 26, 1836.

† Castillo to the Secretary of State of the United States, October 29, 1835.

‡ November 4, 1835.



attorneys of the United States at different points on the frontier and seacoast, and instructed them particularly to prevent, as far as they legally could do, any interference in the pending contest between Mexico and her rebellious colonies.

On the 19th of November, of the same year, the secretary of external relations in Mexico addressed a letter directly to the secretary of state of the United States, complaining of such interference on the part of the people of Louisiana in behalf of the Texan cause. This letter was written in consequence of the capture of the Mexican armed schooner *Correo*, Captain Thompson, by the Texan vessel the *San Felipe*, Captain Hurd, as previously related, in September, 1835. The secretary, in his reply,\* after explaining the character of the laws of the United States, and stating the measures which had been taken by that government to prevent a violation of the neutrality laws, informed Señor Monasterio that the United States could not be held responsible for the conduct of individuals, who left her territory as such; and that she could only proceed against them when they went organized and in armed array.

It was in consequence of this exposition of the laws and policy of the United States, that the Mexican government adopted the decree (given on a previous page) declaring all such intrusive foreigners to be pirates, to whom no quarter should be given; and in execution of which the bloody scenes at Goliad and the Alamo were enacted.

In the meantime, Señor Gorostiza, having been accredited as Mexican ambassador to the government at Washington city, complained of the movements of General Felix Huston, of Natchez, and of the ladies of Nashville, in raising troops for Texas. The American secretary of the state referred him to instructions previously given to nearly all the United States

\* Secretary of State of United States to Señor Monasterio, January 29, 1836.

attorneys. The minister, in reply, rather doubted whether the United States attorneys had performed their duty. He was requested to point out an instance, and the delinquent should be dismissed; but he failed to do it.\* Thus the government of the United States did what it could to preserve its faith with Mexico, and the people did what they could to aid Texas.

\* Gorostiza to the Secretary of State, April 4, 1836; Secretary of State to Gorostiza, April 9, 1836. Gorostiza to the Secretary of State, July 21, 1836; Secretary of State to Gorostiza, July 26, 1836.

## CHAPTER VI.

To return to the movements of General Filisola, now in command of the invading army. It seems that the destruction of Vince's bridge not only facilitated the capture of the enemy who had crossed it, but prevented the main body from receiving information of the battle of the 21st of April until the 23d. "On the afternoon of the 23d," says Filisola, "I was concluding the operation of sending across the river the section with which General Gaona was to march to Nacogdoches, when a soldier of the frontier dragoons presented to me a small piece of paper, written with a pencil, by Colonel Mariano Garcia, first aide of Guerrero, in which he informed me of the unfortunate occurrence of the afternoon of the 21st. A short time after, some fugitives arrived, and among them Captain Miguel Aguirre, of the Tampico regiment, wounded in the action in the thigh, by a rifle-ball, who said that the defeat had been perfect, and the existence of the president quite doubtful. Such news made me immediately suspend the passage of the river by the force that was to have gone with Gaona, and to send a picket of cavalry in the direction of the battle-ground, as much to acquire correct information of the actual fate of the president, as to protect the fugitives who might have escaped. But the enemy had burnt the bridge, which was the only road for retreating; and consequently the picket accomplished little

or nothing in either respect, for all had been killed or made prisoners. Alarm and discouragement was general among all classes, for it was believed that all the prisoners, the president included, would have been shot, as a reprisal for the conduct observed with theirs at Bexar and Goliad.”\*

Before day, on the 24th, the Mexicans had all reached the right bank of the Brasos. Orders were immediately given to retreat, and to concentrate at Mrs. Powell's, on the road to Victoria, and fifteen miles distant from Fort Bend. On the 25th, the divisions under Filisola, Gaona, Urrea, and Sesma, all concentrated there. A council of war was holden, and it was unanimously agreed that they should repossess the Colorado, establish communications with the capital, and await assistance and advice.† Filisola had under his command four thousand and seventy-eight men,‡ and stood more in need of provisions than of additional troops. As had been predicted by the Texan commander, the retreat and pursuit across the Brasos had exhausted the enemy's provisions. For many days they had not eaten bread. The officers were in want of everything. Corn was sold in the camp at twenty-two dollars per bushel, a loaf of bread at three dollars, a pint of brandy at eight dollars! Moreover, the greater part of the soldiers were barefooted, and wanting in clothing. Add to all this the alarm produced by the report of the overwhelming defeat of Santa Anna, and we have the reasons that operated upon the Mexican council of war in favor of a retreat. Accordingly, on the 27th, they marched from Mrs. Powell's, intending to cross the Colorado at Cayce's ferry. They passed the first prong of the San Bernard, and encamped that night “without having a place to stand on that was not covered with water.” Arriving at the

† Filisola's Defence, p. 39.

† Filisola to Tornel, May 14, 1836.

‡ Filisola's Defence, p. 30.

second prong, they found it not fordable. On the afternoon of the 28th, Deaf Smith overtook them, and delivered to General Filisola the orders of Santa Anna of the 22d of April.\* But the Mexican general needed no command to retreat. He was already hastening that operation. The rains were nearly constant. The streams were all overflowing their banks, and the foundations of the roads were broken up. Deaf Smith represents the retreat as a flight—the way being strewn with wagons, artillery, horses, and baggage, abandoned by the enemy. Finding they could not reach Cayce's ferry, they turned up to the *Atasco sito* crossing, and, after innumerable hardships and privations, so feelingly described by Filisola in his letter to Tornel, they passed the Colorado on the 9th of May, and on the 14th arrived at Victoria. They there hastened to find provisions, but in this they were partly disappointed. A quart of corn was sold in camp for a dollar, and a pound-and-a-half loaf for three dollars! Filisola complains of the immense amount of baggage with which he was encumbered, and likewise of the great number of mules and women in the train of the army.

Colonel Alcerrica, who commanded a battalion of Mexicans at Matagorda, as soon as he heard of Santa Anna's defeat, without waiting for orders, retreated by sea to Matamoras. Thus, on the day the treaty was signed with Santa Anna at Velasco, the whole of the Mexican army, who were not prisoners, were on the Guadalupe, or west of it. It is proper also to state that, as Filisola feared the news of his chief's capture might produce disturbances at Matamoras, or in its neighborhood, he despatched General Urrea with eight hundred troops directly to that point.

\* Filisola's Defence, p. 42. We follow Filisola here, who, in his account of the retreat, can certainly be relied on. No enemy could make it worse.

On the receipt of the order of Santa Anna of the 22d of April, General Filisola, in reply, stated that he would repossess the Colorado, and cease hostilities, unless the Texans should give occasion for their continuance. He likewise promised to respect the property of the Texans on the route. But, inasmuch as Santa Anna did not state in his communications the basis of the armistice therein named, Filisola despatched General Adrian Woll to the headquarters of the Texan army to learn the particulars.\* General Woll, bearing a flag of truce, entered the Texan lines before he was known, or the nature of his mission explained. He was conducted to the general-in-chief, courteously received and treated, but detained as a prisoner, and consigned to the care of Major Teal. He appealed to the flag he bore, and remonstrated with some indiscreetness against such treatment. But, at that time, negotiations with Santa Anna were pending; it was known that the enemy's force had concentrated; and it was important that General Woll should be detained until these negotiations were concluded, and the Mexican army safely across the Colorado. This step appeared to be necessary, inasmuch as the immediate return of Woll, after observing the Texan camp, and conversing freely with Santa Anna, might have endangered the consummation of the business on hand. It was desirable that Texas should secure her rights, if possible, without a further effusion of blood, and that the invading army should quietly repossess the Rio Grande; for it was believed that if this object could be effected, and time given for reflection, no army of like force would ever again be sent from Mexico to Texas. Besides, Texas desired repose; she wanted time to plant corn, and to recruit her impoverished garnerers.†

An advance was sent forward, under Colonel Burleson and

\* Filisola to Santa Anna, April 28, 1836.

† Colonel Forbes's Notes.



Captain Karnes, to watch the motions of the enemy. Captain Seguin also did good service in reporting the progress of the retreat. These officers were instructed not to molest the Mexicans, so long as they continued to retreat, and did not encroach upon the citizens or their property.\* On the 5th of May, General Houston surrendered the command of the army to Brigadier-General Rusk, and the latter shortly afterward moved up to Harrisburg.† From this point the Texans continued near the enemy, but strictly observing the articles of the armistice.

The Mexican army having moved from Victoria to Goliad, after being reinforced by the detachment of Andrade from San Antonio, continued the retreat until the 26th of May, when, at the Mugerero, it was overtaken by Colonel Benjamin F. Smith and Captain Henry Teal, commissioners, sent with the public treaty of the 14th of May, with full authority to ratify it on the part of General Rusk, and to ask its ratification on the part of General Filisola. General Tolsa and Colonel Amat having been appointed commissioners on the part of the latter commander, the papers were duly examined, and the agreement

\* Order to Karnes, May 3, 1836.

† Extract from General Houston's order of May 5, 1836:—

“COMRADES: Circumstances connected with the battle of the 21st render our separation for the present unavoidable. I need not express to you the many painful sensations which that necessity inflicts upon me. I am solaced, however, by the hope that we will soon be reunited in the great cause of liberty. Brigadier-General Rusk is appointed to the command of the army for the present. I confide in his valor, his patriotism, and his wisdom. His conduct in the battle of San Jacinto was sufficient to insure your confidence and regard. The enemy, though retreating, are still within the limits of Texas. Their situation being known to you, you can not be taken by surprise. . . . In taking leave of my brave comrades-in-arms, I can not suppress the expression of that pride which I so justly feel in having had the honor to command them in person; nor will I withhold the tribute of my warmest admiration and gratitude for the promptness with which my orders were executed, and union maintained through the army.”

ratified by the respective commissioners, and approved by General Filisola. These matters being adjusted, the latter continued his retreat toward the Rio Grande.

It is not our purpose to enter into the controversy between the generals of the retreating army. The position of Filisola was most unenviable. He foresaw that the storm of disappointment would fall upon his head, whatever he might do; nor would his situation, and the absolute want of provisions, enable him to do much. His official letter, conveying the sad news of the great battle, and the capture of the president, reached the Mexican capital on the 15th of May. It was immediately answered by Tornel, secretary of war and marine. Filisola was directed to address the Texan general, "exacting from him, by decorous means, the liberty of the president general-in-chief, or at least, during the time this point should be arranged, the consideration due to his high dignity." He was further directed to use all his efforts to save the remainder of the army, by concentrating it in some place convenient for provisions. He was further instructed that the preservation of Bexar was of "absolute necessity." And, in spite of the decree declaring the Texans taken with arms in their hands to be *pirates*, he was authorized to "propose exchanges, and to *preserve* for that purpose, because *humanity* required it, the lives of the *prisoners* made, and that might be made, from the enemy."\* When Filisola received that letter, the treaty with Santa Anna had already been ratified by him, Bexar had been already evacuated, and the Mexican army was marching on half-rations or less beyond the Neuces. As to provisions, the little navy of Texas had picked up the supply forwarded from New Orleans, and the merchants there would risk no more.†

The Mexican government having received, through General

\* Tornel to Filisola, May 15, 1836.

† Filisola to Tornel, May 31, 1836.

Filisola, the armistice agreed to between Houston and Santa Anna, approved the conduct of Filisola in its observance; but at the same time stated that they desired the latter to "act with extreme caution, and, while he endeavored not to compromise, in any manner, the life of the illustrious general Santa Anna, he should also avoid pledging the honor of the nation." It was a knotty point—the government could not resolve it; but, while they forbade anything like an acknowledgment of Texan independence, which they declared the nation never would agree to, they left all to the discretion of Filisola, and again reminded him how deeply they were interested in the salvation of Santa Anna.\*

Subsequently recovering, however, from the consternation produced by the blow given, the central authorities urged Filisola to retreat no farther, but await reinforcements, as they would soon despatch four thousand additional troops by water from Vera Cruz to Matamoras. But it was too late: Filisola did not like Texas; he pronounced it a country of "mud and sand," and left it. Nor did the reinforcement arrive.

The government of the United States was not satisfied with mere diplomatic letters, but was to some extent affected by the proximity of these contending forces. General Edmund P. Gaines was intrusted with the command of the southwestern military division of the United States. He felt a deep and earnest sympathy for Texas, and was only prevented by his position from taking part in her behalf. His instructions forbade his advancing beyond the territory then in the possession of the American Union, unless the Indians were employed immediately upon the border, or unless armed parties of the belligerents should approach the frontier so near as manifestly to show that they meant to violate the territory of the United

\* Tornel to Filisola, May 15, 1836 (second of that date).

States. But if the Indians should engage in the war, or circumstances should distinctly show the necessity of crossing the possessory boundary for the protection of the country adjoining the scene of operations in Texas, then he should cross that boundary, which was the Sabine, making known to any armed parties the object of such step. At the same time he was instructed in no event to co-operate with either party, or suffer them to join him. And, should he pass that boundary, he was ordered to return as soon as circumstances would permit.\*

Under these instructions, General Gaines, after ordering the sixth regiment of infantry from Jefferson Barracks to Fort Jesup, came in person to the frontier. There he received intelligence from General John T. Mason, of Nacogdoches, of the warlike attitude of the Indians, and their reported combined movement. He therefore immediately despatched Lieutenant Bonnell to the Caddo villages, to persuade them to peace. Bonnell found that Manuel Flores, a Mexican agent, had been among them, exerting every effort to induce them to declare war against Texas. Gaines, in the meantime, had advanced with fourteen companies to the borders of the Sabine.† Further to strengthen himself, he made a requisition upon the governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, for a brigade each of volunteers, and upon the governor of Alabama for a battalion. To appreciate the apparent necessity for these forces, we must recur to the information (then believed to be true) in General Gaines's possession. General Mason, then commandant of the militia of Nacogdoches, sent him an express, which reached him at Natchitoches, on the night of the 13th of April, informing him "of the concentration of a large number of Indians about sixty miles from Nac-

\* Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, to Edmund P. Gaines, May 12, 1836.

† Letter of J. Bonnell, May 5, 1836.

ogdoches, and thirty miles north of the San Antonio road; that one thousand mounted Mexicans were with them, and that their combined force was at least twenty-five hundred men." He was further informed by Mr. Dart, the bearer of the express, that there were at least three hundred families between the Trinity and the Neches, who would fall into the hands of the enemy; and that Nacogdoches and its vicinity had already been abandoned by the families there resident.\* Under these circumstances, he made the requisition for troops, as before related, and took his position on the western verge of the neutral ground. After the news of the signal victory of the 21st of April, there seemed to be no further necessity for the stay of General Gaines on the banks of the Sabine, for the Indians were then ready to take sides with the whites, and the Mexicans under Gaona were retreating rapidly upon Matamoras.

This movement of American troops was made known to the Mexican government by President Jackson himself. Gorostiza, the Mexican minister, having called on him, the subject of Santa Anna's cruelty came up in conversation. Gorostiza alleged that it was necessary to the consolidation of the dictator's *liberal policy* that rebel blood should be sacrificed. Jackson replied that it was a sacrifice of American blood. "True, your excellency," said the minister, "but among the candidates for land, we could not discriminate."—"Well, well," answered the president, "but Santa Anna, and all others, will find such immolations very unsavory and indigestible. The

\* Samuel P. Carson, Texan Secretary of State, to Sam Houston, April 14, 1836. Carson also says to the Texan commander: "My view is, that you should fall back, if *necessary*, to the Sabine. I am warranted in saying that volunteer troops will come on in numbers from the United States. . . . You must fall back, and hold out, and let nothing goad or provoke you to a battle, unless you can, *without doubt*, whip them, or unless you are compelled to fight." Had Houston taken all the advice that was given him, he would have been, in his own language, "in the situation of the ass between the two stacks of hay!"

Americans will never submit to that system. It is my duty to preserve neutrality ; and, with that view, I have ordered General Gaines to a position favorable to a speedy execution of the boundary treaty, and to prevent interference with the Indians." As Mexico had at that time her agents among the Indians, and her minister knew that Jackson was aware of it, the last reply was significant.

Though there was much that was not true in regard to the reports of the Indian movements in eastern Texas, there is no doubt but that the savages were collected in large numbers on the frontier, were greatly excited, and that nothing but the defeat of the Mexicans prevented them from making an attack upon the settlements. As it was, they did not disperse without committing an act of barbarism. On the 19th of May, 1836, about nine o'clock in the morning, several hundred of them arrived at Fort Parker, on the head-waters of the Navasoto, about sixty miles above the settlements. The fort was at that time occupied by six men and several women and children. Four other men, belonging to the fort, had gone out to the field to work. The Indians presented a white flag, and sent two of their number to the fort, to say that they were friendly, and desired to treat. One of the inmates, Benjamin Parker, went out to see the main body of the Indians, but soon returned and reported unfavorably. However, he went out a second time, hoping to make peace, but was surrounded and killed. Those in the fort attempted to fly, but the most of them were cruelly massacred, and their bodies mutilated. The fort was then plundered, and the savages retreated, with some of the women and children as prisoners.\*

\* Narrative of Rachel Plummer, p. 5. Letter of G. W. Browning, May 23, 1836. Many have read the touching narrative of Mrs. Plummes, and the many wanderings of her father, James W. Parker, in search of his daughter and her son.



We will now return to the Texan cabinet at Velasco. In pursuance of the provisions of the treaty with Santa Anna, the Texan authorities were making arrangements to send their captive to Vera Cruz. Accordingly, on the 1st of June, the dictator and his suite, consisting of Colonel Almonté, Colonel Nunes, and his private secretary Caro, went on board the armed schooner *Invincible*, commanded by Captain J. Brown. Lorenzo de Zavala, the vice-president, and Bailey Hardiman, the secretary of the treasury, being selected as commissioners, under the treaty, to accompany Santa Anna to Mexico, were preparing to embark; but on that day (the 1st of June), General Thomas J. Green, with two hundred and thirty volunteers, arrived on board the steamer "Ocean" from New Orleans. The opposition to the release of Santa Anna, which had been for some time gaining strength, was greatly increased by the arrival of these volunteers. Public meetings were held, and violent speeches made against the measure.\* "In this state of things," says General Green, "President Burnet addressed me a note, requesting an interview, and asking my opinion in this emergency. I told him that, as to any violence being offered to him or his cabinet, I pledged my honor to shield him and them with my life; but that I was of opinion that, in accordance with the overwhelming public will of the citizens of the country, he should remand the prisoner ashore, and await the public will to determine his fate. The president promptly replied that he would do so."† Accordingly, he issued an order to Captain Brown to bring the prisoners on shore. Santa Anna, who had gone on board the vessel by

\* President Burnet's Address, No. 3.

† Green's Mier Expedition (Appendix No. IX.), p. 484. President Burnet and General Green differ somewhat as to this matter. The former does not state that he called upon the latter for his advice, though this may have been done, without being noticed in the address.

order of the government, and on the faith of the treaty which had been solemnly signed by both parties, and who, with the knowledge of the government, had published a short farewell to the Texan army,\* positively refused to debark. The president then appointed Messrs. Smith, Hardiman, Hunt, and Henderson, to wait upon the prisoners, make known the will of the government, and bring them ashore. This was accordingly done, and they were landed at the village of Quintana, opposite to Velasco.

On the same day, but probably after the prisoners had been brought on shore, President Burnet received from certain officers of the army, purporting to act for themselves and the soldiers under them, a strange document. It is proper to state that, on the 11th of May, General Houston had sailed on board the "Flora" for New Orleans, to procure better medical aid and comfort for his wounded limb than could be had in the camp; and that previous to his departure he left an address to the troops on Galveston island and those that should afterward arrive, urging "obedience to the constituted authorities and laws of the country as the first duty of a soldier; that it would adorn his martial virtues, and qualify him for the highest rights of citizenship."† But those who signed and assented to this address to President Burnet, forgetting or disregarding this salutary advice, and while they declared that they abhorred the idea of interfering in the management of the government, assumed to dictate to it, and to claim its control! "We shall

\* Farewell of Santa Anna to the Texan army:—

"MY FRIENDS: I have been a witness of your courage in the field of battle, and know you to be generous. Rely with confidence on my sincerity, and you shall never have cause to regret the kindness shown me. In returning to my native land, I beg you to receive the thanks of your grateful friend. Farewell!

"ANTO. LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

"VELASCO, *June 1, 1836.*"

† Houston's Address, May 11, 1836.

not, however, address you," say they, "in that spirit of irritation and indignation which pervades every one in this army, but in the tone which should ever characterize the *intercourse between the ruling parties* in a country."\* After setting forth their privations and want of provisions, they continue: "And to whom are we to charge these injuries? Surely to you, as the president of this republic! It was your duty to have paid particular attention to the army; to have inquired out their wants, and relieved them. It was surely your duty to have caused provisions, at least, to have been furnished, and to have dropped all other matters until this was done; and you will not be surprised to learn that the indignation and exasperation of the army is now very great at the total failure to pay attention to them, *and the consequences may be serious if redress is not had.* And we now *require* that this army be immediately furnished with a sufficiency of such provisions and clothes as the public may possess or can be procured. . . . In conclusion," say they, "we repeat to you, General Santa Anna *must be safely secured*, and placed at the disposition of the coming Congress."

The poor president! what could he do? The government was as destitute as the army. He doubtless felt grateful to the troops for their heroic services, but the new republic had no treasury, and his private means were limited. "At the time of my visit to Velasco," says Colonel Forbes, "in May, 1836, the president's style and manner of living were most simple. His residence was but little more than a mere shanty. His amiable and accomplished lady, without any servants or hired help, superintended and managed in person her domestic arrangements; and their household and table comforts were

\* Address to President Burnet from "Encampment at Victoria," May 26, 1836.

sufficiently sparse and limited to have called forth the admiration of the Spartan lawgiver.”

Yet the address in question had been presented to the president—the military had usurped the civil authority. The good faith of Texas, in the first treaty she ever made, was broken and trampled under foot—not by the government, but by the *army*—a matter of painful foreboding to President Burnet. “Landing at Quintana, upon the western bank,” says General Green, “we met President Burnet, and surrendered the prisoner to him. The president turned to me and said, ‘General Green, I deliver the prisoner over to your charge, and shall hold you responsible for his safe keeping.’”\* This is the statement of General Green; but it appears, from a letter written by the president to him on the 1st of July, 1836, that he only requested him to point out a suitable officer to take charge of Santa Anna; and General Green named Captain Hubbell, in whose custody the prisoner was placed by the president.†

\* Mier Expedition, Appendix IX., p. 486.

† Extract from “*El Correo Atlantico*” of New Orleans:—

“VELASCO, June 4, 1836.

“We arrived at Galveston on the 30th of May, and on the 2d of June were ordered to repair to this place, where we arrived on the same evening, on board the ‘Ocean.’ We found the place in great confusion in consequence of the cabinet having sent Santa Anna on board of a vessel to send him home, for the purpose of having a treaty ratified which was made by them. The people were opposed to his going, but had not an individual commissioned to be their leader. On the morning of the 3d instant, I came forward as their leader, and formed my company equipped for service, and sent to the cabinet to have him [Santa Anna] and his suite brought on shore. There was at first some objection, but they at last complied, and I now have him and suite in my charge. He was delivered over to me to-night, and I am at this time on duty with a strong guard under my command. General Cos, and four or five hundred Mexicans, are still on Galveston island as prisoners.

“H. A. HUBBELL.”

“EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, VELASCO, July 1, 1836.

“*To Brigadier-General Thomas J. Green:—*

“SIR: I enclose you a copy of a letter found in ‘*El Correo Atlantico*,’ and published originally in the ‘New Orleans Bulletin.’

“This redoubtable ‘leader’ is, I presume, the same you introduced to me as a

On the 9th of June, Santa Anna sent in his protest against the conduct of Texas in breaking the treaty, particularly in respect to his debarkation and reconfinement. On the following day the protest was answered by President Burnet, who, in reference to the last particular, was bound in truth to make the humiliating confession that Texas had not complied with that portion of the treaty, but was prevented by "the influence of a highly-excited popular indignation." The facts were all known to Santa Anna: the Texan government was powerless, and he saw it.\*

The interest felt for Texas by the people of the United States, and the material aid by them furnished, were greatly increased through the influence of the distinguished agents sent there. General Austin was particularly successful; his long services in Texas, and his known truthfulness and simplicity of character, gave great weight to what he said. Though not an orator, he spoke with clearness and judgment, and enforced his positions with facts that were irresistible. His address at Louisville, which was widely published, presented the claims of Texas upon the civilized world for sympathy and aid in such manner as to bring her both.† "Austin is doing wonders among us for his country," says a sensible writer of Virginia; "he is a Franklin in patience and prudence."‡

The changed condition of affairs, however, required other *confidential* officer, to whom the custody of the prisoners might be committed with perfect safety. If he had then been known as the author of the letter enclosed (in which it is difficult to determine whether impudence or falsehood predominates), he certainly would never have borne a commission in the service of Texas, with the approbation of this government. You will please to signify this to Captain Hubbell, whose speedy resignation would be very cheerfully accepted, and would save me the trouble of a more peremptory suggestion.

"Your obedient servant,                    DAVID G. BURNET."

\* President Burnet's Address, No. 5.

† Austin's Address, March 7, 1836. Holly's Texas, p. 253.

‡ Letter of A. M'Call, May 24, 1836.



agents, with power to act upon different matters. The excitement of the 21st of April had scarcely abated on the battlefield, before the desire for annexation to the United States arose in every bosom; and as the victory gave rise to hope, so was the desire strengthened. In accordance with this universal wish, James Collingsworth and Peter W. Grayson were, on the 30th of May, appointed by President Burnet commissioners to proceed to the city of Washington, and obtain access to the executive of the American government, presenting themselves as duly empowered to ask the friendly mediation of that power in procuring the recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas, and to use their best efforts in obtaining a like recognition on the part of the United States. They were also instructed to state that, in the opinion of the Texan government, the annexation of their republic to the American Union, as a member of that confederacy, would be highly acceptable to the people of the former. And, should the authorities at Washington city appear to listen kindly to those matters, inquiries might be made as to the terms on which they would accept Texas. At the same time the commissioners were to point out what the latter would consider indispensable conditions: 1. Her laws then in force should be respected and held valid. 2. All *bona-fide* land-titles to be held sacred, and all entitled to lands to receive them. 3. Slave-property to be respected. 4. Texans owing debts contracted previous to their immigration, to have a specified time for the payment thereof. 5. Liberal appropriations of land to be made for educational purposes. 6. All forfeitures and confiscations to remain as found by annexation.

It appears that, immediately after the treaty of Velasco was known at Washington city, there was in the American Congress a general feeling in favor of the acknowledgment of Texan



independence, and also to have the republic annexed to the Union. General Austin, writing from New Orleans, on the 16th of June, 1836, says: "I shall do all I can to procure the annexation of Texas to the United States, on just and fair principles. . . . The first step is, a recognition of our independence; that done, the way is clear and open. If *official* reports in manuscript of all the principal facts in regard to the political and military state of things in Texas had been sent by the executive government of Texas to their agents at Washington, I could now have had the recognition of our independence to take home. Nothing but the want of such *official documents* was wanted when I left Washington.\* I believe that a report from you, signed by yourself, would have been fully sufficient. There were no accounts of the battle of San Jacinto, except those in the newspapers."

The new commissioners set out on their journey to the United States. The Texan army, having followed the retreating enemy as far as Goliad, collected the bones of those who had been massacred, and buried them with military honors. They then returned to Victoria. General Houston arrived at New Orleans on the 22d of May, and remained until his wound was sufficiently recovered,† when he returned to Texas by way of San Augustine, which point he reached on the 5th of July.

Various speculations were had in Texas as to the value of Santa Anna, and the effect of his detention on the Mexican nation. One thing, however, was beginning to be tolerably

\* General Austin left Washington city on the 24th of May. — *Austin to Houston, June 16, 1836.* General Austin concludes his letter thus: "I am of opinion that our independence will be acknowledged, and that Texas will be admitted into these United States, if they are regularly asked for."

† Houston to Lamar, dated New Orleans, June 4, 1836: "My wound has improved. Some twenty or more pieces of bone have been taken out of it. My general health seems to improve slowly. It is only within the last four or five days that I have been enabled to sit up any portion of the day."

clear—that the longer he was kept, the less would be his value to Texas; so that even those who were willing to violate a solemn treaty, began to wish him disposed of. At home, he was but the head of the central party. The federalists, his opponents, the most enlightened portion of the Mexicans, desired anything rather than his return. In his absence, they were every day gaining power. The president *pro tempore*, José J. Corro, made known the captivity of Santa Anna by a proclamation to the nation. He declared that the national grief was immense, but it would not be useless; that, for the liberty of the president, and for the honor of the nation, the government would raise all possible resources. Unabated efforts were made to raise another army. The *pro-tempore* government was in favor of continuing Filisola in the chief command, but the officers clamored for his removal, and the appointment of Urrea. At length, the latter received the command, and made his headquarters at Matamoras. It was understood that troops were to be sent by water to land somewhere on the coast of Texas, and that others were to come by land to concentrate at Matamoras. Accordingly, about the middle of July, four thousand troops under General Urrea, with General Andrade as second in command, had assembled at that town. But they were in a condition so wretched as in every way to render them unfit to march. Most of them were without discipline, and destitute of clothing or provisions. In addition to this, serious domestic troubles were about to begin in the nation. The centralists were trembling on the seat of power; some of the states had already proclaimed in favor of federalism, and others were on the point of doing so; and thus the invasion of Texas was postponed.

To add to the confusion in Mexico, there appeared, about this time, in the capital, a pamphlet, entitled “The Trial of

Santa Anna.” It was written with spirit, and arraigned him before the bar of public opinion, setting forth with truthful detail his political career. The following may be given as a specimen: “Don Antonio, like Icarus, in attempting to soar too high, was precipitated into the abyss below. We would ask, who is this protector of religion? A man loaded with vice in all its forms. The particular attribute of religion is charity; it knows not how to cause evil or pain to any one. Nevertheless, Don Antonio has shown himself vicious by instinct! He rose successively against Iturbide, Victoria, Bustamente, and Gomez Farias: no commotion occurred in which he did not take an active part. His aim was always disorder, and for no other purpose than the satisfaction of disturbing the public tranquillity. We have seen him at one time for the Yorkists, and at another for the Scotch. . . . The pretensions of this monster have caused the death of many citizens at Vera Cruz, Tolomé, Oajaca, El Palmar, Puebla, Posados, Casa Blanca, Otumba, Queretaro, Guanajuato, San Luis, Los Carmelos, Zcatecas, &c. At the time of the presumptuous campaign of Tampico, he put to death, without any cause, a number of Mexicans; and now, in Texas, he has given cause to horrible reprisals by his inhuman conduct. If it were possible to pile one upon the other the bodies of the dead, whose untimely end has been promoted by General Santa Anna, they would doubtless form a mountain higher than that of Popocatepetl! —and we would say to his flatterers, ‘*Behold a monument erected to humanity and the protector of religion!*’ ”

The very fact that such a pamphlet had a wide circulation in Mexico, or that it was permitted to circulate at all, was evidence of the dictator’s declining power. The Texans, however, were preparing to meet the invading force under Urrea. That the enemy were in earnest about a second invasion, there

can be no doubt. And, to this end, they endeavored to keep the Texans from obtaining any information of their doings at Matamoras. The commissioners who proceeded there under the treaty were arrested and detained until it was too late for the Texans to prepare for defence. General Rusk, however, was advised of the threatened danger, and issued an order, announcing the advance of the enemy, calling in those absent on furlough, and ordering drafts to headquarters.\* Again, on the 27th of June, he issued a stirring address to the people of Texas, summoning them to the field.

It was on the 29th of May that General Rusk ordered Major Isaac W. Burton, commanding a company of mounted rangers, to scour the coast from the Guadalupe to Refugio. The company consisted of but twenty men, though well mounted and armed. On the 2d of June, they received news of a suspicious vessel in the bay of Copano. By the break of day the next morning they were in ambush on the beach, and at eight o'clock a signal was made for the vessel to send its boat ashore, which was promptly answered, and five of the enemy landed from the boat. These were made prisoners, and the boat manned by sixteen of Burton's rangers, who took the vessel—the "Watchman"—loaded with provisions expressly for the Mexican army. The vessel was ordered round to Velasco, but, being detained by contrary winds till the 17th of June, the "Camanche" and the "Fanny Butler," also freighted with provisions for the enemy, anchored off the bar. The captain of the "Watchman" was made to decoy the commanders of the other vessels on board his own, when they also were captured, and all three, with their valuable freights, sent into the port of Velasco and condemned. From these bold achievements, Major Burton and his rangers were known as the *horse-*

\* Order from Victoria, June 17, 1836.

*marines*. The freight, worth some twenty-five thousand dollars, was of great service in supporting the Texan army.\*

Thus passed away the month of June, with little else of a public character to be noted. The Texans, fully persuaded that there would be a renewal of the war, were prepared for it. The enemy essayed, indeed, to recommence it; but, for want of union, means, and, above all, a head, they failed to advance.

General Austin returned to Texas in the first days of July, and visited Santa Anna in Columbia (whither the latter had been taken). The prisoner now made another effort toward an adjustment of the difficulties between the two countries. He proposed to Austin the friendly mediation of the government of the United States,† and, with that view, addressed a letter to President Jackson.‡ In this communication, after giving a pretty correct sketch of recent events, he stated that the home government of Mexico, not understanding matters, had displaced Filisola, and appointed Urrea to the command of the army, who had advanced, as was understood, as far as the Nueces, which had increased the excitement of the public mind in Texas, and the chance of further bloodshed, unless some powerful hand would interpose and cause the voice of reason to be heard; that in his opinion Jackson was the only man who could do good to humanity by acting as mediator in having the treaties carried out. He accordingly called upon him to act as such. At the same time he wrote a letter to Urrea, and gave it as his opinion that the war should at once cease, and that the existing differences should be settled by diplomacy; that Urrea should halt at some convenient place,

\* "Telegraph," August 2, 1836.

† Burnet to Collingsworth and Grayson, July 8, 1836.

‡ Santa Anna to Jackson, July 4, 1836.



and proceed no farther; "and then," continued Santa Anna, "I have not the least doubt that so soon as you officially say to the Texan commander that, 'so soon as my person will be in absolute liberty to join you, then you will retreat beyond the Rio Grande, and cease hostilities,' I shall effect my departure to join you, and proceed on my way to the capital." He further stated to Urrea that he need not regard the orders sent from Mexico; for that, as soon as he received his liberty and reached the capital, he would hold him harmless. This was an ingenious thought, and seemed to carry with it some idea of sincerity.

At the same time, General Austin wrote to General Houston, stating that it was very desirable that General Gaines should establish his headquarters at Nacogdoches, and recommended Houston to use his influence for effecting that object. "And," continued he, "if he would visit this place, and give the people assurances of the good faith of Santa Anna"—that is, if he was satisfied of the fact after seeing him—he (General Austin) thought it would have a decided influence in paving the way to end the war.\*

General Houston received this letter at Sublett's, on the 25th of July, and referred it to General Gaines, merely adding that such a step would save Texas. The letter from Santa Anna to President Jackson was transmitted through General Gaines; and, in order that the Texan agents at Washington city might be properly advised, copies of the public and secret treaty were sent to them. They were also put in possession of the movements of the Indians; and General Gaines was likewise fully advised of their employment by the Mexicans as auxiliaries in the war.† General Houston again addressed

\* Austin to Houston, July 4, 1836.

† Burnet to Collingsworth and Grayson, July 8, 1836.



General Gaines on the 13th of July, enclosing the statements of P. J. Menard and Miguel Cortimas, in relation to the hostile movements of the Indians.

In the meantime, General Gaines, induced by these threatened hostilities, made a second requisition upon the southwestern states for volunteers. The enemy at Matamoras had made three attempts to advance upon Texas, but, for some cause, had as often failed. The failure was said to have been occasioned by desertions. It is probable that the letter of Santa Anna to Urrea had some effect upon these operations. Urrea dared not obey any order coming from him; yet he did not know how soon Santa Anna might regain power, and he was afraid to disoblige him.

The Texan army, now grown to twenty-three hundred strong, was likely to get into great confusion. Having at that time but little to do, each one was engaged in his own projects. General Houston, yet at Nacogdoches, could only give his advice by letter. General Rusk doubtless did what he could to preserve order; but there were too many who wished the command. An eye-witness says, "There were very few above the rank of captain who did not aspire to be commander-in-chief!" To add to the confusion, the executive and cabinet, about the first of July, appointed Colonel Mirabeau B. Lamar major-general of the army. He reached headquarters on the 14th of that month. The account of his reception we give from General Felix Huston, who had shortly before arrived with a considerable force:—

"I arrived at the army on the 4th of July. I had no acquaintance with General Rusk, or any of the officers, except Adjutant-General Smith, Colonel Millard, and Captains Millroy and Wiggington, all of whom I had known but a day or two. I mention this to show that I was detached from the

intrigues of the army, even were I capable of entering into the disgraceful contests for office, which are so often the bane of order and discipline.

“A few hours after my arrival I was waited on by an officer, who requested me to act as chairman of a meeting of officers, convened for the purpose of determining on the reception of General Lamar. I accepted the appointment. At the meeting many suggestions were made, and I obtained much information that was new to me. All present appeared to estimate General Lamar highly, but were disposed to reject him as commander-in-chief, upon the grounds that the cabinet had no right to supersede General Sam Houston, and because they would not consent to the destruction of General Rusk, which they deemed to be the object of the cabinet in making the appointment. Seeing the disposition of the officers, and having a high opinion of General Lamar from character, I suggested the propriety of appointing a committee to draft resolutions, as respectful as possible to him. The suggestion was adopted, and I was added to the committee. When the committee met, I exerted my influence to have the resolutions so drawn, that General Lamar’s feelings should not be wounded; that he should see that the objections to his appointment were not personal to him, but that, on the contrary, all the officers esteemed him highly. The committee adopted my plan. . . . General Rusk had no connection whatever with the meeting or resolutions.\*

\* “*Resolved*, That this meeting highly appreciate the gallantry and worth of General Lamar, and will be at all times ready to receive him with the cordiality and respect due to his personal and military acquirements.

“*Resolved*, That Colonel B. F. Smith and Colonel H. Millard be appointed a committee to wait on General Lamar, and tender him the respects of this meeting, and inform him that, there being some question of the propriety of his appointment by the president as major-general of the Texan army, by which he is directed to assume the chief command of the army, he is requested by the offi-

“When I ascertained that General Lamar was approaching the camp, I sent two officers to wait on him with the resolutions. Previous to their starting, General Rusk had ordered the usual salutes to be fired for his reception. On their returning and informing me that General Lamar acceded to the proposition, I countermanded the order for firing the salutes, without consulting General Rusk. When General Lamar arrived in camp, he was cordially received; and I hoped he would consult with the officers, and that the matter might be amicably settled: but I soon understood that he determined to lay the subject of his reception before the whole army, and take their vote. Accordingly, at his request, the army were paraded in the evening by General Rusk. After the square was formed, General Rusk presented him to the army in almost these words: ‘Fellow-soldiers, I have the honor to present to you Major-General Lamar, appointed by the cabinet.’ General Lamar then addressed the army, and recounted his deeds in a glowing form. He stated that he had fought in the ranks, &c.; that he was about returning to the United States, when the late news of the returning enemy—the Mexicans—reached him; that he immediately determined to return to the army, when the cabinet, unsolicited by him, had conferred on him the office of commander-in-chief; that, on his arrival in camp, he had learned that there were some objections, by some of the army, to his appointment; that he was not ambitious of the office—he did not desire to wear tinsel on his shoulders; that the voice of man made generals, but God made heroes, &c. And he repeatedly stated that if his appointment was not acceptable to the army, he would cheerfully go into the ranks

eers present not to act in his official capacity of major-general until the subject may be more maturely considered by the meeting of the officers of the army.”

and fight by their sides, and lead the van to victory, guided by the flash of his sword.

“From some remarks made by General Lamar, General Green appeared to think that some allusion was made to him! and he addressed the army in a short manner, stating that he thought that General Sam Houston was the proper commander-in-chief; and he said something about the impropriety of the cabinet making the appointment over the head of General Rusk, who had the confidence of the army and the people. General Lamar replied, in an excited manner, that he did not disclaim the desire of being commander-in-chief; and made some remarks about some letters of General Rusk to the cabinet, requesting a major-general to be appointed.

“After General Lamar concluded, General Rusk addressed the meeting, and complained that, when the army was reduced to three or four hundred men, when it was dispirited by the loathsome office of gallanting a defeated enemy from the country, &c., he had written to the president, advising the appointment of a major-general, that the army should be increased, as the Mexicans were retiring, induced by their pay, and that the war was not at an end, &c. He said that his expectation then was, to visit his family, and attend to his private affairs; but that, when the enemy were expected to return in force, when the army was increasing rapidly, and when it would be disgraceful for him to abandon his post, his letters, written under different circumstances, were used as the pretext for making the appointment, &c.

“After these speeches, there were a great many calls by the troops—a few ‘*Lamar!*’ a number ‘*Rusk!*’ and a great number ‘*Houston!*’ Some few called out *particularly* for me. I advanced, and stated that I was aware that the great mass of the calls for ‘*Houston*’ were intended for *Sam* Houston, the

true 'commander-in-chief;' that I had no pretensions to the command, and, in a jocund manner, observed that the only gauntlet thrown which I would take up was the remark of one of the generals, that he would lead the van—that, so long as my name was *Felix* Huston, I would lead the van.

“Thus ended the speeches. After a little delay and some confusion, I applied to General Lamar, and asked him how he would have the question put; and told him I would put it to the army as he desired. He then stated the question, ‘Were the army willing to receive him as commander-in-chief?’ I ordered silence, and stationed two officers for the voters to form on, and put the question in these words: ‘Those who are in favor of receiving General Lamar as commander-in-chief of the army, will form on Major Ward, stationed on my right; and those opposed to receiving General Lamar as commander-in-chief of the army, will form on Colonel Morehouse, stationed on my left.’ When I stated the question, Major Handy, acting as aide to General Lamar, observed that he did not think the question was stated as General Lamar desired. I requested him to see General Lamar. He did so, and said that I was right. At that time another gentleman rode up, and said to me that General Lamar did not know whether it was understood in his speech that he would only hold the appointment temporarily, until the arrival of General Sam Houston, and wished I would so state, which I did, turning to the different parts of the army, repeating his request, and the question, and asking if they all understood me. I then gave the word—‘*March!*’ The tellers whom I had appointed reported one hundred and seventy-nine votes for General Lamar; and, as there appeared about fifteen hundred votes against him, I stated it was not worth while to count them.

“On the next day I was informed Lamar intended to insist



on the command. I waited on him, in company with General Green. In the course of the conversation, General Lamar stated that General Sam Houston, by leaving Texas, had forfeited his station as commander-in-chief. General Green stated that he understood that he was absent on a furlough for three months. General Lamar said he was not aware of such being the case; and if so, he would have known it, as he was secretary of war when General Sam Houston left. During the next day I understood that General Lamar had commenced acting as commander-in-chief, and had signed a furlough under that title. The camp was in great agitation: many persons commenced leaving it. I felt great uneasiness, and expressed a fear that serious difficulties might take place. This state of affairs lasted till General Lamar had a meeting of the officers called. He addressed them, and I understood him to refer it to them whether he should resign or not. After a pause, and some remarks of General Green and Major Miller, he signified his intention to retire. On the next day he left the army."



## CHAPTER VII.

At this period, the credit of Texas was in low repute. By some, her bad credit was attributed to her agents; by others, to different causes. It is probable that the chief cause of her want of credit, next to her poverty, was the appointment of the Messrs. Toby and brothers as principal agents, in lieu of others who perhaps had been more faithful. This appointment, too, was made after they had failed in New Orleans for a considerable amount. It is due to the government to say that it was not apprized of the failure.\* Texas had a large army to support, a growing navy, and also a civil list, and an empty treasury. The practice of impressment had grown so burdensome, that it had exhausted itself. The people had raised scarcely any crops, and they had but little property: hence it became necessary, either to stop the impressments, or ruin the citizens. The former course was taken by President Burnet, in his proclamation of the 14th of July, 1836, and also by an order of General Houston.

As the enemy did not advance, and the Texans had a considerable force—able to defeat five times their number at home—it was proposed to attack Matamoras. Detachments were accordingly sent out to Bexar and the Nueces, and efforts were made to procure vessels to transport troops, munitions,

\* Letter of Samuel Ellis, July 5, 1836.

and provisions, by water, to Brasos Santiago, to co-operate with the force proceeding by land. The better to commence this enterprise, the army advanced to the Coleta.

General Houston, being advised of this contemplated expedition, opposed it for the reasons that, without an efficient navy and more ample means, an invading army could not sustain itself in Mexico; and, what was more important to the good faith of Texas, General Santa Anna had inyoked the mediation of the United States, and the Texan authorities had concurred in laying the matter before President Jackson.\*

After the unpleasant affair in relation to the commandancy-in-chief, many of the troops retired from the service; so that, by the 2d of August, the number was reduced from twenty-three to thirteen hundred men.† In this state of affairs, for want of means, the co-operation of the cabinet, as also of the navy, the descent on Matamoras was abandoned. It is probable that the army was not in possession of the fact of the proposed mediation of the United States, or it would have concurred more fully with the cabinet. General Houston, who was still at Nacogdoches, and as yet unable to perform active service, was loudly called for by the army. Numerous letters and petitions were sent to him by officers and men, desiring his presence. It is not improbable, however that his services where he was were very useful to Texas. Being in full possession of the knowledge of passing events, he transmitted it, with his views, not only to the army, but to General Gaines.

\* Edmund P. Gaines to Sam Houston, August 12, 1836. General Gaines says: "Your views, urging the propriety of concentration within supporting distance of the settled parts of Texas, and pointing out the inevitable and worse than useless risk of operations upon Matamoras, or upon any other part of your western frontier, without a superiority of naval force, evince an extent and a justness of reflection, comprehension, forecast, and military mind, which, if sustained, can not but insure triumph—complete triumph—to the cause of Texas."

† Letter of General Felix Huston, August 2, 1836.

To carry out more effectually the provision contained in the thirty-third article of the treaty between the United States and Mexico, General Gaines sent a detachment of American regular troops, under the command of Colonel Whistler, to take post near the town of Nacogdoches. This had the effect to overawe the surrounding tribes of Indians (the most of whom were immigrants from the United States), and left the people of eastern Texas free to meet the threatened invasion by the Mexicans.

In the meantime, and upon receipt of official news of what had occurred in Texas, the Congress of the United States had taken up the question of the acknowledgment of the independence of the new republic. President Jackson had despatched Henry M. Morfit to Texas, to ascertain and report upon her military, civil, and political condition.\* After some discussion in the house of representatives, it was resolved by a large majority that the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States, whenever satisfactory information should be received that it had in successful operation a civil government capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power.† That body likewise approved the step taken by the president to acquire that information.

By the middle of August, the Texan army had again increased to its former strength. Brigadier-General Felix Huston occupied San Patricio, on the Nueces, with five hundred mounted men. Two companies, also mounted, were at Bexar, rather to protect that place from the incursions of the Indians than against the Mexicans. The remainder of the army, under

\* Message of President Jackson, December 21, 1836. See Morfit's Reports, Executive Document No. 35, Twenty-fourth Congress, second session.

† Passed on the 4th of July, 1836, by a vote of one hundred and twenty-eight to twenty.

General Rusk, was on the *Coleta*, about fifteen miles east of Goliad. The Texan navy consisted of the *Invincible*, carrying eight port-guns and one pivot nine-pounder; the *Brutus*, of like force; the *Independence*, of eight guns; and the *Liberty*, of three guns, undergoing repairs.

Santa Anna was removed to Columbia, and thence, about the first of August, to Orazimba, on the Brasos, about forty-five miles from Velasco.\* This removal was made to prevent his rescue, as, but a short time before, an attempt of that kind had been made by the Mexican consul at New Orleans, through the instrumentality of Bartholomew Pagés. The Texans still retained about fifty officers and five hundred privates of the enemy as prisoners in and about Galveston island, the support of whom was a heavy burden upon the young republic. With the small naval force on hand, the ports of Matamoras and Brasos Santiago were blockaded, and the enemy annoyed and overawed. Thus, upon the whole, the affairs of Texas were prospering; and, further to brighten her hopes, the season was most propitious to the planter, so that, under all the circumstances, good crops were produced in those parts of the country not previously overrun.

On the 23d of July, President Burnet issued his proclamation for the election of president and vice-president, and for representatives to the first Congress of Texas, under the new constitution; also to decide upon the adoption or rejection of that constitution; and likewise upon the question of annexation to the United States. The election was ordered to transpire on the first Monday of the following September, and the new government to meet for installation at the town of Columbia, on the first Monday in October. For the high office of president, two distinguished names had been announced: Ste-

\* Morfit to Forsyth, August 13, 1836.

phen F. Austin, a man endeared to the country by years of toil, privation, and faithful service; and Henry Smith, the former governor of revolutionary Texas. On the 20th of August, Sam Houston was nominated by more than six hundred persons at Columbia;\* also by a large meeting at San Augustine, on the 15th of August; and by other assemblages in various parts of the republic.† The public wish on that point was so manifest, that he had no alternative but to accept. His reasons for so doing are given by himself: "After the capture of Santa Anna," says he,‡ "I was compelled to go to New Orleans, in the month of May, for surgical as well as medical aid. On my arrival, I met a number of Texans there, and they requested me to become a candidate for the presidency. This I positively refused to do. From that time up to within fourteen days of the election, I refused to let my name be used, nor would I, if elected, consent to serve in the office. General Austin and Governor Smith were the candidates, and with these gentlemen my relations were most kind. It was not a desire to obtain the office of president which ultimately caused me to let my name be used; but, there were two parties in Texas, which were known as the '*Austin*' and '*Wharton*' parties. I intend no disparagement to either of the distinguished gentlemen or either of their friends, but it is necessary thus to describe the condition of the political elements then in Texas. Governor Smith was the ostensible head of the '*Wharton*' party. So far as I could judge, the parties were pretty equally balanced. In this posture of affairs, I was firmly impressed with a belief that, if either of the gentlemen should be elected, it would be next to impossible to organize and sustain a government; as, whoever he might be, he would be compelled to fill all the offices with

\* "Telegraph," August 23, 1836.

† *Ib.*, August 30, 1836.

‡ Letter to Guy M. Bryan, November 15, 1852.

his own friends, and those of opposite feelings would, of course, oppose the administration, which, in the then condition of the country, could only be sustained by the united efforts of the community. Not being identified with either of the parties, I believed I would be enabled so to consolidate the influence of both, by harmonizing them, as to form an administration which would triumph over all the difficulties attendant upon the outset of the constitutional government of Texas."

It will be remembered that, at that time, the majority of the people of Texas was composed of immigrants from different portions of the civilized world; and that she had in her midst very many enterprising adventurers, whose ambitious pretensions were not checked by that local patriotism which restrains such persons in countries long settled. The army was proportionably large, and the most of its members had come to reap fame and distinction. The elements, though calm, were not cohesive. A single spark would inflame the entire body. Hence the organization of the new government would require a *palinurus*, who was ever watchful, at the helm. The election resulted in the choice of SAM HOUSTON as president by a large majority, and MIRABEAU B. LAMAR was elected vice-president. The constitution was also adopted, and the vote for annexation was nearly unanimous.

It is proper to state here a movement in the army, consequent upon the attempt of Pagés to rescue Santa Anna. It was the wish of many, and was generally reported, that, by a vote of that body, it was resolved to conduct the captive to headquarters, and place him before a court-martial. General Houston, then at Aies Bayou, being informed of these alleged proceedings, despatched his protest against them.\* He pro-

\* Protest of July 26, 1836. In regard to this protest, General Gaines says: "No inconsiderable portion of your fame, resulting from your late campaign,



tested against it, because all the advantages accruing to Texas by his capture would thus be destroyed; because Texas was bound by every rule of morality and humanity to abstain from every act of passion or inconsiderateness, so unproductive of positive good; because it would endanger the lives of the Texan prisoners then in Mexico, and it would compromit the safety of the North Americans resident in that republic; because Texas, to be respected, should be considerate, politic, and just, in her actions, and Santa Anna would be of incalculable service to her in her then present crisis; because, in cool blood, to offer up the living to the manes of the departed, only found examples in the religion and warfare of savages; and because, as the attention of the United States was then called to the pending differences between Texas and Mexico, to proceed at that time to extreme measures would be treating the American government with great disrespect. The protest, reaching the

the great victory of San Jacinto, will be found in the magnanimity and moral courage displayed by you in preserving the lives of your prisoners, and more especially the life of President Santa Anna, when taken in connection with the great provocation given in his previous conduct at the Alamo and at Goliad. The government and infant republic of Texas will derive imperishable fame from their and your forbearance and humanity in this case. All civilized and enlightened men, in all time and geographical space, will unite in filling the measure of glory and honor due for such magnanimity, forbearance, and humanity."—*Gaines to Houston, August 3, 1836.*

On the same subject General Jackson says: "I take the liberty of offering a remark or two upon a report which is current here, that Santa Anna is to be brought before a military court, to be tried and shot. Nothing now could tarnish the character of Texas more than such an act as this. Sound policy as well as humanity approved of the counsels which spared him his life. It gave possession of Goliad and the Alamo without blood, or the loss of any portion of your army. His person is still of much consequence to you. He is the pride of the Mexican soldiers, and the favorite of the priesthood. While he is in your power, the difficulties of your enemy, in raising another army, will continue to be great. The soldiers of Mexico will not willingly march into Texas, when they know that their advance may cost their favorite general his life. Let not his blood be shed, unless imperious necessity demands it as a retaliation for future Mexican massacres. Both wisdom and humanity enjoin this course in relation to Santa Anna."—*Jackson to Houston, September 4, 1836.*

army, was sent to Columbia. A captain with his command had, just before its arrival, gone, as was said, after the prisoner, to bring him to the army; and the protest only reached Captain Patton, who had the captive in charge, in time to prevent his removal. Captain J. H. Sheppard, the bearer of the document, says the pleasant change of affairs filled Santa Anna with joy, and he embraced him as one who had saved his life.\*

The Mexicans still slumbering in their quarters at Matamoras, and endeavoring by a forced loan to raise means to carry on the war, the Texans began to turn their attention to more peaceful concerns. Immigrants and land-buyers began to come in. New settlements and new towns also began to spring up and gladden the wilderness. Among the latter was the town of *Houston*. The Messrs. A. C. Allen and J. K. Allen, proprietors, having laid off the place into lots, presented them for sale on the last of August, and, with an enterprise worthy of the future mart of a large portion of Texas, went to work in building a saw-mill, hotel, &c., and in encouraging steamboats to make it a place of business. Exclusive of her natural advantages, Houston owes much to these early pioneers.

Nor should we omit, in speaking of the progress of Texas, to refer to her first permanent newspaper, "The Telegraph." It was commenced at San Felipe, about the 10th of October, 1835; and remained there, issuing a number weekly, until the advance of the Mexicans forced it to retreat to Harrisburg. There it set up again, and issued a number on the 14th of April, 1836, when it was borne down and its materials destroyed by the enemy. On the 2d of August following, it reappeared at Columbia. Since that time it has been regularly published. Texas had no better or more useful friend during the dark period of her Revolution. On the great points of

\* Captain Sheppard's Notes.

difference between the two countries, and the movements of armed parties, it spread light and information over the whole country. By means of this potent lever, the government was greatly aided, and Texas made free.

General Houston, after taking proper measures to conciliate the Indians, and sending a request to the chiefs to meet him at Robbins's ferry, on the Trinity, on the 26th of September, left Nacogdoches for Columbia. He arrived at the latter place on the 9th of October, and found the first Texan Congress in session. The message of President Burnet, which was delivered on the 4th, is an important state paper, and presented to the people's representatives an animated account of his administration, with suggestions for their future action. The report of the auditor exhibited an audited indebtedness of upward of a quarter of a million of dollars. If to this be added nearly a half-million due for supplies, over a half-million pay due the army and navy, and a hundred thousand dollars for the civil list, the total indebtedness of Texas at the meeting of the first Congress was not far from a million and a quarter of dollars.\*

The population of the young republic, at that time, did not perhaps exceed thirty thousand Americans, and twenty-two thousand Mexicans, Indians, and negroes.† Thus we behold

\* Morfit to Forsyth, September 4, 1836.

† Estimated population of Texas in September, 1836:—

ANGLO-AMERICANS .....	30,000
MEXICANS— at San Antonio, 2,000; Nacogdoches, 800; La Bahia, 500; Victoria, 120; and San Patricio, 50. ....	3,470
INDIANS—Wacoos, 400; Twowokanies, 200; Tonkawas, 800; Cooshatties, 350; Alabamas, 250; Camanches, 2,000; Caddoes, 500; Lipans, 900; small bands, 800: to which add the civilized tribes—Cherokees, Kickapoos, Choctaws, Chickasaws, Potawatamies, Delawares, and Shawnees—	
8,000.....	14,200
NEGROES.....	5,000
Aggregate .....	52,670

*Morfit to Forsyth, August 27, 1836.*

a country, larger than most of the leading states in Europe, more fertile than any of them, and with a most congenial climate, so torn by the ravages of war, and trampled down by the iron heel of tyranny, that, for a century and a half after its first settlement by Europeans, it has made little or no progress. But a better fate awaits Texas. As yet, however, all was confusion; the people had not become located, and the channels of travel and trade were not determined. Galveston island, since the departure of Lafitte, had been a sunny solitude. At the time of which we write, and for some months previous, the eastern end of the island was occupied by a hundred Texan troops, under the command of Colonel Margan, where they had hastily thrown up a mud fort, and mounted a few pieces of artillery. They had charge of the Mexican prisoners, and the whole occupied some hundred tents and huts around the fort.\* How changed the scene in eighteen years, when the freebooters of Christendom had gathered there under the great Lafitte, and were waging war by land upon the Carankawaes, and by sea against everybody! But Galveston was ambitious, and sent Mr. Millin to represent her interests in the first Congress. That body, however, could not find Galveston among the districts entitled to representation, nor could they find that it formed a portion of any particular county, and so Mr. Millin was dismissed.†

On Saturday, the 22d of October, President Houston was duly installed into office, and delivered to the two houses in convention an inaugural address admirable alike in manner and matter. At the close of his address, he delivered to the speaker his sword, the emblem of the military authority with which he had been clothed, and said: "It now becomes my

\* Morfit to Forsyth, August 23, 1836.

† House Journal, First Congress, p. 92.

duty to make a presentation of this sword, the emblem of my past office. I have worn it with some humble pretensions in defence of my country; and should the danger of my country again call for my services, I expect to resume it, and respond to that call, if needful, with my blood and my life." At the same time, Vice-President Lamar was sworn into office, and addressed the convention of the two houses in his usual happy manner.\*

It is not intended here to enter into a detail of the proceedings of the first Congress of Texas. Its duties in organizing the government were sufficiently arduous, and it is believed the members performed them with a singleness of purpose rarely found in legislative bodies. The president was authorized to appoint his cabinet, and, in so doing, the office of secretary of state was given to Stephen F. Austin, and that of the treasury to Henry Smith. The volunteers and forces in the army, and who had been in the service, were amply provided for in lands and the promise of pay. To raise funds for meeting the public wants, the president was authorized to contract a loan of five millions of dollars. The judiciary, a much-neglected branch of government, was fully organized, and judges were elected for the supreme and subordinate courts. Previous to this period there had been but one *nisi prius* common-law judge in Texas. This office had been created and filled by the government *ad interim*, by the appointment of Benjamin C. Franklin, who had the honor of being the first judge in Texas with common-law and maritime jurisdiction.† Provisions were also made for an increase of the navy; for the protection of the frontier, by calling out rangers, erecting blockhouses, &c.; also for defining and paying the civil list; also the establish-

\* House Journal, First Congress, p. 84.

† President Burnet's Message, October 4, 1836.

ment of regulations for the government of the army and navy ; also for the reorganization of the army, and fixing the military establishment of the republic. These, with an organization of the postoffice department, and the enactment of various special and police laws, constituted the labors of the first session of the first Congress ; after which the two houses adjourned, to meet again on the first Monday in May, 1837, at the new town of Houston, to which place the seat of government had been removed by a law of the session.

The Mexican government, after receiving intelligence of the capture of Santa Anna and his treaty with Texas, notified the United States that his functions as president were suspended. President Jackson, therefore, on receipt of Santa Anna's letter, and in answer thereto,\* after expressing a great desire for the restoration of peace between Mexico and Texas, informed the dictator that the government of the United States had been notified of his suspension, and that good faith to Mexico forbade him from taking any step in the matter ; but if the latter power would signify its willingness to avail itself of the good offices of the United States, it would afford them great pleasure to devote their best services to it.

But differences had arisen between the United States and Mexico, which prevented the latter from asking any such favor. The former had large and long-standing unadjusted claims against the Mexican government, which ought to have been paid. On the 20th of July, 1836, the American minister at Mexico was directed to lay these claims anew before that government, and, if no satisfactory answer was received within the space of three weeks, then to declare to the government that, unless those claims were adjusted without unnecessary delay, his further residence there would be useless. If the

\* Jackson to Santa Anna, September 4, 1836.



matter was still delayed, the minister was directed to give the government two weeks' further time to make a satisfactory answer, before he asked for his passports. Mr. Ellis, in obedience to his instructions, after presenting the claims, finally, on the 4th of November, gave the two weeks' notice; when, no satisfactory answer having been returned, he demanded and received his passports.

On the part of Mexico, she had taken great offence at the occupation of Nacogdoches by the American troops. Gorostiza, the Mexican minister at Washington, had been favored with frequent conferences on the subject. He was referred to the thirty-third article of the treaty between the two powers, whereby each of them was bound, by all the means at its command, to preserve peace and harmony among the border tribes of Indians; and, the better to attain that object, both parties bound themselves expressly *to restrain by force* all hostilities and incursions on the part of the Indian nations living in their respective boundaries, so that the Indians on either side of the border should not be permitted to attack the Indians or citizens on the other side. Gorostiza was also informed that the Indians west of the supposed boundary, and on the "*neutral ground*," were assuming a warlike and dangerous attitude; that Mexico was not there with her forces to keep them quiet, nor had she the ability to do so, as her troops were driven by the Texans west of the Rio Grande; and it became necessary that the United States should assume an advanced position, temporarily, and for her own defence. And the president further stated that he seriously doubted the sufficiency of the causes assigned by General Gaines to justify the removal of troops to Nacogdoches.\* Nevertheless, this did not suit the policy of Mexico, as she desired to employ the Indians against

\* President Jackson's Message, December 6, 1836.

Texas, and, while the American troops remained at Nacogdoches, she could not do so. On the other hand, the presence of those troops at Nacogdoches secured the eastern Texans against the savages, enabling them to leave their homes and go to the defence of their country. Gorostiza, therefore, abruptly left his post on the 15th of October, 1836, and all diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was consequently broken off.

The Mexican authorities had used all their efforts to effect a second invasion of Texas, but domestic troubles and want of means prevented. At length, Urrea, on account of his leanings toward *federalism*, was removed from the command of the army, and General Nicholas Bravo appointed in his stead. Great efforts were made by the authorities to convict Filisola; but his conduct in retreating, and thus saving the lives of so many prisoners, as was believed by the masses in Mexico, made him popular with them. Since the capture of Santa Anna, a gradual change had been going on in the confederacy; and, in December, General Bustamente returned from his exile in France, and his friends proclaimed him a candidate for the presidency, at the election to be held on the first of the following March.

The year 1836 did not close in Texas without serious bereavements. On the 15th of November, Lorenzo de Zavala, the late vice-president, died at his residence on the San Jacinto. His life had been eventful and useful. Providence had cast his lot in a land of revolutions and of blood, but at all times and under all circumstances he had been a constant and ardent lover of liberty and humanity. His remains lie in a free country, and his name will be remembered while that freedom endures. As misfortunes seldom come alone, on the 27th of December, Stephen F. Austin also died. His remains,

followed by the officers of the government and a large concourse of citizens, were placed on the steamer "Yellowstone," at Columbia, and conveyed to Peach Point. On arriving at the Point, the procession was met by a portion of the first regiment of infantry, when suitable funeral honors were paid to the distinguished dead. By order of the government, the army and navy were put in mourning, and minute-guns were fired, in token of the nation's grief. That nation has erected no monument to the memory of Austin; but this he did himself, while he lived, in laying the foundation of a great state, and building it up on principles of moderation and freedom. Austin lived to see his work completed—his country free, prosperous, and happy. His history is a noble lesson to those who, by patience, toil, and enterprise, would do a great and good work.\*

President Houston, after his induction into office, visited Santa Anna in his prison. He treated him with great kindness, while in confinement and made his condition more comfortable. They had a long and free conversation on the subject of the differences between their respective countries,† and many plans were suggested for their adjustment. Houston at length, being satisfied that any further detention of Santa Anna would add nothing to the interests of Texas, by consent of the prisoner, placed him and Colonel Almonté in the custody of George W. Hockley, inspector-general of the army, with

\* General M. B. Lamar long since promised the public a life of Austin. Such a work has been greatly needed in Texas. It is believed that a writer of General Lamar's fine abilities, with the aid of the private papers of the deceased, would do ample justice to his memory.

† After Santa Anna visited Washington city, it was currently reported, and by many believed, that he had made a treaty with President Jackson, by which Texas was ceded to the United States. As it is probable there was not a word said by either of them on that subject, the rumor must have had its foundation in Santa Anna's letter, of the 5th of November, to President Houston. See Appendix No. VI.

Colonel Barnard E. Bee and Major William H. Patton as an escort, and gave instructions to conduct them to Washington city.\* Santa Anna desired to take that route on his return to Mexico, as it would be most safe to his person. The party immediately set out, and arrived at Washington city on the 17th of January, 1837.† Santa Anna was received with great kindness by President Jackson, had several friendly interviews with him, and while there spoke as freely in favor of Texan independence as he had done in Texas. He remained in Washington till the 26th of January, during which time he dined with the president and his cabinet, and had his portrait taken by the painter Earl. Leaving the capital, he “embarked at Norfolk in the ‘*Pioneer*,’ a public vessel provided for him by the president,” and sailed to Vera Cruz. On arriving there, he was coldly received: “None but a few curious loungers met him on the mole; no array of troops met the commander-in-chief.” He retired to his country-seat of *Mango de Clavo*, about twelve miles distant from Vera Cruz, where he waited patiently (as he had often done before) the troubling of the waters.‡

The Texans had detained Santa Anna too long; the power of their captive was gone in his own country. At the presidential election in Mexico on the first of March, 1837, of sixty-nine electoral votes, Santa Anna received but two! Bustamente, the late exile, was chosen by an overwhelming majority. Santa Anna, however, did not despair, but returned to his country-seat, and prepared his famous *manifesto*, in which he unsaid much that he had declared while a prisoner; but one

\* Houston's order to Hockley, November 20, 1836.

† Hockley to Houston, January 20, 1837. The Texan Congress had declared in favor of a still further detention of Santa Anna, but it did not meet with the executive approval. — *Journal of the House*, 1836, p. 144.

‡ “Democratic Review,” 1838, p. 314.

thing he had resolved—and in that he was most sincere—never again to set his foot on the soil of Texas.

It is proper here to state that President Houston appointed General Rusk to a seat in the cabinet,\* which left the command of the army in the hands of General Felix Huston. On the 22d of December, the Texan Congress, by a joint resolution, requested the president to open a correspondence with General James Hamilton, of South Carolina, to ascertain if he would accept the command of the Texan army. In the discussions in that state, touching the independence of Texas (which Governor M'Duffie strangely opposed), General Hamilton had shown himself a warm friend of the infant republic. In the reorganization of the army, provision was made for one major-general; and the government of Texas desired to manifest its gratitude to her distinguished advocate in that chivalrous old commonwealth for his noble services. The president lost no time in making known to him the wish of the new republic, with the expression of a hope that he would accept the high position, and be in Texas by the first of March, as a formidable invasion was anticipated.†

At the close of 1836, the Texan army consisted of about seven hundred men enlisted for the period of the war, and eighty who had six months longer to serve. The troops had neither flour nor bread; beef-cattle there were in abundance on the prairies, but no horses in camp to drive them up. They had likewise a good supply of ammunition, but were without flints.‡

\* General Rusk shortly afterward resigned, in order to attend to his private affairs, which had been much neglected during his long absence in the public service.

† Houston to Hamilton, December 31, 1836. Duplicate, February 11, 1837. Circumstances of a private nature prevented General Hamilton from accepting the appointment. — *Hamilton to Houston, February 16, 1837.*

‡ General Felix Huston's official despatch, December 16, 1836.

The Mexicans had again increased their forces in and about Matamoras. At the latter point there were thirteen hundred and thirty-five infantry, six hundred and seventy cavalry, and four hundred chained convicts, ready to be distributed among the several companies. They had twenty-eight pieces of cannon and two mortars. There were also *en route*, from San Luis Potosi, one hundred and fifty cavalry, three hundred infantry, and four pieces of artillery. Besides these forces, there were at Saltillo twenty-five hundred men of all arms, and at Laredo one hundred and fifty cavalry—making in all an aggregate of over five thousand troops, ready to invade Texas.\* Yet it was believed by many that the object of the Mexican government was rather to present a hostile appearance, and thus prevent the United States from recognising Texas as an independent state, than to invade the Texan settlements. The troubles in the interior of Mexico between the *federal* and *central* factions guarantied the peace of Texas. In fact, she was in a poor condition to meet the enemy. The situation of her army has already been stated. This condition was not owing to the fault of the government, but to the want of credit. She had relied upon the sale of her land-scrip to meet her pressing wants, until some portion or all of the five millions loan could be realized, or until her revenues should replenish her empty coffers. This scrip, passing through the hands of the Messrs. Toby and brothers, of New Orleans, had failed to answer the intended purpose. This was partly charged to the agents. Drafts drawn on them were accepted, payable "*when in funds.*" These payments were procrastinated; the drafts were hawked and peddled through the city, until the credit of the republic was sunk to its lowest ebb. The Texan vessels-of-war were lying idle for want of funds; the recruiting-service was inac-

\* Statement furnished by John Ricord, January 26, 1837.



tive; and the president was compelled to bind himself personally for the payment of beef to feed the army!\* The post at Galveston island—important, as having in charge so many prisoners—was in a starving condition; so likewise were those prisoners transferred to Anahuac. To provide for themselves, they made forays upon the cattle along the coast, in Liberty county. Many of the owners of these cattle had never been on the best terms with the Texan authorities, but had rather opposed the Revolution. Consequently, these arbitrary drafts upon their stock soon exhausted their patriotism, and some disturbances arose in that quarter.† To remedy the destitute condition of the army, the president made a visit to headquarters in January, and, having fully ascertained its wants, and the resources of the surrounding country, took such steps as he could to provide for them.

The question of the recognition of Texan independence had been long the subject of discussion in the United States. There was considerable opposition to the measure, arising from the antislavery feeling in the northern portion of the Union. However, a resolution to that effect was introduced into the senate by Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi. On the 1st of March it was called up, and, after a warm discussion, was passed, by a vote of twenty-three to twenty-two. On the following day a motion

\* Houston to George Robinson, January 13, 1837. The army had other troubles. Under the recent law directing its reorganization, the president had appointed Colonel A. S. Johnson to the command as general-in-chief. He arrived in camp on the 4th of February. Some difference arising between him and General Felix Huston, induced the latter to call him out. They met on the morning of the 5th, and, after an exchange of four or five shots, in which General Johnson was severely wounded, the matter was settled. The affair produced considerable confusion in the army.—*Letter of Captain J. B. Irvine, February 5, 1837.*

† Letter of William Hardin, February 13, 1837. Colonel Hardin had charge of the Mexican officers taken prisoners at San Jacinto, and who had been sent to Anahuac.

was made to reconsider, but it was lost by a vote of twenty-four to twenty-four. The house of representatives made an appropriation for a diplomatic agent from the United States to the government of Texas; and the last official act of President Jackson, previous to his retirement from the executive chair, was the nomination of Alcee Labranche as *chargé d'affaires* to that republic. In a few days afterward, an official audience was given to the Texan ministers in Washington, and they were duly recognised as such to the government of the United States.\* Thus one of the first powers had formally admitted that Texas was able to take care of herself. It was an era in her history worthy of remembrance. It was not a boon, but a just admission of her good conduct and firm purposes.

Having acknowledged her independence, the question of her annexation legitimately came up for discussion. The Texan ministers lost no time in laying the matter before the cabinet at Washington. The *recognition* of the independence of Texas, and her *annexation* to the Union, were very different questions. In determining with respect to the first, the United States did not take the question of *right* between Mexico and her rebellious province into consideration. Their duty to the two countries permitted them to look at the *fact* merely: for if Texas was in fact independent, it was their duty and interest to admit it.

But in regard to annexation—so long as Texas should remain at war with Mexico, and the United States at peace with the latter, the annexation of Texas to the American Union

\* Letters of Memucan Hunt, March 7, 1837, and J. H. Houghton, March 2, 1837. General Hunt says: "I can not permit this opportunity to pass without expressing my gratitude and admiration of the zealous efforts of Messrs. Walker, Preston, Calhoun, and Parker, in behalf of Texas. Their names are most prominently identified with the success of the first recognition of the independence of our republic."

would involve the government of the United States in a breach of treaty with Mexico, and necessarily induce a war.\* Such was the reasoning of the American secretary of state. And, lest the United States might be suspected of a disregard of her treaty of friendship with Mexico, she did not even reserve the subject for further consideration, but dismissed it at once. This disposition of the matter was, no doubt, at that time, correct. The question then came before the people of the United States, as one of time. That these kindred peoples would be united, there could be no doubt: how long, then, did good faith on the part of the United States require her to wait upon the fruitless efforts of Mexico to reclaim her revolted and victorious colony? We will notice the gradual solution of this question.

The increasing number of volunteers, and the consequent expenditure of land-scrip to keep them in supplies, bore so heavily upon the credit of Texas, that some step became necessary to check the movement. Accordingly, an order was issued on the 10th of March, 1837, refusing all volunteers except such as received the passport of Colonel A. S. Thruston, Texan agent at New Orleans; and he was instructed to pass only those who should furnish themselves with good arms, six months' clothing, and two months' rations. This order had the desired effect; and, though it would have been unsafe before that time, it had now become practicable.†

Meanwhile, the threatening attitude of Mexico was daily decreasing. A revolt, growing out of the depreciation of the copper currency, broke out in the capital. The soldiers were called out, and, firing on the mob, killed several. Again, there was a rebellion in the southern part of the confederacy,

\* Forsyth to Hunt, August 25, 1837.

† Order, March 10, 1837. Instructions to Thruston, March 16, 1837.

and troops were ordered to that quarter. Indeed, such were the troubles in the capital, and so strong the demand for the *federacion*, that General Bravo left the army at Matamoras, and hastened to the scene of confusion. The Mexican government, however, having procured and equipped several small vessels-of-war, declared the coast of Texas in a state of blockade. The news of the recognition of Texan independence by the United States was received in Mexico about the close of March. It had a wonderful effect in abating the ardor of the nation. The secretary of war declared, in a speech to the Mexican Congress, that the event had been dexterously arranged by the United States many years before; that they had all witnessed the management and intrigue by which that nation had endeavored to acquire a portion of the territory of the Mexican republic; and that, with the same Punic faith, it had acquired possession of the Floridas from Spain! He further charged the United States with preparing armed expeditions to aid the rebel colonists of Texas; with insulting Mexican vessels, and conducting them into American ports, and there treating them as pirates, while the true pirates displayed an unknown flag in the same American ports, and received every kind of assistance and protection. "And," said he, "our men are now ready to enter on that ungrateful soil, and the God of battles will be with them, for it is a war of justice."\*

Deaf Smith, who, with a mounted force of twenty-one men, had been ranging west of San Antonio, set out on the 6th of March with a view to plant the Texan flag at Laredo. On the evening of the 16th he reached the Chançon, a small stream five miles east of Laredo, where he was discovered by the scouts of the enemy. On the following day, having moved back a mile or two, to obtain better grass for his horses, the

\* "*Diario del Gobierno*," April 2, 1837.

Mexican cavalry, to the number of forty, were seen about a mile distant, advancing in fine order. Smith and his party took a position in a thicket of *mosquitoes*, when the enemy began the attack at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards. Smith gave orders to his men not to fire until they were sure of their aim. After an engagement of forty-five minutes, the Mexicans retreated, having ten killed, and as many wounded. Smith had but two of his men wounded. Learning from the enemy's wounded that there was a considerable force at Laredo, he returned to San Antonio.\*

Of the Mexicans who were natives of Texas, it has been said that there were two parties. From these, two hostile companies were raised: the one under the command of Colonel J. N. Seguin, and the other under Captain Rodriguez. The former kept his headquarters about San Antonio, and the latter at Matamoras. They both ranged over the territory between the two places, and gave to their respective superiors such news as they could gather—the most of which was totally unreliable, yet still calculated to produce uneasiness and uncertainty on the frontiers.

We must not omit to mention here the solemn ceremony of collecting and devoting to funeral honors the ashes of the heroes of the Alamo. It was performed on the 25th of February by Colonel Seguin and his command, under orders from the general-in-chief of the army. The dead had been burnt in three piles. The ashes were collected and placed in a neat black coffin, on the inside of the lid of which were engraved the names of Travis, Bowie, and Crockett; a solemn procession was formed, and the remains borne to the place of interment, where, after suitable orations, they were buried with military honors.

\* Deaf Smith's report to the Secretary of War, March 27, 1837.

The appearance of the Mexican fleet in the gulf was followed by some damage to Texas. The "Champion," freighted with provisions, &c., for the army, was taken by the enemy; and also, on the 12th of April, the "Julius Cæsar," whose cargo was valued at thirty thousand dollars. President Houston had previously issued an order for the release of the Mexican prisoners: but, learning that those on board the captured vessels had been taken into Matamoras and confined, he revoked the order of release.

This blockading navy of the enemy necessarily came in contact with the commerce of the United States; and the Mexican brig-of-war *Urrea*, having captured some American vessels and property, was taken by the United States sloop-of-war *Natchez*, and sent into Pensacola as a pirate. On the 17th of April, the Texan schooner *Independence*, having a crew of thirty-one men, besides several passengers—among whom was William H. Wharton, on his return from his mission to the United States—was met, about thirty miles from Velasco, by two Mexican brigs-of-war, the *Libertador*, having sixteen eighteen-pounders and one hundred and forty men, and the *Vencedor del Alamo*, carrying six twelves and one long eighteen-pounder, and one hundred men. After a severe fight, in which the Texans behaved most gallantly, the *Independence* was overpowered and taken into Brasos Santiago, whence the crew and passengers were transferred to Matamoras and confined. In this engagement, Captain Wheelwright, of the *Independence*, was severely wounded.\*

The Texan navy, on leaving Galveston in May, proceeded to the mouth of the Mississippi, but, failing to find any of the enemy there after a cruise of seven or eight days, turned to

\* Official report of Lieutenant J. W. Taylor, April 21, 1837. Letter of Surgeon Levy, May 5, 1837.



the coast of Mexico. The Texans made some small prizes about the island of Mugere, and thence proceeded to Yucatan, where they cannonaded the town of Sisal for some three hours, but with little effect. The Texan schooner *Invincible* took and sent into port as a prize the Mexican schooner *Alispa*, of eighty tons; and the *Brutus* captured and sent in the schooner *Telegraph*. The Texans also made repeated landings along the coast, and burnt eight or nine towns. This, though sufficiently annoying to the enemy, and in accordance with their mode of warfare, has not been considered, in modern times, the most humane way of conducting a war. Another vessel, the *Eliza Russell*, of one hundred and eighty tons, belonging to English subjects, which was taken by the *Invincible* off the Alicranes, and brought into Galveston, not being freighted with a contraband cargo, was afterward properly restored, with damages, by the republic.\*

The frontiers of Texas during the winter and spring of 1837 had been unsettled. The Indians, actuated by the persuasions of Mexican agents, and the imprudence of many white people living near them, kept up a very annoying predatory warfare. They began their depredations by the murder of three men on the Trinity at Fort Houston; then by the murder of two more on the Neches; and these were followed by numbers of others along the frontier. Besides these outrages, many horses were stolen. The government did what it could to make treaties with the savages, and to keep up a vigilant ranging-service; but still, while the Mexican emissaries were among them, they could not be quieted.

On the first of May, the first Congress met for its second session, agreeably to its adjournment, at the town of Houston. The president had some time before preceded the members.

\* "Matagorda Bulletin."

As the town was not yet a year old, it will not be supposed that the accommodations were extensive. The president's house was a log-cabin, consisting of two rooms or pens—the one having a puncheon-floor, and the other a floor of earth. Yet in that humble dwelling the representatives of the republic and a large number of visitors—among whom were the British agent Crawford, sent to look at the country, and the distinguished Audubon—attended the *levées*.

The message of the president advised the Congress that the cloud of invasion, which a short time before had threatened to break upon them, had passed away. In recurring to the great subject of the finances, he informed them that the agents intrusted with the sale of land-scrip had proved so unfaithful, that further sales were suspended; and, owing to the depressed state of the money-market, none of the five millions loan had been taken.\*

The Congress continued in session until the 13th of June. Among its enactments were, a law to raise public revenue by imposts; modifying the land-law of the previous session, and repealing all laws allowing further bounties to volunteers; imposing direct taxes; authorizing the issuing of the promissory notes of the government; and a law consolidating and funding the public debt. These were the principal laws of a general nature passed at this session. A joint resolution (suggested by the visit of Mr. Crawford to Texas) was also adopted, recommending the appointment of an agent to proceed to England, to procure the recognition of the independence of the republic by that nation.

It has already been stated that there was a revolt in the Mexican capital, growing out of a decree scaling the copper coin fifty per cent. This *emeute*, as before remarked, induced

\* Message, May 5, 1837.

Bravo to leave the army at Matamoras, and repair to the city. Filisola was sent to take again the command. The troops in that town received no pay, nor had they, to any extent, since the evacuation of Texas. The officers were leaving whenever they could, and the soldiers deserted daily. In the meantime, General Moctezuma had declared for the constitution of 1824, and took his position at the Rio Verde, fifty leagues from San Luis Potosi, where the federalists, to the number of over three thousand, rallied around him. About the first of May, General Valencia left Matamoras with eleven hundred troops, under orders to assist in the overthrow of Moctezuma. This reduced the force at the latter place, under Filisola, to about two thousand men. On the 26th of June, Moctezuma was surprised by the centralists, himself killed, and his army cut to pieces.

Such were some of the scenes enacted in Mexico. Her government had become faithless and penniless, and her paper was not worth twenty cents in the dollar. It was manifest that a crisis was approaching, for she must have money; and the priesthood, having the control of it, would make no voluntary surrender. forcible proceedings would at once produce a revolution, for the priests controlled the masses in that country; and they knew very well that they had in Santa Anna a potent friend, who was ready to act at their request.

Texas was as poor as Mexico; and President Houston, seeing the burden the young republic had to bear, was anxious to discharge the most of the troops. Yet, having nothing with which to pay them, he followed the precedent of the United States at the close of the Revolutionary war—he gave them furloughs.\* Thus two thirds of the Texan soldiers quietly

\* Order to the Secretary of War, May 18, 1837; also order of the 19th of May, 1837.

dispersed to their homes, leaving the service in confident reliance upon the good faith of the government.

Colonel John H. Wharton, desirous of making an effort to release his brother from the prison of Matamoras, obtained permission and a flag, and proceeded with thirty Mexican prisoners to that town, to make an exchange. But, on landing, he was made a prisoner and confined in a dungeon. After an imprisonment of six days, he made his escape, and returned to Texas. In the meantime, his brother, William H. Wharton, through the aid of the well-known Captain Thompson, of the Mexican navy, also escaped and reached home. It was intended that Thompson should desert the enemy's service, and leave with him; but Thompson's departure was precipitated by some information given to the Mexican authorities, and he arrived in Texas before either of the Whartons.\* This barbarous conduct on the part of the enemy induced the president of Texas to readmit the granting of *letters of marque and reprisal* against them, which he had suspended on his entrance into office.†

On the 25th of August, the *Brutus* and the *Invincible* arrived off the bar at Galveston, having in tow a Mexican armed schooner which they had captured near the banks of Campeachy. On the same evening, the *Brutus* and the prize entered the harbor, but the *Invincible* could not get in. On the following morning the latter was attacked by two of the enemy's armed brigs. The *Brutus*, in attempting to go out to her aid, ran aground; so the *Invincible* was obliged to continue the unequal contest alone during the day. Toward evening she attempted a retreat, but struck on the breakers near the southeast channel. The crew landed in safety, but during the night

\* "Telegraph," June, 1837.

† President's Proclamation, September 15, 1837.

the vessel went to pieces. The *Invincible* was a favorite craft in the Texan navy, and her loss much regretted.\*

Difficulties having arisen in the meanwhile between the authorities of the United States and those of Texas in relation to the yet undefined boundary-line between the two countries, and conflicts having occurred between their respective citizens along the border in regard to land-claims, President Houston convoked the Texan Congress in extra session on the 25th of September, and laid the matter before that body for its action. As the extra session extended into the annual session, the executive, on the 21st of November, addressed to the two houses his annual message. The important and complicated subject of the finances and currency of the republic occupied a prominent place in this document. The president stated the extraordinary fact that, since the commencement of his administration, only the small sum of five hundred dollars in specie had been paid into the national treasury. He declared the sale of land-scrip, as a means of supplying the wants of the treasury, to be "an imaginary and unfortunate expedient." The act of the previous Congress, authorizing the issuance of a half-million of treasury-notes, had already gone into operation. These notes were received in payment of public dues, and were deemed a better currency than the notes of the non-specie-paying banks of the United States (for the year 1837, it will be remembered, was a period of unexampled commercial prostration and financial embarrassment, which caused a general suspension of the banking institutions of the Union). The president believed that, so long as an *excessive* issue of these notes was avoided, they would have a sound currency, the credit of which would extend to those countries with which the republic had commercial intercourse; but that, if an excess

\* "Telegraph," September 2, 1837.

were issued, the depreciation would be in proportion to such excess.

The report of the secretary of the treasury exhibited an *audited* indebtedness of a little over a million of dollars; but to this should be added the outstanding debt yet to be audited, which perhaps amounted to a million more.\*

\* The author of the "Fiscal History of Texas" has not considered this unaudited portion of the debt of Texas (page 73). Mr. Gouge, so distinguished for his works on banking and the currency, has not done himself justice in his "Fiscal History of Texas." Without looking at the heroic efforts of Texas to relieve herself from the shackles of a tyrant, and the blood of her gallant sons so freely shed in that struggle, his eye has been fixed only on her poverty and her empty treasury. True, he has been industrious in collecting financial facts, and has arrayed them in a masterly manner; but it is always with a sneer, a reproach of her poverty and humble beginnings. We see in his work, not the soul of the lover of his race, but of the Wall-street broker! Surely, Mr. Gouge has lived long enough to know that something else than money constitutes the *man* and the *nation*. In regard to *good faith*, he will turn his fine abilities to a comparison between Texas and the United States at the close of their respective Revolutions. If Texas suffers in the comparison, the point will be surrendered.



## CHAPTER VIII.

No people can live and do well without faith. That which is—of which we have no demonstrative proof—we must receive by faith. Our views are limited, and the more so, if we are wanting therein. To all such no voice is heard, no vision is seen, beyond the dark veil of the future; to them the stars speak not, the graves are silent; they read no lessons in the sky nor in the teeming world around them. As individuals or as a nation they do not live, but simply vegetate. It may be said that the greatness of a nation is co-ordinate with its aggregate faith. The future glows in the bosom of the man of faith; this begets hope, which cheers to labor and to enterprise. What else was it that brought the Franciscan friars to the wilds of Texas, and caused them to devote days and years of peril and of want to the instruction and culture of the savage mind? and what but faith drew around the sanctuary of God these wild children of America? Thus a great work was begun, and a faint glimpse obtained of man's high destiny. But there was to be an end of this missionary movement in Texas. Perhaps it had completed its work when, in 1794, the missions were secularized by order of Don Pedro de Nava, commandant-general of the northeastern internal provinces. After that time, and up to the period of the Texan Revolution, the religious movements in the province were under the direc-

tion and jurisdiction of the *ordinary*, or bishop of Monterey. They can not be said to have had much vitality. So far as Texas was concerned, they were stationary. In fact, the repeated wars and conflicts of which she was the theatre caused religion to decline.

The emigrants to Texas under the colonization system did not fall into the Roman catholic mode of worship. That they had faith, their works abundantly attest; but theirs was the protestant form of worship, and they saw nothing among their new neighbors to induce them to abandon the religion of their fathers. It is true that the law of their immigration required them to profess the catholic faith; but they winked at this law, and tacitly disclaimed the papal jurisdiction. Nor did the Mexican rulers attempt to enforce it upon their consciences. It is due to truth to say that, among all their grievances, they had little complaint to make on the score of religious intolerance. Some practical difficulties occasionally arose: for instance, marriage, being regarded by the catholics as a sacrament, required the action of the priest; whereas, the immigrants, looking at it only as a civil contract, were content to be married by a civil officer, by the captain of a military company, or even by a bond executed by the parties in the presence of witnesses.\* But the protestants were not persecuted in Texas.

This tolerant spirit brought many protestant missionaries into the province before the Revolution. As early as the year 1818, the Rev. Henry Stephenson, of the methodist church, preached on the Texan side of Red river. In 1822, he ex-

\* By the ordinance of the council, January 16, 1836 (Orders and Decrees, p. 135), all judges, alcaldes, commisarios, and ministers of the gospel, could celebrate the rites of matrimony. By the act of June 5, 1837 (Laws of Texas, p. 233), the former marriages by bond were legalized. This law was further extended in 1841 (Laws, vol. v., p. 176).

tended his visits farther west; and, in 1824, he preached the first protestant sermon west of the Brasos, at the camp of John Rabb, near San Felipe. In 1826, Rev. Joseph Bays, of the baptist church, preached at the house of Moses Shipman, west of the Brasos. In the latter part of 1827, he removed to San Augustine, where he continued his labors till he was compelled to desist, it has been said, by the Mexican authorities, but more probably by desperate men of the American stock: for in the history of those times, the great hindrance to the exertions of the American missionaries was found in the opposition of the heroes of the *neutral ground*. In 1828, Rev. Sumner Bacon, of the Cumberland presbyterian church, penetrated as far west as San Felipe,\* and preached wherever he could. In 1829, Rev. Thomas Hanks, of the baptist church, also preached west of the Brasos. It was during this year that the baptists had the honor of establishing the first Sunday-school in Texas. It was organized at San Felipe, under the guidance of T. J. Pilgrim.

The baptists and the methodists have not yet settled the question as to which denomination reared the first church in the Texas wilderness. The former was organized in 1833 west of the Brasos; the latter was organized at a camp-meeting, ten miles east of San Augustine, the same year. About the same time a church was organized by Rev. Milton Estill, of the Cumberland presbyterian faith, in what is now Red River county. Thus, under the Mexican government, the protestants commenced their labors in Texas. In 1832, Sumner Bacon, through the instrumentality of Rev. Benjamin Chase, of Natchez, was appointed agent for the distribution of the Bible in the province. Bacon was a fearless man, and seat-

\* For an account of the first labors of the several protestant denominations in Texas, see Appendix No. VII.

tered the word of God from San Antonio to the Sabine. He met with serious opposition, but it was from his own people, and not the Mexicans. In this work he laid a broad foundation for the protestant missionaries.

The Revolution in Texas necessarily retarded the religious movement, but only to enable it to advance with renewed energy. It may be said that the protestant immigrants brought their preachers, as well as their religion, with them. This remark, however, does not apply to those desperate, homeless wanderers, who, having fled their country, spread disorder and crime wherever they went; and who, after a short career, were destroyed or driven off. On the return of peace, after the army was disbanded, a feeling of gratitude seemed to animate the citizens: they had seen how signally and manifestly God had favored them in their struggle, and flew to the altar of their faith to give utterance to the noblest feelings of their hearts. There is always hope for such a people. When there is a will, there is a way; and those who witnessed the great moral reform that succeeded the clash of arms, beheld the germ, the outcroppings of a spirit, that promised much. Their faith gave truth, dignity, moral firmness, and energy, to their character. They heeded not the timid croakers in the old states, who were willing to denounce what they wanted the courage to enjoy, but wrought valiantly, for they were laying the foundations of an empire. Lasting honor to the old pioneers of Texas, and to the faithful heralds of the cross who came to minister to their flocks! They went forth sowing in tears, but many of them have already gone their way rejoicing, taking their sheaves with them.

As early as 1838, the presbyterian and the episcopalian ministers commenced their operations in Texas; and, though not claiming to be pioneers in this work, the preachers of these

denominations have wrought with zeal, and by example and precept given an impulse to learning that has added much to the character of the state. Nor have the Roman catholics been backward in advancing the moral and intellectual condition of their people. In this country of mild laws and free opinions, they enjoy, as they ought to do, the same religious and civil rights with all others. As they are a people of strong faith, they are left to its enjoyment, and to the full development of whatsoever their hands find to do. As an evidence of the moral growth of Texas, there are now not less than thirty-five thousand of her people attached to the several protestant churches. The numbers belonging to the catholic faith are unknown. It has been recently stated, by a Texan bible-agent, that Texas is more abundantly supplied with the word of God than a majority of the states of the Union.

On the 8th of May, 1837, at the office of Rev. Dr. R. Marsh, in Houston, a meeting of ministers of the gospel was held.\* Its object was the promotion of the cause of religion in Texas. Rumors had been circulated in the United States that the people of Texas had no regard for religion or morality. These were credited by many Christians in the former country, and their effect was keenly felt and deprecated by the latter. This meeting, composed of representatives from several denominations, after the Texas fashion, formed itself into an "*Ecclesiastical Committee of Vigilance for Texas*," and declared that, under the great Head of the church and the benign influence

\* The meeting was composed of the following clergymen, viz. :—

Rev. W. W. Hall, of Houston, presbyterian, from Kentucky ;

“ William P. Smith, of Washington, protestant methodist, from Tennessee ;

“ L. L. Allen, of Washington, episcopal methodist, from New York ;

“ H. Mathews, of Houston, episcopal methodist, from Louisiana ;

“ R. Marsh, of Houston, baptist, from Alabama ; and

“ Z. Morrell, of Milam, baptist, from Tennessee.

*Telegraph, May 16, 1837.*

of charity, it would endeavor to maintain the purity of the Christian name, and the honor and dignity of the ministerial office; for which purpose, the members would give their sanction to no individual professing the sacred principles of religion, who was not of regular standing in the branch of the church to which he might have belonged, and who did not exhibit a godly walk, and produce satisfactory evidence of full membership. They urged a union of the exertions of each branch of the church in advancing the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom. They also appointed the Rev. Drs. Hall, Smith, and Mathews, a committee of correspondence. There is nothing like a committee of vigilance—for we are taught to watch as well as pray; and this small meeting, whose proceedings were extensively published, did much to prevent the ingress of rogues, under sleeves of lawn, into Texas.

In July, 1837, Charles Compté de Farnesè presented himself before the Texan government with certain propositions, combining at once the more extensive influence of the catholic religion, and the recognition by Mexico of the independence of Texas. He came with recommendations,\* and represented

\* "VELASCO, July 11, 1837.

"To His Excellency Sam Houston:—

"DEAR SIR: This will be presented to you by the count Farnesè. His object in visiting this republic is, to offer his *fortune* and *personal influence* to the glorious Texan cause. His views are extensive, and, if fully consummated, will, no doubt, be of infinite service to this republic. They have been fully explained to Dr. Archer, General Green, and other influential gentlemen here, all of whom think highly of them. The count is, no doubt, a gentleman of high literary attainments, and seems to have his heart much set on the establishment of institutions of learning in this country. The proposition he makes, of opening at once (after seeing and consulting with you) a correspondence with the court of Rome, for the purpose of having established in this republic an independent bishopric, if successful, can not fail to be productive of the most *beneficial effects*. It will not only place the catholic citizens of this republic in a very different attitude, but will induce tens of thousands of other catholics to emigrate to the country. . . . .

"Very sincerely yours,

JOHN C. WILLIAMS."



to the president that, “having heard in Europe of the conquest of Texas, he had abandoned his country (where he enjoyed a fine fortune, was allied to several European courts, and had the prospect of a brilliant career), to offer his services and fortune to Texas.” After some preliminary remarks in relation to the protection given by European monarchs to religion, and the human heart and mind “which require to be cultivated like a young plant,” he submitted to the president his “plan,” which was, to treat, through his means, should the president think him worthy, with the court of Rome:—

“1. To raise all Texas to an archbishopric. This step is the sure means of making peace with Mexico through the influence of the Roman court; it will break all communication with the bishop of Monterey, under whose jurisdiction are the catholics of Texas, and will remove all difficulty with other courts in acknowledging the independence of Texas.”

After some further details as to the election and residence of the archbishop, the count proceeds with his plan:—

“6. To accord gratuitously, in all the cities and villages of Texas, a convenient place to build a church, house for curate, and school.

“7. In order that the archbishop, clergy, masters and mistresses of schools, may not become chargeable to government, to accord to them, without distinction, in their respective parishes, or the nearest district, twelve hundred and eighty acres of land.”

“9. The churches, houses of clergy, and schools, will be built by the means of the church: consequently, the government will not have the power to employ them for any other purpose, without consent of the holy see.

“10. The religion catholic apostolic and Roman will be allowed to exercise freely her functions in all parts of Texas.

“11. She will enjoy the protection of government.

“12. She will observe strictly the rites and canons Roman.”\*

How little did the count Farnesè know of the American system of government! To the first article of his plan no man in Texas could object. The catholic church had, and still has, the liberty of creating such ecclesiastical functionaries in the state as she deems necessary to her welfare. The ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth articles, were all granted by the constitution: with this understanding, that the church could make any alterations she chose in her rites and canons, or she could abolish them all, and the government could not and would not interfere. The sixth and seventh articles, which contemplated a donation to the church, were wholly inadmissible, inasmuch as the government makes no grants or donations to any church or sect, but extends to all the liberty of worshipping God as they may think proper. The great error of Count Farnesè was, in supposing that there could be a connection between church and state in Texas. As men have different ways of looking at spiritual matters, the government wisely permits them to think as they please, and to form as many associations and churches as they may wish—not choosing to take part with any, further than to secure to all perfect liberty in their worship. As governments are of this world, and the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, to preserve the peace and purity of each, our institutions keep them separate. This article in the Texan creed would have been the last one surrendered by the people. True, the churches in Texas are poor, and their temporalities would be greatly improved by donations from the state or from individuals; but, in the history of the church, from its first organization, it is clearly shown that her spiritu-

\* Letter and plan of Count Farnesè, July 28, 1837.

ality has been in direct proportion to her poverty. Nearly all the departures from a holy life have been found among those of the clergy and laity who abounded in the comforts and luxuries of the world. In all those governments where religion has become the creature of the state, while she has abounded in temporal good, her spirituality has fled. So little does the arm of God require an arm of flesh to feed his church! These reflections may be unpleasant, but they are true.

In justification of the profound wisdom and happy consequences of this policy in Texas, her history shows as little of religious persecution as any part of the world. May this her favored condition be perpetual!

The conduct of the Indians on the frontiers of Texas was such as to require energetic action on the part of the government. During the spring of 1837, a party of Mexicans visited all the Indian nations on the frontier, making to them the most seductive offers to induce them to make war on the Texans. They promised them arms, ammunition, and the plunder and prisoners—women and children included—taken during the war; also the peaceable possession of the country then held by them. At the same time, these emissaries succeeded in persuading them that, if the Texans were successful in the war then pending between the latter and Mexico, they would seize the country then occupied by the different tribes, and drive them from the land of their fathers. Thus many tribes of the prairie Indians were induced to join the Mexicans.\*

The savages soon commenced their incursions into the settlements, and the Texan Congress found it necessary to declare war against them. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Horton, of San Augustine, was ordered to raise a force of a hundred and twenty

\* B. L. Chouteau, Agent for the Osages, to William Armstrong, Superintendent of Indian Affairs West, March 1, 1837.

men, and as many more volunteers as might be deemed necessary, to proceed against the prairie Indians.\* Yet no successful effort was made to chastise them. Every day or two, during the year 1837, some murdered citizen or stolen property attested their hostile feeling. In the autumn, Lieutenants Benthuisen and Miles, with eighteen mounted rangers, proceeded from Fort Smith to the head-waters of the Trinity, where, on the 10th of November, they fell in with a hundred and fifty hostile Indians. A fierce battle was fought, which lasted two hours. The Indians, having lost their chief, retired for about twenty minutes, elected another leader, and returned to the charge. The Texans had in the meantime taken a good position among some timber on a knoll. The savages, unable to drive them out, and suffering severely from their rifles, set fire to the grass all around them. The Texans then made a charge upon their foes, who, after considerable resistance, fled, leaving about fifty warriors killed! The rangers lost Lieutenant Miles and eight privates killed, and three wounded.†

The great question before the second Congress was, the disposition of the public lands. It will be remembered that the general consultation, on the 13th of November, 1835, closed all the land-offices, and ordered all empresarios, commissioners, and surveyors, thenceforth to cease their operations. This decree necessarily rendered all certificates granted, or loca-

\* President Houston to J. W. Parker, June 1, 1837. The most powerful enemy to the Texans, among the Indians, was *Chicony*, the principal chief of the Camanches. Major A. Le Grand, of the Texan army, was sent to treat with him. He found the chief near the confluence of the Big and Little Washita. Le Grand having stated the object of his visit, Chicony replied that, "so long as he continued to see the gradual approach of the whites and their habitations to the hunting-grounds of the Camanches, so long would he believe to be true what the Mexicans had told him, viz., that the ultimate intention of the white man was, to deprive them of their country; and so long would he continue to be the enemy of the white race."—*Report of A. Le Grand, April 26, 1837.*

† "Telegraph," December 23, 1837.

tions or surveys made, after that date, invalid. The objects of this decree were manifest, but a reference to a few facts will render them more so. The legislature of Coahuila and Texas, in its last days, finding that the latter province was about to be lost to Mexico, or at least to Coahuila, undertook a shameless and corrupt squandering of the public domain in Texas. These *quasi* land-titles were to be resisted. Under the colonization laws of Mexico, tracts not exceeding eleven leagues to one person, could be sold to *natives*. Under color of these laws, and using the names of natives, land-speculators, claiming to act as their attorneys in fact, had already begun and were preparing to possess themselves of the best lands in Texas. This wholesale operation, as a fraud upon the colonist and the soldier in the field, was also to cease. Numbers of persons, having purchased up *head-rights* of individuals (who never made Texas their home, but visited the country, and remained only long enough to obtain their title-papers), wished to locate and perfect the titles to these head-rights; and, having exhausted this list of transient persons, names were manufactured, and head-rights granted upon them. It was necessary to check this operation likewise. Yet the endeavor was resisted in some parts of the republic; and, to avoid all difficulties arising from the extension of titles after the decree of November 13, 1835, it was found convenient to ante-date them.\*

\* "February 5, 1836. — Had a long conversation with Major Don Jorge Antonio Nixon, the commissioner for granting land-titles. . . . The operations of this office are now suspended, and some hundreds of deeds are now lying here incomplete, waiting for some formalities, and the payment of fees. Nixon expected to be removed, or to have his duties superseded, and he has had the shrewdness to *certify all the incomplete deeds, prior to a certain date*; so that, when the purchaser comes for his deed, he will find it ready, as far as the commissioner can make it so." — *Notes of Colonel William F. Gray: MS.* The hundreds of Spanish titles, thus ante-dated, were soon put into circulation. When Colonel Gray saw them, they were waiting for a purchaser.

Many old settlers who were entitled to head-rights, and many soldiers who were entitled to bounties, were, at the passage of the decree, and for a considerable time afterward, engaged in the army, and their claims certainly were of superior merit. Hence it was but a matter of justice to them that they should have an equal chance with others in the selection of their lands. If "the spoils belonged to the victors," surely they had the best right to them.

Many efforts were made by the majority in the first Congress to recommence the distribution of the public lands, but the president did what he could to resist them. The sectionizing of the public lands had been provided for by the constitution.\* The president was desirous of complying with this provision. Its meaning, when we refer to the mode of surveying lands in the United States, in sections of a mile square, is plain enough. But the Congress of Texas chose to understand it otherwise, and passed the general land-law without any regard to the sectionizing system. The president vetoed the law on the 13th of December, and the two houses passed it by a majority of two thirds on the following day.†

Some remarks here upon the history of land-titles in Texas may not be uninteresting. Neither Spain nor Mexico ever considered the public lands within the limits of the latter as of any value. So far as Texas was concerned, it was the policy of Spain to keep them unsettled, as a barrier to encroachments upon her mines. In the first days of success after the Mexican Revolution, a feeling of enterprise was manifested, and the idea of colonizing the vacant lands entertained. Even then the sale of lands was only suggested by the successful operation of

\* Constitution of the Republic, General Provisions, Section 10: "The whole territory of the republic shall be sectionized, in a manner to be hereafter prescribed by law."

† Acts of 1837, p. 62.



the system in the United States of the North.\* A good deal more attention was paid to water-privileges, and lands incapable of irrigation were deemed of no value, except for pasturage.

The first grants of the Spanish government in Texas, of which we have any record, are those of the three missions of Concepcion, San Juan, and La Espada. The grants for the missions of Valero and San José were doubtless made earlier, and probably some individual grants, but we know of none now in existence.† The three first-named missions were located in the first instance on the St. Mark; but such was the difficulty of procuring water for irrigation, “so necessary to the support of the people who were to be indoctrinated,” that on the 29th of October, 1729, the viceroy of Mexico, Casa Fuerte, commissioned the governor of Texas, the ex-guardian of the apostolic college of Queretaro, and the president of the Texan missions, to make a new settlement or location. After some search, they made their selections of three places—two on the San Antonio river, and one on the “Medina,” below the junction of the two streams. They next proceeded to the neighboring tribes of Indians, to whom “they spoke, and explained the holy and benevolent purpose of their institution; and three tribes, among others in the vicinity, viz., the *Pacaos*, the *Pajalats*, and the *Pitalacs*, agreed to settle the three places selected, and to submit to doctrine.” The commissioners, having completed their labors, made a report to the viceroy, and petitioned him to make the necessary decrees. The viceroy laid the matter before Ribera, former inspector of the *presidios*

\* Report of Lucas Alaman, Secretary of State to the Sovereign Constituent Congress, November 1, 1823.

† The writer is greatly indebted to Colonel J. W. Hampton, Colonel Crosby, and to Mr. Buchanan, the commissioner and translator of the land-office, for transcripts of the old grants to be named in this connection.

of New Spain, for his opinion. The ex-inspector reported on the 22d of September, 1730, concurring with the report of the commissioners, except in regard to the location for the lower mission "on the Medina river, at thirty leagues' distance from the *presidios* (San Antonio and La Bahia), where it may be liable to attacks from the Apaches, who on many occasions appear in a hostile manner in that territory. . . . This danger would not exist if the said mission were located in the same vicinity with the other two."

The viceroy, in conformity with this opinion, on the 2d of October, 1730, decreed that the captain of the royal presidio of San Antonio, should issue a decree that the three missions should be located as recommended, using his judgment as to the plan of locating the lower mission. He further ordered that each mission so to be located "be furnished with three soldiers for the term of two years, this time being considered necessary for the instruction of the Indians in tillage, and at the expiration of this time one soldier shall remain in each mission, the other two returning to their corps."

On the 15th of December, 1730, the captain of the presidio of San Antonio de Bexar, in pursuance of this order of the viceroy, remitted the same to Don Gabriel Costales, captain of the presidio of *La Bahia del Espiritu Santo*, with orders to execute it, he being delegated as judge for that purpose, in the absence of any public or royal notary. In making a return of his proceedings, Captain Costales says: "A despatch was presented to me from the most excellent viceroy, through the captain of the royal presidio of San Antonio, which I kissed and placed on my head, as a message from my king and natural lord, which with blind obedience I obey, and am ready to execute whatever it commands." Upon this return, the captain of the presidio of San Antonio, on the 12th of January, 1731,

decreed the establishment of the missions named. All these formalities being attended to, and the acts of each party written down, and attested by assisting witnesses, the captain of San Antonio proceeded on the 5th of March, 1731, to the first mission-ground, called *Our Lady of the Concepcion de Acuña*,\* accompanied by several of the officers of the presidio, and Father Bergara, and seized the hand of the captain of the tribe, in the name of all the other Indians who had attached themselves to said mission, and led him about over the locality, and caused him to pull up weeds, throw stones, and perform all the other acts of real possession, that by virtue thereof they might not be dispossessed without being first heard and defended by Father Bergara, president of the Texas missions, or such other of the clergy as might have administration over them. After declaring the bounds of the mission, there was attached to it pasture-lands, watering-places, irrigating privileges, uses, and services, and the further right, in planting-time, to drive their stock out west for pasture, so as not to prejudice the crops. The act of possession concluded by notifying the Indians, through an interpreter, what they should do in advancement of Christian doctrine, and in avoidance of crime.

At the same time, Captain Perez proceeded to put other tribes in possession of the mission-grounds of *San Francisco de la Espada*, and *San Juan*, situated below, on the San Antonio river ;† the same formality being observed in each case. The record of the titles (which, as will be seen, is a simple narrative of the action of each party) was then filed in the archives of San Fernando de Bexar, and a certified copy furnished to each mission. It will be observed, in the foregoing

\* The baptismal name of the viceroy was Juan de Acuña.

† At this period (1731), the river below the junction of the Medina and San Antonio was called the *Guadalupe*, and the present river of that name was called *San Marcos*. At times, however, it retained the name of "Medina" to the gulf.

abstract of the transfer, that the title was assumed to be in the king of Spain, and that the transfer was to the Indians, and not to the priests, who, by their vows, could own no worldly estate.

In regard to the mission-lands of *San José de Aguayo*, they were claimed by Don Domingo Castelo, one of the king's ensigns, for his services at the presidio of San Saba; but, after a protracted lawsuit between him and the mission, the title was vested in the Indians of the mission, on the 18th of November, 1766, by purchase, for one hundred and fifty dollars.

For a further illustration of ancient Spanish titles, we will refer to the grant to Luis de la Bega, in 1792. The lieutenant-governor of Texas, Captain Juan Cortes, had issued an order that he would donate lands to all who had not received them. In pursuance of this order, La Bega presented his petition, asking a title to a place called *Las Castañas*, where he had a herd of mules, requesting that it be given him for the pasturage of his animals, "with all its inlets and outlets, uses and customs, for himself, his heirs and successors, at all times to use it as a lawful right, since from it benefit would result to him." The petition closes in the usual form: "I petition you to please order to be done as already prayed, that thereby I may receive favor; and also to receive this on common paper, there being none of the proper kind [stamped]. I swear this is not in malice, but necessary," &c. On this petition, the lieutenant-governor says: "Let it pass to the solicitor" (*procurador*), in order that, without prejudice to a third party, he give the corresponding possession. The solicitor then declares that, in pursuance of the lieutenant-governor's order, "he proceeded to the place called *Las Castañas*, and, having notified the settlers who joined and lived at the place of my intention, I gave him from the place he petitions for as far as the bank

of the river Angelina, to the east a league and a half, bounding with the barrens, without being able to extend the other two courses on account of its being occupied: and taking the said Don José Luis de la Bega by the hand, and between one of said leagues he placed the corresponding signs, and I granted him the corresponding possession in the name of his majesty (whom God preserve!) in the presence of my assisting witnesses, with whom I act, for want of a notary public."

These three papers—the petition, the order, and the possessory act—constituted La Bega's title. While they were filed in the archives of Nacogdoches, the owner could have a certified copy. A title to a lot in Nacogdoches, granted the same year to Pedro Gengle, is in the same form—the *procurador* stating in the possessory act that he led the said Pedro Gengle by the hand to the premises, and at each corner of the land, "as a sign of possession, he drove stakes, pulled up weeds, and threw stones."

Some years afterward, the large grants about the villages having covered most of the lands, it became necessary to be a little more particular in extending titles. The grant ceased to follow as a matter of course upon filing the petition; but the representative of the king first had an examination made, and a report of the result returned, upon which he acted in his discretion; and sometimes a slight consideration was paid. In 1810, San Miguel presented his petition to Governor Salcedo for a grant of a parcel of land lying three leagues from Nacogdoches, situated on "Palisada creek, which joins with the Nana," adjoining the lands of his neighbors Pedro Espaga and Vicente Michelli. The reason he assigns for asking the grant is, that he is absolutely without any land on which to labor and keep his stock. The governor directed the petition to pass to Pedro Procela, a neighbor, whom he commissioned

to go upon the premises, and examine, and report as to the quality and circumstances of the land, its waters, whether it was vacant, its value (in reference to the tariff for grazing-leagues), and whether a grant of it would be prejudicial to a third party. Manuel Delgado, clerk of the council, having certified to the genuineness of the governor's decree, the papers were handed over to a notary, who notified Miguel and Procela of what was done, and caused them to sign an acknowledgment of the notice.

Procela, thus commissioned, went upon the premises with two assisting witnesses, and made the required examination. It is proper to state that Procela was a friend of the applicant; and accordingly, in his report to the governor, he represented the land as broken, bad winter pasturage, with no permanent water, and unfit for farming; and, having noticed particularly the circumstances of the land, he declared it afflicted with "an almost general epidemic of ticks, hornets, &c., which was common to the jurisdiction" of Nacogdoches. He further declared the land vacant, that it could be granted without prejudice, and, in conclusion, estimated the value of the whole tract (of twenty-five hundred acres) at five dollars! As to the governor's action upon this interesting report, we are not advised; but the entire proceeding shows that it had become much more difficult to obtain titles to lands than formerly.

As the majority of the inhabitants of Texas, at the time of the establishment of the colonial system, were civilized Indians and their descendants, the fruits of missionary labor, and known generally as "Mexicans," we will refer to the mode by which they acquired titles to their lands. It has already been seen that, in the establishment of the missions of Concepcion, San Juan, and Espada, the title and possession of the missions were formally vested in the Indians. By a royal *cedula* of the king



of Spain, of the 10th of September, 1772, the four missions around the presidio of Adacs—viz., *Our Lady del Pilar de los Adacs*, *Our Lady de los Dolores de los Aes*, *Our Lady de Guadalupe de los Nacogdoches*, and *Our Lady de la Luz del Orquizaco*—were abolished, and, as we have seen, the convents removed to San Antonio, where lands were distributed to them on the east bank of the river.

The order of the commandant-general De Nava, of April 10, 1794, in directing the discontinuance of the Texan missions, also required the abolition of the community system by which the Indians held their property; and they were placed upon the same footing as other Spanish subjects. While the order provided carefully for the morals of these new subjects of his majesty, by requiring the magistrates to see that professional gamblers and liquor-dealers did not enter into their towns, it also provided that, of the best lands belonging to each settlement (*pueblo*), there should be set apart eight lots of about fourteen acres each for their use, additional lots to be added as the number increased. The remainder of the league around the mission was to be divided among the Indians in right of inheritance, and titles extended to them in the name of the king—the titles, however, being limited to them and their descendants. Thus the missionaries ceased to have the administration of the Indians or their temporalities, and they became as other Spanish subjects, responsible alone to the civil authority.\* In spiritual matters, however, the Indians as well as the

\* The returns made of the number of Indians in the mission of San José, in pursuance of this order of De Nava, are as follows:—

CHRISTIAN INDIANS—Men, 27; women, 26; boys, 11; girls, 14; widows, 6 . . . . .	84
PAGAN INDIANS ( <i>gentiles</i> )—Men, 6; women, 5; boy, 1; girls, 3 . . . . .	15
Total . . . . .	99

*Return of July 30, 1794.*

missionaries came under the jurisdiction of the bishop of the diocese.

This decree of De Nava seems either not to have been fully carried out in Texas, or else it was confined to those missions under the influence of the expelled Jesuits (though we do not find that they obtained a footing in Texas); for, by a decree of the Spanish cortes, of the 13th of September, 1813, all the missions in Texas were ordered to be secularized. This was probably induced by the democratic leanings of the priests. It was not until the 15th of September, 1823, that the supreme government of Mexico ordered the execution of the decree of the cortes. Finally, in 1827, the legislature of Coahuila and Texas divided out the mission-lands.\* Thus, during the several changes of government, the same policy was pursued, and the "Mexicans" of Texas (*Indios reducidos*) received titles to their lands. But the various wars that occurred in Texas, between 1810 and 1835, destroyed and drove off large numbers of the old inhabitants; their landmarks were obliterated, their titles destroyed and forgotten, and under the new order of things the same lands were relocated and granted once more to new settlers.

Under the colonial system, the ancient mode of extending titles was generally observed. Foreigners being permitted and invited to settle in the country, either came at their own expense, and on their own account, or they were introduced by *empresarios*, who contracted with the government to bring in so many families, in consideration of the lands which were given to such contractors for this service.† The general colonization law declared that the state desired to augment the settlement of its territory, to advance the raising and increase

\* Decrees No. 37, November 26, 1827, and No. 37, June 15, 1827.

† Decree No. 16, Article 3, *et seq.*

of stock, and the progress of commerce and the arts. For agricultural purposes, a *labor* of land was allowed; for grazing, a fourth of a league; to a single man, a third; and to each head of a family, a league. The first step in procuring the grant, after the domiciliation of the applicant, was a petition to the executive, representing the sovereignty of the state for, the title to the vacant lands is in the state. But as it was not convenient for the governor to give his personal attention to this matter, commissioners were appointed to represent him, and the petitions were addressed to them. These petitions merely set forth the facts of the applicant's immigration, from what country, and the extent of his family, if he had one. The commissioner, by a written order, remitted the application to the *empresario*, for his examination and report. The latter having reported that the applicant was a colonist, the papers were returned to the commissioner, who issued an order to the surveyor to survey and mark the lands designated, and make return with duplicate plots of the premises. The commissioner then decreed a title, and put the party in possession. He did not actually go with him upon the premises, as had been done in former times, but the decree set forth that he put him in real, actual possession of the lands. In this decree the conditions provided for by the law were inserted, viz., the setting up of permanent landmarks at the corners within one year, the cultivation of the lands, and the payment of the government dues within six years. The latter amounted to thirty dollars for a league of grazing-land, and two and a half or three and a half dollars per *labor*, according as it was irrigable or not irrigable. There was a further condition in the decree that the land should not pass into *mortmain*. All these parts of the title being entered in a book, according to their date, constituted what is known as a Spanish title. They were then care-

fully copied off, and certified by the commissioner to be a faithful copy. This copy, with one of the maps, was delivered to the colonist as his title. They are sometimes called "second originals," and sometimes "*testimonios*." The originals were retained by the commissioners, and finally deposited in the general land-office, where they can be referred to, as proof of the genuineness of the *testimonio*. This was the general form of the colonial head-right grants. In cases of purchase from the state, or of grants to the military, the form was varied to suit the consideration and conditions of the law.

Under the Texan land-law of the 14th of December, 1837, the American system is introduced. A commissioner of the general land-office is created; also a board of commissioners for each county, to take proof and issue head-right certificates; and likewise a surveyor for each county, to survey, and make out and record field-notes of the land designated. These field-notes, with the certificate, are returned to the general land-office, examined, located on the map of lands, and, if found correct, and on vacant lands, a grant or patent, signed by the governor and countersigned by the commissioner, passing under both their seals, issues to the party in the name of the state. Should the party's claim be for military services, he obtains his warrant from the war-office, and proceeds to locate it as a head-right certificate. So, likewise, in regard to land-scrip, the same course is pursued.

Under this important law, hundreds of claims were presented and acted on early in 1838. Many locations, however, were made on these old Spanish grants, the parties being either ignorant of their existence, or supposing them forfeited by non-performance of conditions. But, under the general principle that none but the state could set aside a grant for non-performance of subsequent conditions, and a conflict of interests hav-

ing prevented any action in the Texan Congress or legislature on that point, the old grants have generally been sustained, and often to the prejudice of a more rapid immigration. The Congress, however, remitted all the conditions annexed to head-right grants, except the government dues.

The year 1838 opened well for Texas. During the latter months of 1837 a heavy immigration had come into the country, the parties composing which brought with them substantial means and industrious habits. The Mexicans, to the number of five or six hundred, had advanced as far as San Patrio, but soon retired, driving before them some two thousand head of cattle ranging west of the Nueces. The prudent use of the promissory-notes of the republic, being received for duties and other public dues, had given a temporary relief to the treasury. The increase in the number of immigrants had also added to the imports and tariff dues. Lands had likewise risen in value; so that Texas was in a prosperous condition. During the year 1837 her farmers had made good crops, that of cotton alone being estimated at fifty thousand bales, and worth at the selling prices two millions of dollars. The new town of Galveston was beginning to rise in the public estimation. Commerce had sought out the harbor as the best in the republic, and responsible merchants were beginning to settle there. As in 1836 a vessel scarcely anchored in the harbor once a month, now, in the beginning of 1838, vessels were arriving daily, and the harbor presented the appearance of an Atlantic port. The merchants who had previously confined their trade to New Orleans, were now extending their business to the eastern cities.\* With the demand from the interior,

\* "Telegraph," February 17, 1838. A writer in that paper of June 16, 1838, says that, twelve months previous to that time, there was but one building there, but at the time he wrote there were fifty or sixty elegant buildings, and fifteen or twenty vessels in the harbor.

grew up the traffic between Galveston and Houston. This trade was carried on by four steamboats; and the growth of the last-named town was equally rapid. For the first quarter of 1838, the imports at Galveston were over a quarter of a million, and the duties about fifty-one thousand dollars.

The want of means had caused a reduction of the naval as well as military force of the republic; but at length the authorities succeeded in procuring the brig *Potomac*. This vessel was the only one afloat in the Texan navy in the summer of 1838. But, at that time, Texas had no need of a navy to defend her against her enemy; for the French government, having certain claims against Mexico, which she failed to meet, sent her, from on board the national frigate *L'Herminie*, off Sacrificios, an *ultimatum*, the substance of which was, that the republic, by the 15th of May, 1838, should pay six hundred thousand dollars claimed as indemnity.\* The Mexican government having rejected this *ultimatum*, her ports were blockaded on the 15th of April, and a considerable French naval force was assembling at Vera Cruz.† This blockade, which lasted for some time, gave peace to the western frontier of Texas.

The diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States, which, as we have seen, were so suddenly broken off, were again resumed. On the 20th of May, 1837, the Mexican Congress passed a law authorizing President Bustamante to propose a reference of their differences to a third party. With this view, Señor Martinez was accredited as ambassador to Washington, and submitted the proposition to the secretary of state.‡ It was accepted on the part of the United States, and

\* M. Deffaudis to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 21, 1838.

† Proclamation of blockade, April 15, 1838.

‡ Martinez to Forsyth, April 7, 1838.



a convention proposed for making out the details of the reference.

The differences between Mexico and other nations freed Texas from present anxiety, relieved her from some expenses which she was ill able to bear, and gave her time to consolidate her strength, thus increasing the improbability of another invasion. Yet she was preparing to protect her coasts and commerce. In pursuance of an act for augmenting the navy, approved November 4, 1837, Samuel M. Williams was appointed by the president to contract for the vessels required by the law. Accordingly, on the 13th of November, 1838, he contracted with Frederick Dawson, of Baltimore, for one ship, two brigs, and three schooners, to be fully armed, furnished with provisions and munitions, and delivered in the port of Galveston, for which the contractor received two bonds of the republic of two hundred and eighty thousand dollars each, which might be redeemed by sterling bonds for five hundred and twenty thousand dollars, or by payment of the face of the bonds with ten per cent. interest. If the bonds were not so satisfied by the 1st of December, 1839, then the bonds, deposited in the Girard bank, were to be delivered over to the contractors.\* This was a portion of the loan.

In 1838, and for some time previous, the banks in the United States had ceased to redeem their paper; consequently, it was considerably under par. The promissory-notes of the government of Texas had suffered a like fate, and for a still stronger reason, that they were never redeemed with specie, but only in receipt of public dues. In New Orleans, they were received

\* Samuel M. Williams to President of the Girard Bank, November 29, 1838. Contract with Dawson, Appendix to Journals of Fifth Congress, p. 202. Report of M. M. Potter, Chairman of Special Committee of the Texas Senate, January 22, 1854. It is not very creditable to Texas, that, after a lapse of more than fifteen years, these bonds are still unpaid.

tolerably well on their first issuance, in November, 1837; but by the spring of 1838, after the issuance of half a million, they fell to fifty cents in the dollar.

It was undoubtedly the true policy of Texas to sustain the credit of this paper, at least while it was used at all. To do this, it was necessary to limit the amount circulated. But the Texan Congress, forgetful of the sage maxims of experience, passed a bill in May, 1838, requiring the secretary of the treasury to issue as much more. The president vetoed the measure, and, among his reasons for so doing, he stated, as the cause for the original adoption of the plan, that Texas had just come out of a war in which she had achieved freedom and glory; "but the struggle had left us destitute and naked. There were no banks; there was no money; our lands could not be sold, and the public credit was of doubtful character. To avoid the absolute dissolution of the government, it became necessary to resort to some expedient that might furnish temporary relief." As the relief intended was only temporary, it was desirable, to make it efficient, that the issue of promissory-notes should be limited to the local demand, as it was impossible that such a currency could have credit abroad. The limited issues already made had raised the price of merchandise in Texas one or two hundred per cent. higher than in the United States, or in Mexico, or perhaps in any other country. The executive veto had the effect to prevent the enactment of the law, and to sustain the credit of the paper then out.\*

The constitution of the republic provided that the first president elected by the people should hold his office for two years, and be ineligible to a re-election during the next term; while succeeding presidents should hold their office for three years, and be alike ineligible. As, under this provision, Houston's

\* House Journal, Texan Congress, May, 1838, p. 119.

term would expire on the second Monday in December, 1838, the public had become interested in the election of his successor. M. B. Lamar and Peter W. Grayson were the candidates brought forward by their respective friends, and supported with considerable zeal. The Texan newspapers of that year abound in the same charges and denials, the same freedom and abuse of political discussion, exhibited in the press of the United States. Before the election, however, which was held on the 3d of September, Colonel Grayson put an end to his life, at Bean's station, in Tennessee. MIRABEAU B. LAMAR, his competitor, was elected president, with only a nominal opposition, and DAVID G. BURNETT was chosen vice-president.

The latter part of the year did not pass away without Indian disturbances. On the 10th of August, Colonel Karnes, with a company of twenty-one men, was attacked by two hundred Camanches, near the Arroyo Seco. The savages were defeated and routed with the loss of several warriors, while the Texans suffered no loss, except in the wounding of Colonel Karnes.

About the same time, there was a strange rebellion—if such it might be called—at Nacogdoches. On the 4th of August, a party of citizens went in pursuit of some stolen horses. They found them secreted in a Mexican settlement. On their return, they were fired on, and one of their number killed. Several persons then followed the trail of the murderers. It was soon found, from the size of the trail, that the number of Mexicans, as they were believed to be, was large, and the pursuers returned. On the 7th, Colonel John Durst reported to General Rusk that there were a hundred or more Mexicans encamped about the Angelina, under the command of Nathaniel Norris, Cordova, and Cruz. General Rusk made an immediate requisition for men. A company of sixty volunteers from the town of Douglass was posted at the lower crossing of the

Angelina. On the 9th, they reported that they had been fired on, and asked for assistance. This report proved to be incorrect, but the enemy was found to be posted on the right bank of the river. On the 10th, it was reported that the Mexicans had been joined by about three hundred Indians; and on the evening of that day their force amounted to six hundred men. On the same day, President Houston, then at Nacogdoches, received a letter from the Mexican leaders, disclaiming allegiance to Texas. Having done this, the malcontents set out on their march for the Cherokee nation. Houston, being advised of this movement, directed General Rusk not to cross the Angelina. Major Augustin was detached with one hundred and fifty men to follow the Mexican trail; while the main body of the Texans, under General Rusk, marched toward the headquarters of Bowles, the Cherokee chief, whither he understood the enemy had gone. On reaching the Saline, he discovered that the insurgent leaders had fled to the upper Trinity, and that their followers had dispersed. This *emeute* was in every way remarkable, nor did any subsequent discovery explain its object. The leaders must have known that a successful revolution was impossible; and, after the rebels were embodied, they shed no blood, nor did they offer to do so. The movement probably arose, in the first instance, from that mutual want of confidence existing between the two races since 1835.\*

\* "Redlander," September, 1838. The Mexicans having assembled at the Angelina, President Houston issued his proclamation on the 8th of August, requiring them to return to their homes, under the penalty of being declared enemies to the republic. To this proclamation their leaders sent the following reply:—

"The citizens of Nacogdoches, being tired of unjust treatment, and of the usurpation of their rights, can not do less than state that they are embodied, with arms in their hands, to sustain those rights, and those of the nation to which they belong. They are ready to shed the last drop of their blood; and declare, as they have heretofore done, that they do not acknowledge the existing laws, through which they are offered guaranties (by the proclamation) for

Again, on the 25th of October, 1838, at José Maria village (since occupied as Fort Graham), a bloody battle was fought by a number of Texans, under Colonel Neil, and a portion of the Camanches located there. After a fierce conflict, the Indians fled, leaving many of their warriors slain.\* On the 20th of the same month a party of surveyors was attacked by the Camanches within five miles of Bexar, and two of them killed. A party of thirteen citizens went out to discover the enemy's intentions, when, three miles from the place, they were attacked by more than a hundred Indians. On being charged, the savages gave way, and then closed upon the Texans' rear, killing eight and wounding four of them.†

And again, on the 14th of October, General Rusk, at the head of two hundred men hastily levied, arrived at Fort Houston, on the Trinity, in pursuit of a motley collection of Indians and Mexicans, who had been committing depredations on the frontier. Learning there that the marauders were at the Kickapoo town, he marched to that place, and encamped at sunset, on the 15th. At daybreak, on the 16th, the engagement commenced, and continued for about fifteen minutes, when Rusk ordered a charge. It was instantly made, upon which the enemy fled, and were pursued for nearly a mile, leaving eleven

their lives and properties. They only ask that you will not molest their families, promising in good faith to do the same in regard to yours.

"VICENTE CORDOVA,

"A. CORDA,

"NAT. NORRIS,

"C. MORALES,

"J. ARRIOLA,

"JOSHUA ROBERTSON,

"J. VICENTE MICHELI,

"JUAN JOSE RODRIQUES,"

"J. SANTOS COY,

and others.

"August 10, 1838."

Antonio Manchaca, who visited their camp, reported about one hundred and twenty Mexicans and twenty-five Biloxi and Ionaes Indians present, which number was no doubt correct. — *Manchaca's Report, August 17, 1838.*

\* "Southwest American," August 18, 1838.

† "Telegraph," November 3, 1852.

dead on the field. The Texans had a like number wounded, but none killed.\*

Thus the whole frontier was lighted up with the flames of a savage war. The immediate cause of these hostilities is to be found in the opening of the land-offices in the beginning of the year. Surveyors and locators, desiring to select the best lands, had gone out beyond the settlements, and began their operations. The Indians, seeing them at work, were not slow to believe what the Mexicans had told them—that the white people would take all their hunting-grounds, and drive them off. Their attacks upon the frontiers were in resistance of this movement.

The third Congress convened on the 5th of November, and appointed a joint committee to wait on President Houston and inform him that the two houses were organized, and ready to receive any *written* communications he might wish to make, which duty was performed. As the constitution declared that the president “should, from time to time, give Congress information of the state of the republic, and recommend for their consideration such measures as he might deem necessary,” without specifying in what mode he should do it, he did not concur with them in this interpolation upon that instrument. He replied to them very briefly, transmitting the reports of the several departments, and thus concluded: “Had no restriction been placed by the resolution on the right of the president to select the *mode* in which he would convey proper intelligence to Congress, and ‘recommend such measures as he might deem necessary,’ he had important information to lay before the honorable body, and would have rendered it with pleasure, under the constitutional right secured to him, and in discharge of his duties; but, for reasons which to his mind are satisfactory, he

\* Rusk to Parker, October 23, 1838.



declines for the present any further communication." This brought the two departments of the government to a stand. The house of representatives, in which the interpolation originated, had got into an awkward position. A motion was made to retrace their steps, but consistency prevented. A committee was appointed, which reported favorably to the *written* message. Still it did no good: the constitution spoke for itself; and it was well known that, under a like clause in the constitution of the United States, the first two presidents had delivered their messages in person. To supply the want of such information, various calls were made and answered on specific points.

The report of the secretary of the treasury, for the year ending September, 1838, exhibited a net revenue from imports of over two hundred and seventy-eight thousand dollars; a circulation of promissory-notes to the amount of six hundred and eighty-four thousand dollars; a funded debt of more than four hundred and twenty-seven thousand dollars; and unpaid audited claims amounting to over seven hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars. The exact aggregate of the last three items shows the indebtedness of the republic at that time to have been one million, eight hundred and eighty-six thousand, four hundred and twenty-five dollars.\*

The financial condition of Texas was greatly improved, notwithstanding the revolutionary debt was pressing upon her. Her people had been engaged in agriculture, and immigration had enhanced the value of lands and provisions. Those who had to sell, found a ready market. Measures were taken to collect a direct tax, though as yet nothing had been thus real-

\* Mr. Gouge is particularly severe upon the financial operations of Texas at this period. He ought to have remembered that "poor people must do as they can;" and that speculators, seeing at that time the necessities of the young republic, plundered her without mercy. — *Fiscal History of Texas*, p. 82, *et seq.*

ized. As the new-comers now constituted a majority of the inhabitants, the control of affairs fell pretty much into their own hands. They were ardently desirous to be annexed to the mother-country, and, the better to attain this object, it was deemed by some to be good policy to withdraw the proposition of annexation from the cabinet at Washington. This course was recommended by President Houston to the second Congress, but failed by a close vote. In the Congress of the United States, the question of annexation had been warmly discussed, the subject of slavery forming an extensive element in the opposition. While the American government could not, in good faith to Mexico, accede to the proposition, as long as there was the least prospect of the latter power carrying on the war against her revolted province, the former was most friendly disposed toward the government and people of Texas. The convention for running the boundary-line was settled, and kind offices in every way extended. The Texan policy of withdrawing the proposition for annexation, reducing her duties on imports, and thus inviting a profitable commerce with Great Britain and France, was admirably calculated to excite the jealousy of the disaffected portion of the United States, and to hasten that union which the young republic seemingly repelled. We shall see the effect of this policy.

Among the distinguished dead of Texas this year may be mentioned James Collingsworth and John A. Wharton. Collingsworth was the first chief-justice of the supreme court of the republic. He was a man of fine talents, great urbanity, and a devoted and valuable friend to Texas in her struggle. He had a pleasant wit, was a most admirable companion, and of scrupulous integrity. He had emigrated to Texas to rid himself of a false habit, which unfortunately pursued him, and brought him to a premature grave. John A. Wharton had

come to Texas in 1829. Throughout her long contest with Mexico, she found no truer or more gallant defender. He died just as President Houston's first term was expiring. A reference to the letter written by him to Houston in 1829, inviting him to Texas, and to the distinguished part subsequently taken by each in the affairs of their adopted country, will afford materials for solemn reflection. Collingsworth and Wharton were both from Nashville, Tennessee.

## CHAPTER IX.

ON the 9th of December, 1838, the ceremony of the inauguration of President Lamar occurred in front of the capitol, and in the presence of an immense concourse of people. After the valedictory of President Houston, General Lamar delivered his inaugural address.\* In that well-written paper, he says: "The character of my administration may be anticipated in the domestic nature of our government and the peaceful habits of the people. Looking upon agriculture, commerce, and the useful arts, as the true basis of all national strength and glory, it will be my leading policy to awaken into vigorous activity the wealth, talent, and enterprise, of the country; and, at the same time, to lay the foundation of those higher institutions for moral and mental culture without which no government on democratic principles can prosper, nor the people long preserve their liberties." On the subject of annexation, he remarked: "I have never been able myself to perceive the policy of the desired connection, or discover in it any advantage, either civil, political, or commercial, which could possibly result to Texas. But, on the contrary, a long train of consequences,

\* "It was received," says the *Telegraph*, "with general approbation. It was pleasing to notice the remarkable degree of confidence and esteem that was everywhere manifested toward President Lamar. He is almost unanimously regarded as the pride and ornament of his country; and from his administration the most fortunate results are expected."—*Telegraph*, December 12, 1838.

of the most appalling character and magnitude, have never failed to present themselves whenever I have entertained the subject, and forced upon my mind the unwelcome conviction that the step, once taken, would produce a lasting regret, and ultimately prove as disastrous to our liberty and hopes as the triumphant sword of the enemy."

Shortly after the inauguration of the new president, the people of Texas were gratified with the intelligence of the capture of Vera Cruz. The blockade by the French not availing to bring the government to terms, Admiral Baudin despatched a messenger to General Rincon, the Mexican commandant, informing him that he was about to attack the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa. This fortress, situated on an island in the harbor, was defended by one hundred and sixty pieces of artillery and about five thousand men. The bombardment commenced about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 27th of November, and was so well directed, that in four hours, after a loss of six hundred men in killed and wounded, the Mexicans capitulated, marched out of the castle, and the French took possession. By permission of the victors, a small Mexican force was allowed to remain in the city to preserve order.

President Lamar sent in his message to Congress on the 21st of December. It was lengthy, and, with the exception of some historical inaccuracies, well written. He laid down his course of policy with great frankness. Among the measures recommended was a national bank, to "be the exclusive property and under the exclusive control of the republic."—"Such a bank," says he, "incorporated for a suitable term of years, founded on a specific hypothecation of a competent portion of the public domain, which should be immediately appropriated to that purpose, with the additional guaranty of the pledged faith of the nation, and an adequate deposit of specie in its

vaults, would, it is confidently believed, confer many eminent and continued blessings upon the country.”\* Happily for Texas, there was too much of the democratic element in her councils to adopt this exploded policy. Her statesmen had learned in the older states many valuable lessons on this subject: among them, that a paper currency was not money, and that it could not represent money, unless there was, at a convenient point, *money* to be represented by it; that Texas had no money, and could only obtain it honestly by paying a consideration; that her credit was already exhausted, and could not be further extended except at ruinous rates of interest, in which the lender was paid as well for the risk he run as for the money he loaned. In addition to these facts, they had just witnessed a terrible conflict in the United States between a national bank and one of the most popular of her presidents, in which the victory was long suspended. Such an institution in Texas, even had it been possible to procure a specie basis, would have proved a source of boundless political corruption.

President Lamar further stated that, “when the bank shall have fully gone into operation, and developed its satisfactory influences on the pecuniary transactions of the country. . . it is hardly conceivable that any fortuitous combination of events could occasion an extensive demand for the metals. The ordinary current wants of the country would be regularly supplied; and it is not probable that any respectable merchant or other capitalist would risk his character, either to gratify his spleen or his avarice, by getting up a captious run on a sound and solvent bank, which involves the reciprocal relations of citizens and country, and is an object of universal patriotic pride and endearment.” During the war of the American Revolution,

\* Mr. Gouge's comments on this portion of the message are quite appropriate. — *Fiscal History of Texas*, p. 89.



when the continental paper, for the redemption of which the public faith was pledged, had become so depreciated, that purchases could scarcely be made with it, the Congress resolved that any one who should refuse to receive it at par in business transactions should suffer a certain penalty. Yet neither the character nor patriotic pride of the merchant or capitalist, nor the penalties of the law, induced them to take it at par. As a marketable commodity, it passed at the market price; and, to demand and enforce more, was robbery.

—However, the message went to the Texan Congress for its consideration.

To bring up properly the events of 1839, we must recur to what was done in Mexico. The agreement between Admiral Baudin and General Rincon, the commandant at Vera Cruz, was not ratified by the Mexican government: on the contrary, Santa Anna was despatched with five thousand troops to drive the French out of the place. In attempting this, he lost his leg, together with many of his troops. On the 9th of March, 1839, a treaty was made between Mexico and France, which, being shortly afterward ratified, the French forces left the territory of the republic, and the gallant admiral paid Texas a visit on his way home.\*

The federal party in Mexico, taking advantage of Bustamente's engagements in repelling the French, declared for the constitution of 1824. The civil war thus ensuing raged over a great portion of the confederacy, with more or less success on the part of the insurgents. In Tampico, they routed the centralists under the command of General Piedras (formerly well known at Nacogdoches), and disposed of that officer after the Mexican fashion. About this time, General Mexia arrived at Tampico, and found Urrea in command of the federalists.

\* Baudin's order of the day, March 29, 1839.

These two chiefs, having raised a considerable force, set out for the capital. In the meantime, Bustamente assumed the command of the army in person, leaving Santa Anna to act as president in his absence. He marched to encounter the federalists, and met them about the first of May, at Acajete, near Puebla, where a terrible battle ensued, in which the federal army was totally defeated. General Mexia was captured, and, of course, immediately shot, while Urrea fled for his life. The civil war was, in fact, by this contest, virtually ended, though much strife and bloodshed continued on the frontiers.

The Mexican federalists were well disposed toward Texas, and their leaders did not fail to keep up a correspondence with the republic. A trade of some importance sprang up between Bexar and the Rio Grande. Indeed, Texas was so much deceived by these evidences of friendship, that she thought negotiations might be started for a peace. With this view, Barnard E. Bee was despatched as a minister to Mexico, and the Texan minister at Washington was instructed to engage the mediation of the United States, and the good offices of Mr. Fox, the British minister there, to bring about the same end. Mr. Forsyth, the secretary of state, did write to Mr. Ellis, to inquire of the Mexican government whether the mediation of the American cabinet was desired; and Mr. Fox promised to write to Mr. Pakenham, the British minister in Mexico, favorably to the claims of Texas.\* Mr. Dunlap, the Texan minister at Washington, also had some confidential conversations with Señor Martinez, ambassador to that government from Mexico, on the same subject. The latter conversed quite frankly; but Mr. Dunlap was somewhat too strong in his demands when he spoke of extending the western boundary of Texas to the Pa-

\* James Webb to Richard G. Dunlap, March 14, 1839. Richard G. Dunlap to J. P. Henderson, May 24, 1839.

cific, so as to include the fine harbor of San Francisco! He also wrote Señor Martinez a letter, recapitulating the topics of their conversation. Martinez answered him very politely, but not as a minister, and promised to send his letter to the Mexican government.\*

As these diplomatic movements seemed to be predicated upon the success of the federal party in Mexico, they were completely checkmated by the battle of Acajete, referred to on the previous page. It was the centralist party that first made war on Texas; it was the centralist party which she had so signally overwhelmed; and it was still with that party—proud, bigoted, and impotent, as it was—that she had to deal. The Texan minister was not received, nor did he even present his papers.†

Previous to the French attack on Vera Cruz, and the civil war in Mexico, that government had commenced a system, which, if it had been carried out as was intended, would have been most disastrous to Texas. Its object was to turn loose upon her all the Indian tribes upon her borders, from the Rio Grande to Red river. Of this fact the Texan government obtained undoubted evidence. Before the revolt of the Mexicans at Nacogdoches, Vicente Cordova had been in correspondence with the enemy at Matamoras. In July, 1838, he addressed

\* R. G. Dunlap to F. P. Martinez, October 8, 1839. F. P. Martinez to R. G. Dunlap, October 9, 1839.

† The Vera Cruz "*Censor*" spoke thus of the Texan minister when off Sacrificios: "We do not know which most to admire, the audacity of those brigands in sending us their pedler to ask us to allow the peaceable possession of their robbery, or the answer the commandant-general gave to the individual who apprized him of the arrival of this quixotic ambassador. From the tenor of the reply, it appears that, if he lands, he will be accommodated with lodgings at the prison. Nevertheless, the supreme government will designate what ought definitely to be done. The commandant says he is not aware of the existence of a nation called the 'republic of Texas;' but only of a horde of adventurers, in rebellion against the laws of the government of the republic."

a letter to Manuel Flores, the Indo-Mexican agent at Matamoras, stating that he held a commission from Filisola, to raise the Indians as auxiliaries to the Mexican army, and had already entered on his duties. He wished to co-operate with Flores, and have an understanding with him as to the mode of procedure; and for that purpose he desired, if possible, to have a meeting and personal consultation.\* Cordova wrote to Filisola on the 29th of August and the 16th of September, 1838, from the head-waters of the Trinity, giving him an account of his progress. The departure of Flores from Matamoras was, from some cause, delayed till the spring of the following year. In the meantime, on the 27th of February, 1839,† Brigadier-General Canalizo, who had succeeded Filisola at Matamoras, sent his instructions to Cordova—the same that had been given to Flores—to excite the frontier Indians to make war on Texas. He said it was in the power of the Indians, and also for their interest, to prevent the Texans from taking advantage of the troubles in Mexico; that they must not trust to flying invasions, but to operations having a more permanent effect—causing, if not daily injury, at least perpetual alarm and inquietude to the enemy, and depriving them of their commerce, the spoils of which were to go to the Indians. While the savages were to be cautioned not to go near the boundary of the United States, they were to occupy the line of Bexar, about the Guadalupe, and from the source to the mouth of the San Mark. “This position,” continues Canalizo, “is the most

\* This letter, among other papers, was found on the person of Flores when he was killed.

† Senate Document No. 14, Thirty-second Congress, second session, p. 33. This letter from Canalizo to Cordova is dated “1838” in the printed document, and also in the copy sent from Texas to Mr. Dunlap, her minister at Washington. It should be 1839. It refers to the hostilities with France, which did not occur till after its date. And another fact should be borne in mind: Canalizo was not in command at Matamoras at that time.

favorable for the friendly Indians (as well as for the friendly Mexicans), in order that they shall have the enemy in front only, keeping a friendly and generous nation as Mexico *in the rear.*” They were not to cease to harass the Texans for a single day—“to burn their habitations, to lay waste their fields,” and, by rapid and well-concerted movements, to draw their attention in every direction; and if the Texans should assemble in considerable bodies, the Indians were directed to hang about them in small parties, and to harass them day and night, endeavoring at every cost to cut off (steal) their horses. The instructions to Cordova were to be sent to him, and he and Flores were to have an interview as soon as possible. They were required, however, to extend humane treatment to defenceless persons of both sexes and of all ages. They were to pursue and punish all Indians friendly to the Texans, and all Mexicans who traded with them. Canalizo, in his letter to Cordova, informed him that, as soon as the hostilities with France should terminate, the Mexican army, greatly increased, would proceed to recover Texas. Flores had messages from Canalizo to the chiefs of the Caddoes, Seminoles, Biloxas, Cherokees, Kickapoos, Brasos, Twowokanaes, and perhaps others, promising them the lands on which they had settled, and assuring them that they need “expect nothing from those greedy adventurers for land, who wish even to deprive the Indians of the sun that warms and vivifies them, and who would not cease to injure them while the grass grows and water runs.”

Such were the instructions under which Commissioner Flores set out on his mission. Cordova had been hanging about the Indian camps high up on the Trinity and Brasos rivers, his followers greatly reduced. On the 14th of May, Flores and his party of twenty-five marauders, about half of whom were Indians, passed between Seguin and Bexar, where they commit-

ted some murders. They were pursued by Lieutenant James O. Rice and seventeen men, who overtook them on the San Gabriel fork of Little river, about fifteen miles from Austin. Rice and his party attacked and killed Flores and two others, and put the balance to flight, who left behind them their plunder, consisting of three hundred pounds of powder, a like quantity of shot, balls, and bar-lead, and more than a hundred mules and horses.\* But, what was of most importance to Texas, the correspondence before referred to fell into the hands of the victors. How many Indian tribes had been supplied previous to this capture, we can not tell. The discovery of this correspondence was a most fortunate thing for the republic; for, had the insidious plots of the enemy been carried out, and the flames of a savage war spread along the entire frontier, followed by an invasion from Mexico, it would have done her a serious injury. Such was doubtless the intention of Mexico; and it was a courageous resolve in the authorities of that nation to place the Indians *in front*. They reasoned, no doubt, that, by the time their savage allies had stolen the horses of the Texans, ravaged their fields, and burnt their habitations, the main body of the invading army could succeed better in the reconquest of the revolted province.

It will be observed that Canalizo, in his instructions, directed that no approach should be made toward the frontier of the United States. There was but one dangerous tribe of Indians in that direction—the Caddocs. A portion of this tribe had been taken by General Rusk in November, 1838, disarmed, and handed over to their agent in Shreveport, where they entered into a treaty to remain until the war between Texas and the balance of the tribe should cease.† These Indians, and in

\* Senate Document No. 14, Thirty-second Congress, second session, p. 26.

† E. Burleson to the Secretary of War, May 22, 1839.



fact some of the tribes in Arkansas, had been under the influence of Cordova.

That chieftain, making his way westward with between sixty and seventy Mexicans, Indians, and negroes, encamped on the 26th of March at the foot of the Colorado mountains. Colonel Burleson, getting news of him, collected eighty men, started on his trail, and overtook him on the Guadalupe. After the first fire, the enemy fled, and were followed for four miles, when night prevented further pursuit. Twenty-five or thirty of them were killed, but their leader made his escape to the Rio Grande. Thus terminated the mission of Flores and Cordova. But the spirit of war thus awakened in the Indians was not so easily allayed.

On the 25th of January, 1839, three companies of volunteers were organized in the upper settlements on the Colorado, and placed under the command of Captain John H. Moore, with orders to march against the Camanches. They proceeded up the Colorado until the 14th of February, when they arrived within ten miles of the Indian village. After nightfall, they marched cautiously to within about a mile of the village, where they dismounted, tied their horses, and sent eight mounted Lipan Indians to *stampede* the Camanches' *caballada*. The main body of the rangers, having advanced to within three hundred yards of the enemy, were discovered. This was just at daybreak. Captain Moore now ordered a charge. It was promptly made, the troops throwing open the doors of the wigwams, or pulling them down, and slaughtering the enemy in their beds. The Camanches retreated to a bend in the bayou, and formed for defence. The smoke had so increased the darkness, that the Texans retired for a few moments to reload their pieces. They had scarcely formed, however, when the Camanches charged them in front and flank. These onsets

continued, at short intervals, until ten o'clock, when the fire of the Indians came from a greater distance. Captain Moore sent ten men to reconnoitre, who reported the enemy to be very numerous. About half-past eleven o'clock, the Indians ceased firing; and the Texans, believing their force was insufficient to drive them from their secure position, retired to their horses, a mile below. In fifteen minutes after their arrival, however, they were surrounded by from three to five hundred of the Camanches, who opened a fire on them. This the Texans soon silenced, when the Indians sent in a flag, stating that they had five white prisoners—a woman and four children—probably hoping for a sale or an exchange. The fight was not renewed. Captain Moore had in his command sixty-three white men and sixteen Lipan Indians, and had one killed and six wounded. The Camanches lost about thirty killed, and a like number wounded.\*

About the last of February, a party of Indians, having committed several murders† some twelve miles above Bastrop, were pursued and attacked by about fifty Texans. The savages having the advantage of position, the whites fell back; but being reinforced by thirty more, under Colonel Burleson, they again advanced. The Indians took a good position, and the fight commenced at one o'clock in the afternoon. The Indians were greatly superior in numbers, and continued the conflict until dark, when they retreated, having twenty or thirty killed. The Texan loss was three killed.

On Sunday, the 27th of May, Captain John Bird, having marched from Fort Milam to Fort Smith, on Little river, discovered Indians near the latter place. At one o'clock in the

\* Report of the Secretary of War, November, 1839, p. 42.

† Among these murders were the killing of Mrs. Coleman and her child.—*General Burleson to the Secretary of War, March 2, 1839.*

afternoon, Captain Bird, with thirty-five in rank and file, proceeded against them. After a march of five miles, they came in sight of twenty-seven Indians. Pursuing them three miles farther, they found themselves within a hundred and seventy-five yards of the enemy, arrayed in order of battle. The Texans charged upon them, both parties being mounted, and kept up the pursuit for three miles, but to no purpose, for the savages could not be overtaken. The Texans then returned; but after retracing their steps for half a mile, they were suddenly surrounded by about forty Indians, who shot their arrows from every direction. The Texans made for a ravine six hundred yards in front, which they succeeded in reaching, in spite of the desperate attempts to prevent them by the savages, who now retired to the top of a hill three hundred yards distant. In about half an hour, the Indians advanced in full view, having their number increased to some two hundred and forty. They raised the war-whoop along their whole line, and charged upon the ravine with fearful yells. The Texans gave them a deadly reception, and they retired again to the hill, carrying off their dead and wounded. A second desperate charge was made, and was again repulsed with a like list of killed and wounded. After a fight of more than an hour, the Indians retreated to the hill, with a heavy loss of men and horses. Darkness coming on, both parties retired. The Texans lost five killed, among whom was their gallant captain, and had two wounded. The loss of the savages was supposed to be thirty killed.\*

In the hostile movements of this year, our attention is called to the war with the Cherokees. Agreeing with President Lamar as to the destiny of this people, we will refer to some of the facts and discussions on the subject.

\* Report of Nathan Brookshire, commanding, May 31, 1839.

The treachery of Cordova, and the warlike demonstrations of the Indians in eastern Texas in 1838, are already before the reader, and their causes known. The president, in his message of the 21st of December, 1838, assumed the position that the immigrant Indian tribes had no legal or equitable claim to any portion of the territory included within the limits of Texas; that the federal government of Mexico neither conceded nor promised them lands, nor civil rights; that it was not necessary to inquire into the nature and extent of the pledge given to the Cherokees by the consultation of 1835 and the treaty of February, 1836, consequent upon it, for the treaty was never ratified by any competent authority.

Now the facts are, that in 1822, long before any colonist had settled in eastern Texas, or any colony contract had been made for that section, the Cherokees emigrated to Texas. They established a village north of Nacogdoches—the town, at that time, being a waste, lately swept by the forces of Long and Perez. On the 8th of November of that year, the Cherokees, by Captain Richard and others of their head men, entered into an agreement with the government of Texas, by which it was stipulated that certain Cherokee chiefs should proceed with their interpreters to Mexico, to treat with Iturbide for the settlement of their tribe where it was then located. In the meantime, the agreement guaranteed to the Cherokees the free and peaceful right to cultivate their crops, and the privileges of natives. The chiefs proceeded to Mexico, and the imperial government having satisfied them—whether verbally or in writing is immaterial—they returned. An order from the supreme government was despatched to the commandant-general of the eastern provinces, and by him to the governor of Coahuila and Texas, dated August 15, 1831, and by the latter to the political chief of Bexar, dated September 1, 1831, directing a compliance

with the promises made by the supreme government to the Cherokees. The governor states in his communication that, "for the preservation of peace with the agricultural tribes, he had offered them their establishment on a fixed tract of land, and they had selected it." He requested the political chief to put them in possession, with corresponding titles. The political chief, on the 25th of September, replied that the matter should be attended to in accordance with the prescribed forms. Again, on the 22d of March, 1832, Colonel Piedras was commissioned by the political chief to put the Cherokee families into individual possession of the lands they possessed.\* Whether there was any actual, written title, is unknown and immaterial. In the *empresario* concession afterward made to David G. Burnet, and including part or all of their settlement, the lands already appropriated were excepted from those to be occupied by the colonists under Burnet.

For fourteen years the Cherokees had occupied this land, holding it in quiet and undisputed possession. They were not intruders on the whites, for they were there first. The Mexican authorities recognised them, as an agricultural tribe, with Mexican privileges, and Colonel Bean was official agent for them, in common with other tribes. No voice had been raised against their title. It was deemed by all both *legal* and *equitable*. To give weight and dignity to this title, the consultation of November, 1835, at a time when Texas was weak, when a heavy cloud hung over her hopes, and her liberties were suspended upon a most unequal and unjust war, made a very solemn pledge to those Indians, acknowledging their just claim to their lands, setting forth the boundaries thereof, and saying further: "We solemnly declare that we will guaranty to them the peaceable enjoyment of their rights to their lands

\* Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Texas Senate, January 22, 1840.

as we do our own. We solemnly declare that all grants, surveys, or locations of lands, within the bounds hereinbefore mentioned, made after the settlement of the said Indians, are, and of right ought to be, utterly null and void." To make it, if possible, still stronger, the consultation resolved that each member sign it as a "pledge of the public faith, on the part of the people of Texas." And they did sign it: the names of Wharton, Waller, Martin, Houston, Zavala, Patrick, Henry Smith, Grimes, J. W. Robinson, Mitchell, and Millard, among others of the distinguished worthies of the Revolution, were placed by themselves to that pledge. Surely they did not intend to deceive the Indians by thus purchasing their neutrality until the war was over, when they, having no further need of them, would declare that the Indians had no title either *legal* or *equitable*. The suggestion that the consultation had no power to make such pledge is preposterous. The members of it had power to adhere to the constitution of 1824, or to sever from it; the assembly was organic, primitive, revolutionary. Twenty or thirty thousand people were defending themselves against eight millions. They met, by their representatives, for general consultation. They found a nation of Indians in their midst, advanced in civilization, and having an influence over other tribes. These Indians had occupied the country first, and it was important to conciliate them. This was done by the pledge given. It is a rule in ethics that the promiser is bound by what he believed the promisee understood by the promise. No mental reservation or technical objection can avoid this moral conclusion. From all which the result is, that President Lamar's message, in this respect, is unsupported by history, as by the good faith of Texas toward those Indians.

On the other hand, it was impossible that the Indians should



have an independent government within that of Texas. They must necessarily come under the laws of the latter, or emigrate. It was not proposed to them that they should come under the Texan laws as citizens. The great object of many was to get their lands, for they were located in a fine and desirable country. The Texans were the first violators of the pledge of 1835. The ink was scarcely dry on the paper, when locators and surveyors were seen in their forests; and this, too, notwithstanding the consultation, by the decree of November 13, 1835, had ordered such locations and surveys to cease all over Texas.

But it is useless to dwell further upon the subject. The Cherokees were charged with the plunder and murder of many of the inhabitants residing among them and in their vicinity. The Killough family were cruelly massacred; only three or four escaped, and they were brought into the settlements by the Cherokees, who, by their "cunning representations," says the secretary of war, charged these acts upon the prairie Indians and the treacherous Mexicans. To prevent such occurrences, Major Walters had been ordered with two companies to occupy the Neches Saline, not only to watch the Cherokees, but to cut off their intercourse with the Indians of the prairies. Bowles, the Cherokee chief, notified Major Walters that he would repel by force such occupation of the Saline. As the major's force was too small to carry out his orders, he established his post on the west bank of the Neches, out of the Cherokee territory.\*

Colonel Burleson, who was then collecting a force on the Colorado, to operate against other Indians, was directed to march his troops lower down, so as to be ready, on the shortest notice, to enter the Cherokee territory. In the meantime,

\* Report of the Secretary of War, November, 1839, p. 6.

the government came in possession of the papers of Manuel Flores, including letters addressed to *Big Mush* and Bowles, the chiefs of the Cherokees.\* On their reception, Burleson was ordered to increase his force to four hundred men, and march into the Cherokee nation. He reached the east bank of the Neches on the 14th of July; and, about the same time, Colonel Landrum's regiment from eastern Texas arrived there. The Nacogdoches regiment, under General Rusk, had arrived some days before, and taken position near the Cherokee village. The entire force was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Douglass. Commissioners had, for some days, been in conference with the Cherokees, to effect, if possible, their peaceable removal. The commissioners offered to pay them fairly for their improvements, but we have no information that any offer was made for their lands. The Indians were required to surrender their gun-locks, and remove to their brethren in Arkansas. At noon, on the 15th of July, all further attempts to make a treaty were abandoned, and General Douglass was directed to put his troops in motion. The council-ground was about five miles below the Indian camp. When the Texans arrived there, the Cherokees had retreated about seven miles farther up the river. They were pursued, and a company of spies, which first came in sight of them, was fired on. The Indians displayed their forces on the point of a hill, having a ravine and thicket on the left. General Rusk motioned to them to come on; they advanced and fired four

\* It is inferred from these documents, found on Flores, and addressed to the Cherokee chiefs, that the latter were in correspondence with the Mexican authorities. I have before me the original papers sent them by Canalizo: they are directed to "*Señor Virg Mas, Gefe de los Charaquics*" — "*S'or Teniente Coronel Vul.*" It is remarkable, if the alleged correspondence had existed, that their names were not better known. The fact that *Big Mush* was addressed as *chief*, and Bowles as *lieutenant-colonel*, shows how slight was their acquaintance with these chiefs.

or five times, and immediately occupied the ravine and thicket on the left. The main body of the Texans coming up in the open prairie, now formed, and the action became general. The Texans charged the ravine, and advanced up from the left. A portion of the Indians, who were attempting to approach the troops on their right flank, were repulsed. The Cherokees fled when the charge was made, leaving eighteen dead on the ground. The Texans had three killed and five wounded. The engagement commenced a little before sunset, and the pursuit ended at night.

On the morning of the 16th, the troops proceeded on the trail made by the Indians the night previous. In the afternoon they were found strongly posted in a ravine, half a mile from the Neches, and seemed eager for a fight. While the Texan advance was dismounting, the Indians commenced the action, killing several horses and one man, before their opponents could form, but they were soon driven by the advance into the ravine. The Indians were protected by a ravine and a thicket in their rear, while the Texans had to advance upon them through an open wood and down a hill. The main body coming up, was formed, and the firing commenced at the distance of one hundred and fifty yards. The Texans kept advancing and firing until within fifty yards of the ravine, when, upon a signal, they charged. When they reached the ravine, the Indians fled, and retreated into the dense thicket and swamp of the Neches bottom. The charge was gallantly continued into the swamp, but the enemy made no stand. Thus ended the conflict of the 16th. It lasted an hour and a half, and was well contested by the Indians. The Texans lost five killed and twenty-seven wounded. The loss of the Cherokees was probably a hundred killed and wounded, and among the former was their distinguished chief Bowles. In the official report

of the action, he was styled "the long-dreaded Mexican ally Colonel Bowles." In these two contests there were engaged about five hundred Texans and eight hundred Indians.\*

The trail of the retreating Cherokees was followed for some days. Several Indian villages were passed, their "extensive cornfields cut down and their houses burnt." On the evening of the 25th, further pursuit being useless, the secretary of war, who accompanied the expedition, directed the troops to be marched to their homes, and mustered out of service. "For eighteen months afterward," says a worthy officer† in those engagements, "the Indians came back in small parties, and committed fearful depredations upon the lives and property of the people on the frontiers."

In the march of General Douglass, he passed the villages of nearly all the civilized Indians. He says: "The Cherokees, Delawares, Shawnees, Caddoes, Kickapoos, Biloxies, Creeks, Ouchies, Muskogees, and some Seminoles, had established during the past spring and summer many villages, and cleared and planted extensive fields of corn, beans, peas, &c., preparing evidently for an efficient co-operation with the Mexicans in a war with this country." It was very natural to infer, from these agricultural labors, that the Indians were preparing for a war against Texas; but neither their plans nor crops were permitted to mature. He speaks also of the Indian territory through which he marched, and says that, "in point of richness of soil, and the beauty of situation, water, and productions, it would vie with the best portions of Texas."

Thus the vexed question with regard to the civilized Indians was settled, and there could be no hindrance to surveyors or

\* Reports Nos. 8 and 16 of General K. H. Douglass, referred to in the Secretary of War's Report, November, 1839. Statements of Major Wortham and Dr. Jowers.

† Major John Wortham.

settlements on their fine lands. The previous administration had endeavored, by treaties and presents, to conciliate all the frontier Indians: this had pursued a sterner policy. It had, in all the conflicts, killed about three hundred warriors, leaving five thousand more, all exasperated against Texas, and ready to unite with her great enemy against her. However, the main point was to secure the rights, property, and lives, of the Texans; and if that was more thoroughly effected by war, so much the better for the republic. As to the rights of the Indians, much has been said and written in regard to them. Perhaps the excuse offered by Cicero, for the extension policy of Rome, is the best for us—that “*no people have a right to the soil, who do not know the use of it.*”

In the conduct of the war, the Texan troops behaved with their accustomed gallantry; and among their leaders should be particularly noticed General Rusk and Colonel Burleson—the one in the east and the other in the west—and both ready at a moment's warning to fly to an exposed point. They will be long remembered in Texas as the defenders of her frontiers.

In accordance with the contract with Frederick Dawson, the Texan government received, on the 27th of June, 1839, the schooner *San Jacinto*; on the 7th of August, the schooner *San Antonio*; on the 31st of August, the schooner *San Bernard*; and, on the 18th of October, the brig *Colorado*. A corvette and a brig were yet wanting to complete the contract, but were confidently expected by the end of the year.\* On the 23d of March, was also delivered the steamship-of-war *Zavala*, purchased by General Hamilton, agent, of James Holford. These vessels, with the *Charleston*, undergoing repairs, and the receiving brig *Potomac*, constituted the navy of Texas, and with which the secretary of the navy said, “it was confidently

\* Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 8, 1839.

believed that, in a very short time after the navy should have received orders for capture and reprisal, it would be enabled to afford a source of *revenue* to the government, equal to the amount which had been expended for its creation." It would have been well for Texas if these anticipations had been realized; for the cost of this navy was nearly eight hundred thousand dollars, paid with the bonds of the government, as she had but little money. The expenditure for naval purposes during the first nine months of 1839 was nearly sixty thousand dollars; and the estimate of appropriations for one year from the 30th of September, 1839, was upward of half a million of dollars.\*

The European relations of Texas were doing well. J. P. Henderson, the commissioner sent out to England and France, to obtain from those powers an acknowledgment of her independence, had succeeded, in 1838, in making a commercial arrangement with Great Britain—with the reservation, however, that "until they formally recognise Texas, they will consider her as a part of Mexico." In November of that year, he concluded a like arrangement with France, but without any reservation whatever, Texas being spoken of by her as a nation, and her authorities as a government.† The new republic did not at that time create any very great sensation in Europe, and the statesmen of those old governments made little inquiry into her condition. Mexico was largely indebted to British capitalists, and the latter wished Texas to pay a share of those debts before she was cut loose from the parent-country. Besides, the slave-question presented an obstacle on the part of some, particularly O'Connell, of Ireland, who was eloquent and boisterous in his opposition. The government of France gave

\* Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 8, 1839, Document C.

† J. P. Henderson to President Houston, November 10, 1838.



little heed to the subject of Texan independence, but did not care to offend that of Great Britain by precipitate action. Count Molé, the French premier, saw at once that Texas would become a part of the United States, and said it was only a question of time. The French ambassador at Washington was, however, directed to send an agent to Texas, and ascertain what sort of a country and government it was. Accordingly, the minister despatched M. Saligny, one of his *attachés*, on this mission, upon whose report the government of Louis Philippe finally, on the 25th of September, 1839, entered into a treaty with Texas, acknowledging her in every respect an independent nation.

The Texan Congress, by an act approved January 14, 1839, appointed five commissioners to select a site for the capital of the republic. The commissioners—Albert C. Horton, Lewis P. Cook, Isaac W. Burton, William Menifee, and J. Campbell—made choice of the present location, on the east bank of the Colorado. The town was immediately laid off, extending a mile north from the river, and between Waller and Shoal creeks. Its situation, at the foot of the Colorado mountains, is lovely and romantic. It was at that time on the extreme frontier, the nearest settlement being at Bastrop, thirty-five miles below. On the west, the nearest settlement was San Antonio, distant about eighty miles. To Lavaca bay, one hundred and fifty miles distant, the only settlements were Gonzales and Victoria; to Houston, a distance of nearly two hundred miles, the only settlements were about Washington; while to those on Red river, nearly four hundred miles distant, the intervening country was alike unoccupied. The location was there made with a view of drawing to the west a population that would protect that frontier from the common enemy, and such was its happy effect. The town-lots of the new capital

(AUSTIN) were sold out in August; and, with the enterprise common to the people of Texas, buildings were soon erected. By the first of October, the offices of the government were transferred there; and in the following month the Texan Congress found itself deliberating in a comfortable hall, in that beautiful wilderness, almost within hearing of the Indian war-whoop!\*

The revolutionary movements set on foot in Mexico by the federalists, early in 1839, extended to the states bordering on the Rio Grande. General Anaya, the chief of the revolutionists on this river, having been put to death at Tampico, almost at the commencement of the outbreak,† General Lic. Antonio Canales and Colonel José Maria Gonzales, with their attendants and a detachment of armed *rancheros*, fled from the Rio Grande, and established their headquarters at Lipantitlan, on the Nueces. Canales, as commander of the federal forces, issued a proclamation, inviting the Texans to join him, promising them an equal division of the spoils, twenty-five dollars per month, and, to such as should serve during the war, a half-league of land. At this point he was joined by a number of Mexicans from the Rio Grande, and about one hundred and eighty Texans, the latter under the command of Colonel Reuben Ross, late aide to General Felix Huston, and Colonel Jordan, late a captain in the Texan service. Both these Texan officers were brave and efficient. On the 20th of September, 1839, Canales, with a force of six hundred effective men, including the Texans, took up the line of march, and crossed

\* President Lamar's Message, November, 1839. "Southwest American," 1852.

† General Anaya visited Texas in the spring of 1839, and declared his object was the establishment of the constitution of 1824. He was a man of talents and influence. I am principally indebted to the excellent Notes of the Federal Campaign of 1839, by Captain Thomas Pratt, an eye-witness and participant, for the present account.

the Rio Grande on the 30th in two divisions—the northern under the command of Colonels Jordan and Zapata, and the southern under the chief himself and Colonel Ross. The order was given to surprise and attack the town of Guerrero, about three miles from the west bank of the river, and then occupied by General Parbon, with five hundred centralist regulars and four pieces of artillery. Some delay, caused by the difficulty in crossing the horses of the northern division, enabled the enemy to discover the intention of the federalists in sufficient time to make good their retreat from the town. Canales entered it on the 1st of October, and captured twenty prisoners; but without delay he proceeded after Parbon, who had marched down the river toward Mier. The federalists overtook him within six miles of the latter place, where he had entrenched himself; but during the night of the 2d he abandoned his entrenchments, and retreated toward Monterey. Canales sent out his spies, who reported that Parbon had taken his position for battle twelve miles southwest from Mier. The federal troops were immediately put in motion, and by eleven o'clock on the morning of the 3d they came up with the enemy. The report of a nine-pounder announced his readiness to fight. The impetuosity of the Texans broke through all restraint, and completely deranged and destroyed the plan of battle. Colonels Ross and Jordan exerted themselves in vain to enforce order among them: every man was an officer, and a host within himself, and fought on his own account! Besides the Texans, there were at that time, in the federal army under Canales, two hundred and fifty mounted *rancheros*, one hundred and ten infantry, and sixty Indians, the latter badly armed. But the eagerness of the Texans separated them from these forces, who were only spectators of the conflict. The Texans, within point-blank shot of the enemy, and partly protected by a gul-

ley and a few mosquito-bushes, for some time kept up a brisk fire against his front. At length, seeing that their mongrel allies were doing nothing, Ross and Jordan gave the order to charge. The movement was executed and sustained with desperate bravery. The centralists stood their ground for some twenty minutes, when they gave way before the impetuosity of the Texans. The confusion and want of capacity in Canales, however, prevented him from taking advantage of the enemy's condition; and the latter was enabled to make good his retreat from the field of battle with his artillery and camp-equipage. Parbon sent a flag, requesting a cessation of hostilities for twelve hours, which being imprudently granted by Canales, he set out in the night and marched five miles to a stone *ranch*, a strong place where he could have defended himself against a greatly superior force. The Texans lost in the action of the 3d—known as the battle of *Alcantro*—fourteen killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was a hundred and fifty in killed, wounded, and missing.

Early on the morning of the 4th, the federalists set out in pursuit of Parbon. The Texans, in front, appeared before his position, and demanded a surrender. Their appearance in his front was so sudden and unexpected, that, not having procured water or provisions for his troops, he surrendered, delivering his sword to Major Joseph Doland, of the Texan forces. The major requested him to deliver it to General Canales. "No, sir!" replied Parbon; "to the brave Texans I surrender—they are my conquerors!" By this capitulation, the federalists made three hundred and fifty prisoners, who joined their ranks, and were reinforced by the captured artillery.

The victory of *Alcantro*, and the accession of the enemy's forces to the federal army, gave influence and stability to the cause of the latter, while it spread alarm and dismay among

the centralists. Had Canales taken advantage of this happy juncture, he might have gained fresh laurels, and firmly built up his cause; but he remained inactive at Mier for forty days, during which time the enemy recovered from his panic, rallied his forces, and prepared to renew the conflict. Having enjoyed the *carnival* at Mier, Canales set out for Matamoros, distant about one hundred and sixty-five miles; and, after a tedious march of twenty-eight days, the federal army presented itself before that place on the 12th of December, being one thousand and sixty strong (including a hundred and fifty Texans), with four pieces of artillery. The centralists entrenched at Matamoros consisted of fifteen hundred regulars, having eighteen pieces of artillery, under the command of General Valentine Canalizo. On the 15th, a detachment of sixteen Texans and a like number of Mexicans, under Colonel Zapata, made an attack on one of the enemy's outposts, killed thirteen, and made good their retreat. This induced Canalizo to call in all his outposts. On the 16th, Canales called a council of war, and made known to it his intention to raise the siege, for the reasons that the centralists would not come out to meet him, and it was improper, under the circumstances, to attack them in their stronghold. He further alleged a scarcity of provisions, and a want of the necessary implements to carry on the siege. This decision of the commander offended the federal army, and especially the Texans, who offered to act as the forlorn hope in storming the town; but the proposal being rejected, Colonel Ross, with fifty of the Texans, withdrew and retired to their homes.

On the same day, Canales raised the siege, and set out for Monterey, where he expected to obtain a supply of ammunition, as the town was weakly defended by the centralists. On the 22d of December, the federal army reached Caderita, within

twenty-five miles of Monterey, where they received an abundance of provisions, and a contribution of five dollars to each soldier. On the 23d, they continued their march; but learning that the centralists in Monterey had received a reinforcement of sixteen hundred men, they halted and entrenched within six miles of the city.

General Arista, who commanded the centralists in Monterey, marched out with his whole force, and took a position within eight hundred yards of his adversary. Such was the nature of the ground between the two armies, that neither party had a clear view of the other. The action, however, commenced on both sides, by a spirited fire of artillery, "which," says Captain Pratt, "was kept up during the day, with true Mexican valor, without doing any damage to either party." During the night, General Arista fell back a mile nearer the city, and entrenched and fortified his position. Expecting to be pursued the next morning (the 24th), he formed an ambuscade of four hundred men in a narrow defile in the direction of the federal army, but it was discovered by the Indian scouts.

Canales, by an admirable military movement, threw forward three hundred cavalry, as if to bring on an engagement, while with the main body he marched by a secret route, unseen by the enemy, to the rear of the latter, and presented himself before the city. Had he marched in, he could have taken the place without any difficulty, for it was defended by only two hundred and fifty troops just arrived; but, to the astonishment of his army, he marched it into the yard of a convent, and commenced to fortify. Arista reached the city at five o'clock the same evening. A mutual cannonading then ensued, which continued for two days, without resulting in any damage. On the afternoon of the 27th, the enemy's cavalry, amounting to three hundred men, advanced to the lines of the federal army,



and challenged the cavalry of the latter—a like number—to a combat. The challenge was accepted, and the federal horse sallied out, commanded by Colonels Zapata and Gonzales; but, when within fifty yards of the enemy, the latter officer fled, and left Zapata to sustain the entire burden of the command. After a sharp skirmish, Zapata retreated, leaving six of his men dead on the field of conflict.

The federal army at this time numbered twelve hundred and fifty men, of whom one hundred and forty were Texans, some recruits having supplied the place of those that had retired at Matamoras. While these Texans adhered to Canales, Arista did not choose to come to a decisive engagement. But he now adopted a plan more congenial to the feelings of the Mexican portion of the allies. Treachery and bribery did the work. This commenced on the night of the 27th, and by the following night the numbers of the federal army were reduced to five hundred and fifty men! They, of course, retreated; and, at nine o'clock on the morning of the 29th, being pursued by the enemy's cavalry, they halted to give them battle. But the latter did not attack them. Arista, however, received a hundred and sixty more deserters from the federal ranks, leaving only about two hundred and fifty, exclusive of the Texans. These were almost entirely composed of the prisoners, who had surrendered under Parbon, and joined their conquerors. They probably had good reasons for not going back to the centralist ranks, as they would doubtless have suffered as deserters. The retreating forces were continually pursued and harassed, but never could bring their pursuers to battle. At length, on the 31st of December, the retiring federalists reached the narrow pass of Sabinas, where their enemies left them. On the 7th of January, 1840, they recrossed the Rio Grande. Here, for the present, we will leave them, intending to return to their

operations. True, these occurrences did not happen in Texas, but Texans were engaged in them; and as they were the life of the party with which they took sides, and afraid of nothing but treachery, they did their country a vast service in amusing her enemy at the expense of that enemy, while she was gathering her resources, increasing her numbers, and growing in importance and respectability among the independent nations of the world.

The fourth Congress assembled at Austin on the 11th of November, 1839. President Lamar's message, delivered on the following day, is lengthy. He speaks fully on the subject of the Indians, and represents that the war prosecuted against them had proved a national blessing. "The cries of captivity and murder," he says, "have, of late, been seldom heard upon our borders. With the exception of a few recent massacres, resulting entirely from the temerity of our own people, the frontier has, for some time, enjoyed an almost equal security with the interior sections of the country; and is at the present moment in a state of tranquillity heretofore unknown, and which we hope, by proper vigilance and activity, to render as permanent as beneficial." The president declares it as his opinion, that the "proper policy to be pursued toward the barbarous race is absolute expulsion from the country." He deprecated the humane policy which the United States had pursued so long toward the Indians within her territory, as never having been productive of the good that was anticipated, but on the contrary it had generally resulted in injury to the whites, without any adequate benefit to the savages. His conclusion was, "to push a vigorous war against them; pursuing them to their hiding-places, without mitigation or compassion, until they shall be made to feel that flight from our borders, without the hope of return, is preferable to the scourges of war." The

sound Christian morality of this stern policy toward the Indians is extremely problematical. A large majority of them were strictly natives, as were their ancestors for untold generations. The great body of them lived on the head-waters of the Texan rivers, and many of them had as yet never seen the face of the white man.\* But, admitting the humanity of this procedure, whither could the aborigines fly? To drive them into the territories of the United States, would be a violation of treaty obligations; and, to force them into Mexico, would have supplied her with many thousand exasperated warriors, infinitely more brave and daring than her own people; and, to massacre them, even if practicable, would have savored of unmixed barbarity.

In regard to the finances, reference is made by the president to the report of the secretary of the treasury. It is an able document, but represents with too much truth the growing indebtedness of the republic. The revenue collected and paid into the treasury for the year ending September 30, 1839, did not amount to one hundred and eighty-eight thousand dollars, while the current expenses for the same period were over nine hundred thousand dollars. The promissory-notes of the government in circulation had increased to the enormous sum of more than one million eight hundred thousand dollars.† This

\* We are told by Froissart that, on one occasion, the duke de Bourbon went to make war on a town in Africa. Approaching the place, he sent a herald, as was the custom in those days, to announce his intention. The people of the town sent another herald, to know why he thus invaded and wished to make war upon them. After consulting some time as to an answer—for these people had never heard of him before—he sent back, for reply, that “they had killed the Lord Jesus Christ!”

† Report of James H. Starr, Secretary of the Treasury, November 3, 1839. In a speech of Senator Rusk, delivered in the United States senate on the 19th of July, 1854, there is exhibited a statement, from under the hand of James B. Shaw, controller of Texas, dated March 20th of that year, showing the expenses incurred by the republic of Texas in maintaining peace with, and protecting her frontier

excessive issue of the paper of the government was followed by the necessary consequence, its depreciation; and it was manifest to all that, without some change, it would soon become so entirely worthless, that the government would have to refuse taking it for public dues, for governments as well as individuals must have something substantial for their support. To remedy this evil, the executive was doing what he could to procure the five-million loan. General Hamilton had been sent to Europe to effect the object. In the meantime, the Texan commissioners had obtained of the United States bank two hundred and eighty thousand dollars, predicated upon the eventful success of the loan. Of this amount, a little upward of sixty-two thousand dollars went into the treasury, which was about all the *money* it had received for some time. The balance was employed in the purchase of arms and supplies for the public defence.

Notwithstanding the efforts made during the summer of 1839 to reduce the Indians, and drive them away, they still continued to commit their depredations upon the frontiers. On the 24th of October, Captain Howard had a skirmish with a number of them between the San Gabriel and Little rivers, in which he succeeded in killing three or four;\* and, on the

from the incursions of, Indians removed thither and belonging to the United States. As this probably includes the greater part of the appropriations made by Texas on account of the Indians, we compile from it the following table of Indian appropriations for each year: —

1837 } Houston's first term . . . . .	{ \$20,000
1838 } . . . . .	{ 170,000
1839 } Lamar's term . . . . .	{ 1,430,000
1840 } . . . . .	{ 1,027,319
1841 } . . . . .	{ 95,000
1842 } Houston's second term . . . . .	{ 20,000
1843 } . . . . .	{ 66,950
1844 } . . . . .	{ 17,142
1845 . . . Jones's term . . . . .	45,000

\* Captain Howard's report, October 29, 1839.

25th of December, General Burleson encountered a party of Cherokees on the western bank of the Colorado. They sent out one of their number to have a talk with him; but, believing their only object to be to gain time, he took their messenger into custody. On seeing this, they commenced firing on him, when he attacked them and put them to flight, taking (in addition to the messenger) five women and nineteen children prisoners. Six warriors were found dead on the field. The Texans unfortunately lost the gallant Captain Lynch, who fell at the first fire. Among the captives was the helpless family of the chief Bowles.\* These conflicts were some of the fruits of the Indian policy of those days. The one hundred and forty savages seen by Captain Howard, in the affair of the 24th of October, were all well mounted, he tells us, on good *American* horses—the proceeds of their robberies along the frontiers.

Another subject, of a very different character, but equally unpleasant, must close our sketch of the year 1839. The land-certificates issued by the boards of county commissioners being found valuable as an article of traffic and location, the commissioners in some of the counties had undertaken their manufacture. This dishonest and unlawful proceeding was carried to a fearful extent; and so great was the circulation of these spurious certificates, that it was impossible to distinguish the fraudulent from the genuine. The president called the attention of Congress to the subject; and that body passed a law, appointing a special board of commissioners to proceed from county to county, and, at each place of issue, in conjunction with the respective county boards, to take testimony, and decide as to the genuineness of every certificate which, from the register kept in each county, appeared to have been issued

\* General Burleson's report, December 26, 1839.

since the opening of the land-office. The commissioner of the general land-office was, by the law, prohibited from recognising any survey made upon a certificate not reported by the commissioners as genuine.\* This enactment, and the action of the commissioners under it, did much good in checking the system of land-frauds, and saved the republic from enormous losses.

\* Act, January 3. 1840, vol. iv., p. 139.



## CHAPTER X.

NEARLY four years had now passed since the battle of San Jacinto, and Texas was still free. No considerable number of the enemy had subsequently invaded her soil. Indeed, with the exception of the war she was conducting against the frontier Indians, Texas was at peace. Immigration had greatly increased her numbers and industry, her wealth, and means of living comfortably. But the miserable state of her currency, and the heavy budget of her expenses, bore hard upon all. These expenditures were induced, in part, by the many campaigns against the Indians, the fitting out and maintaining the navy, and by an attempt to frame and support the skeleton of a government which neither her population nor resources would justify. With nations, as with individuals, it is impossible long to present a show of power and magnificence without adequate means. Such an exhibition is followed by bankruptcy. The true greatness and power of Texas consisted in her rich and abundant lands, and the noble institutions which her people had founded in spite of her enemies. These, and not a long list of officials with sounding titles, constituted the skeleton which was to be filled up, with people, wealth, and commerce.

The credit of Texas was rapidly waning. Her five-million bonds had travelled over America and Europe in search of a

purchaser, but none could be found. Not that lenders were not able, but because Texas had not the credit. To cripple the latter still further, a great increase of the paper issues followed the necessities of the government, and, as the circulation increased, their market value went down. By the month of June, 1840, this paper had fallen to seventeen cents on the dollar, and by the close of the year it was worth but fourteen cents! These promissory-notes had driven all *money* out of the country, and had broken to pieces the standard of value. They operated as a forced loan, and impoverished both government and people. The warrants drawn upon the treasury for the fiscal year ending with September, 1840, were over two millions of dollars, which had been paid in these notes, and in eight per cent. bonds created by the act of February 5, 1840. But these bonds were little better than the notes. Many ingenious efforts were made to avoid the crisis which every one saw was approaching. These eight per cent. bonds, it was thought, would answer a good purpose. On the same day, another act was passed, authorizing the issuance of change-notes to the amount of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars. But, as the large notes had expelled the large coin, so likewise the small notes expelled the small coin. Then other acts were passed to convert these floating promises of the republic into eight and ten per cent. bonds; but this only increased the debt to the extent of the interest. In fact, every method was employed to preserve the public credit but the right one—a reduction of the public expenditures. These financial blunders necessarily embarrassed commerce and the business relations of the community. The officers of the government and the troops were equally sufferers, for their pay would not support them. Yet these sufferings were a wholesome lesson. The public intentions were good; and it was believed that the

Congress which was to meet in the fall of 1840 would discover the evil and apply the remedy.

On the 20th of January, 1840, Congress adopted the common law, so far as it was not modified by statutes. So far as crimes and their punishment were concerned, it had been the rule of proceeding since the Revolution. It was now introduced as a system, and was most agreeable to the ideas of liberty entertained by the citizens, who were mostly from common-law states. Some exceptions were created by the statutes, and civil-law rules retained in regard to marital partnerships, successions, &c., which they did not understand, and do not yet understand; still, as a system, the people felt that their rights were more secure under the common law. In a general view of the two systems, the one treated the governed as children, the other as freemen: the one was most suitable to a strong government, the other to one that was free.

The intestine commotions in Mexico did not abate during the year 1840. The quarrels of the opposing factions at home served to divert their attention from Texas. The centralists, under the guidance of Bustamente and Santa Anna, and the federalists, directed by Urrea and Gomez Farias, had many battles and treaties. Their example was followed by their respective adherents in the different states. Between the 15th and 26th of July, there was considerable fighting in the capital; many hundreds were killed, and much property destroyed. The great body of the people of Mexico, ignorant of the principles at stake, and of the designs of their leaders, were drawn into these conflicts, and either killed in battle or reduced to penury. It was well for Texas that her enemy was thus occupied. As to so much of this civil war as occurred along the right bank of the Rio Grande, her citizens could scarcely be indifferent spectators. They naturally took sides with the fed-

eralists. The disbanding of the large number of troops which Texas had employed against the Indians in 1839 had deprived many of them of any permanent means of subsistence. Their military pay amounted to nothing; and the stagnation in business, consequent upon the worthless condition of the currency, prepared many of them for the first enterprise that should occur, with the promise of food and raiment. President Lamar, believing it incompatible with the true interest and honor of Texas that her citizens should intermeddle with that contest, issued his proclamation, warning them not to invade Mexico, and also from all marauding and other acts of hostility against her territory, until by public notice it should be announced that active hostilities were to be renewed between the two nations; declaring that any citizen who should invade the Mexican republic, or by any hostile act molest its inhabitants within their own territory, should be considered without the protection of the Texan government, which disclaimed all participation in their conduct, and could afford no countenance to their unauthorized acts.\*

With these facts before us, we will return to the movements of Canales on the Rio Grande. On the 8th of January, 1840—the day after the heroes of Alcantro had crossed to the east side of that river—forty-five of the Texans took their leave, and returned to their homes. With his remaining force, General Canales proceeded about six miles up the stream, where he issued a proclamation, calling a convention of delegates to organize the “*Republic of the Rio Grande.*” The delegates

\* By all the principles of sound policy, President Lamar was right in this proclamation. Texas could have but one object in view—her independence. It was her interest to cultivate the arts of peace, and strengthen and consolidate her institutions; and experience had proven, and has since proven, that in all these contests, whether in Mexico or in Cuba, when the time of trial came, the Anglo-Saxon forces were deserted, and left to *tread the winepress alone.*

met on the 18th of January, and organized their new government, after the model of the constitution of 1824. Jesus Cardenas was made president, and the Licentiate Antonio Canales commander-in-chief. After regaling the troops with extra rations and *muscal*, the government and army recrossed the Rio Grande, and proceeded to Guerrero, where, on the 28th, the new republic was joyfully inaugurated amid great pomp and ceremony. Here they remained until the 18th of February, when they marched to the old *presidio* of the Rio Grande, one hundred and sixty miles above Guerrero, and entered it without opposition on the 3d of March, the centralist forces having evacuated the place. There were seventy-four Texans in the federal army; and they proposed that Canales should march to the Nueces, in order to recruit and obtain reinforcements. As he did not agree to this, sixty of them, under the command of Colonel Jordan, left him and returned to Texas. After the departure of Jordan, Canales proceeded with his remaining troops to Morales, a small place, three days' march from the *presidio*, where, on the 15th of March, he was met by an overwhelming force of the centralists under Arista, and had his adherents so cut up and defeated, that he was barely able to escape into Texas.\*

After the battle of Morales, Canales visited Austin, and Cardenas proceeded to Victoria on the Guadalupe, for the purpose of obtaining a reinforcement of Texans, for without them they could not win a battle. Arista, to prevent as far as possible another campaign, issued a proclamation, promising pardon to all who should, within a month, come in and submit to the centralist government.† To what extent these submissions were made we are not informed, but it is very certain that they did

\* Notes of the Federal Campaign of 1839-'40, by Captain Thomas Pratt.

† Dated at Saltillo, April 30, 1840.



not prevent the parties making them from joining Canales on the first favorable opportunity. The latter having, by proclamation, fixed his headquarters at San Patricio, the Texans, notwithstanding the warning of President Lamar, rallied to his standard; and, by the first of June, he found himself at the head of two hundred volunteers under the command of Colonel William S. Fisher, one hundred and ten under Colonel Jordan, one hundred under Colonel Seguin, and three hundred Mexican *rancheros* under his own immediate command, making an aggregate of seven hundred and ten men. With this force he set out on his march. Colonel Jordan, with his command of Texans, and one hundred and fifty mounted *rancheros* under Colonels Lopéz and Molano, were ordered to proceed in front, as the advance of the federal army. For the present, we will follow this advance.

After a slight skirmish with the centralists at Laredo, they proceeded, through Guerrero and Mier, to Comargo. Here, Lopéz and Molano, pretending that such were their orders from General Canales, pushed rapidly into the interior, for the purpose, as was said, of raising troops, contributions, arms, and ammunition. Their real object, however, was to betray the Texans under Jordan, and break up the federal army. Leaving Comargo on the 26th of June, they occupied the town of Tula; thence pursuing a southern route, and passing many villages, they reached Morallo, a handsome town of about twelve thousand inhabitants, situated in a beautiful valley of the Sierra Madre. After spending some days here to recruit, they proceeded to Linares, a large town, where they were received with the ringing of bells and the firing of artillery. The Texans did not think their force justified the joy that was manifested: however, they did not make themselves unhappy, for they had come to fight, and were used to it; and, if they really were



“sold,” they had intended to make the “delivery” somewhat expensive. Having feasted a week at Linares, they marched to Victoria, the capital of Tamaulipas, which place they entered on the 17th of August. The centralist forces, four hundred in number, under the command of the governor, at their approach had retreated from the city, and fled to the mountains. The federal army was received in the state capital with the usual pomp and display, and the new republic recognised by the ringing of bells and the huzzas of the Mexican rabble, who, in the presence of a military force, would have rendered like homage to any system whatever.

Some time was spent in Victoria in organizing the new state government, and in recruiting the federal forces. López and Molano seemed to be in no haste to quit the city, until, as was reported, Arista was on his march with a strong force to attack them. They then ordered a retreat to the mountains. The Texans opposed this retrograde movement, and so far succeeded as to stop the army in a position three miles from Victoria. Remaining a week in this position, and hearing nothing of the enemy, the two Mexican colonels were suddenly seized with the idea of pursuing the former governor of Tamaulipas. So, breaking up their camp, they set out on the 12th of September, by a forced march, for Jaumare, a small mining-town in the Sierra Madre, where it was said they would find the old governor. They reached the place on the 16th, and, on entering it, discovered the enemy on the opposite side, in full retreat. The town, beautifully situated in a valley, and surrounded by lofty mountains, was almost depopulated. The people had fled with the old centralist governor, leaving all their property, and a few *peons* and decrepit citizens to take care of themselves. The federalists, on reaching the plaza, found that the town authorities had also fled. As they could do no better, they took

one of the peons, and invested him with the dignity and power of an *alcalde*. At first, the thing sat awkwardly upon him, and he entered timidly upon the discharge of his high functions. As his principal duties, however, consisted in responding to the requisitions of the federal army, he soon learned how to discharge them: nay, more, he fell into the usages of his distinguished predecessors; and when a requisition was made for a beef, or a mutton, or a fowl, he took care to order a like supply for himself, being fully persuaded that the entire blame could be laid upon "*los diablos Tejanos!*" Thus the federal army, with the new *alcalde* and his brother-peons, lived sumptuously in the town of Jaumare.\*

After remaining here several days, a council of war was held, when it was determined to march upon Saltillo, raise contributions to pay off the troops, and then retire to the Rio Grande, and form a junction with the main body of the federal army under Canales. After several days' march through the mountains, and by a route unknown to the Texans, they were informed by Captain Peña, of the mounted *rancheros*, that Lopéz and Molano were conducting them to San Luis Potosi! A halt was immediately demanded, and, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the two Mexican colonels, the course of the army was changed. Pursuing their way for twelve days, over rugged and almost impassable mountains, they arrived within a day's march of Saltillo, where they halted at the *hacienda*

\* Captain Pratt relates a singular story of these people. Some years before, they were visited by the cholera, and great numbers died. It was believed to be a Divine visitation, and recourse was had to the supplications of the *padre*, but without avail. A public meeting was then held, and it was concluded that their water had been poisoned. Now the town was supplied with water from immense reservoirs, which were under the control of the priest and the *alcalde*. So it was decided that they had brought this dreadful calamity upon the Jaumareños. They were therefore condemned, brought upon the plaza, and publicly shot!

*del Potosi*; and here Colonel Jordan received an express from a reliable friend at Victoria de Tamaulipas, informing him that he and the Texans under him were betrayed; that Lopéz and Molano were in secret correspondence with the centralists, and for a specified sum of money were to place the Texans in such a position before the enemy, that they could be easily overwhelmed. Jordan was a frank and noble-hearted man, and, having no treachery in his own nature, could not conceive it in others. He immediately laid the letter before Lopéz and Molano, who, having read it, declared in terms so emphatic that the charge was false, and that the writer was a personal enemy who wished to ruin them, that Jordan was persuaded of their sincerity, and was willing to co-operate with them. But the news of this express soon spread among the Texans, who were not all as credulous as their commander, and they watched the subsequent movements of the Mexican colonels with considerable distrust.

The following day (October 22d) was spent by the federalists in cleaning their firearms and moulding an extra quantity of rifle-balls. On the morning of the 23d, they mounted and set out for Saltillo. At ten o'clock they discovered the enemy, entrenched on the brow of a hill, three miles south of the city. The federalists halted on another eminence, about six hundred yards from their opponents, having a ravine between the two armies. They formed in order of battle, when a flag appeared from the enemy, desiring a conference. Colonel Molano was despatched in answer to the flag, and held a consultation of about three hours. During this time, many messages were sent, which were well understood by Lopéz. He told Jordan that Vasquez, the centralist general, offered two hundred thousand dollars to the federal military chest, and five days' rations to each man, on condition that they would retire from before

Saltillo; but that Molano insisted upon two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and on this point negotiations were then pending with the authorities of the city, which would speedily be consummated. Thus was Jordan cajoled, while Molano was in fact conferring with Vasquez as to the *safest* mode of *delivering* over the federal army into the hands of the centralists; for it was known to be a delicate operation, and, so far as the Texans were concerned, quite dangerous. Vasquez was also waiting for reinforcements. At one o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy's auxiliary troops having arrived, under the command of General Montoya, preparations were immediately made for an attack upon the federal lines.

The force of the centralists consisted of one thousand men, of whom six hundred were infantry, having two nine-pounders, and four hundred were cavalry, together with a large number of citizens from Saltillo, variously armed and equipped. They were so certain of victory, that they had invited the populace of the town to come out and see them triumph. The federal army consisted of one hundred and ten Texans, under Jordan, and one hundred and fifty mounted *rancheros* and seventy-five Mexican infantry, under Lopéz, making an aggregate of three hundred and thirty-five men. So soon as the centralists were seen to move, Colonel Lopéz, assuming the command of the federal forces, ordered a march to the right flank toward a gap in the mountains so situated as to give the enemy every advantage over them. The Texans at once discovered the treachery of the villain Lopéz; and Captain Allen rode rapidly to Colonel Jordan, and exclaimed: "Where, in the name of God, sir, are you leading us? If you take us to yonder gorge, the enemy will not leave a man to tell our fate!" Jordan took a hasty glance at the position, and ordered a countermarch, passing rapidly along the ravine, within a hundred and fifty yards of

the centralists' entrenchment, to an old *hacienda* situated at point-blank distance from their cannon. The Texans now dismounted, placed their horses in an enclosure in the rear of the *hacienda*, and every man stripped for the fight. López, in command of the *rancheros*, would not suffer the latter to dismount, but took his position three hundred yards to the left of the Texans, in order, as he said, to prevent them from being surrounded! The Mexican infantry, under the command of a brother of Molano, were ordered to occupy a stone house on the Texan left; but, instead of so doing, they went over to the enemy, and turned their arms against the Texans. The centralists immediately commenced the action with their nine-pounders, which they fired without intermission for an hour. At the first discharge, Colonel López, waving his sword, cried, "Long live the supreme government!" and fled to the enemy, with two others of his command, taking with them the baggage and ammunition of the federal army.

The Texans were thus left in a situation the most critical—deserted by their friends, far from their country, surrounded by ten times their own number, and left with only the ammunition which they carried about their persons. Yet, under all these gloomy circumstances, "there was only one determined resolve among that brave band gathered around the decayed walls of the *hacienda* on that glorious day—it was, to fight to the death: no thought of retreat or surrender was, for a moment, entertained."\* As for the *rancheros*, deserted by López their commander, the most of them stood firm, and some of them fired at their colonel as he fled. The centralists now moved with their whole force from their entrenchment, and

\* I have before me the official report of Colonel S. W. Jordan, dated Laredo, November 2, 1840, but prefer to follow Captain Pratt's "Notes," as they were taken on the spot, and are more reliable.

occupied three sides of the Texan position. In this manner they slowly advanced, under cover of their cannon, and firing repeated volleys of musketry. Colonel Jordan had ordered his men to reserve their fire until the enemy approached within “*saving* distance.” Accordingly, they lay snugly ensconced behind the old walls and an *adobe* fence, forming a half-moon, and did not fire a shot until about four o’clock in the afternoon. General Montoya, supposing from the extent of *his own fighting*, that most of the Texans had fallen, ordered a general assault upon the *hacienda*. When the assailants had come within thirty yards of the walls, the Texans gave them a shout of defiance, followed by a fearful volley from their deadly rifles. The latter were in earnest; and the enemy also fought well, being cheered from the hill in their rear by the thousands of men, women, and children, who had come out to see *los Tejanos* taken. At that distance, the rifle-bullets went on no foolish errand, but nearly all took effect. Column after column of the centralists advanced, faltered, and fell under the murderous fire. At length, their ranks became disordered; a panic followed, and they fled. Soldiers, citizens, women, and children, all took the road to Saltillo, and in such confusion as though the Texans were in close pursuit at their heels! They left four hundred and eight killed upon the field of battle, and but few wounded. The Texans had only three killed and nine wounded, two of the latter mortally. A party of the enemy attempted to carry off their artillery, but a lucky shot at a long distance brought one of them down, and they also fled, leaving the heroic Texans masters of the field and of the enemy’s guns, together with a great quantity of small-arms and ammunition.

As the Texans were deserted by their allies, they determined to abandon the cause. Having provided for conveying their wounded, they mounted their horses, and set out for Texas.



They met the enemy's cavalry, who had been stationed on their route to cut off their retreat. As the Texans emerged into a plain, the hostile squadron, four hundred in number, charged upon them in gallant style. Two volleys from the rifles, however, brought them to a pause, and then a precipitate retreat. The Texans soon fell into the Monclova road, and continued their way to the Rio Grande, being followed by squadrons of the centralist cavalry, which kept at a very respectful distance.

To return to General Canales. That chieftain set out, with a force of about two hundred Mexicans and one hundred Texans, upon an expedition against San Marino, a small town in the eastern portion of Tamaulipas. Meeting with a body of centralists near the place, he retreated, without firing a gun, to Comargo, his headquarters. This retreat, probably brought about by treachery to the federalists, was the death-knell of that party on the Rio Grande. The battle of Saltillo occurred on the 23d of October. There was shortly afterward published the treaty between Colonel Juan Molano and General Arista, dated Victoria de Tamaulipas, October 14th, by an article of which it was provided that "all Mexicans, under the command of Don Juan Molano, will separate from, and abandon to their fate, the adventurous strangers [Texans] at present among them." That Molano should have entered into such a scheme of treachery, was very natural; but that Arista, the elegant and accomplished gentleman of Mexico, should have become a party to it, proves but too truly that the thing is common in that country. The fearful retribution which fell upon the traitors at Saltillo also proves that God never ratifies such compacts. About the same time, Canales entered into a similar treaty with Arista, but it stipulated for the safety of his auxiliaries. We have now closed the account of the federal war, which we introduced because of the part taken therein by the Texans,

and the effect it had in diverting the Mexicans from stealing and murder on the western frontier.

The Indians continued hostile and troublesome. The Comanches had made frequent forays into the Texan settlements, and, among other outrages, had carried off several captives. In February, 1840, a few of these Indians came to San Antonio, for the purpose of making a treaty of peace with Texas. They were told by the commissioners to bring in the thirteen white captives they had, and peace would be granted. They promised that, at the next full moon, they would do so. The commissioners repaired to Bexar to meet them; and on the 19th of March, a little after the appointed time, the Indians, sixty-five in all, including men, women, and children, came in, bringing, however, but one of the captives. Twelve chiefs met the commissioners in the treaty-house, and the question was put to them, "Where are the prisoners you promised to bring in to this talk?" They answered: "We brought the only one we had; the others are with other tribes." The little girl who had been brought in said this was utterly false, as she had seen the others at the Indian camp a few days before, and that they intended to bring in only one or two at a time, in order to extort for them the greater ransom. A pause ensued for some time in the council, when the same chief who had given the answer inquired how they liked it. No reply was made, but an order was despatched to Captain Howard to bring his company into the council-room. When the men had taken their position, the terms upon which peace would have been made, had they brought in the captives as they promised, were explained to the chiefs. They were also informed that they were prisoners, and would be detained until they sent the rest of their company for the captives, and brought them in.

As the commissioners were retiring from the room, one of

the chiefs sprang to the door; and the sentinel there stationed, in attempting to prevent his escape, was stabbed by him with a knife. Captain Howard received a like wound. The remaining chiefs now rose, drew their knives, and prepared their bows and arrows, and the fight became general. The soldiers killed the whole of the chiefs engaged in the council. The warriors, not of the council, fought desperately in the yard; but the company under Captain Redd advancing, forced them to take shelter in a stone house, whither they were pursued and cut down. A party of the savages at last made their way to the opposite side of the river, but were pursued, and all killed, except a renegade Mexican, who was permitted to escape. All the warriors, thirty-two in number, together with three women and two children, were killed. Twenty-seven women and children were made prisoners. In this remarkable fight, none escaped except the Mexican. The Texans had seven killed and eight wounded. They despatched one of the squaws to inform the Camanches that they were willing to exchange prisoners.\* After the lapse of some days, the squaw returned, bringing two white captives and four or five Mexicans, and proposed to exchange them for her own people, and pay the difference in *horses*. Colonel Fisher, the officer in command, informed her that all the white captives must be brought in, and then her kindred should be released.†

The Camanches hung about San Antonio in small parties, brooding over their loss. The killing of so many of their chiefs was a severe stroke, and they were divided on the question of war. At length they retired to their homes, on the upper branches of the Texan rivers, to make serious preparations for a terrible visitation on the white settlements.

\* Report of Colonel H. M'Leod to President Lamar, March 20, 1840.

† "Telegraph," April 15, 1840.

On the night of the 4th of August, a large body of Indians passed down south, their trail crossing the road at M'Clure's hill. It was immediately afterward discovered, and the news sent to Gonzales by the 6th.\* Couriers were despatched with all haste to the settlements on the Lavaca and the Guadalupe, to give notice of the approach of the Camanches. A company of twenty-four men was likewise immediately raised by Captain Ben M'Culloch,† which on the same evening set out in pursuit. The Indians had passed down rapidly, and appeared before Victoria on Thursday evening, the 6th of August. The citizens had no knowledge of their being in the neighborhood till they had surrounded the town. Under these circumstances, they hastily gathered such arms as they could find, and defended the place so well as to prevent the enemy from pene-

\* Letter of W. D. Miller, August 17, 1840.

† Ben M'Culloch is a native of Tennessee. He arrived in Texas in January, 1836, and joined the army at Groce's, just as it set out on that memorable march which won the liberties of the republic. Having an offer of the command of one of the "*Twin-Sisters*," he joined the artillery, and served in that capacity at the battle of San Jacinto. For his gallant conduct he was made lieutenant a few days after the action, and was discharged in July following. In Colonel M'Culloch's statement of the battle of the 21st, he says: "We commenced firing [the artillery] at two hundred and ten paces from the enemy's breastwork, and kept in advance of our line until we were less than one hundred paces from the enemy, when they gave way and were pursued by us two hundred and fifty paces beyond the breastwork; but we were prevented from firing by our own men, who had outstripped us in the race. During the action, General Houston rode from Millard's command across in front of No. 1 [the piece commanded by M'Culloch], which delayed the firing of the gun for a moment. I afterward observed him between Burleson's regiment and the enemy, not more than sixty paces from and advancing upon the enemy, being about thirty paces in advance of our line." In 1839-'40, Captain M'Culloch was a member of the Texan Congress; and, in 1845-'46, of the first state legislature. Besides the Camanche war of 1840, he was engaged in innumerable battles and skirmishes with Indians and Mexicans. After the commencement of the Mexican war, he went into it as a captain of rangers. His fame won in that war is world-wide. General Taylor preferred him to all others as a spy, and in that capacity he rendered signal service to the American cause, without the loss of his men. He is now (1855) the efficient marshal of Texas.

trating into the more settled portions of the town. After some fighting, the Indians retreated, having collected all the horses on the prairie, and a large portion of the cattle, which they drove off. On the morning of the 7th, they made another attack on the town, and burnt one house. As they met with more resistance in this last attack, they marched across the Guadalupe, and, after committing several murders and robberies on the way, attacked Linnville, a small place of only five houses, on the morning of the 8th.\* The people of Linnville supposed them to be a caravan of Mexican traders, until they had come up to the town, which they did at full speed, in the shape of a half-moon. The citizens fled to the bay, and most of them found safety on board a lighter. The Camanches remained in the town until dark, burning the houses one by one, and destroying such property as they did not wish to carry away; also all the cattle they could find. The number of the savages making this foray was estimated at four hundred.† They killed at and near Victoria fifteen persons, and six more in and about Linneville. They carried off Mrs. Watts as a prisoner, and drove off an immense number of horses. In their retreat they were further burdened with a heavy amount of goods.

The company that left Gonzales on the 6th of August, under M'Culloch, was reinforced on the following day by thirty-six men from the upper Lavaca, and sixty-five more from Victoria and Quero. The rangers arrived at Victoria at sunset on the 8th. Learning here the destruction of Linnville, they continued their march until midnight, and encamped on the Casa Blanca. Proceeding down that stream, they discovered the enemy just before noon on the 9th, and had a skirmish with

\* "Texas Sentinel," September 19, 1840.

† William H. Watts to the Editor of the "Gazette," August, 1840.



them, in which the whites had one killed, and the Indians four or five. The latter retreated northward, pursuing the trail by which they had come down. The Camanches were all well mounted on fresh horses, while those of the Texans were worn down and exhausted by constant riding and excessive fatigue. As the Indians declined a fight, it was impossible to force it on them. However, the rangers continued the pursuit, being further reinforced by Captain Owen's company from Texana. On the morning of the 10th, they again came up with the Camanches, and found them drawn up in order of battle on the top of a ridge. The Texans advanced, but the Indians fled, and, the better to avoid a conflict, they commenced scattering on the way the plunder they had gathered; and, as the large number of their horses impeded their retreat, they killed many of them. As it was evident that the Indians would not fight until forced into it, Captain M'Culloch was despatched to the settlements on the Colorado, in order to raise a force to intercept the savages in the neighborhood of Plum creek. This stream, a tributary of the St. Mark, was somewhat beyond the settlement, and it was believed that the Indians would there make a halt. The duty of raising the intercepting force was performed with wonderful celerity. Those who had been in pursuit of the Camanches, having followed them to M'Clure's hill, turned in to Gonzales to refresh their exhausted horses.

The news of the inroad of the Camanches had spread rapidly through the settlements, and the volunteers were soon on their way, by forced marches, to the point of interception. Captain Caldwell with thirty-seven men, Captain Ward with twenty-two men, and Captain Bird with thirty-five more, reached there on the 11th of August. General Felix Huston arrived on the same evening, and took the command. On the morning of the 12th, the spies reported that the Camanches were approach-



ing. About the same time, Colonel Burleson came up with a hundred men under Captains Jones, Wallace, and Hardiman.\* General Huston immediately formed for battle. The Indians, seeing the Texans in their front, likewise prepared for action. Their right occupied a piece of woods, while their line extended on the left a quarter of a mile into the prairie. General Huston dismounted his men, and a random fire was commenced. The Indian chiefs, arrayed in all the splendor of savage warriors, and finely mounted, bounded over the space between the hostile lines, exhibiting feats of horsemanship and daring which none but a Comanche, who is said to live on horseback, could perform. But, notwithstanding the rapidity with which they rode, several of them were seen to fall. As the fighting progressed, the Texans advanced; and the enemy being disposed to keep at a distance, General Huston ordered Burleson, with the right wing, to move around the point of the woods occupied by a large body of the Comanches: at the same time, he directed Caldwell, with the left wing, to charge into the woods. These movements were executed in gallant style. The Indians fled at all points, and scattered in every direction, abandoning all their plunder and stolen horses. A most animated pursuit was kept up for fifteen miles. About an hour after the action commenced, the recruited forces from Gonzales came up. The rout of the enemy was thus complete. Their killed, numbering from fifty to eighty, were scattered from Plum creek to the St. Mark, and as high up as the San Antonio road. Several hundred horses and mules, with packs and baggage, fell into the hands of the victors. The captive Mrs. Watts was retaken and returned to her friends. Her husband, the collector at Linnville, had been killed there, on the 8th, by the savages. Thus did the Comanches fail in their revenge for their slain

\* Felix Huston's official report, August 12, 1840.

chiefs at San Antonio. It is probable that they were directed in this incursion by the Mexicans at Matamoras. It was well known there that large quantities of goods had been brought to the two points attacked, for the purpose of trade with the federalists on the Rio Grande. The centralists thought it a good move thus to break up these dépôts.

The Texan government was determined still to pursue these Camanches, and give them yet another proof of its ability to chastise them. Accordingly, in September, Colonel John H. Moore had orders to raise a volunteer force in Fayette county, and march up the Colorado in pursuit of those that escaped at Plum creek. On the 5th of October, he set out with ninety Texans and twelve Lipan Indians.\* After passing the headwaters of the San Gabriel, he proceeded to the San Saba, and up that stream. Continuing his march for two days up the latter river without finding the enemy, he diverged to the Concho, and thence to the Red fork of the Colorado, passing over a country of surpassing richness and beauty. On reaching the Red fork, Colonel Moore came upon the trail, leading up the river; this he followed until the signs indicated that the Indians were at no great distance. He halted, and sent out two of his Lipan spies. They returned in the evening of the 23d of October, and reported that they had discovered the Camanche village. The troops were ordered to get their suppers, and be ready to march.† At half-past five o'clock in the afternoon, they set out, and proceeded ten miles due north, when they reached the river. Continuing about four miles farther up the stream, the beef-cattle were herded in a mosquito-thicket, and four miles still onward the troops were ordered to dismount. This was at midnight. Spies were again sent for-

\* "Texas Sentinel," November 14, 1840.

† John H. Moore's official report, November 7, 1840.

ward, to discover the force and position of the enemy. The scouts returned at three o'clock, and reported the village as situated on the south bank of the river, and, from its appearance, they judged it to contain sixty families and one hundred and twenty-five warriors.

At daybreak on the 24th, the Texans, leaving their pack-mules, proceeded to the village. It seems they were not discovered till they ascended the hill two hundred yards from the village. A charge was instantly made, and the Camanches fled to the river, which bent round the village like a half-moon. A murderous fire was opened and continued upon the flying enemy. Passing through the village, the Texans dismounted and continued the fire. Some of the Indians were killed before reaching the river; others were shot or drowned in the stream. A portion succeeded in crossing and reaching the prairie on the opposite bank; but Lieutenant Owen, who had been ordered, with fifteen men, to cross over and cut off their retreat, succeeded admirably in this business. As this was a war of extermination, the bodies of men, women, and children, were seen on every hand, dead, wounded, and dying. The fight around the village lasted about half an hour, and the pursuit extended some four miles.

The work was done: the butcheries of Victoria and Linnville were avenged. There were forty-eight of the Camanches killed in the village, and eighty more either shot or drowned at the river; and thirty-four prisoners remained in the hands of the victors. The latter had only two men wounded. The village was then utterly destroyed by fire; and Colonel Moore collected a *caballada* of five hundred horses, taken from the enemy, and returned to the capital of Texas, where he arrived with all his forces (except one man who had died on the way out) on the 7th of November. This, the severest chastisement

which the Camanches had received, was inflicted on them in their distant home, at least three hundred miles from Austin.

The fifth Congress assembled at Austin on the 2d of November. The message of President Lamar was not lengthy. He spoke favorably of the progress made by the republic in her domestic and foreign affairs. General James Hamilton, one of the loan-commissioners, had been empowered, previous to his departure for Europe, to establish diplomatic relations with the nations of that continent; and the importance of such relations with Spain was referred to, on account of the extent of the trade with Cuba. Mr. Treat, the private agent of Texas in Mexico, had been so far listened to, that he was permitted to submit his propositions; but the president entertained slight hopes of success. On the subject of the finances, he observed that, "so long as we have to depend, for our daily moneyed operations, upon the promises of the government to pay at a future day, *no matter in what form they may be issued*, those issues must and will depreciate." — "This depreciation of paper," he continues, "not founded upon a specie basis, or its equivalent, is inevitable, and to the extent of the depreciation is the loss of the government that is compelled to resort to such issues. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to our financial prosperity that we should effect a loan, as it probably is, at present, the only means which can be resorted to, for keeping our currency at par." Such reflections are wholesome, and doubtless grew out of the painful experience of the president in the management of the Texan currency. Yet it was most fortunate for Texas that she did not secure the loan. At that time, and under the then-existing circumstances, it would have been expended in a year or two, leaving the republic still more deeply involved. The want of credit prevents nations as well as individuals from going into debt. Texas,

being out of credit, soon learned the important but necessary lesson of living within her means. That lesson has done her more good than three such loans.

The long-disputed boundary-line between Texas and the United States was not yet run. St. Denis and Governor Sandoval had quarrelled about it; so had France and Spain; then Spain and the United States; then the latter and Mexico. Finally, when Texas was recognised, she made a treaty with the United States for running the boundary-line; but when the commissioners, Messrs. Hunt and Overton, met at the mouth of the Sabine, instead of running the line according to the treaty which their respective governments thought was plain enough, they disagreed, and opened the old sore, by a diplomatic discussion, which continued until the Texan appropriation was exhausted.\*

The Congress of 1839-'40 had provided that the navy should be laid up in ordinary, unless the safety of the coast should require it to remain in active service. A report having been circulated that Mexico was equipping a squadron with which to attack Texas and her commerce, the navy was continued in active service. There was another consideration in favor of this course. The states of Yucatan and Tobasco had declared their independence of Mexico; and it was deemed advisable to make a demonstration of the naval power of Texas on the coast of these new governments, and to ascertain whether their secession from the Mexican confederacy would cause them to cease hostilities against Texas.

\* This correspondence extends from the 22d of February, 1840, to the 16th of March following. It was carried on near the mouth of the Sabine, on its western bank. It is a recapitulation of the old discussion between John Quincy Adams and Don Luis de Onis in 1818. The immediate question between the commissioners was, whether Sabine lake was the "Sabine river" named in the treaty. If so, the line should run on its western bank; if not, General Hunt contended that it should run along the middle of the lake.

Perhaps one of the best evidences of the progress of a nation is to be found in its newspaper department. In 1836, Texas had but one weekly newspaper; in 1840, she had over a dozen, one or two of which were semi-weekly.\* These papers were brought out in a creditable style, and their columns well edited. If they supported their respective views with zeal, they did so with dignity, and seldom ran into those excesses so discredit-able to the partisan organs of the parent-country. True, there were exceptions, but they were mostly attributable to new editors, who, in coming to Texas, had brought with them more of the spirit of personal controversy than was common in the new country.

The fifth Congress met with a determination to do something for the credit of the republic. The great difficulty was, to determine what should be done. While complaints were made of heavy direct taxes, and of a burdensome tariff on articles of prime necessity, it was still indispensable to have a revenue to carry on the government. The most sensible conclusion was, therefore, to reduce the appropriations. Congress digested and passed an act† greatly reducing the number of officers of the government; placed all the public vessels in ordinary, except a schooner; declined making an appropriation for the regular army; and enacted some other provisions in regard to the revenue, by means of all which the appropriations were reduced

\* These papers were —

In Austin, the *Gazette* and the *Sentinel*.

In Houston, the *Telegraph*, the *Times*, and the *Morning Star*.

In Galveston, the *Civilian* and the *Courier*.

In San Augustine, the *Journal*.

In Brasoria, the *Brasoria Courier*.

In San Luis, the *Advocate*.

In Matagorda, the *Colorado Gazette*.

In Richmond, the *Telescope*; and,

In Washington, the *Emigrant*.

† An act to abolish certain offices, &c., January 18, 1841.



nearly sixty-six per centum, and the means to meet them increased. This effort on the part of Texas to meet her expenses helped her credit. The two houses did nothing with the currency—perhaps they could not. It was diseased; and nothing but money would give it relief. It was therefore permitted to languish another year—some hoping for a loan, others that time would effect a cure, and others, again, that it would altogether cease its functions.

The year 1840 did not pass away without further evidence of the growing consequence of the republic. England, Holland, and Belgium, acknowledged her independence, and the former country sent J. T. Crawford as *chargé d'affaires* to represent her near the government of Texas. France was already represented by M. De Saligny, with the same diplomatic rank. Texas was indebted to General James Hamilton for the treaties of recognition with England, Holland, and Belgium. The objections on the part of England, on account of the slavery question, had been to some extent removed by the published writings of William Kennedy and Jonathan Ikan, both Englishmen, who had visited Texas, and given an impartial and interesting account of her progress. In connection with this question of slavery, we find, in 1840, the name of *Monroe Edwards*. He had turned up as a man of enterprise in Texas, and entered upon a scheme for the importation of slaves. He met with a man in Mississippi by the name of Dart, with whom he entered into a partnership. Dart was to furnish the funds, and did furnish him thirty thousand dollars, with which he went to Cuba, to purchase negroes.\* It appears that a slaver had been captured by a British cruiser, and brought into Havana, where the negroes were apprenticed for a term of years. Edwards purchased a large number of these negroes and intro-

\* Edwards says the negroes were purchased by John Edwin Sumner as agent.

duced them into Texas. It was understood, between him and Dart, that they were to be sent through Texas to Louisiana. But Edwards commenced selling them out in Texas, and appropriated the proceeds to his own use. Dart, on learning these facts, sequestered the remaining negroes; but, on the trial, Edwards gave, in evidence, a full receipt from Dart for the money originally advanced. Upon a close examination of this paper, it was found that Edwards had extracted all the writing on a letter from Dart to him, except the signature, and had written the receipt above it. Edwards was forthwith prosecuted for forgery. He gave bail, and fled to the United States. In 1840, he wrote to President Lamar, and also to General Houston, and perhaps other distinguished persons in Texas, representing the facts in part, but stating that he had been defrauded in the purchase of the negroes, believing them to be slaves; that, by treaty stipulations, both England and Spain were bound for the restoration of the negroes to freedom; that the British government had been fully advised of all the facts, with a descriptive list of the negroes; that he was then on his way to London, with letters from Mr. Adams, General Wilson, Mr. Fox, Dr. Channing, and twenty other gentlemen of high standing here and in Europe, to press the liberation of the negroes; and was advised that the Texan government would be held responsible for them. He further stated that he had high authority for saying that, the moment the question was agitated in London, the successful negotiation of the Texan loan was at an end; and concluded by advising that the negroes be safely kept, to abide the issue to be made by the British government.\*

The object of Edwards in writing thus is not so easily ascertained; but he proceeded to London, and, by the plausibility

\* Edwards's letter, November 1, 1840.

of his story, and his apparent sympathy for these negroes, he attracted so much attention, and acquired such influence with the ministry, that it became necessary for General Hamilton to interpose, and expose him as a criminal who had fled from justice in Texas.\* This interposition had the desired effect, and Edwards turned his attention to other enterprises.

To the friends of Texas it was gratifying to see the growth of her commerce, and the interest felt therein by foreign nations. During the first quarter of 1840, ninety-two vessels arrived at the port of Galveston. There was a corresponding increase of arrivals at Velasco, Matagorda, and other points. Many of these vessels were from Europe, and brought merchandise to exchange for cotton. This increase of trade, though rapid, was natural, and did not exceed the increase of population induced by a constant stream of immigration. The town of Houston, situated at the head of Buffalo bayou, a river navigable at all times, had already become the centre of a consid-

\* As proof of the extent of Edwards's operations, we give General Hamilton's letter to him:—

“No. 15 COCKSPUR STREET, LONDON, *November 23, 1840.*”

“SIR: I have just been informed by Mr. Stevenson that you have presented to him a letter of introduction, asking his good offices, from the secretary of state of the United States, and that you have a similar letter to General Cass, the American minister at Paris. I beg leave to inform you that I have apprized Mr. Stevenson that you are a fugitive from the public justice of Texas, charged with the commission of an infamous crime. I shall feel it my duty to make a similar communication to General Cass.

“I likewise understand that you propose making an application to Lord Palmerston for the aid of her majesty's government for the purpose of subserving some alleged objects of public justice in Texas. As the representative of the republic of Texas in Great Britain, I shall not fail to advise Lord Palmerston of the facts which I have communicated to the representatives of the United States at Paris and London.

“I hope you will spare me the pain and necessity of a more detailed and public statement of your recent history in Texas.

“I remain your obedient servant,

“J. HAMILTON, *Envoy of the Republic of Texas.*”

“MONROE EDWARDS, Esquire.”

erable trade with the interior. This trade had extended up the Brasos, the Trinity, and even the Colorado; for it was found to be a cheap market for purchases, and transportation thence to the state capital was not higher than from Linnville. At that time, freight between the two places could be had at eighteen or twenty dollars per hundred weight, payable in promissory-notes, the latter being worth from fifteen to eighteen cents on the dollar.\* An extensive and quite an increasing trade was carried on through the outlet of Red river; and this traffic was the more profitable, because the importers were not so particular about paying the duties. At first, Texas bought much and sold but little, and the balance of trade was against her; but, in looking at the comparative tables of her commerce for the years from 1838 to 1841, both inclusive, we find that her necessities induced her to purchase less and to sell more. For example, in 1838, she imported thirty-five thousand bushels of corn; in 1841, not two thousand bushels, because she had found it necessary to raise it. In 1838, she imported fifty-six thousand pounds of butter; in 1841, but little over half that quantity. The fluctuations in her currency had its effect during these years, but aside from this the tendency of trade was favorable, and evinced more industry and economy on the part of the population.

Among other improvements, the republic was engaged in the construction of a military road from Red river to the *presidio* crossing of the Nueces; and it was proposed to add to this a like road from the town of Austin to Santa Fé, a distance of six hundred miles. The motives for this are set forth in the report of the secretary of war. Santa Fé, situated about twelve miles east of the upper Rio Grande, or, as it is called up there, the Rio del Norte, was included within the statutory limits of

\* "Telegraph," June 24 and July 15, 1840.

the republic of Texas. The place was settled entirely by Mexicans, and, never having been conquered by Texas, was still under the government of Mexico. The country between the Texan capital and this point was wholly unoccupied, except by hordes of savages that roamed over it. For many years the adventurous traders of the United States had carried on a successful inland commerce with Santa Fé, of the annual value of four or five millions of dollars.\* Santa Fé was not altogether the consumer, but rather the *dépôt* for these importations, which were distributed thence to Chihuahua and other portions of northern Mexico. This trade was conducted principally through St. Louis, in Missouri; and it was believed that, by diverting it through Texas, the distance of land-transportation would be shortened three or four hundred miles, and that republic be made the recipient of the vast profits realized. Another object was to be attained: that portion of the Texan territory would thus be conciliated, and the two sections, although separated by so wide a desert, bound together by the interests of commerce. The secretary of war proposed, as a preparatory step, the construction of a military road from Austin to Santa Fé. President Lamar seemed to feel a deep interest in the affairs of New Mexico, and as early as April 14, 1840, had addressed a letter to the authorities and people of that province.

The president's health had been for some time very bad; and, getting no better, he obtained from the Congress a leave of absence, and about the middle of December retired from his official duties, leaving them to be discharged by the vice-president.

\* Report of the Secretary of War, September 30, 1840.

## CHAPTER XI.

THE year 1841 opened with prospects gloomy enough. The imports into Texas during the past fiscal year had exceeded one and a third millions of dollars, while the exports amounted to but little over two hundred thousand dollars, which exhibited an increase of indebtedness for that year of more than a million. From this, however, should be deducted a difference in valuations, and the amount of moneys brought into the country by immigrants; still, it would leave a large balance against the people of the republic. To this add the increase in the public debt; and also the utter want of means and credit of the government; and we may form an idea of the prospect before them. That the condition of affairs did not meet the public approbation is manifest from the fact that very few of the old members were returned to the fifth Congress. Under the circumstances, all eyes were turned to the able negotiations of General Hamilton. The propositions made in Great Britain, France, and Belgium, were infinite. To give Texas credit in Europe, and raise means to pay her debts, was a problem which General Hamilton had undertaken to solve. He was a man of financial genius, with the organ of hope largely developed, and possessed of a most untiring zeal. He was, however, greatly mistaken in supposing that he could easily change the views of the chief ministers of those ancient courts. That he



labored honestly for Texas, there can be no doubt ; but, at the present time, it is equally clear that the republic was benefited by his want of success. Among the plans for a loan was one set forth in the prospectus of Messrs. Lafitte and Company, bankers in Paris. After much negotiation, General Hamilton thought the affair concluded, and so wrote on the 4th of February, 1841.\* The news was received with great joy, not only in Texas, but in the United States, for she had many friends there who were *interested* in her success. The treasury notes and bonds, that had been down to twelve or fifteen cents in the dollar, suddenly rose one or two hundred per cent.† This French loan was to extend to thirty-five millions of francs, and was to be raised by subscriptions, the bonds to be reimbursed in lands, duties, or cash, at the option of the subscriber. General Hamilton, previous to the consummation of the arrangement, had assured himself, as he supposed, of the favorable disposition and protection of the French government for the negotiation of the loan. This assurance he had in writing from M. Guizot, the prime minister, and verbally from the king. No sooner, however, had the negotiator left for London, and the prospectus for the loan was issued, than an article appeared in the "*Débats*," the government organ, opposing it. The bankers, seeing this, postponed opening the books for subscrip-

\* "PARIS, February 4, 1841.

"To the Editor of the *New York Times and Star* : —

"SIR: As the commissioners of loans of the republic of Texas were instructed by his excellency President Lamar, in the event of their effecting a negotiation of the loan for that republic, to make a public announcement of the fact, that meritorious holders of the securities of government, who may have aided the country in the hour of its necessity, may not be the victims of the speculation of those acting under secret information, I will thank you to state in your paper that I have this day concluded in this city a contract with the bank of Messrs. J. Lafitte and Company, for the Texan loan. . . . .

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"J. HAMILTON."

† Letter to B. E. Bee, April 18, 1841.

tions.\* General Hamilton did not yet despair ; but there were difficulties in his way in Texas, of which he was not then advised. In February, 1841, there was pending before the Texan Congress a bill providing for the incorporation of a French company, which by its terms was authorized to introduce eight thousand French immigrants, to whom were to be granted three millions of acres of land along the frontiers of the republic, from Red river to the Rio Grande. This measure, which M. De Saligny, the French *chargé d'affaires*, had much at heart, passed the house of representatives, but was lost in the senate ; and much unnecessary prejudice was excited against the French in consequence. There was also another matter in which the French *chargé* was personally interested.†

It seems that a difference occurred between a servant of M. De Saligny and Mr. Bullock, in which the servant was beaten by the latter. Saligny made his complaint to the government, and Bullock was arrested, and bound over to answer at the next term of the district court. In the meantime, the latter, who kept a hotel, finding Saligny on his premises, ordered him away. Complaint was also made of this outrage, and Bullock again bound over. These violations of diplomatic privilege exasperated the French minister, and a correspondence followed ; but the Texan government failing to give satisfaction, the former left his post.‡ Saligny was a brother-in-law of M.

\* Letter of General Hamilton, May 18, 1841.

† "Fiscal History of Texas," p. 110. Mr. Gouge says he "had been on the spot, and inquired into the particulars. M. De Saligny had a number of horses, which were fed with corn. Mr. Bullock's pigs intruded into the stables to pick up the corn the horses suffered to fall to the ground. One of M. De Saligny's servants killed some of the pigs. Mr. Bullock whipped the servant."

‡ It was understood that a French fleet was coming to the gulf of Mexico to settle this affair ; and the Texan *chargé* at Washington mentioned the subject to the American secretary of state, and to the British minister in that city, both of whom promised to send their respective squadrons around there to look after the French. But when Houston came again into office, a kind letter was sent

Human, the French minister of finance; hence he was found the first to oppose the loan, and so gave notice in the "*Messenger*" and "*Moniteur*," his organs.

Still, General Hamilton thought that Lafitte and Company could carry the loan through without the aid of the French government, or at least that these differences could be adjusted: so he wrote, and continued to inspire the Texans with hope. In the meantime, gigantic projects were hewn out in Texas. A bank, with a large capital, was to be established. General Hamilton had procured John Horseley Palmer, late governor of the bank of England, to lay down a plan for it, and, it was said, was making efforts to secure the services of Samuel Jaudon, late agent of the United States bank, as president of this financial organ of the Texan government. But General Hamilton failed in Paris. His success was no better among the Dutch, for they also were borrowing. Still, the hope of a loan did not suddenly expire; the prospect, with alternations of brightness and gloom, afforded facilities for gambling in the sale and purchase of the notes and bonds of the republic. She was manifestly living on that hope: for her revenues in 1840, though nominally four hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars, were in fact but little over ninety thousand dollars; and her expenses during that year were upward of four times that amount.

Texas had employed all the means in her power to secure her independence, and to induce Mexico to acknowledge it. She had formed a convention with Great Britain, by which she had promised to assume five millions of dollars of the debt due by Mexico to British subjects, if that government would procure from Mexico an acknowledgment of her independence.

to France, which satisfied her wounded honor, and M. De Saligny returned to his post. — *Jones's Letters on Annexation*, p. 10.

She had sent Mr. Treat as a private agent to treat with the latter power; then Mr. Bee; and subsequently, in the spring of 1841, she had despatched Mr. Webb, with instructions to open and conduct negotiations for peace, under the influence of the mediation promised by Great Britain.\* But the latter agent was not received, and immediately returned. This was followed by a report that the Mexicans were preparing to invade Texas. Thus was the republic overwhelmed with debts at home, and threatened with war from abroad. But the Texan Congress and executive were equally ready to meet the enemy. "Texas proper," says President Burnet, "is bounded by the Rio Grande: Texas, as defined by the sword, may comprehend the Sierra del Madre. Let the sword do its proper work." But the means were not to be had. It is believed that, had General Hamilton negotiated the loan, an army of at least ten thousand men would have marched into Mexico in 1841. They may possibly have thus won a peace, but the loan would have been exhausted. Mexico, on her part, was earnestly preparing for an invasion of Texas. She had succeeded in effecting a loan of three millions of dollars, with a portion of which fund she had engaged the building of two vessels-of-war at New York. These vessels were built, and delivered to her at Vera Cruz. But, while she was preparing, she found employment for her troops at home. Yucatan, having declared her independence, proceeded, on the 16th of May, 1841, to proclaim a republican constitution at the capitol in Merida, and despatched Colonel Martin Francisco Peraza as envoy to Texas. He arrived at Austin on the 11th of September, and entered into a speedy arrangement with the executive, the substance of which was, that Texas should furnish certain naval aid, and Yucatan engaged to pay its expenses in part while

\* Anson Jones's Letters on Annexation, p. 16.

operating against the common enemy. The business was soon done, and Peraza embarked with the naval force destined for the coast of Yucatan. Mexico had yet other troubles. On the 6th of October, Santa Anna, at the head of ten thousand men, marched into the capital of the nation, deposed Bustamente, seated himself in the chair of state, and assembled a Congress of his own selection to confirm his authority. Thus was Mexico engaged at home.

The freebooters on her frontiers found time, however, to make occasional excursions across the Rio Grande. Sometimes they would capture the property of the citizens, and even the citizens themselves. Captain Philip Dimit, long distinguished as a pioneer and gallant defender of Texas, became their victim. He was engaged, with some workmen, on the 4th of July, 1841, in erecting a mercantile establishment on Corpus Christi bay, about fifteen miles below the present town of Corpus Christi (but then known as the *ranch*e of Aubrey and Kinney), when the place was visited by Captain Sanchez, aide-de-camp to General Ampudia, with a party of fifteen cavalry, who took Dimit and his men prisoners, and, after plundering the establishment, conducted them to Matamoras.\* From this point, they, with others, were taken to Monterey, and delivered over to Arista. By his order they were ironed, and started into the interior, under a guard commanded by Captain Chaffind. That officer, a humane man, had their irons taken off after the first day's march. On the third day they arrived at Saltillo. Here their anticipations of a long imprisonment and horrid treatment were such, that they resolved to attempt their escape. They proposed to procure a quantity of *muscal*, well drugged with morphine, and give it to the guard, and, while they were affected by it, to escape. Two physicians,

\* Deposition of William Thompson, July 10, 1851.

who were among the prisoners, were charged with this duty. Their gourds being supplied with this mixture, they arrived at the *Hacienda de Agua Nueva*, where they were quartered for the night. The Mexican guard were abundantly helped to the liquor in the gourds, and in the night the signal was given to make the attack. By some means, however, the morphine proved to be inefficient, and the *muscal* alone had served to keep the guard awake, and to stimulate their courage. There were only nineteen of the Texans, armed with but a few guns which they had picked up, and a guard of ten times their number. The Texans had got off some distance, when daylight appearing, Captain Chaffind sent for them, and said that, if they would return, they should be forgiven; if not, he would have Dimit shot. This was repeated in hearing of the latter, who, fearing that Chaffind would put his threat into execution, and not wishing to be shot like a felon, took a large dose of morphine which he had with him. Having taken the opiate, he wrote a letter to his wife, made a disposition of his property, and then calmly lay down on his blanket, requesting his friends around him to make known his death, and solicit the Texans to throw the mantle of charity over the act. "I do not fear death," said he, "but dread the idea of ending my life in a loathsome dungeon. Tell them I prefer a Roman's death to the ignominy of perpetual imprisonment, and that my last wish is for my country's welfare." Soon after, he sunk into a sleep, from which he never awoke. Thus fell a noble spirit, by whom the first "Lone-Star" banner was unfurled on the heights of La Bahia.\*

One of these bands of Mexicans, under Ignacio Garcia, was met on the 7th of April, about ten miles from Laredo, by Captain John C. Hays, in command of a company of twenty-five

\* Journal of Captain Thomas Pratt.



spies. After a short contest, the enemy retreated, leaving three killed and three wounded. Hays pursued the fugitives so closely, that he took twenty-five of them prisoners, without the loss of any of his command.\* These scouts under Captain Hays were very useful and efficient in protecting the western frontier from Mexican and Indian incursions.

In the latter part of the spring of 1841, extensive preparations were being made in Texas for an armed visit to Santa Fé. The Congress having failed to make an appropriation for the army, it was disbanded, and consequently there were many men thrown out of employment, who were anxious for such an adventure. The objects and motives of the expedition must be explained. It has already been stated that the secretary of war had warmly recommended it in his report. President Lamar had spoken on the subject in the message of 1839. The friends of the measure had brought it up in each house of Congress, by the introduction of bills authorizing an expedition to Santa Fé, providing only for a small outfit; but both bills were rejected.† The object of the expedition was, to endeavor to prevail upon the people of New Mexico, residing within the statutory limits of Texas, to submit quietly and peaceably to an incorporation with the other citizens of the republic, and to acknowledge the right of Texas to complete jurisdiction over them. This being done, the revenue-laws were to be put into operation, and a small military force retained there for the purpose of repelling any sudden attack of Mexicans or Indians. A commissioner was also to reside at Santa Fé, as the agent of the government, with special instructions for his guidance. No further alterations were to be made in the laws or form of

\* Captain Hays's official report, April 14, 1841.

† Report of the Select Committee on the Santa Fé Expedition, December 6, 1841.

government of the people than were absolutely necessary in the change of their allegiance.\* It was stated in an official paper that the expedition had been solicited by some of the citizens of Santa Fé, and the commander was instructed by President Lamar not to attempt a subjugation of the people by arms, should it be found that they were unwilling to submit to the Texan laws; and that the men were only permitted to go as an armed body, to defend themselves, and the articles of traffic taken with them, against the hordes of savages which they might encounter on the way.†

The members of the expedition rendezvoused at an encampment on Brushy creek, about twenty miles from Austin. The military, under the command of brevet Brigadier-General Hugh M. Leod, consisted of five companies of mounted infantry and one of artillery. Accompanying these went a caravan of merchants, with goods, suited to the market, drawn in wagons; also some adventurers, who were neither soldiers nor merchants, but who went along for pleasure; and, finally, Messrs. William G. Cooke, R. F. Brenhan, and J. A. Navarro, the commissioners, who were charged by the president with the execution of his instructions.‡

Difficulties were raised in fitting out the expedition. There was no law making any appropriation for such an object, and each branch of the Congress had rejected a proposition for such an appropriation. The president, however, gave orders to the quartermaster and commissary generals of the militia to contract for the necessary provisions and munitions of war for the expedition. Having endorsed the orders himself, he directed the proper officers to audit and pay them. The control-

\* Secretary of State of Texas to B. E. Bee, June 21, 1841.

† James Reilly, Texan *Chargé*, to American Secretary of State, March 21, 1842.

‡ Secretary of State to B. E. Bee, June 21, 1841.

ler having refused to allow these accounts, was ordered by the president, through the secretary of the treasury, to do so.\* The gordian knot being thus untied, the expedition set out from Brushy creek on the 20th of June, 1841. The president had spent the previous night in the camp, and, after taking leave of the "pioneers," returned to the capital.

This expedition was unfortunate—in wanting the sanction of law, in its consequences, and especially in the time of its departure; for, on the 22d of June, the commissioners sent by Arista, to treat of an armistice, arrived in Austin. A more favorable feeling was beginning to appear; a brisk trade was springing up between Texas and the Rio Grande, encouraged by both parties; and it was understood that Arista was willing to unite with the Texan authorities in the overthrow of the robbers that infested the plains of that river. So soon, however, as the commissioners learned the departure of the Santa Fé expedition, they returned to Mexico, and the abduction of Captain Dimit and others followed.†

The number of volunteers doing duty under the orders of General M·Leod was two hundred and seventy. The remainder of those connected with the expedition, consisting of the

\* The following is the president's order:—

“EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *March 24, 1841.*”

“*Hon. John G. Chalmers, Secretary of the Treasury:*—

“SIR: You will instruct the controller to open upon his books an appropriation for fitting out an expedition to Santa Fé; also an appropriation, subject to my order, for disbanding the regular army; also an appropriation, subject to your order, for extra clerk-hire in the treasury department.

“MIRABEAU B. LAMAR.”

“*To J. B. Shaw, Esq., Controller:*—

“SIR: You will comply with the above orders of the president.

“J. G. CHALMERS, *Secretary of the Treasury.*”

On this order, something over eighty-nine thousand dollars were drawn from the treasury and applied to the Santa Fé expedition.—*Report of Select Committee, &c., December 6, 1841.*

† “Telegraph,” June 23 and 30, 1841.

staff, the commissioners, merchants, tourists, and servants, numbered about fifty. "The long train of wagons moving heavily forward, with the different companies of volunteers, all well mounted and well armed, and riding in double file, presented an imposing as well as an animating spectacle, causing every heart to beat high with the anticipation of exciting incidents on the boundless prairies."\* After innumerable adventures—such as buffalo-hunts, Indian skirmishes, and mustang-chases—and much privation, with a loss of some few of the party—they arrived, on the 11th of August, within seventy or eighty miles (as they supposed) of San Miguel. During the most of this time they had been lost among the mountains of the Red and Wachita rivers. From this point they sent forward Messrs. Howland, Baker, and Rosenberry, to procure provisions, and ascertain how the expedition would be received.† The main body continued their wandering journey through a broken, barren country, until the 10th of September, when they came to something like an old cart-road, but it was soon lost in the sandy waste. The party were nearly driven to desperation by hunger. "Every tortoise and snake, every living and creeping thing, was seized upon and swallowed by the famishing men with a rapacity that nothing but the direst hunger could induce."‡ A few days afterward they came up with some Mexicans, on their return from a trading-excursion among the Indians; but the latter could give them nothing to eat, nor any information, except that San Miguel was still some seventy or eighty miles distant, but that there were settlements and flocks of sheep, where they could procure food, at the village of Anton Chico. The advance, which had first encountered the

\* "Santa Fé Expedition," vol. i., p. 72. We are indebted to George Wilkins Kendall for a lively and romantic account of the expedition.

† *Ib.*, vol. i., p. 162.

‡ *Ib.*, p. 250.

Mexicans, sent back three of them to guide the main body by a shorter route, while they set out for the settlements. Arriving at a fine camping-ground on the Rio Gallinas, where the shepherds kept their flocks, "a scene of feasting ensued which beggars description."

The next morning it was determined by the advance party to send W. P. Lewis, captain of the artillery, and George Van Ness, secretary to the commissioners, directly to San Miguel. Messrs. Howard, Fitzgerald, and Kendall, accompanied them. They took a letter to the *alcalde*, informing him that a large trading-party from Texas was approaching; that their views were in every way pacific, and that they desired to purchase a considerable quantity of provisions to send back to the main body. They also took with them a number of President Lamar's proclamation, stating the object of the expedition, and that if the inhabitants of New Mexico were not disposed peaceably to join the Texan standard, the expedition would forthwith return. Accordingly, Captain Lewis and his party left the Rio Gallinas on the 14th of September for San Miguel.\* The shepherds at the Gallinas had informed the advance that the country was in arms against the Texans, and that Howland and his companions, who had been sent in advance on the 11th of August, were prisoners at Santa Fé. Here, it would seem, a courier should have been despatched to General M'Leod with the information, so that, whether true or false, he could have been on his guard. Howland was, in fact, in prison, and attempted to make his escape, to give notice to the Texan commander; but he was retaken, and for that offence afterward shot in San Miguel.

Captain Lewis and his party, about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th, came up with two muleteers. From them

\* Santa Fé Expedition, vol. i., p. 270.

they learned that Howland's party were prisoners at Santa Fé, and that a great stir and excitement existed in the country in consequence of Governor Armijo having informed the people that it was the intention of the Texans to burn, slay, and destroy, as they went. Here, again, it seems that this information should have been conveyed back to the main body. It was transmitted to the party left at the Rio Gallinas, but not to M'Leod. That night, Lewis and his companions slept at *Anton Chico*, where they received an intimation that they would be arrested and shot the next day. Disregarding this warning, they proceeded toward San Miguel; but on the way they were surrounded, disarmed, and dismounted, in the politest manner possible, by a company of Mexicans under the command of Don Salezar, and started on foot for the point of their destination. Shortly afterward they set out on the march for Santa Fé, but on the road met Governor Armijo, on his way to attack the Texan invaders of New Mexico. In addition to the fatigue of the march, the captives were tied together; and in this condition, about sunset, they met Armijo. The governor saluted them as friends, stated that he had heard of their capture, and asked them who they were. Captain Lewis replied that they were merchants from the United States. Here Van Ness interrupted him, and said that, with the exception of Kendall, they were all Texans. Armijo, seeing the lone star and the word "Texas" on Lewis's coat, took him by the collar, and said: "What does this mean? I can read—'Texas!' . . . You need not think to deceive me," continued the governor; "no merchant from the United States ever travels with a Texan military jacket!"\*

Lewis, being well versed in Spanish, was taken as the governor's interpreter, and mounted on a mule. His companions

\* Santa Fé Expedition, vol. i., p. 295.



were compelled to retrace their steps on foot toward San Miguel, where they arrived on the following morning, and saw Howland and Baker, two of the Texans, shot. Armijo next proceeded against Colonel Cooke, who was left at the Rio Galinas with the advance of the expedition, consisting of ninety-four men. The day after Lewis and his party had left Colonel Cooke, the latter set out with his force, and encamped near Anton Chico. He sent four of his men to the village to buy provisions, where they were arrested, but afterward released. Cooke asked Salezar what had become of Lewis and his party. He answered that, being satisfied with their good intentions, he had sent them on to the governor. On the 17th of September, when Cooke was about to set out for Santa Fé, Salezar sent him word that Armijo would be there in a few hours. With professions of great friendship on the part of Salezar, Cooke soon found himself pretty well surrounded by four or five hundred men. He was about to commence an engagement, when some one said Captain Lewis was at the head of the Mexican forces. Very soon, Lewis, in company with the governor's nephew, advanced. The former told Cooke that the people of New Mexico were exasperated against the Texans, and were in arms; that, in addition to the six hundred troops before them, he had seen four thousand more, well equipped, who would be on the ground in a few hours; that there were five thousand more on the march from Chihuahua, but Governor Armijo had commissioned him to say that, if the Texans would give up their arms, they could have permission to come in and trade, and that at the end of eight days they would be returned to them. Lewis further stated that such was the custom of the St. Louis traders when they came to Santa Fé, that no harm could result from such a course, and for the truth of these statements he pledged his honor. The Texans believed Lewis—

gave up their arms — were betrayed, arrested, and plundered. William P. Lewis was a *traitor*.\* One is here reminded of the promises made to Fannin and Ward. Cooke had better have acted like Jordan at Saltillo.

The following day, Governor Armijo arrived, and ordered the prisoners to be all tied, and started them on to Mexico, without permitting them to see their friends who had been previously taken, after which he immediately set out to meet the main body of the Texans under General M'Leod. The latter, after receiving the message sent by the Mexicans at the Rio Gallinas, proceeded on his march; but the constant annoyance of the Indians, and, above all, starvation, rendered his movements slow, and wore out his command. He had reached the Laguna Colorado, some thirty or forty miles from the Rio Gallinas, when he was met by Armijo. Having but few men fit for service, their horses having nearly all perished or run away, and many of the men having thrown aside their arms to relieve themselves of the burden, the Texans, upon the promise of good treatment, and that their personal effects should be returned to them, surrendered. This being done, they were searched, plundered, bound, and marched off to San Miguel, where the last of them arrived on the 12th of October.

Kendall assigns the following as causes of the failure of the expedition: "In the first place, the expedition began its march too late in the season by at least six weeks. Had it left Austin on the first of May, the grass would have been much better, and we should have had little difficulty in finding good water

\* Extract of a letter from Armijo to Garcia Condé, governor of Chihuahua, and published in "*La Luna*:" —

"In consideration of the great services rendered by Captain W. P. Lewis, in assisting me to capture these Texans, I have given him his liberty and his goods, and earnestly recommend him to the notice of the central government." — *Santa Fe Expedition*, vol. i., p. 346.

for both ourselves and our cattle. In the second place, we were disappointed in obtaining a party of Lipan Indians as guides, and were consequently obliged to take a route some three hundred miles out of the way, and in many places extremely difficult of travel. Thirdly, the government of Texas did not furnish wagons and oxen enough to transport the goods of the merchants, and this, as a matter of course, caused serious delays. Fourthly, cattle enough on the hoof were not provided, even with the second supply sent for by the commissioners from Little river. Again, the distance was vastly greater than we had anticipated in our widest and wildest calculations, owing to which circumstance, and an improvident waste of provisions while in the buffalo-range, we found ourselves upon half allowance in the very middle of our long journey—a privation which weakened, dispirited, and rendered the men unfit for duty. The Indians also annoyed us much by their harassing and continual attempts to cut off our small parties and steal our horses. Finally, the character of the governor of New Mexico was far from being understood, and his power was underrated by all. General Lamar's estimate of the views and feelings of the people of Santa Fé and the vicinity was perfectly correct. Not a doubt can exist that they all were, and are, anxious to throw off the oppressive yoke of Armijo, and come under the liberal institutions of Texas: but the governor found us divided into small parties; broken down by long marches and want of food; discovered, too, a traitor among us; and, taking advantage of these circumstances, his course was plain, and his conquest easy."\*

It would seem that when the advance reached the Gallinas,

\* "The wild-goose campaign to Santa Fé was an ill-judged affair; and their surrender without the fire of a gun has lessened the prowess of the Texans in the minds of the Mexicans, and it will take another San Jacinto affair to restore their character."—*General Jackson to General Houston, May 25, 1842.*

and had an intimation of a hostile feeling, they should have notified General M'Leod of that fact; and, as the sheep-folds furnished an abundance of meat, they should have sent back a supply to his famishing soldiers; and, above all, remained there till he came up and recruited his men. They would then have been able to present an undivided front to the enemy. Yet, after all, those engaged in the expedition may have adopted the best course. At all events, they were paraded in bonds on the plaza of San Miguel, on the morning of the 17th of October, and marched to Mexico by way of Santa Fé. Armijo, the governor, is fully described by Kendall; and he seems to have obtained in New Mexico a very consistent account of him. He began his career about Albuquerque, the place of his nativity, by sheep-stealing. At this business he was very expert. Even after he became governor, he boasted of having stolen and sold to the owner thereof the same ewe fourteen times! As he grew up, he turned his attention to *monté*, at which he was very successful. He took the lead in the revolt against centralism in 1837, but secretly remaining at his *hacienda*. Upon the overthrow of the federal party in Santa Fé, he managed to get himself appointed governor. In that exalted station he was controlled by no law but his own will, nor did his desires extend beyond the accumulation of wealth. His character was as bad as it could be, and his actions were consistent with it.

Previous to leaving San Miguel, the goods of the Texan merchants were brought to the square, and disposed of according to the wishes of Governor Armijo. Captain William P. Lewis obtained a good share of them, as did also the governor. The prisoners were placed under the control and charge of Salezar, a brute in feeling, and a precious scoundrel in his business-relations. It is doubtless a clear principle that a people who

will submit to the guidance of such men as Armijo and Salezar are unfit for liberal government, and it seems to be no violation of human or Divine justice that such a country should pass into better hands.\* To illustrate the conduct of Salezar: early on the second morning after leaving San Miguel, the prisoners, weary, and chilled with the cold, were ordered to rise and continue the march. The only food offered to one hundred and eighty-seven half-starved men consisted of fifty small cakes! Calling the prisoners around him, Salezar would toss a cake into the air, to enjoy the scramble made by the poor fellows for the little morsel.

Without giving a detail of a march so long and painful, and under treatment so cruel, it is enough to say that, in the first days of February, 1842, the Texan captives, being separated, were safely confined in the prisons of Santiago, Puebla, and Peroté. Here we leave them to the tender mercies of Santa Anna, and return to the stirring events in Texas.

The term of service of President Lamar would expire in December, 1841, and a new chief magistrate was to be elected on the first Monday in September. The names of David G. Burnet, the vice-president, and Sam Houston, were presented to the people of Texas for this high office. During the canvass, there was much excitement. The newspapers entered into it with spirit and feeling. In fact, the strife was only surpassed by that witnessed the year before in the United States, in the contest between William H. Harrison and Martin Van Buren.

\* "These Mexicans have shown themselves incapable of observing the rules and practice of honorable war between civilized nations. Their savage course will not fail to draw down upon them the retribution they deserve. Ought it not to be so? Why should a land, abounding in many of Nature's favors, be occupied by men who appear incapable of either moral or political advancement? We will not be disappointed if this proves, too, but the prelude to *the occupation of that country [New Mexico] by the Anglo-Saxon race.*"—*New Orleans Bulletin*, January 3, 1842.

The result was, the election of SAM HOUSTON by three fourths of the suffrages. This was deemed an affirmance of his humane policy toward the Indians, of a more rigid economy in the administration of the public expenditures, and of a more pacific conduct toward Mexico. In the existing condition of Texas, it became important that her conduct should be such as to meet the approbation of the United States, of France, and of England, the three great nations that had acknowledged her independence, and were extending to her the relations of amity and commerce; for their sakes, as well as her own, it was important that she should act on the defensive, and abstain from all acts of robbery and plunder. By this course, the contrast would be more manifest when compared with the barbarous conduct of her enemy, and she could appeal with a better grace to the governments that had introduced her into the family of nations. EDWARD BURLESON was elected vice-president.

Treaties had been made with the European powers, but not with the United States; it was therefore an important object with President Lamar to enter into a suitable commercial arrangement with that power. The treaty of 1831, between the United States and Mexico, by which their commercial relations were governed, was altogether unsuitable. The boundary-line between Texas and the United States had been run, and included within the limits of the former a wealthy and considerable settlement on Red river, before then considered as in Miller county, Arkansas. For the benefit of this and other Texan settlements in the Red-river valley, it was important to provide by treaty for an *entrepôt* on the Mississippi. A further and more definite treaty was necessary in regard to the Indians residing near the borders of the respective republics. To procure the formation of a treaty, covering these objects, occupied the last days of the administration of President Lamar.



But the engagements of Mr. Secretary Webster, in adjusting the differences of the United States with Great Britain, prevented its consummation.

The Texan minister at Washington, desirous of extending the trade of the republic, addressed a note on the 27th of February, 1841, to Señor D'Argaiz, the Spanish ambassador in that city, suggesting the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas by Spain, and proposing that some commercial arrangement be made in regard to the trade between Texas and Cuba. D'Argaiz answered the note with much politeness, and promised to transmit a copy of it to Madrid, and also one to the captain-general of Cuba. He did so; but his letter to Madrid was lost on the ill-fated steamer "*President*." After some delay, he sent another copy, and received in reply the declaration that the captain-general of Cuba was authorized to make a commercial arrangement. This answer was verbally communicated to the Texan *chargé* at Washington.\*

The sixth Congress assembled at Austin on the 1st of November, 1841. The expenditures for the year had been one million, one hundred and seventy-six thousand, two hundred and eighty-eight dollars; while the receipts were only four hundred and forty-two thousand, six hundred and four dollars, and these almost entirely in government paper. The amount of the public debt was unknown; in fact, it had increased so enormously, that it could only be estimated.† In the papers of that time, and even in official documents, the estimate varied from seven to twelve millions of dollars! The national debt counted against the republic as so many dollars, while her daily receipts and expenditures were effected through the medium of her own paper, at a rate varying from ten to twenty cents

\* Señor D'Argaiz to B. E. Bee, March 3, 1841.

† Fiscal History of Texas, p. 113.

on the dollar. It was manifest that some different course must be pursued. The paper was becoming every day more worthless, and the government itself could not long survive the use of it.

While her expenditures were so much greater than her receipts, it was very clear that Texas was not paying her debt: nay, the question arose, whether she could live at that rate; and, to men of reflection, it became palpably evident that she could not. Estimating the annual expenses at two hundred thousand dollars, and the interest on her debt at four hundred thousand dollars, the amount wanted each year would be six hundred thousand dollars. To meet this, would require a tax of fifty dollars to be paid annually by each of her twelve thousand voters—a thing impossible. The government was bound to live. Bread is the first thing—in affluence or poverty, bread is indispensable. Of the debt (which we will estimate at ten millions of dollars), a portion of it, say three millions, had been paid out by the government, not at its face value, but at its market value, varying between ten and fifty cents in the dollar. On the subject of its redemption, the secretary of the treasury, in his report, says: “While public faith, which should be held sacred, if possible, at all times, would seem to require the payment of our engagements to the uttermost farthing, still it should be borne in mind that we have not received full consideration for our liabilities; and if, under the imperious circumstances of our situation, we can only afford a liberal reimbursement to our creditors of their investment, strict justice will have been obtained.” On this observation of the secretary, a late writer, in behalf of the creditors, is very severe upon Texas. “There is little hope,” says Mr. Gouge, “that the rights of creditors will be much respected when those rights come in collision with the interests and necessities of

government ;”\* and he speaks further of such being the “public mind” in Texas. This able writer is aware of the fact that these notes and bonds were not *money*, and that they were not paid out as such ; but by the law of the land they were paid out in *equivalents*, at their supposed value. Many of them were finally sold in the streets at three and five cents on the dollar ! A bill calling for one hundred dollars, thus sold, would nominally bear eight or ten per cent. interest. The fortunate holder who, upon his investment of five dollars, should receive back one hundred dollars in money, and interest on the amount, would be more lucky than the finder of a gold-mine. That portion of the debt contracted, not by *equivalents*, but to the amount called for on the face of the notes or bonds, stood on a very different footing ; and the same good faith that required Texas to pay the value she received in the one case, required her to pay the entire obligation in the other : such, at least, was her feeling and wish at that trying moment. It is very true that this debt need not have been so large, and that its augmentation was unwise and ruinous ; yet the fact was so, and the Congress of November, 1841, could not undo what had been done. Nor did the Texans choose to follow the example of their fatherland in regard to the continental currency—*let it go*. Mr. Gouge knew nothing of the “public mind in Texas.” If he had examined the history of her struggle, as he did the books of her treasury, he might have learned somewhat of the public mind.

At the very time Mr. Secretary Chalmers was penning the report so offensive to the “rights of creditors,” a scene was transpiring on the right bank of the Rio Grande, which, if Mr.

\* Fiscal History of Texas, p. 114. The United States set a bad example, in refusing to redeem her “continental” paper. She should have redeemed it for her own sake—for the word of a state is sacred. The same may be said of Texas.

Gouge had read, as Texas read it, would have shed some light upon the subject of the public mind. The Texan prisoners, hungry, barefooted, and worn out, are driven before the Mexican guard. We will give the affair in the language of an eyewitness: "On being driven from the cart, M<sup>c</sup>Allister declared his inability to proceed on foot. Salezar drew his sword, and peremptorily ordered him to hurry on, and this when Salezar had half a dozen led mules, upon either of which he could have placed the unfortunate man. Again M<sup>c</sup>Allister, pointing to his swollen and inflamed ankle, declared himself unable to walk. Some half a dozen of his comrades were standing around him, with feelings painfully wrought up, waiting the *dénouement* of an affair which, from the angry appearance of Salezar, they now feared would be tragical. Once more the bloodthirsty savage, pointing to the main body of the prisoners, ordered the cripple to hurry forward and overtake them. *He could not.* 'Forward!' said Salezar, now wrought up to a pitch of frenzy; 'forward, or I'll shoot you on the spot!'—'Then shoot!' replied M<sup>c</sup>Allister, throwing off his blanket, and exposing his manly breast, 'and the quicker the better!' Salezar took him at his word, and a single ball sent as brave a man as ever trod the earth to eternity. His ears were then cut off, his shirt and pantaloons stripped from him, and his body thrown by the roadside as food for wolves."\*

President Houston having entered upon the discharge of his official duties on the 13th of December, sent in his message to Congress on the 20th. On the subject of the war with Mexico, he stated that, after the unsuccessful advances already made by Texas for peace, no further effort should be made on her part; that kindness should be extended toward the people of

\* Kendall's "Santa Fé Expedition," vol. i., p. 393. The ears were taken along as a receipt, showing the disposition made of the prisoner.

Mexico, and the commerce between the two countries encouraged; that any interference in the civil wars in Mexico was incompatible with the dignity and interests of Texas, and calculated to exasperate the former, while it only weakened the resources of the latter. This portion of his message indicated his course in regard to Yucatan. His views on this subject were given more explicitly in a letter dated October 26, 1841, before the naval force sailed for the coast of that peninsula. "We have no interest," says he, "in forming alliances with foreign countries, if the laws even authorized the president to do so. Those who joined the federalists were betrayed. The result will be, that the people of Yucatan will reunite with the central government, and our navy will be betrayed."

On the subject of Indian relations, President Houston declared his policy to be totally different from that lately pursued. He recommended that trading-posts be established along the frontier, that traders be permitted to traffic with the Indians at these posts, and that a force of some twenty-five men be stationed at each. He further recommended the making of treaties with the Indian tribes; declaring that when the latter found that Texas was disposed to treat them kindly, confidence would be restored, and the interests of trade would keep them quiet; that millions of dollars had been expended in the attempt to exterminate them, but it had served only to irritate, and war and theft were the result. With an amount less than one fourth of former appropriations he firmly believed he could procure and maintain peace with all the tribes on the Texan borders.

On the subject of the finances and the condition of the treasury, the president stated that the government was in a condition more deplorable than at the period of its commencement. "There is not," he observed, "a dollar in the treasury. The

nation is involved from ten to fifteen millions. The precise amount of its liabilities has not been ascertained. . . . We are not only without money, but without credit, and, for want of punctuality, without character. At our first commencement we were not without credit; nor had a want of punctuality then impaired our character abroad or confidence at home. Patriotism, industry, and enterprise, are now our only resources—apart from our public domain, and the precarious revenues of the country. These remain our only hope, and must be improved, husbanded, and properly employed.”

The president then proceeded to recommend some definite course or means of keeping the government from falling to pieces. He says: “I will not hesitate in recommending the only plan which, to my mind, appears practicable and efficient. View it as we may, it will at least find justification in necessity. We have no money—we can not redeem our liabilities. These facts are known, and we had as well avow them by our legislation as demonstrate them by every day’s experience. I would therefore recommend to the honorable Congress a total suspension of the redemption of our liabilities, to a period sufficiently remote to enable the government to redeem in good faith such as it ought to redeem. It is known to the executive that, to a considerable amount, they have been justly incurred, while he has reason to believe that many will be brought forward not by any means entitled to governmental consideration. To attempt a redemption of our present liabilities by taxing our population to the amount necessary, would be to them ruinous. Much as we might have deprecated this course of policy, we have now no other remedy left. The evil is upon us. While many just claims are thus deferred, we can only refer our creditors to our inability to pay our debts.”

To sustain the government, the president recommended that



the taxes be reduced, and that the same as well as the customs be paid in par funds. He also recommended the issuance of *exchequer bills*, not exceeding three hundred and fifty thousand dollars in amount, to take the place of the promissory-notes. He also advised a loan of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

These were the chief points in Houston's message. The sixth Congress, which might well be termed the "Reform Congress," went zealously to work, not only to reform abuses, but to inquire into the causes of those that had already occurred. A select committee of the house of representatives took to task the late president and vice-president for moneys drawn from the treasury without authority of law, and on the 6th of December, 1841, made a strong report on the facts. Yet, as these moneys were applied partly to the payment of the disbanded army and partly to the Santa Fé expedition, and the intentions of those high officers were believed to be good and patriotic, the matter was passed over.

To return to the movements of the Texan financial negotiator in Europe. After dismissing the business of Lafitte and Company in Paris, General Hamilton repaired to Brussels, and entered into a *quasi* agreement with the Belgian government; and, returning to London, he addressed President Houston a note, apprizing him that he would be in Texas between the middle of January and the first of February, 1842, with a commissioner of that government, who was coming out to see if the arrangement could be concluded.\* It proposed that Belgium should specifically endorse a loan to Texas of seven millions of dollars, at six per cent. interest, redeemable by a sinking-fund within twenty years, upon a pledge of the public faith, the taxes and resources of the country, a general pledge of the

\* Hamilton to the President, November 18, 1841.

whole of the public lands, and a special pledge of five millions of acres—together with a pledge of one half the amount borrowed, which was to remain in the Belgian treasury, at four per cent. interest, until Texas paid up the other half with the interest: which amounted to a joint-loan, Texas paying two per cent. on the half borrowed by Belgium, to obtain her as a partner. In addition to this, Texas was to admit Belgian manufactures of cotton, iron, woollen, and linen, at half the duties imposed on those of other nations; and her arms and munitions of war were to enter free of duty, while the same articles from other countries should pay a duty of one hundred per cent. Besides, Belgian vessels were to have the same privileges in the coastwise trade of Texas, and pay only the rate of tonnage paid by vessels of the republic. In addition to all this, Belgium was to send out a commissioner to look into matters in Texas, and report upon them to his government.\* President Houston submitted the *projet*, without comment, to Congress; but that body did not adopt it.† On the contrary, it had previously repealed all laws and parts of laws authorizing the five-million loan.‡

Thus ended a fantasy which Texas had pursued for years, to the great prejudice of her finances and true interests. Honor to the noble resolves of the sixth Congress, which had proclaimed in Texas the true doctrine that a nation is not enriched by borrowing, and that the Palmers and Jaudons of finance were not the true fountains of a people's wealth! This body went still further: the two houses enacted a law abolishing many offices, and reducing the salaries of those retained;|| and

\* General Hamilton's *projet*, Brussels, October 20, 1841.

† Special Message, February 22, 1842.

‡ Act of January 12, 1842.

|| Act of December 11, 1841. "A comparative statement of the officers employed at the seat of government, their grade and pay, during the years 1840,

while they declined making a proposition for a loan, even for the small amount of three hundred thousand dollars—for they knew of no one that would take it—they authorized the issuance of exchequer bills to an amount not exceeding two hundred thousand dollars. The law further provided that nothing but gold and silver, and such bills, should be received for duties, or for direct or license taxes; that collectors of revenue should redeem them, when presented, with any money which they might have on hand; that the bills should be paid out for no other purpose than those specified in the appropriation laws, and when returned into the treasury they were to be cancelled.\* But, ten days afterward, Congress went still further, and passed a law directing that a joint committee of the two houses should call on the secretary of the treasury, and receive from him every species of notes, star-paper, eight or ten per cent. bonds or notes, treasury warrants, drafts, or change-bills (which had been redeemed or paid in), “and the same set fire to, burn up, and wholly destroy.”† And the same thing was to be repeated on the first day of every month, by commissioners to be appointed for that purpose. These were favorable signs.

On the 18th day of January, 1842, the first authentic information of the capture of the Santa Fé expedition was received in the Texan capital. It came through Señor Alvarez, the American consul at Santa Fé, and with a wonderful accuracy of detail. It filled the people of the republic with profound sorrow. They had seen a well-appointed force of noble spirits set out from the valley of the Brushy on the 21st of June, pro-

1841, and 1842,” made out by James B. Shaw, controller, on the 16th of December, 1842, is now before me, and shows the amount of salaries as follows:—

1840.....	\$174,200
1841.....	173,506
1842.....	32,800

\* Act of January 19, 1842.

† Act of January 29, 1842.

ceeding as they supposed to an easy and peaceful conquest. During the long march through the wilderness, they heard nothing from them; and it was indeed astounding to learn, for the first time, seven months afterward, that the entire expedition, with all the arms, horses, and goods, had been taken—without firing a gun—the property appropriated by the captors, and the prisoners bound and on the march to the city of Mexico!

On the receipt of the first report of the capture, the Texan representative at Washington laid the matter before the government of the United States, and urged its kind offices in behalf of the prisoners. As many of them were citizens of that republic, and had gone out in no hostile attitude, but only as travellers and adventurers, this fact was also strongly urged.\* Mr. Secretary Webster immediately sent special instructions to Mr. Ellis, the American minister at Mexico, to procure the release of the citizens of the United States so captured; and, in relation to the Texan prisoners, he charged him to say to the Mexican authorities that summary, sanguinary, or undue punishment, of the Texans in their custody, would be more apt to defeat the object of that punishment than if the offenders were to have a fair trial; that it would excite and foment in the United States a bitterness of feeling prejudicial to Mexico: therefore, in a friendly manner, regular judicial proceedings and mild punishments were recommended.

Texas, not satisfied with this step, urged the appointment of a special envoy from the United States to Mexico; and, as the captives had many friends about Washington, a memorial was strongly signed and presented for that purpose. Other memorials also came in from a distance. These were followed by resolutions from the legislature of Kentucky, and then by reso-

\* N. Amory to the Secretary of State of Texas, January 4, 1842.

lutions of inquiry from the national house of representatives. Mr. Amory, the Texan *chargé d'affaires*, called upon Senator Preston, of South Carolina, for advice. Mr. Preston suggested that General Waddy Thompson, of his own state, be sent as minister to Mexico, with full instructions on the subject; and immediately waited on Mr. Webster, and urged his appointment. The latter approved of the proposition, and promised to lay it before President Tyler.\* General Thompson was appointed, and took out with him further instructions to demand positively the release of the prisoners who were citizens of the United States, and also requiring that the Texans who were in captivity should be treated with humanity, and not abused or put to slavish or degrading labor.†

The Texan Congress, upon receipt of the intelligence of the capture of the party sent to Santa Fé, passed an act extending the boundaries of the republic, so as to include portions of the states of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Durango, and Sinaloa, and the whole of Chihuahua, Sonora, New Mexico, and the two Californias—embracing a country of greater extent than the American Union at that time, and including two thirds of the territory of Mexico, with two millions of her inhabitants! President Houston vetoed the bill, upon several grounds. He stated that other nations would view it as a *legislative jest*, inasmuch as it was the assumption of a right utterly impossible to exercise. He took occasion also, in his veto-message, to give a view of his pacific policy.‡ “I need not assure your honorable body,” he observes, “of the ardent desire I entertain for peace and friendly intercourse with all nations. So long as we are not on amicable terms with Mexico, so long will we suffer hindrance

\* N. Amory to the Secretary of State of Texas, January 14, 1842.

† James Reilly to Anson Jones, Secretary of State, March 25, 1842. Daniel Webster to Waddy Thompson, April 25, 1842.

‡ Veto-Message, February 1, 1842.

to our prosperity. The constant cry of invasion will be sounded, not only throughout Texas, but throughout all nations to whom we are known; and while this is the case, we may feel confident that immigration will be impeded, if not entirely prevented. From this source we are to draw both population and wealth; and no matter how desirable our soil and climate might be to foreigners, nor how great their anxiety to make our country their home, it certainly would be no additional inducement to families that Texas should remain in hostile relations with Mexico, which might, and would, at all times, render their situation one of unpleasant excitement, if not of danger. . . . . Texas only requires peace to make her truly prosperous and respectable. Peace will bring with it every advantage." He further argued that the bill for taking so much of their territory would arouse and unite the Mexicans, and excite them to a powerful effort against Texas, which would at least annoy the latter, and withdraw her citizens from the pursuits of industry. He further stated that the mediation of Great Britain had been invoked, and its exercise only delayed to await the ratification of certain treaties; that should this extension of boundary, however, be enacted, it would form a barrier to any successful negotiation, and suspend all diplomatic action on the part of the British government. The president, in conclusion, stated that the moment selected for bringing forward such a measure was most unfortunate, as the Santa Fé prisoners were then in the hands of the enemy, and he was using his best efforts for their release; that the news of this claim set up by Texas to so much of Mexico, arriving in the capital of the latter country, would render abortive all his efforts for their liberation, and perhaps cause their destruction. The fact of the passage of the bill by Congress, notwithstanding the presidential veto, had an unhappy effect upon the diplomatic relations



of Texas. Mr. Webster, the American secretary of state, mentioned it to the Texan *chargé d'affaires*, and said "it looked as if Texas was too grasping, and might excite the jealousy of other nations."\*

The unanimous vote of the people of Texas in favor of annexation to the United States will be remembered, as also the diplomatic correspondence between Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Hunt, in 1837, on that subject. The administration of Martin Van Buren being opposed to it, the proposition was formally withdrawn by Texas on the 12th of October, 1838,† and not revived again until 1842. On the 26th of January of the latter year, Mr. Reilly, the Texan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, was instructed to direct his attention to the subject, and observe whether there was any disposition on the part of the government of the United States to assent to or offer a proposal of that kind, and whether the American Congress and the people of that country manifested a like disposition. If so, he was directed to report the facts for further instructions. Mr. Reilly, after making the necessary inquiries, reported to his government that the administration of President Tyler was decidedly in favor of the annexation policy, that it was popular with the Congress, and that Texas was rapidly increasing in reputation and character in the United States.‡ The position of President Tyler before the people of the American Union was peculiar. A reference to a few facts will illustrate this. In the contest between the two political parties in 1840, the whigs advocated a United States bank, and the democrats the independent treasury. William H. Harrison, as the exponent of the former party, was their candidate for president: and, to

\* James Reilly to the Texan Secretary of State, March 11, 1842.

† Anson Jones to Aaron Vail, October 12, 1838.

‡ James Reilly to the Texan Secretary of State, April 15, 1842.

enable them to succeed in the election, they had added to the ticket the name of John Tyler for vice-president. The antecedents of the latter had shown him to be a democrat, and opposed to a national bank; yet, as they would have the president on their side, the whigs were willing to wink at these heresies of their vice-president, provided they could thus draw over enough of the democratic element to succeed. Mr. Tyler also waived the subject as much as possible, in order to obtain the office. The plan was laid with great skill, advocated with unusual zeal, and crowned with triumphant success. On the 4th of March, 1841, these distinguished persons were duly installed into office, and an extra session of Congress called to meet on the last day of the following May, to put the bank into operation. But, on the 4th day of April, just one month after his installation, President Harrison died, and John Tyler was, by the constitution, invested with the executive functions. The Congress met, and the triumphant party very soon chartered a bank, which, to satisfy the supposed scruples of President Tyler, they called the "*fiscal bank*." He received the bill on the 6th of August, and vetoed it on the 16th. As this veto was not included in the programme of 1840, the Congress got up another bill, which, in further compliance with his conscientious scruples, was denominated the "*fiscal corporation*." This bill was sent to him on the 3d of September, and he returned it with his veto on the 9th. The whig party, which had thus far sustained him, could stand it no longer, but nearly all deserted. With the exception of Daniel Webster, the secretary of state, who had foresight enough to discover that a national bank was "an obsolete idea," the entire cabinet resigned. Mr. Tyler, having estranged himself from his ancient friends the democrats, could not count on their aid: so the administration presented the anomaly of a government without friends. However,

the president had patronage, and some discretion, and soon gathered around him what was known in that day as a "corporal's guard," and so the federal government went on.

Since the battle of San Jacinto, the annexation of Texas had been more or less discussed by the people and press of the United States, and all men of discernment saw that it must take place, and that its consummation was only a question of time. The vast emigration to Texas, following the achievement of her independence, excited and hurried on this feeling in the popular mind. Mr. Tyler saw it, and had too much penetration, and was too much in need of friends, to permit the performance of an act so glorious to pass into other hands. He spoke freely to the Texan minister on the subject. "I am anxious for it," said he, "and wish most sincerely I could conclude it at once." — "The president would act in a moment," wrote Mr. Reilly, "if the senate would assent."\* But, as matters then stood, it was deemed best to mediate with Mexico. Accordingly, instructions were sent out to Waddy Thompson to use his best efforts to bring about a peace between Texas and Mexico.

\* James Reilly to Anson Jones, Secretary of State, July 11, 1842.

## CHAPTER XII.

It is said to be easier to raise spirits than to put them down. The spirit of economy had been called up in Texas; and the sixth Congress, being fully pledged to it, doubtless went too far. It is true that the appropriations of the two houses exceeded the revenue; but they took no measures to increase the latter. The president had recommended that the taxes be reduced one half, but paid in par funds. This would, in fact, have increased them two hundred and fifty per cent.; but it was not done, and the amount of direct taxes collected, scarcely paid the expenses of the operation.\* The result was, that the issue of exchequer bills, though small, was entirely dependent upon the duties on imports for redemption. The large frontier of the republic, contiguous to the United States, afforded such abundant facilities for smuggling, that the amount of these duties was greatly reduced. Hence the exchequer issue was not worth, in June, 1842, more than fifty cents in the dollar. Texas was in a state of torpor, and her people, occupied with their private affairs, seemed to take little interest in the national credit or in public business.

But they were soon aroused from this state of torpidity by the appearance of an invading army from Mexico. This army was not intended or expected to resubjugate Texas. That

\* Houston's Message, June 27, 1842.

idea had not entered into the head of Santa Anna since he kissed the hand of Sylvester, on the 22d of April, 1836. The subject of annexation had been freely discussed in the United States. In all those discussions, the principle, as laid down by Secretary Forsyth in 1837, was admitted to be correct; "but," said the advocates of annexation, "the war between Mexico and Texas has terminated; no hostile army of the former has invaded the territory of the latter for six years, and, though there has been no formal recognition by Mexico, the war is in fact ended, and there is no legal impediment to annexation." It was in reply to these discussions that a thousand Mexican troops were despatched to Texas early in 1842. Texan spies had given short notice of their advance upon Refugio, Goliad, and San Antonio. The enemy, under the command of General Rafael Vasquez, amounting to about seven hundred men, of which only about one hundred were infantry, appeared before San Antonio early on the 5th of March, and sent in Colonel Corasco to demand a surrender of the place, promising complete protection and immunity to such as should not contend in arms. At that time, the Texan force in the town consisted of only a little over one hundred men, mostly from Gonzales, under the command of Colonel John C. Hays. A consultation was held, when it was determined to despatch Messrs. Van Ness and Morris to the Mexican general, and inform him that the Texans would decide by two o'clock in the afternoon what they would do. The commissioners repaired to the enemy's headquarters, and made known this fact. In the meantime, the Texans concluded to evacuate the place, which they did, and retired upon the Guadalupe. The commissioners remained with Vasquez until night, were treated with great hospitality, and then escorted out of the enemy's lines. The Mexicans, in taking possession of the town, hoisted

the national flag, appointed an *alcalde*, and declared the Mexican laws to be in force. They behaved with great propriety at first, and placed sentinels over private property for its protection. They brought with them and scattered over the place Arista's proclamations of the 9th of January preceding. The American population, with very few exceptions, left with the Texans troops. The enemy remained in the town only two days, and departed on the morning of the 7th. They took with them all the valuables they could carry, for which purpose they collected what wagons and carts they could find. In other respects they behaved as well as could be expected of a public enemy. A considerable number of the Mexicans of San Antonio went with them.\* It is also to be observed that the plunder taken was not by order of the enemy's officers, but by the soldiers privately, and by the Mexican citizens, who carried it off with them as their own.†

On the day the enemy took San Antonio, a small force entered Refugio. They conducted themselves with like propriety at that point, paying for what was furnished them.‡ On the evening of the 3d of March, a party of forty Mexicans appeared at Goliad. They found few people there, nor were they so civil to them, but took two or three of the men prisoners, and drove off some beeves.¶ They, however, soon retreated, as did those from Refugio.

The news of this invasion was sent from each point of contact with wonderful despatch to every part of Texas, and loud calls were made for a turn out *en masse* to repel the invaders. The summons was immediately obeyed; but the distance from these points to the settlements was considerable. However,

\* Letters of W. D. Miller, March 9 and 13, 1842.

† Letter of General Terrill, March 16, 1842.

‡ Letter of W. J. E. Heard, March 6, 1842.

¶ Letter of James D. Owen, March 4, 1842.



General Burleson reached San Antonio on the evening of the 15th of March with two or three hundred men, and other forces from the lower settlements on the Guadalupe and Colorado soon arrived. The panic, nevertheless, induced many families on the frontier to fly from their homes. The report had preceded them that the enemy were many thousand strong. Official calls were made upon the militia to turn out and repair to the point of danger; and Brigadier-General A. Somervell, of the first brigade, being the senior officer of the militia, was directed to take the command.\* It was understood and expected that Austin, the capital, would be attacked. This was a most important point to Texas; for all her records, and especially the papers of the land-office, upon which every land-title in the republic depended, were there kept. While most of the inhabitants retired farther within the settlements, a force of some two hundred men remained behind to guard the town. The chests containing many of the records were, for greater safety, buried in the ground.

By the 15th of March, the number of Texans in camp, and on the march, was at least thirty-five hundred;† but they had turned out without preparation, and only for a campaign of a few weeks. A consultation was held on that day by the officers at San Antonio, when it was concluded that the Mexicans had already crossed the Rio Grande; and, as the order of the secretary of war did not authorize a march across the Texan boundary, it was decided to halt until General Burleson could ascertain the views of the president on the subject of marching into the enemy's country. But, on the day before, the executive had issued an order, directing the troops to be organized, and to await further orders.

\* Order, March 10, 1842. Executive Record, p. 47.

† Order, March 14, 1842. Executive Record, p. 51.

Having determined, if practicable, to commence offensive war against Mexico, it became necessary to obtain aid from the friends of Texas in the United States. To carry the Texan banner successfully into the enemy's territory, "would require all the munitions of an invading army; a military chest would also be necessary to effect the object and insure success;" the troops should be landed at a designated point, and subject to the orders of the executive; each soldier should be supplied with six months' clothing; the recompense of the troops should consist of the property they obtained by conquest upon principles of honorable warfare.\* These were the views made public by the president on the 16th of March; and agents were despatched to the United States to see what could be done. W. H. Dangerfield was appointed commissioner, under an old unrepealed law of 1839, authorizing a loan of a million of dollars, to ascertain what could be effected in that way.† He was also instructed to act as an agent, as were others, and directed to use every exertion to procure pecuniary aid from abroad.‡ In regard to the volunteer troops that were invited from the United States, special orders were given to the agents that none were to come except such as were armed and "clothed and provisioned for six months." This was absolutely necessary, for Texas had neither money nor credit with which to do these things. It was estimated that five thousand troops would be required for a successful invasion, and that two millions of dollars would be needed. When we look at the force and means employed subsequently by the United States for the same purpose, the estimate was low enough.

\* Letter to H. H. Washington and others.

† Houston to Dangerfield, May 17, 1842. Executive Record, p. 92.

‡ *Ib.*, Executive Record, p. 91. Letter to H. R. A. Wigginton, May 13, 1842. Letter to John Darrington, May 12, 1842. Letter to Walter Smith, May 12, 1842. Letter to Barry Gillespie, April 30, 1842.

The president again wrote to General Somervell, on the 18th of March, reminding him of the important preparations necessary for an offensive war. As many of the troops were anxious to proceed at once across the Rio Grande, without any preparation, order, union, or discipline, he referred to this point, and to the fate of Grant, Johnson, and, in fact, all the disasters of the spring of 1836, and warned them against disobedience of orders. Making an estimate of the time necessary to collect means and troops from the friends of Texas in the United States, the president informed General Somervell that the army would not be ready to move from the rendezvous under four months, or until the 20th of July.

In the meantime, great excitement had arisen among those volunteers who expressed a wish to advance immediately. In fact, it was reported that an army would be raised and march into Mexico on its own account; and that, for this purpose, agents, other than those appointed by the government, were collecting troops and means in the United States. To counteract these lawless proceedings, President Houston issued his proclamation on the 25th of April, declaring such agents as acting without the authority of the republic; that the war with Mexico was national, and would be conducted by the nation; and that such conduct on the part of such pretended agents was calculated to embarrass the republic.

This excitement and party strife had been greatly increased by proceedings in the Texan camp at Bexar. General Somervell arrived in camp on the 18th of March, but the troops refused to obey the president's order. General Somervell then retired, leaving General Burleson in command, but without orders. On the 31st of March, General Burleson addressed him a note, saying that if he would repair to headquarters the next day, he would again cheerfully yield the command to him.

This General Somervell declined, as the troops claimed the right of electing their commander. On the 2d of April, General Burleson disbanded them. This was followed by a publication from that officer on the 6th of April, in which he says: "I feel no hesitation in believing that if my orders had permitted me to cross the Rio Grande, and retaliate upon our enemy his oft-repeated outrages, by this time five thousand brave men would have been west of said river, inflicting a chastisement upon him which would result in an honorable peace. But President Houston's order of the 22d of March—in which he says that 'one hundred and twenty days will be necessary before we can make a move against the enemy'—was a finishing stroke to all our present prospects of redress." The vice-president may have been right in his view of the matter, for he was a man of daring spirit and military sagacity; but experience has since shown that it required from the United States an army of twenty thousand men, and an expenditure of seventy millions of dollars, to procure from Mexico an honorable peace.

In the meantime, the president advised the Texan agents in the United States to send all *emigrants* to Corpus Christi, and not to permit them to come without arms, clothing, and provisions, for Texas was absolutely unable to furnish these things. Notwithstanding these directions, the volunteers came over the gulf, and landed at *Galveston*, without having any of the requisites named in the positive and repeated orders of the executive. The government therefore pressed into its service a vessel to take them to the rendezvous, where they were compelled to subsist as best they could—and they could obtain nothing but beef.

To obtain means, and a legal sanction to an invasive war, the president convened the Congress, to meet on the 27th day

of June. It was summoned to meet at Houston.\* The Mexicans having procured two vessels-of-war from England, in addition to the two purchased at New York, it was expected that they would appear on the Texan coast; and preparations were made at Galveston for their reception. The Texan navy having sailed to the coast of Yucatan in the fall of 1841, in pursuance of the treaty concluded with Peraza, was not available, although its return was expected. In the meantime, a coast-guard, under the command of Captain John Clark, was organized and despatched to Aransas bay, and elsewhere along the coast, to look out for any vessels freighted for the enemy.† A number of volunteers from the United States being collected at Corpus Christi, the adjutant-general, James Davis, was ordered on the 5th of May to repair to that point and take the command.‡ He was directed to organize and discipline the troops;

\* The constitution provided (section 3, general provisions) that the president and heads of departments should keep their offices at the seat of government, unless removed by permission of Congress, or unless in *cases of emergency in time of war* the public interest may require their removal. On receipt of the news of the Mexican invasion, the president issued an order (March 10, 1842) for the removal of the archives of the republic to the city of Houston. The citizens of Austin held a meeting, and appointed a committee to organize resistance to this order. They notified Colonel Ward, commissioner of the general land-office, that they were ready to assist in the removal of the land-office papers, but that it must be to such place as they might select, and not the president. The affair created considerable excitement at the time, and the more because local interests were involved as well as the safety of the records. The following order from the officer acting under the authority of those who had resolved to resist the executive order, will give an idea of the matter:—

“REGIMENTAL ORDERS, BASTROP, March 19, 1842.

“*Mr. George Noessel*:—

“SIR: In pursuance with orders from headquarters, dated 18th inst., you are hereby ordered to stop any wagon running down the river, except those under a French passport [De Saligny was removing his archives].

“You will examine all trunks, unless the teamster will swear that he saw the same loaded, or the contents of the same, &c.

“W. S. WALLACE, *Lieutenant-Colonel 4th Regiment Texas Militia.*”

† Order, March 12, 1842. Executive Record, p. 51.

‡ Executive Record, p. 87.

and they were by no means to advance toward the frontier without the orders of the executive, and any attempt to do so without orders was to be suppressed. "The greatest and every curse," says the order, "which has befallen Texas, and every disaster and massacre, have resulted from a foolish passion to take Matamoras without means. When there are means for a successful attack, it shall be taken; and, until then, any attempt would be destructive to Texas."

General Davis, on reaching the troops, found them on the Nueces, greatly disorganized, and without anything to eat. He appointed a quartermaster, but he could procure nothing but beef, and that he obtained from the few settlers without remuneration; for, as has already been stated, the government had neither money nor credit. The citizens of Refugio county complained bitterly to the president of the consumption of their property. "Not only have all our beeves been taken," say they in their petition, "but our cows and young calves are impressed, and many of our families left without beef, the principal means of our support."\* Unhappy Texas!—too poor to provide provisions for a few troops, and too much out of credit to borrow! Nevertheless, it was perhaps best for the cause of humanity and civil liberty that both Texas and Mexico were unable to raise the means for prosecuting offensive war. The want of men and munitions gave opportunity for reflection; and the time required to procure these served also to calm the passions aroused and to heal the wounds inflicted by past oppression. The poverty of Mexico had another good effect: it induced her to release the Santa Fé prisoners. Some few of them were discharged in April, 1842, and the others not long afterward†—with the exception, however, of José Antonio

\* Petition of Michael Reilly and others, May 13, 1842.

† "I have just returned from Mexico, where I had the means of knowing



Navarro, one of the commissioners sent out by President Lamar. He remained in prison some two years longer.

The solemn assurances voluntarily given by Santa Anna, while in Texas, of his favorable disposition in regard to her independence, did not accord with his conduct in sending the force under Vasquez to San Antonio. In addition to this fact, he had written letters to Messrs. Bee and Hamilton, full of the high pretensions of Mexico. General Hamilton had written him a letter, proposing an indemnity of five millions of dollars to Mexico in consideration of a treaty of peace and limits, and two hundred thousand dollars for contingencies and secret service. Santa Anna became indignantly virtuous on the receipt of this letter, and, although it was marked "confidential," caused it to be published in the newspapers of the city of Mexico on the 18th of February, 1842, with his reply,

pretty well what disposition would probably be made of the Texan prisoners. The government have kept them so long, and at so great expense, that they would willingly get rid of them under any conditions. It was supposed by their excellencies, General Thompson and Mr. Pakenham, that they would all be released in a short time; and, with this expectation, the former wrote me, on the 30th of April, to request the 'Texas government and their friends at home to put him in funds to take care of them.' They will require at least two thousand dollars to take them from their several places of confinement to Vera Cruz." — *Letter of F. Perin, May 26, 1842.*

"Two drafts, one for 1163.66 dollars, and another for 5090.10 dollars—both in favor of L. S. Hargous, Esq., American consul at Vera Cruz—have been laid before me. I can not describe my regret at not having it in my power to meet the demands. The government has not one dollar of the funds described, nor has the executive the means to obtain them for any purpose. The situation of the Santa Fé prisoners has been known to the honorable Congress for the last two sessions, and its attention called to their condition, but no law was passed for their relief. There is not one dollar left at the disposition of the president, except to meet special appropriations made for the present year. The president sympathizes most feelingly with the Santa Fé prisoners, and rejoices at their return to their country and friends. If his private means would enable him to do so, he would most certainly relieve all their wants, and contribute to their comforts; but he is as destitute of means as the government of Texas.

"I am your obedient servant,

"SAM HOUSTON.

"August 24, 1842."

*Executive Record, p. 139.*

in which he denounced the offer as *impudent and audacious*.\* This conduct of Santa Anna was presented to the notice of the president of Texas, and, after the incursion of Vasquez, he deemed it proper to reply to these pretensions of the Mexican dictator. This he did on the 21st of March, by a reference to past transactions, and in a manner so appropriate as to attract the attention of other powers. The letter was extensively circulated in America and Europe; it was also published in Yucatan in the Spanish language, and thence circulated to some extent in other parts of Mexico.†

In accordance with the executive call, the Texan Congress assembled at Houston on the 27th of June; and on the same day the president sent in his message. After referring to the late incursion of the enemy under Vasquez, and the pompous declaration of Santa Anna, threatening the resubjugation of Texas, he said: "Our citizens have been, and are still, liable to continual annoyance from the enemy. No formidable invasion, it is true, has been attempted since 1836, nor do I believe they will ever be able to effect its accomplishment; but, though this is my firm conviction, I am nevertheless equally satisfied that they will interpose every impediment to the peace, prosperity, and settlement, of our frontier." He therefore advised that measures be taken to counteract the enemy's designs. He further stated that, under the conviction that an immediate invasion had been intended by the Mexicans, he had felt himself authorized, by virtue of existing laws, to invite immigrants from the United States, to assist in giving protection to the advanced settlements. Under that invitation, immigration to some extent had taken place; and, for want of means on the

\* These facts are taken from a Spanish copy of General Hamilton's reply of March 21, 1842, published in Merida de Yucatan.

† Executive Record, p. 56. See Appendix No. VIII.

part of the government, the immigrants had been sustained almost entirely by private contributions. They could not, however, be longer supported in that way. The president therefore asked the Congress for an immediate decision of the question of invasion. He then referred to the finances of the republic—reminding the two houses of former recommendations, and the consequences which had resulted from their failure to provide a revenue. Among other things, he stated that, for want of appropriations, the transportation of the mails had *entirely ceased*. This had greatly embarrassed the executive, “for he had not one dollar at his disposition for the employment of expresses, even under the most urgent circumstances.” These matters, together with a recommendation that an appropriation be made for the support of the navy—lately returned from the coast of Yucatan—closed the more important points of the message.

The two houses, during their session, called upon the president for information in regard to the immigrant volunteers. He replied on the 18th of July, informing them that a spirit of insubordination and mutiny openly prevailed among them, destroying every hope of usefulness and harmony; that he despaired of their reformation, and suggested that it would be more politic for Texas to rely upon her own militia, and to discharge the foreign volunteers.\*

The Congress at length passed a bill authorizing offensive war against Mexico. It provided that the president should call for volunteers for that purpose, and, should the number responding to such call be insufficient, then he was required to order out not exceeding one third of the militia of the republic, including those that volunteered. The executive was authorized to take command of the army in person; and suitable

\* Executive Record, p. 120.

agents were to be appointed to receive, in and out of the republic, contributions of land, money, provisions, and equipments, necessary for the prosecution of an offensive war; and the president was authorized to hypothecate or sell not exceeding ten millions of acres of the public lands for the purpose of raising a war-fund.

It was very clear that, to prosecute an offensive war, with the hope of making even an impression on the eastern provinces of Mexico, less than five thousand troops would not be sufficient. It was equally clear that they must have a military chest. So large a body of men could not march and subsist on the proceeds of the chase, or the few cattle on the route east of the Rio Grande. The Congress had appropriated ten millions of acres of the public lands; yet, at that time, under existing contracts, persons emigrating to Texas could obtain lands by settling on them; and land-scrip representing thousands of acres was in the markets of the United States, and could be purchased at the rate of twenty-five dollars per section. At this rate, if the whole ten millions of acres could have been immediately sold, it would have realized only four hundred thousand dollars. This amount would scarcely have equipped the army. As to the donations, the government had not even the means to start out its agents. The people of Texas were too poor to give to any extent, and the zeal of her friends in the United States had greatly abated since they had received the news of the retreat of Vasquez from San Antonio. Colonel Dangerfield, who had proceeded to New Orleans to procure the million loan, did not obtain a dollar. For these, and other reasons presented, the president vetoed the bill.\*

\* Veto-Message, July 22, 1842. Executive Record, p. 126. General Jackson, in a letter to President Houston, dated August 17, 1842, says: "If you had not vetoed this bill, it would have led to the destruction of your country, and the

The Mexicans embodied on the west bank of the Rio Grande were constantly advised, through the traders to Corpus Christi, of the situation and numbers of the Texan force on the frontier. The volunteers under General Davis, on the Nueces, by the last of June had been reduced by desertions and other causes to one hundred and ninety-two men. The enemy, being informed of this, determined to attack them. Accordingly, on the evening of the 6th of July, General Davis received intelligence that he would be assailed the next morning by a considerable force under Canales, the old federalist chief. He removed his camp from the open prairie about two hundred yards nearer to a ravine, for the better security of his troops against the Mexican cavalry, having his right protected by the river and a slight skirt of timber. At daylight on the 7th, the enemy, about seven hundred strong, of whom five hundred were cavalry, with one piece of artillery, attacked the camps, or tents of brush, which the Texans had left the evening before. After making a charge, they discovered that the Texans were not there, but, discerning their new position, they advanced upon them in a very careless and disorderly manner. A few of the enemy, being in advance of their main force, were permitted to approach near the Texan lines, when they were fired upon with some effect. This checked them, and they fell back to

disgrace of all concerned in the invasion of Mexico—as the attempt in your present situation must inevitably have failed, and placed you in a condition that you could not successfully defend Texas from being reconquered by the power of Mexico. Your true policy is to act upon the defensive, and husband all your means for this purpose, and be at all times prepared to meet and destroy any invading or marauding party of Mexicans.”

“I have always thought,” says Joel R. Poinsett, in a letter dated May 26, 1842, “that the true policy of Texas consisted in maintaining a defensive attitude, strengthening itself as much as possible at home and abroad, and suffering Mexico to forget its existence, which, with their usual apathy, if unmolested, they would soon do. Every year would render invasion by Mexico less probable, as well as much less likely to succeed, should such an unprofitable and extravagant measure be resolved upon by the pride and folly of that government.”

the main body, who opened a fire upon the Texans, but the distance was too great to produce any result. When the enemy had got out of reach, the Texans ceased to fire, but remained in their position. In a short time, fifty of the Mexican cavalry, with the piece of artillery, took a position about two hundred and fifty yards to the Texan left, with a view to rake their line. At this moment, a Texan soldier, named Ferguson, by a lucky shot with a large rifle, inflicted a mortal wound on the officer commanding the detachment with the cannon; whereupon the whole force under Canales retreated. They carried off with them, however, a stand of colors belonging to the Galveston company, which had been accidentally left at the former camp. In this affair, the Texans had only one man slightly wounded; the enemy's loss was not ascertained.\* Soon after this, the volunteers under General Davis disbanded.

The veto of the war-bill produced considerable excitement against the president, yet he was firm to his purpose. It is not improbable that information received from the Texan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington† had some influence on the mind of the executive; for just before the war-bill passed the Congress, he received notice that the government of the United States intended to represent to that of Mexico the folly of a further continuation of the war, and to offer its services as mediator. Accordingly, Mr. Webster addressed to the American minister at Mexico an admirable letter on that subject. He referred to the facts that the language, customs, and habits, of the Texans, were different from those of the people of Mexico; the great distance of Texas from the Mexican capital; the long period during which they had been separated; the recognition of the independence of Texas by so many great states; the treaties

\* General Davis's report, July 7, 1842.

† James Reilly to the President, June 10, 1842.



and commercial relations entered into with her; and the additional but important fact that the ultimate reannexation of Texas to Mexico "was among the things most to be doubted."\* For these reasons, the United States looked upon the war as useless, and quite annoying to the commerce on the gulf; and, while she could not interfere, if the parties were determined to continue the contest, she could not look at it with indifference, and would cheerfully accept the office of mediator if desired. Mexico, however, having rejected the mediation of Great Britain,† also rejected that of the United States, and prepared, not for another invasion, but for a marauding expedition similar to that which she had sent out in the spring.

At daybreak, on the 11th of September, 1842, a force of about twelve hundred Mexicans, under the command of General Adrian Woll, entered San Antonio. At that time, the district court for Bexar county was in session, and the appearance of the enemy being unexpected, the citizens were but little prepared for defence.‡ After a slight resistance, by which a few of the invaders were killed and wounded, a capitulation was agreed upon; and the citizens, having assurances that they would be treated as prisoners-of-war, surrendered. The enemy thus acquired fifty-three prisoners, including Judge Hutchinson, presiding in the court, and the lawyers in attendance. They conducted themselves with the same propriety as in their incursion of the previous spring. No authorized plunder or robbery occurred. The object of the expedition was doubtless the same as that of the former—that is, to contradict the argument advanced by the annexationists in the United States, that the war was *in fact* at an end.

\* Daniel Webster to Waddy Thompson, June 22, 1842.

† Ashbel Smith to President Houston, May 31, 1842.

‡ Report of the Secretary of War and Marine, November 12, 1842.

General Woll still lingered in San Antonio; and news of the incursion reaching the Texan executive, orders were issued to the militia west of the Brasos to repair to the point of attack, and to the militia east of that river to hold themselves in readiness. Brigadier-General Somervell, the senior officer of the western militia, was ordered to repair to the frontier and take the command.\* His instructions were to assume the charge of all the troops who would submit to his orders. The secretary of war had previously issued an order, directing those who had turned out on the first alarm to report to the government; but no report was made. General Somervell was therefore ordered to report regularly, as the government would look to him for official news.

The report of the enemy's arrival at San Antonio reached Gonzales the same day, when the citizens, to the number of eighty men, under the command of Captain Matthew Caldwell, set out to meet him. They arrived at Seguin on the 13th of September.† Having advanced to the Salado, a creek six miles east of San Antonio, Captain John C. Hays was despatched with about fifty men to draw out the Mexicans. In this he succeeded well; for General Woll, with two hundred cavalry and six hundred infantry, sallied from the town in pursuit, while Hays fell back on the Salado. Caldwell had here a force of about two hundred and twenty men, well posted behind the bank of the creek, some two miles above the crossing. About eleven o'clock in the morning, he was attacked on two sides by Woll's entire force of eight hundred men. The action continued till near sunset, when the enemy fell back, badly cut up, with a loss of sixty killed, and perhaps as many wounded.‡

\* President Houston to Somervell, October 3, 1842. Executive Record, p. 149.

† Quartermaster Bennett's letter, September 27, 1842.

‡ Caldwell's first report of this engagement is as follows:—

“SUNDAY, September 17, 7 o'clock, P. M.

“At the Salado, two miles above the old crossing, we commenced fighting at

The Texans had but one killed (Jett), and nine wounded. But just as the fight ceased between Caldwell and the Mexicans, a fearful tragedy occurred. Captain Dawson, with fifty-three men, from La Grange, in attempting to join Caldwell, were discovered and surrounded by the enemy. Dawson found a grove of mosquito-bushes, in which he rallied his men and commenced his defence; but the Mexicans withdrew from the range of his rifles, and poured in upon his unprotected company a shower of grape-shot. Dawson sent out a white flag, but it was fired on. Thirty-two of his men were killed, two or three escaped, fifteen were taken prisoners, and the remainder cut down after they had surrendered. Among those that escaped was Woods, who, in the act of delivering up his arms, received a cut from a sword. He seized a lance in the hands of one of the enemy, killed the lancer, mounted his horse, and reached the position of Caldwell in safety.\*

Many of the Mexicans of San Antonio and its vicinity were engaged on the side of the enemy. Among them were Colonel John M. Seguin and Cordova. Seguin, up to the beginning of 1842, had been the steady friend of Texas: he had a small company of *rancheros* at the battle of San Jacinto, where he behaved handsomely; and after that event, he had been continued in command on the western frontier.† But he left the

eleven o'clock to-day. A hot fire was kept up till about one hour by sun, when the enemy retreated, bearing off their dead on the ground, and very many dead and wounded were taken from the field by their friends. We have a glorious band of Texan patriots, among whom ten only were wounded, and not one killed. The enemy are all round me, on every side; but I fear them not. I will hold my position till I hear from reinforcements. Come and help me—it is the most favorable opportunity I have ever seen. There are eleven hundred of the enemy. I can whip them on my own ground without any help, but I can not take prisoners. Why don't you come?—Huzza! huzza for Texas!

“MATTHEW CALDWELL, *Colonel commanding.*”

\* Thomas William Ward's letter, September 28, 1842.

† Letter of Colonel John C. Hays, September, 1842.

Texans at a time when he was not much needed, and when he could have little hope of anything but disgrace in the abandonment of the lone-star banner. Cordova, who had figured so conspicuously about Nacogdoches in 1838, had little to lose except his life; and it is said he was killed at the Salado, on the 17th.\*

The enemy hurried back to San Antonio, and sent off their baggage on the same night after the action. At daybreak on the 18th, their forces set out on the retreat, taking with them such of the Mexicans of Texas as adhered to them. The latter, in departing, made another forcible requisition upon the unhappy town for plunder, and carried off what they could. Colonel Caldwell, having his force now increased to four or five hundred men, went in pursuit of the Mexicans. Twice he came up with them, but feared to attack them, as he supposed they would be reinforced. This expected reinforcement was said to be a body of fifteen hundred men under General Ampudia, who had marched to Goliad. The supposition proved to be incorrect, but it saved the enemy from a handsome defeat. After a pursuit of some thirty or forty miles, the Texans returned.

At the first news of the advance of the Mexicans, the town of Austin was thrown into commotion, from an expectation that they would visit that place. This excitement was increased from the fact that, on the 4th of September, five men on Brushy road, two miles from Austin, were attacked by the Indians, and two of them killed. The records of the land-office were still there, and their safety jeopardized. Colonel Ward, the commissioner, closed the land-office by proclamation.† As the danger

\* It was said that Cordova was killed by Jett, at the beginning of the action.  
— *Letter of T. W. Ward, September 28, 1842.*

† Proclamation, September 28, 1842.

of having the records destroyed was imminent, the committee of the citizens who had controlled them since the invasion of the previous spring, felt the necessity of their removal, and proposed to the commissioner to take them to such point as *they* should deem safe from the encroachments of the enemy. A conference was held, and it was proposed that the commissioner should remove them to such point as *he* should deem proper, the wagons to continue hauling until they had transported such of the records as the *committee* thought valuable. This the commissioner declined, but proposed to remove them eastward as far as Brushy creek. This was conceded on the part of the committee, but the wagoners refused to remove them.\* Thus they remained there, and, by the retreat of the enemy, were left unmolested.

As a considerable number of troops were marching westward, a further and special order was issued to General Somervell on the 13th of October, directing him to select an eligible point for a rendezvous, and proceed to the organization and drill of all such volunteers as should report to him with a "firm resolve" to be obedient to orders, and, if required, to cross the Rio Grande. He was instructed to receive no others into the service. He was further directed to establish his camp at some distance from San Antonio, that the Mexicans might not be informed of his designs. "When the force shall have assembled," continued the order, "if their strength and condi-

\* Letter of the Commissioner of the General Land-Office, September 28, 1842.

"AUSTIN, September 23, 1842.

"Thomas William Ward, Esq. :—

"SIR: The committee of safety, having prepared wagons to take the archives of the government to a place which *they* deem safe from the encroachments of the enemy, should it approach this city, are now ready to commence the removal of them to that place.

"Your obedient servants,

"SAMUEL WHITING, *Chairman,*

"JAMES WEBB,

"JOSEPH LEE,

"EUGENE C. KELTY,

"A. D. COOMES,

"WILLIAM L. CAZNEAU."

tion will warrant a movement upon the enemy, it is desirable that it should be executed with promptness and efficiency.”\* From the time of the first assembling of the troops until their departure, there was much confusion, arising out of a want of provisions and ammunition, but, above all, from the insubordination and ambitious pretensions of various persons in the army, who, feeling themselves competent to assume the direction of the entire force, and march them to victory over the whole of Mexico, were surprised and indignant that the command was not conferred on them. The result was, that many of the volunteers returned home from Bexar. However, about the 18th of November, General Somervell set out from the Medina with some seven hundred and fifty men, and, after a rather unpleasant march, reached Laredo, on the Texan side of the Rio Grande, on the morning of the 8th of December.† About one hundred Mexican troops, who had evacuated the town on the approach of the Texans, retired across the river. General Somervell marched three or four miles down the left bank of the stream, where he encamped. The next day (the 9th) a portion of the troops visited Laredo and plundered it. This conduct was in direct violation of the orders of the execu-

\* M. C. Hamilton, Secretary of War, to A. Somervell, October 13, 1842. General Alexander Somervell was a native of Maryland, and was about fifty years old at the time of this campaign. In 1817, he removed to Louisiana, where he established a farm. Failing in this business, he proceeded in 1824 to Missouri, where he followed the business of a merchant. In 1833, he was induced by the late James F. Perry to remove with his vocation to San Felipe, in Texas. When the Texan Revolution broke out, he took part in it, and, with the rank of major, participated in the operations and battles around San Antonio in 1835. Such was his popularity, that, in the reorganization of the army early in 1836, he was elected lieutenant-colonel. In this office he was among those distinguished at San Jacinto. He served in the Texan Congress as a senator in 1836-7; was in the Indian campaign of 1839, under Colonel J. C. Neill; and was afterward elected to the command of the first brigade of Texas militia. He was accidentally drowned in January, 1854. He was a man of fine social qualities, sincere attachments, and a welcome guest. — *Colonel John Henry Brown's Notes.*

† Letter of General Memucan Hunt, January 8, 1842.



tive and of General Somervell. So soon as the commander discovered what was transpiring, he gave orders to the sentinels on duty to arrest every straggler as he came within the lines of the encampment, that he might be conducted to the quarters of the guard and examined. The result was, that the spoils, consisting of a little of everything in the town, were thrown into a pile, and the *alcalde* sent for, and directed to return the articles to the owners.\*

On the 10th of December, it seems that, by consent of General Somervell, those of the troops that desired to do so were permitted to return to their homes. Some two hundred availed themselves of this permission, and returned, under the command of Colonel J. L. Bennett. The remainder of the army, moving down the river, arrived opposite Guerrero on the 14th. On that day and the next, the Texans crossed the stream, and encamped within a mile of the town, which submitted without a contest, and filled the requisition made upon it for supplies. On the 16th, General Somervell ordered the troops to recross the river, which was effected on that day and the succeeding. On their first passage they had crossed in canoes: their return was greatly facilitated by the use of four large flat-boats found in the Rio Salado, which empties into the Rio Grande near Guerrero. General Somervell had made a requisition upon the town for a hundred horses, but, as they were not supplied, he sent Major John C. Hays with seventy men to demand five thousand dollars in lieu of the horses. The *alcalde* came into the Texan camp with seven hundred dollars, declaring it was all that could be raised, and that the horses could not be procured, as they had been driven off by the *rancheros*, who had retreated from the town on the appearance of the Texans. An

\* Letter of General M. Hunt, January 8, 1842. Statement of William B. Middleton.

order had been published, assuring the troops that there should be an equal division of the spoils. "In some instances," says General Hunt,\* "captains of companies would allow their men to detach themselves in small numbers, and acquire for their purposes any number of horses and mules they could find; other officers denied their men this privilege, saying that all property thus acquired should be procured by regular details of men, and equally divided between officers and men. But, when we commenced this second retreat, General Somervell failed altogether to conform to his pledge. Consequently, the captains who had been most particular in requiring and enforcing discipline and subordination from their men, in not allowing parties to leave camp, acquired no horses or mules to supply those of their companies whose horses were unfit for service. This produced great dissatisfaction, and increased the prejudice and contempt almost universally entertained and openly expressed by the officers and men toward General Somervell. In fact, I heard many of the officers and men declare their determination not to be commanded by, and conducted on their march home, by an officer incompetent as he had proved himself to be. Consequently, on the morning of the 19th, when General Somervell issued an order of march,† Cap-

\* This quotation from General Hunt is made with the more confidence, because he was present, and reduced the facts to writing immediately on his return.

† The following is the order of the 19th of December 1842:—  
"Order No. 64.

"HEADQUARTERS, CAMP OPPOSITE THE MOUTH OF THE SALADO, }  
"EAST BANK OF RIO GRANDE. }

"The troops belonging to the Southwestern Army will march at ten o'clock this morning for the junction of the Rio Frio and the Nueces, thence to Gonzales, where they will be disbanded. By order of Brigadier-General Somervell, commanding the Southwestern Army.

"JOHN HEMPHILL, *Acting Adjutant-General.*"

General Somervell states as his reason for issuing the above order, that, "having been eleven days on the river, and knowing the various positions of the

tains Fisher, Cameron, Eastland, Ryan, and Pierson, refused obedience, together with most of the men under their command, and a large number of officers and privates of other companies. The result was, another division of our forces, which were then reduced to about five hundred men. About two hundred officers and men accompanied General Somervell, and three hundred accompanied the five captains above mentioned. The five captains who separated from General Somervell declared their intention to proceed down the river far enough to procure horses to remount those of their commands who were on foot, or whose horses were unable to carry them, and a necessary supply of food to take them into the settlements, when they would return home."

Before the two parties finally separated, it was proposed to depose General Somervell, and elect another commander, but the proposition was not acceded to. Somervell then set out on his return, marching slowly the first two or three days, to enable his men to get a supply of beef. The march was then more rapid; and the troops finally reached Bexar during the last days of January, 1843, having suffered much for want of provisions and winter clothing.

The companies who had separated themselves from Somervell marched four miles down the Rio Grande on the 19th of December, where they encamped for the night. The next morning they elected Captain William S. Fisher to the command, and resumed their march down the river. Four or five flat-boats were used in the descent, to transport baggage, provisions, and a portion of the troops. On the 21st, they arrived and encamped opposite the town of Mier, which is situated

enemy's troops, I was satisfied that they were concentrating in such numbers as to render a longer stay an act of imprudence."— *Report to the Secretary of War (without date).*

about six miles distant from the right bank of the Rio Grande. On the following day they crossed the river and marched into the town, where they made a requisition upon the *alcalde* for provisions and clothing.\* He promised that the articles called for should be delivered the next day at the river, but below the Texan camp. The troops then returned to their camp on the east side of the river, bringing the *alcalde* with them as a surety for the performance of his promise. On the morning of the 23d, the Texan camp was moved down opposite to the point where the articles were to be delivered.† That day and the next passed away, however, but still the requisition was not filled. The Texan spies, who had been kept on the west side of the river, on the morning of the 25th captured a Mexican, who reported that General Ampudia had arrived at Mier with troops, and prevented the fulfilment of the *alcalde's* promise. The Texans determined to pass the river and give them battle. By four o'clock in the evening they had all crossed over, and were on their march to the town. Captain Baker with the spies, being in the advance, first met the enemy, who had sallied out from Mier. On the approach of the Texans, Ampudia retreated to the town. At dark, the invaders found themselves on an eminence to the eastward of the town, with the Alcantra (a small, rapid stream) between them and the enemy. The latter had succeeded in capturing five Texans, from whom they derived such information as the prisoners chose to give them.

After some difficulty in finding a crossing, the Texans at length passed the Alcantra in the dark (a constant fire being kept up between Baker's spies and the Mexican cavalry), and stumbled upon a small picket of the enemy. Giving them a

\* Statement of Messrs. Watson and Hensley.

† "Mier Expedition," p. 78.

fire, the assailants advanced to a street leading directly to the square, the entrance of which was protected by artillery. The Texans would take their position in the street, fire upon the artillery, and then turn the corner to reload, while the enemy's grape-shot passed harmlessly by. Thus the night wore on, a light rain falling during the action. The Texans, in order to protect themselves from the weather, and get nearer the square, commenced opening passages through the stone houses, until they got within fifty yards of the artillery. Opening portholes, they now poured a destructive fire upon the Mexicans. When daylight appeared so that they could see the artillerymen, they silenced the enemy's pieces with their unerring rifles. The Mexicans then occupied the housetops, and the fight continued till noon on the 26th. About this time, the small Texan guard that had been left the previous night on the east side of the Alcantra, attacked about sixty of the enemy's cavalry, and routed them. A large body of Mexicans then advanced to overwhelm this guard. The latter resolved to break through their ranks, and, if possible, join their comrades in the town. They made the attempt, fired with good effect, and started for the Alcantra. The distance was three hundred yards. It was a fearful feat, and in its accomplishment four were killed, three were made prisoners, and two only succeeded.

Shortly after this, Colonel Fisher, in repelling a charge of the enemy, received a wound, which, though not very severe, was sufficiently so to produce vomiting. During the confusion caused by this event, the Mexicans sent in a white flag by Dr. Sinnickson, one of the Texan prisoners they had taken, with a proposition from General Ampudia for the Texans to surrender, declaring that they should be treated with all the consideration due to prisoners-of-war; that they should not be sent to Mexico, but kept upon the frontier until peace was made,

or an exchange effected;\* and that, if these terms were not accepted, they should be allowed no quarter. The Texans, having a considerable list of wounded, and their commander believing that they could not reach their position east of the Rio Grande without a loss of two thirds of their number, surrendered upon the terms proposed. But the articles of capitulation, not being drawn up until after the surrender, were altered to suit the views of the victors.† The enemy had engaged in this contest over two thousand men; the Texans two hundred and sixty-one!‡ The loss of the latter was sixteen killed and mortally wounded, and twenty or thirty more or less seriously wounded. The Mexican loss was not ascertained, but was doubtless four or five hundred.

On the last day of December, General Ampudia set out with the prisoners for Mexico, leaving those of them that were wounded at Mier, in charge of Dr. Sinnickson. On the 9th of January, 1843, the captives reached Matamoras, where they remained until the 14th, when they again set out, guarded by a troop of cavalry under the command of Colonel Savriego. They arrived at Monterey on the 29th, where they remained till the 2d of February, and, having changed their commander, they proceeded to Saltillo, where they found a half-dozen of the Texans who had been taken by Woll on his recent visit to San Antonio. At Saltillo, Colonel Barragan took charge of the prisoners, and proceeded with them to the *Hacienda Salado*, a hundred miles farther on, where they arrived on the

\* This is the way Green states it ("Mier Expedition," p. 96), but Dr. Sinnickson, who carried the message, and whose statement Green has furnished (Ib., p. 474, Appendix IV.), says that Ampudia promised "to use his influence with the supreme government to prevent their being marched to the city of Mexico, but to have them retained east of the mountains," &c.

† Mier Expedition, p. 82, *et seq.*

‡ The Texans had left a guard of forty-two men on the east side of the Rio Grande, who, after the battle, returned home.



10th. The captives had for some time determined to overcome the guard, and attempt their escape out of the country.

Just at sunrise on the 11th of February, when the word was given by Captain Cameron, he seized and disarmed one of the sentinels at the door of the prison, and Samuel H. Walker (afterward so distinguished in the Mexican war) disarmed the other. The prisoners rushed out into the outer court of the building, where were one hundred and fifty infantry guarding the arms and cartridge-boxes.\* Some of these fled, and the others surrendered, while the Texans were arming themselves, and securing ammunition. There was another company stationed at the gate of the outer court; the cavalry had likewise formed. The Texans, being armed, rushed out at this gate, and forced the cavalry to retreat; the infantry stationed there also surrendered. The conflict was soon over, and the victory won: the Texans had five killed and several wounded; the loss of the enemy was considerably more. One of the articles of the capitulation provided that the wounded of the Texans, who were to be left behind, should be cared for.

At ten o'clock in the forenoon, the Texans set out for home. After a march of fifty-three miles, they halted at midnight and fed their horses. They then proceeded twelve miles farther, and slept two hours. The next morning early, leaving the Saltillo road, they continued the march, proposing to leave that city on their right. On the 13th, they struck the road leading from Saltillo to Monclova; but the ensuing night they unfortunately abandoned it, and took to the mountains on the left. The 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were spent in trying to make their way through those barren mountains, during which time they suffered intolerably for want of food and water. They killed and ate their horses, and many of them, be-

\* Mier Expedition, p. 154.

coming exhausted and deranged through hunger and thirst, wandered off, or fell down among the ravines. At one o'clock in the afternoon they discovered a smoke, but, on approaching it, they found a troop of Mexican cavalry. Many of the fugitives had thrown away their arms, and the remainder were too much worn down and dispirited to make a defence. They accordingly surrendered, but on the positive promise that they were to be treated as prisoners-of-war. Here they were tied in pairs, and remained till the 22d to recruit. The Mexicans brought in such of the prisoners as they could find scattered in the mountains; but, of the one hundred and ninety-three who left the Salado on the morning of the 11th, five died of starvation in the mountains, four more effected their escape and returned to Texas, and three others were never heard of, but were supposed to have died in that barren waste.

On the 22d, the prisoners were marched back, stragglers being constantly found and brought up to the main body. On the 27th, the number being increased to one hundred and sixty, they were all ironed. On the 24th of March, they reached the Salado, the scene of their late victory, where they received news of the order of Santa Anna that every tenth man should be shot. They were all securely bound in irons, and well guarded. They were then drawn up to a wall, behind which the officer stood with the fatal pitcher containing one hundred and fifty-nine white beans and seventeen black ones. The pitcher was held up so that those drawing could not look into it. As their names were called, they advanced and drew each one a bean. This solemn business was performed by the prisoners without a change of countenance, but with that self-respect which they felt they should display. The irons were taken off from the unfortunate, and that evening (the 25th of March) they were led to the place of execution, bound together

with cords, and their eyes bandaged. They asked the privilege of being shot in front, but it was refused. They were made to sit down upon a log near the wall, with their backs to their executioners, where, just before dark, they were repeatedly shot till life was extinct.\* Thus, for this courageous and praiseworthy attempt to escape from a captivity so cruel, were these men barbarously put to death.

The survivors were marched thence to the city of Mexico. Arriving at Huehuetoca, within eighteen miles of the capital, they were met by an order from Santa Anna directing Captain Ewing Cameron to be shot. The command was promptly executed the next morning; and Cameron, in dying, left to the world an example of heroic fortitude in the manner in which he met his fate.† He had passed the ordeal on the 25th of March, and drew a white bean. After thus trifling with his life, it seemed to be a refinement of cruelty to order his execution, almost within sight of the capital of a nation that would at least wish the world to believe it civilized! The warrant for his death was procured through the influence of Canales. When the federal army was encamped on the Nueces, previous to the campaign of 1840, Cameron lost his horse, but afterward found him in the possession of a Mexican. The former seized his property, and the Mexican resisted, calling upon his countrymen to assist him. Canales, hearing the altercation, ordered Cameron to deliver up the horse, which he refused to do, and,

\* List of those who drew the black bean, and were shot, at the *Hacienda Salado*, on the 25th of March, 1843:—

L. L. Cash,	Thomas L. Jones,	J. M. N. Thompson,
James D. Cocke,	Patrick Mahan,	James N. Torrey,
Robert Dunham,	James Ogden,	James Turnbull,
William M. Eastland,	Charles Roberts,	Henry Whaling,
Edward Esté,	William Rowan,	M. C. Wing.
Robert Harris,	J. L. Sheppard,	

*Mier Expedition*, p. 444.

† *Ib.*, p. 284.

drawing his pistol, declared in broad Scotch that he would shoot the first man who laid hands on his property. Shortly afterward, Canales had him tried by a court-martial (of which Captain Thomas Pratt was judge-advocate), for disobedience of orders. The court, looking upon the affair as an attempt of Canales and the Mexican to rob the prisoner, acquitted him. From that moment the vengeance of Canales pursued him; and in 1843, when the one had got into favor with Santa Anna, and the other was a captive in chains, the order for his execution was solicited and obtained.\*

The remainder of the prisoners were conducted to the city of Mexico, where, in heavy irons, and subjected to the most servile labors, we will for the present leave them; promising, however, to render an account of their escape from the dungeons of the capital.

The result of the expeditions to Santa Fé and Mier was a practical proof of the general principle that Texas was not prepared for an offensive war against Mexico. The last-named expedition proved also that the Texans, though never wanting in prowess, were not in 1842 under the same discipline, and as obedient to orders, as the men of 1836. General Somervell's instructions were to receive none under his command but such as promised obedience to his orders. These instructions were made known to the volunteers, and they gave the promise. It was left to his discretion to cross the Rio Grande or not. For reasons given in his report, he issued the order of the 19th of December for the troops to march to Gonzales, to be disbanded. Whether he was right or wrong in giving this order, he was in command. It was disobeyed; and the consequence was, a fearful sacrifice of many noble men, and a long and gloomy captivity of others.

\* Captain Pratt's Journal, MS.

## CHAPTER XIII.

THE Congress at the called session had changed the time of its regular sessions to the first Monday in December;\* but circumstances, in the opinion of the president, required its earlier convention. It was accordingly summoned to meet at Washington, on the 14th of November, 1842. The executive and heads of the departments had removed to that place on the 20th of the preceding September.† President Houston, in his message, presented the public affairs as in a gloomy condition—the country without credit, without means, and millions of dollars in debt. In regard to the late troubles on the frontier, he complained of a want of concert of action, and a disposition to proceed without means or orders. As to the currency, the exchequer bills had at one period fallen to twenty-five cents in the dollar, although at the time not more than one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars were in circulation. The amount in circulation at the date of the message did not exceed thirty thousand dollars; yet, for want of a revenue to support these bills, they were under par. As an important remedy for these evils, he recommended the collection of revenue, the suppression of individual and corporation notes issued for circulation, as also the notes of foreign banks. He further recommended some provision for carrying the mails. He likewise gave an

\* Act of July 23, 1842.

† Executive Record, p. 143.

account of the trouble in regard to the archives, and the resistance opposed to their removal; and also in regard to the steps that had been taken to conciliate the Indian tribes.\* A favorable commercial treaty, which had been made on the 30th of July, 1842, between the United States and Texas, was presented to the senate.† The alliance with Yucatan was discouraged, and an opinion expressed that the revolted province would reunite with Mexico.‡

On the subject of the navy, in connection with the Yucatan alliance, the president, on the 22d of December, sent a secret message to Congress. He had not referred to it in his annual message, not wishing the world to know the deplorable condition of that arm of the public service. The vessels of the navy had returned from Yucatan early in May, 1842, and were ordered to repair to New Orleans and Mobile to refit, preparatory to the enforcement of the blockade of the ports of Mexico. This blockade had been proclaimed by Texas in the confident belief, as expressed by Commodore Moore, that, with the aid of the friends of the republic in the United States, the squadron would be ready for sea in a few weeks. But, up to July, it was not ready. In that month, application was made for the balance of the naval appropriation, amounting to nearly nineteen thousand dollars, Texas currency; and it was advanced, upon the representation that by its use four vessels could be got to sea. This also failed, and the navy was ordered to report at Galveston for further instructions.¶ This order to

\* Message, December 1, 1842.

† *Ib.*, December 19, 1842.

‡ *Ib.*, December 14, 1842.

¶ Order of October 29, 1842. This order was repeated on the 5th and again on the 16th of November, 1842. Not being obeyed, Captain Moore was, on the 2d of December, commanded to repair to Washington, on the *Brasos*, and report in person to the department of war and marine. This last order was repeated on the 2d of January, 1843; and, not being obeyed, he was, on the 22d of that month, peremptorily ordered to turn over the command to the senior officer in



repair to Galveston was repeated two or three times, and, being disobeyed, Captain Moore was ordered, on the very day the secret message was sent to Congress, to turn over the command to the senior officer present, and report in person to the department of war and marine. The blockade not being enforced by Texas, other nations complained of its existence, and asked that it be discontinued. The *San Antonio* had been despatched to Yucatan in August, 1842, without the knowledge of the Texan government, and was lost in a storm. The estimates made for the support of the navy for the current year amounted to over two hundred thousand dollars, which Texas could not meet. Under all these circumstances, the president recommended the sale of the vessels. A large portion of the public debt had been incurred in their purchase; they were still unpaid for; and he believed that the person from whom they had been purchased could be induced to take them again.

In accordance with this representation, the Texan Congress passed a secret act, authorizing the president to sell the war-vessels;\* and, in compliance with this act, he appointed commissioners to dispose of them. They repaired to New Orleans, and made known their business to Captain Moore. It appears, from an unofficial letter of one of the commissioners, dated the 10th of March, 1843, that Captain Moore had large claims against the navy for moneys expended for its use, and that he was inclined to hold on to the vessels; that he was not bound to obey any orders from the navy department emanating from

the navy, and report to the department in person. On the 10th of March, 1843, Captain Moore replied that "it is, of course, unnecessary for me to proceed to the seat of government;" and "I expect to get to sea in a few days, and keep at sea until the determination of our difficulties with Mexico, without any expense to the government of Texas."—*G. W. Hill, Secretary of War and Marine, to Captain Moore, July 19, 1843.*

\* Act of January 16, 1843: not published in the laws. This secret act was repealed by the act of February 5, 1844.

a law not promulgated; and that the secretary of war and marine was bound to send him a certified copy of that secret act before he was under obligations to comply with it. It further appears that Colonel Zavala, of Yucatan, was at New Orleans, urging Captain Moore to sail down the gulf-coast and capture the Mexican fleet. The latter declared that he would take it, blockade the whole coast, and levy contributions to the amount of eight hundred thousand dollars, half of which he would deposit in the treasury of Texas.\*

Under these circumstances, the president, having before him the act for the sale of the vessels, and his orders being disobeyed, issued further and peremptory instructions to the commissioners, dated March 22, 1843, requiring them to proceed to New Orleans and get the vessels into their possession, if practicable, and hold them subject to the orders of the government; and, should resistance be made, they were instructed to call upon the proper authorities of the United States for aid. The instructions, referring to the previous orders issued to Captain Moore, declared that he had no authority to enter into any arrangement with Yucatan, or to do anything but to sail to the port of Galveston, and report in person to the department, as he had been ordered to do. The commissioners were further instructed, should Captain Moore fail to render obedience to former orders, to publish a proclamation which the president sent them. This proclamation, referring to former orders, and the fact that they were disobeyed, gave notice of Captain Moore's suspension from his command, required him to return home and report, disavowed all his acts, and requested all nations in amity with Texas to seize and bring in the vessels to the port of Galveston.

The commissioners, on arriving at New Orleans, presented

\* Letter of Colonel James Morgan, March 10, 1843.

their authority, and placed the proclamation in the hands of Captain Moore. It seems that the latter acknowledged the authority of the commissioners, and promptly consented to sail for Galveston. Accordingly, they departed; Colonel Morgan, one of the commissioners, being on board. Arriving at the mouth of the Mississippi, they learned that the Mexican war-steamship *Montezuma* was at Telchak, distant from the other vessels of the Mexican navy, and that it could probably be taken. They sailed to that point, but arrived at Telchak after the steamship had left. Captain Moore then proceeded down the coast with the *Austin* and *Wharton*, and had two important engagements with the vessels of the enemy, in which the Texans fought gallantly, and gained some advantages.

In the meantime, the president, finding that his commissioners as well as Captain Moore had disobeyed his orders, and that one of them had actually gone out with the navy, and was advising and directing its operations—and that new arrangements had been entered into with Yucatan, without his orders—and also ascertaining that his proclamation had been disregarded, and not published—took immediate steps to publish it himself. It reached the public eye, and in due time the coast of Yucatan, and brought the wandering commissioner and captain in command of the navy to the part of Galveston, where they arrived in July.

It seems, from the newspapers of that day, that this cruise had been got up in New Orleans; and that the management of the navy had effectually been taken out of the hands of the Texan government, and was controlled by others. The New Orleans papers, ignorant of the existence of the secret act of Congress, denounced President Houston in such terms as would have satisfied the world that the navy was under their control, and subject to their orders, and that the government of Texas

had nothing to do with it but to pay for the vessels.\* The position of the Texan post-captain at New Orleans, according to his own showing, seems to have been this: if he attempted to obey the first orders given him, he could not obtain the means to take the vessels to Galveston; but, to go on a cruise to the coast of Mexico, the government of Yucatan and certain friends in New Orleans would furnish the means. Of course, Yucatan and the New Orleans friends would expect to be benefited thereby. How? In the prizes taken; for there was no other means of remuneration.

After the return of the vessels of the navy to Galveston, they were placed in ordinary, and, for want of funds to equip and man them, they so remained.

The seventh Congress, which adjourned its regular session on the 16th of January, 1843, passed but few laws of a general character. The policy of treating with the Indians had so far proved successful, that but ten thousand dollars were appropriated for intercourse with them;† and provision was made for trading-houses, interpreters, the restoration of stolen property, and for prohibiting the sale of ardent spirits among them.‡ It was also declared murder for a white man to kill an Indian in time of peace within the settlements. Another law was passed for the better collection of license-taxes, which was important, as under former laws but few paid such taxes, and they were greatly needed. The most important act of the session was one for the protection of the western frontier. It provided for the election of a major-general, and required him to call into immediate service on the western frontier six companies. It further provided that, “should the major-general of the militia

\* Exposé of Colonel James Morgan, July 16, 1843. Letter to the People of Texas, by Edwin Ward Moore.—*Telegraph*, July 16, 1843.

† Act of January 6, 1843.

‡ Act of January 16, 1843.

deem it expedient, he may at any time take the field, and command in his official capacity any number of troops." Fifty thousand dollars were appropriated to this service. The president disapproved of this bill, because it created a military government, and, though the constitution made the executive commander-in-chief of the army and navy, yet by this law the major-general was rendered independent of the government. The two houses, however, passed the bill by a two-thirds majority; but they elected Thomas J. Rusk to the high office so created, by whom the laws were respected.\*

As the year 1843 witnessed the first diplomatic movement, in which Mexico was a party, for a termination of the war, it will be necessary to give some account of its rise and progress. It seems to have had its origin in the castle of Peroté, in the brain of J. W. Robinson—commonly called "*Lawyer Robinson*"—one of the prisoners captured and taken to Mexico by General Woll, in September, 1842. Robinson, taking lessons from his illustrious correspondent General Santa Anna, who, when a prisoner, was willing to treat on any terms, addressed a letter to the Mexican president on the 9th of January, 1843. In this communication he set forth that he was an old Texan—a colonist—and had never been wanting in loyalty to Mexico; that when Woll entered San Antonio, although he thought his band was a pillaging-party, he did not make use of his arms, but laid them down as soon as he knew they were the troops of Santa Anna—an error which made him appear a rebel.† The writer then proceeded to give in his adhesion to Mexico, and thought himself capable (as he was a lawyer) of communicating to Santa Anna some rare information; that on his way

\* Act passed by a constitutional majority, January 16, 1843.

† Robinson committed another *error*, of which he did not inform Santa Anna: he was at the battle of San Jacinto!

through the Mexican republic, he had been thinking of a plan, the details of which could better be given in a personal interview; and that the Texans, after seven and a half years of war, were anxious for peace, and would gladly accept it on terms having for their basis the reunion of the republic with that of Mexico. Robinson, wishing to get some others of his fellow-prisoners released, said a portion of them were of the same opinion with himself, and that, if they could be charged with a mission to Texas, they would exert a powerful influence in reuniting her with the Mexican confederacy. He suggested to Santa Anna that peace could not be made without an armistice; the people would then be committed to a discussion of the subject.\* He then proceeded to set forth generally the terms on which a reunion might take place; and proposed that Santa Anna would name commissioners, and unite with them one or two of the prisoners who were of the writer's opinion, that they might proceed immediately to Texas to enter upon their duties. Robinson closed his letter in diplomatic style, by "taking advantage of the occasion to tender to his excellency his high consideration and respect."

Santa Anna, then at *Manga de Clavo*, transmitted the letter to Tornel, the minister of war and marine, suggesting that Robinson's object might simply be to obtain his liberty; "but if it should not be so," said he, "and he should act in good faith, nothing can be lost on hearing him, and some favorable result may be obtained." He requested Tornel to lay the letter before the "substitute president," and, if that functionary should think proper, he (Santa Anna) would hear what Robinson had to say, it being understood that he would make no concessions

\* This letter, which was by Santa Anna published in the "*Siglo Diez Nueve*" of the city of Mexico, was wretchedly mutilated. The conditions of the reunion are wholly omitted.



to the latter that would compromit the nation; and, lest the opportunity might slip, the dietator was in as great a hurry about the matter as Robinson.\* The government gave to Santa Anna a speedy and full power to arrange the negotiation with Robinson as he might think proper.†

Santa Anna immediately sent for Robinson, who came to *Manga de Clavo*, and, after long conferences, the latter satisfied him that he would make a good commissioner. "He was immediately set at liberty, that he might, without loss of time, proceed in the fulfilment of his offices."‡ At the same time, the bases of the reincorporation of Texas with Mexico were drawn up, signed by Santa Anna,|| ratified by the "substitute president,"§ and delivered over to the envoy Robinson, who set out for Texas.

Robinson, having reached Washington, on the *Brasos*, laid before the president of Texas all that had transpired between him and Santa Anna. Houston saw at once, in these proceedings, a probable mode of releasing the Texan prisoners in Mexico, and likewise a foundation for a peace. It is a principle of human nature that, when those who are hostile, stop to reason upon their differences, the feeling of hostility declines as the discussion progresses; and especially was it applicable to Mexico and Texas, who were both exhausted by a long war. It would have been a poor compliment to Houston to believe for a moment that Santa Anna could obtain the advantage of him in diplomacy. His acquaintance with human nature, and particularly with the Mexican dictator, was admitted to be profound. In this discussion he had every superiority. Rob-

\* Santa Anna to Tornel, February 6, 1843.

† Tornel to Santa Anna, February 11, 1843.

‡ Santa Anna to Tornel, February 18, 1843.

|| Santa Anna's propositions, February 18, 1843.

§ Tornel to Santa Anna, February 23, 1843.

inson was the emissary of the enemy, but in favor of Texas. The correspondence was between Santa Anna and Robinson, and Houston had the control of it. The latter therefore dictated to Robinson the following confidential letter to Santa Anna, dated the 10th of April, 1843:—

“ When I arrived at Galveston, it was soon understood that I had important news from you to the people of Texas, and there was a great stir to see what it was. Knowing it would meet your views, I published the substance of the propositions in the newspapers, accompanied by remarks of my own, recommending them to the favorable consideration of the people of Texas. When I did this, I thought it would have a great effect at once; but it did not produce as much excitement as I expected.

“ From Galveston I proceeded to Houston, and remained there some days, with the expectation that I would see some clear manifestation of the feelings of the people on the subject of the propositions. I have the honor to enclose your excellency the ‘Houston Telegraph’ of the 5th of April, in which you will see, among other items, the publication which I made over my signature, and that I presented the propositions to the people in the most favorable light. I have also the honor of enclosing your excellency a newspaper published at Washington, by which you will perceive that I arrived there on the 6th instant, and laid your communication before General Houston. The paper contains various items of interesting news, which I have marked for your excellency’s attention.

“ On my way to Washington from Houston, I passed through the most thickly-settled and wealthy sections of the Brasos. The news of my arrival had spread with great rapidity, and, of course, there was much anxiety among the people. The first question usually asked me was, ‘Are all the prisoners

released?" On answering in the negative, they asked me if I thought they would be released. I expressed the belief that your excellency would release them, if you had not already done so. The next inquiry was, whether I had not brought terms proposing peace. To which I said, 'I think so.' They then asked me if your excellency had proclaimed an armistice between Mexico and Texas. I told them you had not; but that I looked upon it as in effect so, until the wishes of the people could be known upon the subject of your propositions. I found the people much engaged in the cultivation of their farms, except those who are very anxious for an invasion of Mexico; and many who are in favor of an invasion are improving their farms and planting their crops, so as to be ready for any action the government of this country might think it necessary for this country to take.

"When I laid your communication before General Houston, he read it, and asked me if I thought the translation correct. On my replying that I did, he evinced no excitement, but observed that, since the commencement of the Revolution in 1835, the affairs of Texas and Mexico had become much more complicated than they had once been; that, since that time, Texas had been recognised by foreign powers as independent of all governments, and had formed treaties; and that, for Texas to act independently of the consideration of those powers, would, in his opinion, be treating them with disrespect. I endeavored to find out from him what course would be adopted in reference to your excellency's propositions, but I could not ascertain what his purposes were—if he had any.

"I find that your excellency and myself were mistaken when we suspected that Texas was torn to pieces by factions. It is not so. The price of produce this year has been low; money is scarce in the country, and there is some discontent; but that

discontent, I am assured, does not arise from the acts of the government. There are some factious men in Texas, and they have some papers at their command. These papers, however, are supported by the contributions of the faction, or party, that wishes to annoy the executive. They are not encouraged by popular sentiment, but are used to create one, if possible, against the government. It will be impossible for them to succeed. The whole number of men, of any prominence of character, engaged in this opposition, would not exceed some thirty or thirty-five in the republic.

“I would most respectfully beg leave to submit to your excellency, in gratitude for your kindness to me, a few suggestions, which your excellency can take into your distinguished consideration.

“The first is, that if your excellency had thought proper to have released all the Texan prisoners and let them return to their homes, and declared an armistice for some months, until the people in Texas could have had time to think of your propositions, if the president had submitted them to their consideration and action, it would have had a good effect upon the people. They would then have been freed from passion and excitement; but when almost every neighborhood has an acquaintance or friend a prisoner, the people can not act on these subjects without much feeling; and there are many persons here ready to excite them in favor of a war beyond the Rio Grande.

“The last Congress passed a law favorable to what war-spirit there is in Texas; and the president has authority to accept the services of forty thousand volunteers, which he would be authorized to land at any point of the coast of Texas, entirely beyond its settlements, and on the borders of the Rio Grande.

“You will see, from the papers, that General Rusk was

raising a very large expedition, to march across the Rio Grande; but it is possible it may be delayed a while, although the preparations will go on.

“If I were to judge from what I have heard since my return, and what I knew before I was taken prisoner at Bexar, I would think that Houston would prefer peace, if it could be had on terms he thought perfectly honorable to Texas. He has always been opposed to an irregular warfare between the two countries; but he has now succeeded in making peace with the Indians, and, as that will relieve the northwestern frontier of much embarrassment, it is possible he may unite all the influence he may have with those in favor of prosecuting the invasion of Mexico. If this should be the case, and Texas applies all its energies to war, I think she would be easily able to raise from her own citizens an army of ten thousand men, besides volunteer immigrants, as they are called; and that they would take care to land within one or two days' march of the Mexican frontier. I will not be so presumptuous as to advise your excellency about anything; but, as things have changed since I communicated with your excellency in relation to the affairs of Texas, I feel bound to inform you of such facts as result from my observations.

“If your excellency should wish to send me any instructions, or make any further communication, you can have it directed to the care of Major James H. Cocke, customhouse, Galveston, who will forward it to me wherever I may be. I will endeavor so to manage as to get my despatches to your excellency through some safe channel. Your excellency will be aware of the discretion with which I will have to act, from the character of the communication I have made in the papers.”\*

\* Extract of a letter from General Houston to Joseph Eve, United States *chargé d'affaires* to Texas, dated April 22, 1843: “Touching the communication of Santa

The perusal of this first and last despatch of his excellency the Mexican president's minister shows that two points are recommended — the armistice, and the release of the prisoners. On those points the document is very clear. On the subject of an invasion of Mexico by Texas, the matter is left in a very threatening aspect. As to everything else, Santa Anna is left in a very thick fog. This letter reached him in due time, and offered much food for reflection. Previous to this correspondence, however, the Texan government had applied to the three powers — France, Great Britain, and the United States — asking them to make a joint offer of mediation between Texas and Mexico. France and the United States would doubtless have been willing to do this; but Great Britain, never sincerely interested in the success of Texas, further than it appertained to her own interests, had a desire to exclude slavery from the new republic. She supposed that, by mediating separately, obtaining an influence in the Texan government, and throwing into its territory a large emigration of her own people, she could procure the recognition of Texan independence by Mexico, on condition of the abolition of slavery. This she imagined Mexico would the more readily do, because the latter power, as well as herself, was anxious to offer every barrier to the growth and advancement of the United States. In fact, the

Anna, I have this to remark — that it is an anomaly, in both statesmanship and diplomaey. From it I deduce the fact that some of the powers have touched him in a tender part, and this I regard as a wincing. I take pleasure in enclosing you a copy of the translation of his propositions, from which you will perceive (for I am told it is pretty correct) that General Santa Anna could not have expected any direct action by this government. His not addressing it to any authority in the country, as you say, manifests its absurdity. It is impossible for a community to speak, unless through some organ, and in his communication he recognises none. If he expects to make capital out of it, he certainly will not find it in Texas; for his *sine qua non* would place Texas, bound hand and foot, at the mercy of his will. Take it all in all, it is a curious piece of workmanship, and will do very well to file away as a curiosity for after-times; and that is about as much as can well be made of it."



influence of the British government over that of Mexico was such, that when it chose to exert that influence, it could have had the independence of Texas acknowledged at any time—and we will shortly see evidence of this fact. Therefore, upon the proposition of Texas for a triple mediation, Lord Aberdeen said that “it would be better, on all accounts, that each party should act separately, but similarly in tone, in point of time and argument, in urging the Mexican government to reconsider the subject dispassionately and impartially, and to lose no time in coming to an accommodation with Texas, on the basis of a recognition of the independence of that country.”\* In this view the other powers concurred. Lord Aberdeen then made out his instructions to the British minister at Mexico, and sent a copy of them to Lord Cowley, ambassador at Paris, to be shown to the French government. M. Guizot copied them, and transmitted them to the French minister at Mexico. On the part of the United States, Mr. Webster instructed the American minister at Mexico to remonstrate in strong but kind and friendly language with the Mexican government against the marauding mode of warfare carried on against Texas; that if the war was continued, it must be conducted openly, honorably, and according to the rules recognised by all civilized and Christian states in modern times. Mr. Webster said further that the United States owed the duty of seeing this done—they owed it to the parties themselves, to the interest and character of this continent, and to the cause of civilization and human improvement; and it was a duty they would discharge with impartiality and firmness.† The American secretary further

\* Aberdeen to Elliot, November 3, 1842.

† The French *chargé d'affaires*, De Cramayel, places the separate mediation upon the ground of the absence of good feelings between the United States and Mexico: “Le gouvernement de S. M. B., se fondant d’une part sur le non succès des démarches déjà faites par lui dans ce même but, et, d’une autre part, sur

stated that, unless Mexico, in a short time, made peace with Texas, or showed a disposition and an ability to prosecute the war with a respectable force, the United States government had it in contemplation, at no distant period, to remonstrate in a more formal manner.

But all these promising hopes were dimmed by the news from Texas. The effect, among those powers friendly to that country, and who were able to aid her, was most blighting. The Mier expedition, the movements of the navy, the resistance to the collection of duties on Red river, and the denunciatory meetings held, which were encouraged by the press, all combined to injure the character of the republic. Let us refer to the facts. It will be remembered that Mr. Reilly, on the part of Texas, concluded an admirable commercial treaty with the United States, which was duly ratified by the government of the former. It was, however, in the most important particulars, rejected by the United States senate. A committee had reported favorably on the treaty, and, had the vote then been taken, all would have been well; "but," says the Texan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington,\* "the day after the report was made, the news of our internal commotions, our dissensions and civil discords, coupled with our disasters, reached here, in all their glowing and exaggerated enormities, and, like a withering sirocco, blasted every effort of our friends, and paralyzed every movement in behalf of our treaty. . . . 'Texas is rent and torn,' said the senators in discussing the treaty, 'by her own internal discords; she is without a dollar in her treasury; her numbers are small; her laws are set at defiance by her citizens;

l'inconvénient qu'il pouvait y avoir d'associer les Etats Unis à la médiation, dans un moment où leurs relations avec le Mexique paraissaient sur un pied peu amical, n'a pas cru devoir accéder à cette demande."—*De Cramayel to Anson Jones, January 28, 1843.*

\* Letter of Isaac Van Zandt, March 4, 1843.

her officers, both civil and military, can not have their orders executed or obeyed; Mexico is now threatening to invade her with a large land and naval force; she can not long stand under such circumstances; the chances are against her. She will either have to submit to Mexico, or come under some other power. If, then, we should extend to her these privileges by treaty, might not such power to whom she became attached claim like privileges?" These arguments induced the rejection of all that was valuable to Texas in the treaty. The baneful influence of this news extended also to England and France.

In regard to the Mier expedition, the fact that the party of Texans had crossed the Rio Grande in the face of General Somervell's order to march home, had been published to the world before that officer's return. The United States and Great Britain both complained of it, as being the same character of warfare for which they had reprehended Mexico. "I am instructed," says Mr. Eve, the American *chargé d'affaires*, "to remonstrate in strong language against Texas carrying on the war for retaliation, or otherwise, by marauding parties; but that, if she makes war, let it be open, manly, and according to the strict rules of modern warfare. Texas owes this to herself, and to the character of the Anglo-Saxon race."\* — "If, sir," said Mr. Webster to Mr. Van Zandt, "you can get your people to unite at home, and lay aside that factious spirit which is lately so often shown, we would secure you peace in less than six months."†

As it was useless to deny the facts, for they had gone forth over the world, and as Texas could not lose her great friends, and ought not to lose them, she undertook to make apologies.

\* Letter of Joseph Eve, April 11, 1843.

† Letter of Isaac Van Zandt, March 4, 1843.

Besides, she needed their friendly aid in getting her citizens, who were imprisoned in Mexico, restored to their liberties and homes. In an interview between Mr. Webster and Mr. Van Zandt, in March, 1843, the American secretary informed the latter that "the late movements of the forces of Texas, having exhibited an apparent inconsistency with the principles which the government of Texas had avowed should govern its action, and partaking of that character of warfare against which it had protested, and which the interposition of the United States had been invoked to arrest; that therefore his government would necessarily be constrained to suspend the measures which it had designed to take, and which it would have deemed proper to adopt toward the contending parties."\*

In answer to this, Mr. Van Zandt, being furnished with a copy of the orders issued to General Somervell, alleged that the government of Texas had not departed from the rule laid down. In reference to those of the troops that disobeyed the order to return home, Mr. Van Zandt said that, "as citizens, they were liable to strong excitements; and, driven to desire vengeance and retaliation upon an enemy with whom that country is at war, and from whose soldiery the most wanton, flagrant, and cruel injuries have been long received and endured, and whose inhuman acts have been sanctioned by the government of Mexico, it is but natural to suppose that some irregularities will occur, and that attempts will be made at retaliation by individuals suffering from the consequences of such wrongs and injuries. These acts of individuals, though in a great degree excusable under such peculiar circumstances, should not be imputed to their government."†

In the same despatch, Mr. Van Zandt further says: "From

\* Letter of Isaac Van Zandt, March, 1843.

† Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Webster, March 23, 1843.

the inhuman treatment heretofore inflicted upon our prisoners, it is much to be feared that General Santa Anna, or those acting by his influence or orders, will sacrifice the lives of these unfortunate men, under the pretext that they were not acting at the time under the orders of the Texan government, or some other plea. It will be observed, however, that, although the men may be all murdered who were taken prisoners under Colonel Fisher, yet some few have escaped, who can establish the fact beyond a doubt that articles of capitulation were signed, and that the men were promised kind treatment, and all the rights of prisoners-of-war. This being the case, it can not be material to the question which may be brought to an issue between them and the government of Mexico, whether they were acting under the immediate and legal orders of the government of Texas or not."

Immediately upon the receipt of the news of the capitulation of the Mier prisoners, the Texan government sent despatches also to its ministers in France and England, asking their interposition; but, as time might thus be lost, the president applied to Mr. Elliot, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Texas, to use his good offices, and, in answer to the remonstrances of his government, observed: "Admitting that they went without orders, and that so far as that was concerned the government of Texas was not responsible, and the men were thereby placed out of the protection of the rules of war—yet the Mexican officers, by proposing terms of capitulation to the men, relieved them from the responsibility which they had incurred; and the moment the men surrendered in accordance with the proposals of capitulation, they became prisoners-of-war, and were entitled to all immunities as such. . . . Upon this view of the case," continued the president, "I base my hopes of their salvation, if it should be speedily presented, through

the agency of her majesty's minister, to the Mexican government."\*

On receiving intelligence of the battle of the Salado, and of the recapture of the Texan prisoners, Santa Anna had ordered them to be shot; but, upon the interposition of the American and British ministers, the sentence was changed to a decimation. The harsh treatment toward the Mier captives was said by Santa Anna, at one time, to result from the murder of the guard at the Salado; † at another it was attributed to the plundering of Laredo. ‡

Thus much on the Texan prisoners in Mexico, the view taken of the matter by other nations, and the defence made by the Texan government. But still these captives were kept in confinement, and the most of them at servile labor. "They were hitched to a wagon," says William B. Middleton, "twenty-five in a team, and compelled to haul rocks from the mountain to

\* Houston to Elliot, January 25, 1843. Mr. Elliot, on seeing in the opposition papers the charge against the president that he had endeavored to produce a prejudice against the prisoners in the eyes of Santa Anna, wrote him as follows: "I forwarded to Mr. Pakenham, in a private letter, what you said to me on the subject. In my understanding, your position was, that these prisoners were entitled to the benefit of their capitulation, though you could not, of course, deny that the movement across the Rio Grande had been made on their own responsibility; and I concluded your purpose in saying this was, to free yourself from the imputation of using the language of aversion to an irregular and incursionary character of warfare in your communications to foreign governments, and of sanctioning it in your orders to the officers of the republic. It appears very probable that Mr. Pakenham conferred with General Thompson in the interest of these prisoners; but it must be quite unnecessary to say to you that he never could have given the least room for all this most unjust and injurious imputation that you desired to prejudice your unhappy countrymen in the sight of General Santa Anna. It is also quite possible that Mr. Pakenham and General Thompson may have thought that no good would come out of any appeal to General Santa Anna upon the subject at that time; but I am quite convinced that Mr. Pakenham never misconstrued your kind wishes about the prisoners, and I am equally sure that he was cordially disposed to second them."—*Elliot to Houston, June 10, 1843.*

† Santa Anna to Wilson Shannon, September 5, 1844.

‡ Same to Mr. Pakenham.



the castle of Peroté. The prisoners, however, at no time lost their buoyant spirits; nor did they ever lose an opportunity for fun. McFall, a large, powerful man, was put in the lead, and was always ready, at the word, to get scared and run away with the wagon. This was often done, and the corners of the *ulobe* houses always suffered in such cases. The Mexican officers would laugh, and the owners of the houses would swear in bad Spanish. Sometimes the team would stop in the street, doff the harness, and half of them go into a drinking-house on the right, and the other half to another house on the left. When they were driven out of one house, they would run over to the other. Thus the overseers were kept busy. They had the power of using the lash, but did not do it very often, as the Texans made it their business, at the peril of their lives, to return such civilities with ample vengeance.”\*

In 1842, information was transmitted to Texas, through a gentleman in Missouri, that a rich caravan of Mexicans, having a large number of mules and a hundred and fifty thousand dollars in specie, had passed from Santa Fé to Independence, and would thence proceed to the eastern cities to convert their specie into merchandise, setting out on their return to Santa Fé in the spring of 1843. As they would on the route pass through the territory of Texas, many of the Texans were desirous to capture them. Accordingly, on the 28th of January, 1843, Colonel Jacob Snively made application to the Texan government for authority to raise men to proceed to the northern portion of the republic, and capture the caravan. On the 16th of February, the permission was granted by the war depart-

\* One of the overseers struck the prisoner William B. Middleton while he was stooping down to receive a bag of sand. Middleton immediately knocked him down with a stone. The guards ran up; but a Mexican officer present, seeing the whole affair, protected the prisoner. The overseers were not soldiers, but *convicts*.

ment, and he was authorized to organize such force, not exceeding three hundred men. The expedition was to be strictly partisan, the troops to mount, arm, equip, and provision themselves, and to have half the spoil—but this was to be taken only in honorable warfare. They were authorized to operate above the line of settlements between the Rio del Norte and the United States boundary, but were to be careful not to infringe upon the territory of that government.\* Such were Colonel Snively's instructions, and such his authority.

The troops rendezvoused at Georgetown, six miles from Coffee's station, and the then extreme frontier. On the 24th of April, a sufficient force having arrived, the orders of the secretary of war were exhibited. Colonel Snively was unanimously chosen to the command; but so much of the order of the war department as provided that one half of the spoil should be paid over to the government "was unanimously rejected by vote."† The volunteers adopted a set of by-laws, and decided that the army regulations should govern them, when not in conflict with the by-laws.

On the 25th of April, having about one hundred and seventy-five in the command, they set out on the march. The general course of travel was west, on the dividing ridge between the waters of Trinity and Red rivers, on the old Chihuahua trail. They had occasional accessions to their ranks, and learned on the first of May that the news of the expedition had been published in the Missouri papers. At length, after various adventures amid the splendid scenery of the prairies and the Wachita mountains, on the 27th of May, to their great joy, they reached the Arkansas river, and encamped on its right bank,

\* G. W. Hill, Secretary of War, to Jacob Snively, February 16, 1843.

† I quote from the admirable manuscript journal of the expedition furnished me by Colonel Stewart A. Miller.

about forty miles below the crossing of the Santa Fé trail. At this time they had a scanty supply of provisions, and were in want of a proper knowledge of the country they were in, and of the distance to their place of destination. Some of them were sick, and borne on litters; others, whose horses had been lost or died, were on foot. Yet they were cheered by the sight of the river. On the following day they sent spies across the stream to search for the Santa Fé road, who returned and reported it to be eight miles distant, on the opposite side. Fresh signs of extensive travel were seen on the road, but it was unknown whether they had been made by the Mexicans or by Bent's people, who had a station one hundred and fifty miles higher up. Near the Arkansas crossing they met some of Bent's men, who informed them that the Mexican caravan was expected to pass, on its way to Santa Fé, in about eighteen days. They were also informed that the caravan was guarded by five hundred Mexican soldiers as far as the United States boundary-line, and that those troops were in that vicinity, waiting the return of their merchants. On the 2d of June, a partnership was proposed by the Bents. They offered to "put in" forty men at that time, and forty more shortly afterward; and were to have a *pro-rata* share of the spoil: but, in a few days afterward, the Bents sent word that they could not comply. The Texan spies, who had gone out to look after the enemy, reported six hundred. The advance of the latter took one of the Texans prisoner; but he passed himself off for one of Bent's men, and they released him. The Texans remained in the valley of the Arkansas some time, recruiting, drilling, and hunting for the enemy. On the 9th of June, they took a Mexican prisoner, from whom they learned that an express went from Texas to Council Grove, and informed the traders of the advance of Snively's expedition; but that the former, having procured

two hundred United States dragoons to guard them across the boundary, would pass on.

On the 17th of June, the Texans received news of the caravan. It was advancing, "composed of sixty wagons, and seventy-five hundred weight of merchandise." About fifteen of the wagons' belonged to Americans, and the whole was guarded by three hundred United States dragoons, under the command of Captain Philip St. George Cooke. On the 20th, while the Texans were awaiting the arrival of the rich prize they had come to find, they met with a detachment of the enemy. The latter secured a good ravine, the only one for miles around in the prairie. The Texans immediately charged them, each one advancing according to the speed of his horse. Some of the Mexicans fled; the others, after discharging their pieces, surrendered. Those who fled were pursued, and three of them killed. The victory showed an aggregate of seventeen killed, and eighty prisoners, eighteen of whom were wounded. The Texans sustained no injury whatever, and from the spoils supplied themselves with horses, saddles, and arms, in abundance.

The Texans marched with their prisoners to a good "water-hole," where they remained until the 24th of June. On that day, about three hundred mounted Indians rushed into their camp at full speed, and one of the picket-guards fired at them, but they proved to be friendly. About this time the Texans began to be dissatisfied, and desired to return to their homes. This dissatisfaction continued; and on the 28th, when the spies came in, and brought no news of the caravan, it was greatly increased. About seventy of the men withdrew from the command, and elected Captain Chandler to lead them home. Three more of the wounded prisoners having died, the others were furnished with arms to keep them in meat, the wounded with mules to ride, and the whole of them set at liberty.

Captain Chandler with his party set out for home on the 29th of June, and Colonel Snively with the remainder proceeded up the Arkansas, to hunt game, and await the caravan. On the 30th, a party of Snively's men crossed to the left bank of the river, to kill buffaloes. They were discovered and run in by the advance of Captain Cooke's dragoons. That officer soon came up with his entire force, consisting of one hundred and ninety-six men, well mounted and equipped, and two pieces of artillery. He sent for Snively to visit him, and asked to see his papers, which were shown to him; whereupon he said to Snively that he believed the Texans were encamped on the territory of the United States.\* Cooke then consulted with his officers, and they were of the same opinion. He then informed Snively that the Texans must be disarmed. Snively protested, and gave his reasons why the Texans were on their own territory. Cooke replied that "he had made his terms, and to them the Texans must submit." He further said that, "if one of Snively's men attempted to escape, he would throw his shells into their encampment, and send his dragoons across the river to cut the command to pieces."

Captain Cooke then crossed over the Arkansas with Colonel Snively, and with his dragoons surrounded the Texan camp, lighted his port-fires, and ordered the Texans to stack their arms, which they did, asking to be received as prisoners-of-war. Cooke told them he had made his terms, and they must submit to them, or they should receive worse. This he said to them after they were disarmed. Cooke then recrossed the river, leaving with Snively's command of a hundred and seven men only ten muskets! The Texans were thus left, surrounded by Mexicans and Indians, six hundred miles from home, though on the soil of Texas, the easy victims of the first-comer. After

\* Snively's report to the Secretary of War, July 9, 1843.

a night's reflection, Cooke saw that such inhumanity would not do, and, on the morning of the 1st of July, he sent for the men, and offered to escort as many of them as wished to go to Independence, Missouri. Some fifty of the Texans took this route, and received three of the ten muskets left with the entire command. The balance refused an escort, unless they were guarded home. Cooke then ordered the Texans to leave the territory of the United States as soon as possible, and departed.

Colonel Snively now sent an express to Captain Chandler, and set out for Elm creek, about eight miles distant, and joined the latter on the 2d of July. Spies were sent off to look after the caravan, as the Texans did not care to give up the main object of the expedition. On the 4th, the Indians *stampeded* their horses, and took off sixty head. The Texans pursued the savages, and killed ten or fifteen of them, having one of their own men killed, and another wounded. On the 8th, the spies brought news that the caravan had crossed the Arkansas, and was on its way to Santa Fé. Snively, finding nearly all the men that had set out for home under Chandler unwilling to pursue it, resigned his command on the 9th of July. Chandler and his party set out for home. It is proper here to state that, by a previous understanding, the fifty men who went with Cooke were to return and join their comrades. They started, but, meeting some other Texans, they all returned to Cooke's command except fourteen.

The Texans now made a trial for volunteers to go after the caravan. They raised eighty-two men, elected Captain Warfield to the command, readopted the Georgetown by-laws, and set out on their march. Seventeen of them faltered, and returned with Chandler; the balance proceeded after the caravan. On the 13th, they struck a fresh trail, believed to be of a large body of Mexicans, under Governor Armijo, who were



escorting the merchants. The Texans, fearing that they would be overpowered, abandoned the further pursuit, and started for home. On the following day, Captain Warfield resigned, and Colonel Snively was re-elected to the command. On the 20th of July, the Texans had a skirmish with the Camanches; and, on the 6th of August, after great privation and suffering, they reached Bird's fort, on the Trinity. Thus closed the Snively expedition.\*

Having now pretty much concluded our accounts of the warlike expeditions in which Texas was interested, we turn to her diplomacy and domestic proceedings. It is proper to state, however, that since the last incursion of the Mexicans into San Antonio, the republic had kept an efficient company of rangers, under the command of Captain John C. Hays, between the western frontier settlements and the Rio Grande, and that its services had been very important. The Indians, being kindly treated, had assumed a more peaceful life; and, under the protection of the government, the trading-houses kept them supplied with the very few articles which they needed. The unfavorable influences of the Santa Fé and Mier expeditions have already been referred to; nor did that of Snively add anything

\* The Texan government made an earnest complaint against this violation of its territory by Captain Cooke, and the president of the United States ordered a court of inquiry to investigate the matter. That tribunal assembled at Fort Leavenworth, and decided that Captain Cooke had acted within the line of his duty, and that he had disarmed the Texans within the territory of the United States. Notwithstanding this decision of the court, however, it turned out that Captain Cooke had invaded the territory of Texas, and had there disarmed the Texans. The Congress of the United States subsequently acknowledged the illegality of Captain Cooke's proceedings, and made a trifling appropriation to the Texans engaged in the expedition. — *General Order, U. S. Army, No. 19, April 24, 1844.*

In reference to the surrender of the Texan rifles, Snively's party would certainly have perished had they not taken the precaution to secrete some of their good rifles, and deliver over the *escopetas* which they had taken from the Mexicans. This will account for their ability to pursue the caravan, and to pass through the country of the Camanchea. — *S. A. Miller's Journal: MS.*

to the glory of the Texan arms. "The first step," observes General Jackson to President Houston, in a letter dated August 31, 1843, "that led to the injury of the fame of Texas, was that foolish campaign to Santa Fé; the next the foolish attempt to invade Mexico, without means and men sufficient for the occasion. The fate of this rashness to those concerned will, I hope, put a stop to these disorders, and control the Texans within the bounds of your orders. The Texans now on the Santa Fé road from the United States can only be viewed by Mexico as a band of robbers—unless there by your orders—and, if taken, will every one be put to death."

In proportion as the Texan sky was overcast by these unlucky campaigns, that of Mexico was the more brightened. A member of the United States Congress, deeply interested in behalf of Texas, and intimate with Almonté, the Mexican minister, approached him upon these matters. "At one time," said Almonté, "we did not suppose that we could reconquer Texas; yet no man could have sustained himself in Mexico who would have declared otherwise, or who would have advocated the acknowledgment of Texan independence: but now the scene has partly changed, and we entertain strong hopes that Texas will soon be so reduced as to offer but little resistance."\* Such was the result of insubordination in Texas, and such the hopes of Mexico.

But there was an influence at work that was destined to do much for Texas: it was a feeling of *jealousy* between the United States and Great Britain. It has been already intimated that the latter had made no serious attempt to produce peace between Mexico and Texas. It was only when she learned that President Tyler and his cabinet were favorable to annexation, that she began to put forth her power. Although the

\* Letter of Isaac Van Zandt, March 4, 1843.

proposition for a union of the two republics had been formally withdrawn by the Texan government, yet Mr. Van Zandt, without instructions to treat, held informal conversations with the members of the American government upon the subject. He found the president and cabinet anxious for the success of the measure, but fearful that it would not meet the sanction of the senate. To stimulate President Tyler, the members of Congress friendly to Texas called upon him individually, and urged him to act, suggesting the designs of the British government. General Jackson was solicited to address a communication to President Tyler upon the subject, which he did; and, at the same time, he wrote to Texas, "I see you are negotiating with Mexico, but be careful of the designing English."

As early as the 10th of February, 1843, the Texan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington was notified by his government that the rejection by the United States of the annexation propositions of 1837 placed Texas in an attitude which would render it improper in her to take the first step toward a renewal of those propositions. He was therefore authorized to say verbally, should the matter be brought up, that it would be necessary for the United States to make an advance so decided as to "open wide the door of negotiation to Texas." Should that be done, then he was instructed to say that Texas renewed the proposal for annexation.

Santa Anna's propositions, through the medium of Robinson, "were everywhere met, by the people to whom they were addressed, with indignation and contempt."\* Yet they satisfied the people of Texas, and of other nations, that the Mexican chief desired to treat; and that, so far as he could venture on his popularity at home, he would do so. The British *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, taking advantage of this pacific disposi-

\* Anson Jones, Texan Secretary of State, to Isaac Van Zandt, May 8, 1843.

tion, under instructions from his government, urged upon Santa Anna the importance of an effort to settle the difference by commissioners to be appointed by each party. He further stated to the dictator that it would be useless to send commissioners to treat, on any terms, so long as the present warfare was carried on.

Santa Anna then authorized Mr. Percy Doyle, the British *chargé d'affaires*, to inform President Houston, through Mr. Elliot, that he would agree to an *armistice*; and stated that he would at once give orders for a total cessation of hostilities on his part, and requested that General Houston would despatch similar orders to the officers commanding the Texan forces. Should this be done, "he was ready to receive any commissioners which might be sent from Texas to treat on the terms proposed by him."\* This communication was immediately despatched by an express brought by her Britannic majesty's sloop *Scylla*, and transmitted to the Texan government at Galveston.† The "terms proposed" by Santa Anna may have been those sent by Robinson, or those transmitted to Mr. Doyle — for the Texan government was only furnished with an extract from Mr. Doyle's letter. It was accompanied, however, by an official and an unofficial letter from Mr. Elliot, expressing the belief that the negotiations, once commenced, would "end in an honorable and desirable peace." In this view the vicomte De Cramayel fully concurred, and joined in urging the armistice.

The president of Texas, on the receipt of these communications, though he had little faith in the result, felt that it would be advantageous to the republic to negotiate, thus allaying for a time the ravages of war. Besides, it would encourage the friends of annexation in the United States, promote immigra-

\* Percy Doyle to Charles Elliot, May 27, 1843.<sup>1</sup>

† Charles Elliot to Anson Jones, June 10, 1843.

tion, and give time to Texas to improve her finances, still in a wretched condition. The armistice was accepted and proclaimed on the 15th of June, to continue pending negotiations for peace, "and until due notice of an intention to resume hostilities (should such intention thereafter be entertained by either party) should be formally announced through her Britannic majesty's *chargés d'affaires* at the respective governments." At the same time, Captain Elliot was informed of the acceptance of the armistice, and requested to obtain the sanction of Mexico to the time of its duration, as set forth in the proclamation, previous to the appointment of commissioners. A despatch was also immediately forwarded to the Texan *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, enclosing copies of all these transactions.\* The sloop *Scylla* carried back to Mexico the acceptance of the armistice, and the proclamation of President Houston.

These diplomatic movements, executed with secrecy and despatch, produced the most intense curiosity and interest in the public mind; and when, a few weeks afterward, a despatch was transmitted from the Texan government to its *chargé* at Washington, saying that, inasmuch as the United States had taken no definite action on the subject of annexation, and there being a prospect of an adjustment of the difficulties with Mexico, the president of Texas deemed it advisable to take no further action in the matter at that time†—when this information was imparted to the American government—the public anxiety was greatly increased. Texas saw the feeling of jealousy between the United States and Great Britain, and *took no pains* to dissipate it. She saw that the contest was for the mastery of the gulf of Mexico—involving the Monroe doctrine; and

\* Anson Jones to Charles Elliot, June 15, 1843. Anson Jones to Isaac Van Zandt, June 15, 1843.

† Anson Jones to Isaac Van Zandt, July 6, 1843.

that, in the final issue, she had in her own hands the disposal of this great inland sea, with all its potent commercial and maritime influences. A dispassionate observer, acquainted with her antecedents, might well conclude that Texas would never fall into the lap of England. A thousand glorious associations connected with the fatherland forbade it; but the politics of the contending powers were not guided by such observers. Their passions, feelings, and pride, were all involved, and the "*pear was ripening*" more rapidly than the conservative school imagined, or even desired. Texas loved the parent-country, and felt that she was excusable in the use of such coyness of conduct as would cause that love to be reciprocated. The giant soul of the American Union could only be aroused by that jealousy which the mysterious diplomacy of Texas produced: and, as the plot thickened, the mystery increased, and with it the jealousy of the United States, until "TEXAS" became the battle-cry through mountains and valleys; and such standard-bearers as Benton, who were waiting for the *pear to ripen*, were overwhelmed, and the victory won!

The president of Texas seemed to enjoy this contest for supremacy between the great powers. To Captain Elliot, the British *chargé d'affaires*, he thus writes: "I know you will be amused at various matters with which 'Capricorn' of the 'Tropic' has been regaling the public at our expense. If we were butterflies, and lived but a day, we might be teased by such things. Pray, don't let them affect your serenity. I am as cool as a shoemaker's lapstone in an open shop at Christmas. I deny nothing; but as I see a piece, on the subject of your correspondence with Santa Anna, in the 'Farmer,' I will send it to you."\* To Judge Eve, the American *chargé*, he writes as follows: "I find, as news reaches me from both the

\* Houston to Elliot, May 7, 1843.



United States and Texas, that the subject of annexation is one that has claimed much attention, and is well received. I find that even the oldest settlers, even some of the original three hundred, are as anxious for the event to take place as any that I meet with. How the project is to ultimate, it is impossible to divine. The democracy of the United States is in favor of the measure; and if it should become a political lever, both of the political parties will grasp at the handle. But of these matters you can judge better than it is possible for me to do; you have more sources of information than I can have.”\*

Thus passed the first half of the year 1843. The publication of the armistice dispersed the warlike preparations of Texas. The people were pleased with the change: ignorant of the moving causes, they saw a prospect of peace. The country never witnessed a more abundant harvest. Immigration was anticipated to a large extent. Fine farms were beginning to dot the face of the country; cattle were multiplying; and hope seemed at last to revel in a clear sky. The president was preparing for a visit to a grand Indian council of all the tribes in Texas, in which the United States were also to be represented.

\* Houston to Eve, February 7, 1843.

## CHAPTER XIV.

ON the 24th of July, 1843, Captain Elliot sent another despatch to the Texan government, transmitting the information, derived from the British *chargé d'affaires* in Mexico, that the duration of the armistice should be determined by the military authorities of the two countries, and referring Texas to General Adrian Woll, then in command at Matamoros. The despatch further proceeded to state that the commissioners to treat could come by land or sea; but that Santa Anna trusted they would be sent with full powers to negotiate upon the terms brought out by Robinson. Captain Elliot adds: "Under these circumstances, it will be for the government of Texas to determine what course to pursue. By admitting the *nominal* concession required of them, peace would be immediately secured; and, with peace, commerce and agriculture would flourish, and the foundations of daily-increasing wealth and power would be laid." This extract shows that the influence of the abolitionists and the Mexican bondholders in London controlled British politics on the Texan question. At the same time that there was perhaps not a single white man in Texas who would for a moment have submitted to even the nominal supremacy of Mexico, it was desirable to push forward the negotiations for an armistice, and establish it upon a solid basis. This could be done without touching the questions that would arise in the

subsequent treaty negotiations. The Texan secretary of state, therefore, in his reply, informed Captain Elliot that his government would accept Santa Anna's proposition to send commissioners to treat with General Woll concerning the terms of the armistice; and, should these be satisfactorily adjusted, then commissioners would be despatched to Mexico, to treat for a permanent peace.\*

On the 26th of July, Lieutenant Galan, of the Mexican army, arrived at Washington, on the *Brasos*, with a letter from General Woll, proposing to make public the armistice so soon as the Texan government recalled the forces under Snively. He also proposed Laredo as a suitable place for the commissioners on the armistice to meet. Woll's letter was addressed to "*General Houston*." The latter referred it to the secretary of war, who replied as though it had been directed to the president of Texas, and informed General Woll that the commissioners would meet at Laredo about the 25th of September; and also that orders had been issued to call in the Snively expedition as soon as it could be reached.†

It is proper likewise to mention that the Texan secretary of state, in his letter to Captain Elliot of the 30th of July, said that if Mexico were sincerely desirous to remove all obstacles to a successful and happy termination of existing difficulties, she should at once release the Texans she held in captivity; for, so long as they were detained, accounts of their sufferings would reach their friends and countrymen in Texas, and keep alive a hostile feeling. Captain Elliot was requested to present this matter, through the British minister in Mexico, to Santa Anna. To this application an answer was shortly re-

\* Charles Elliot to Anson Jones, July 24, 1843. Anson Jones to Charles Elliot, July 30, 1843.

† Adrian Woll to General Houston, July 16, 1843. George W. Hill to Adrian Woll, July 29, 1843.

turned, through the same channel, to the effect that, so soon as the Texan government delivered all the Mexican prisoners in its hands—some of whom had been detained since the battle of San Jacinto—at the headquarters of General Woll, then Santa Anna would release all the Texan captives held by him, though they amounted to more than the Texans held of the Mexicans.\* To this Mr. Jones replied that Texas retained no Mexican prisoners; that those of San Jacinto had all been released in 1837; and, if any of them still remained in the country, it was of their own choice: nevertheless, the president of Texas had issued his proclamation, calling upon all that were in the republic, and who chose to return, to report themselves to Colonel John C. Hays, at Bexar, by the 10th of October, when they would be sent to General Woll free of charge.†

On the 26th of September, George W. Hockley and Samuel M. Williams were appointed, on the part of the Texan government, commissioners to meet those of General Woll, at some point on or near the Rio Grande, to agree upon the terms of the armistice. Their instructions were as follows: "To endeavor to establish a general armistice between Texas and Mexico, to continue during the pendency of negotiations with Mexico for a permanent peace, and adjustment of the difficulties between the two countries, and for such further period as they could agree upon, requiring due notice to be given by either party disposed to resume hostilities, to the other, through the minister of Great Britain resident at the corresponding court, six months previous to any act of hostility; to agree that the government of Texas should appoint commissioners, clothed with full powers, to meet at the capital of Mexico, to

\* Charles Elliot to Anson Jones, August 28, 1843.

† Anson Jones to Charles Elliot, September 4, 1843. Houston's Proclamation, September 4, 1843.

negotiate for the adjustment of all existing difficulties between the two countries, and the establishment of a permanent peace between Texas and Mexico; to require safe conduct by sea or land, to and from the city of Mexico, for the commissioners which might be appointed by the government, as also protection during their stay in Mexico, and for all persons charged with despatches from Texas for the commissioners, and from them to Texas, as is usual among nations in such cases." These, together with some further provisions, prohibiting Mexican soldiers from crossing the Rio Grande, and in relation to the punishment of persons violating the armistice, constituted the instructions to Messrs. Hoekley and Williams.\*

The rumors put in circulation in regard to these matters were infinite; though they would have passed unnoticed, had not the name of General W. S. Murphy, the successor of Judge Eve as *chargé d'affaires* from the United States, been associated with them.† A correspondence ensued, and the rumors were found to be disconnected with General Murphy. Still, the fact was manifest that the jealousy of the United States was greatly excited by this passing and repassing of the British sloop-of-war *Scylla* from Vera Cruz to Galveston, and the consequent armistice. The interest taken by the American government in bringing about a peace between the belligerent countries became the more lively. General Thompson was instructed to protest and remonstrate in the most solemn manner against a recent order of Santa Anna, directing all foreigners taken in arms to be immediately put to death, and to declare

\* Instructions of G. W. Hill, Secretary of War, September 26, 1843.

† Mr. Van Zandt, writing from Washington, under date of November 7, 1843, says: "I think it may be safely set down as true that General Murphy, among other things, thinks that there is an undue intimacy existing between the president of Texas and Captain Elliot." Mr. Van Zandt did not see the despatches, but gathered this much from a conversation with President Tyler.



that the United States viewed that order as inhuman and barbarous, and could not see its execution with indifference. He was further instructed to say that his government viewed the war between Mexico and Texas as having lost its high character, and that it could be called only a war of plunder, pillage, and robbery; that the United States deprecated its further continuance; and, while they did not dispute the right of Mexico to resubjugate Texas if she could, they questioned her right to keep the subject open, and expressed the decided opinion that the war should be at once ended, either by negotiations or by arms. These, with some other very strong observations, constituted the new instructions to the American minister in Mexico, from the pen of Mr. Upshur, the successor of Mr. Webster as secretary of state.\*

In the beginning of October, and while affairs were thus progressing, some difficulties occurred between the governments of Great Britain and Mexico, and of such a character as to cause Mr. Doyle, the British *chargé d'affaires*, to suspend his diplomatic functions. This necessarily cut off the channel of communication between Texas and Mexico. Yet the Texan government was assured that the differences were only temporary.†

\* Isaac Van Zandt to Anson Jones, August 10, 1843.

† Letter of Charles Elliot, November 27, 1843. It appears that, at an anniversary ball given by Santa Anna, at which the different foreign ministers were in attendance, there was a display of flags taken in battle. Among them was a British standard taken from an English sailor at the battle of Mier. Mr. Doyle, the British minister, requested that it might be removed, and was assured that it should be done the next day. Time passed on until the 27th of September, when another ball was given. Mr. Doyle, on attending, saw the English union jack still hanging in the *salon de reception*. After some strong diplomatic notes, Mr. Doyle suspended his functions. There were also some other differences in regard to certain claims due to British subjects, which, being brought into the discussion, influenced the minister in the course he took. Mr. Doyle, previous to the suspension of his functions, had transmitted to Santa Anna what Houston had said about the Mexican prisoners in Texas, and his proclamation for the re-



In the meantime, the Texan government, to strengthen its hold upon the western frontier, encouraged a trade between the people of the two countries at Corpus Christi, and urged the United States and Great Britain to appoint consuls for that port.

The eighth Texan Congress assembled at Washington on the 4th of December, 1843. The message of President Houston did not appear until the 12th. In that paper he referred with pleasure to the prosperous condition of the republic, her growing commerce, and the good results of the pacific policy pursued toward the Indian tribes, with all of whom, except two, treaties had been made. He referred also to the pending negotiations for an armistice with Mexico, and stated that the two individuals appointed by Texas had set out on their mission. For the kind offices of the three great powers in bringing about these negotiations he presented the thanks of the country. The efforts of the British government were particularly named as flowing from a sincere and "disinterested" desire to bring about a result honorable to the republic.

But the message of the Texan chief magistrate was soon forgotten in the excitement produced by that of John Tyler, president of the United States, delivered to the federal Congress on the 5th of December, 1843. The Mexican government, anticipating some action in the American Congress on the subject of annexation, had forestalled the result by threatening the United States with a declaration of war if such annexation took place. President Tyler referred to this threat as idle; and, after speaking of the predatory character of the war which had been waged by Mexico for eight years, declared that "the

lease of any that might remain; but, by the breaking off of his official intercourse, the former was prevented from pursuing the matter of the release of the Texan prisoners in Mexico any further.

Creator of the universe had given man the earth for his resting-place, and its fruits for his subsistence. Whatever, therefore, should make the first, or any part of it, a scene of desolation, affected injuriously his heritage, and might be regarded as a general calamity. Wars might sometimes be necessary, but all nations had a common interest in bringing them speedily to a close." All this was sound philosophy; and President Tyler, in its practical application, declared that the "United States had an immediate interest in seeing an end put to the state of hostilities existing between Mexico and Texas." Among other reasons given why the American Union could not be indifferent, he affirmed that "a warfare, such as was waged between those two nations, was calculated to weaken both powers, and finally to render them—and especially the weaker of the two—the subjects of interference on the part of stronger and more powerful nations, which, intent only on advancing their own peculiar views, may sooner or later attempt to bring about a compliance with terms, as the condition of their interposition, alike derogatory to the nation granting them, and detrimental to the interests of the United States." President Tyler then gave many cogent reasons why the United States could not quietly submit to such interference, and declared that they were bound by interest and sympathy to see that Texas was left free to act, "especially in regard to her domestic affairs, unawed by force, and unrestrained by the policy or views of other countries."

This message reached the British and French representatives to the Texan government at New Orleans. They were "wonder-struck."—"When Texas," said they, "has arrived at a state of truce with Mexico, with no help from the United States, and has good hope of a permanent peace, out comes the government of the United States with a declaration that Mexico is not to be suffered to make war against her. Why, she is

*not* making war against her; and this notice would have been more kindly timed in December, 1842, when there was good reason to believe that Mexico did meditate an incursion into Texas. But at that time the United States were negotiating their claim-convention with Mexico, and then it did not suit them to irritate the Mexican government. 'Pay us the money, and you may do what you like with Texas,' was the music of December, 1842; but, now that there is a hope of settlement, the United States do what they can to prevent it. That Mr. Tyler should have said so much concerning the settlement of the affairs of Texas, without one syllable of notice of the wishes or feelings of the government and people of Texas, is certainly the most barefaced piece of political impudence on record. And when Mr. Tyler speaks of the geographical line of division, and of the opinions of some people that the territory actually belongs to the United States, he is a *gigantic joker*. Such drollery beats the world.

"When he arrives at the point of deciding that the United States will not suffer Texas to entertain any project respecting the abolition of slavery—for that is meant broadly enough—he really seems to be intending something very little short of the *enslaving* of the government and people of Texas. Whatever may be the *decision* of the government and people of Texas on that, or any other subject of internal interest, it is surely their unquestionable right to entertain or reject any proposition made to them by powers in alliance with them, without asking the good leave of Mr. Tyler—and upon grounds which they may judge best suited to their own interests and honor.

"If Texas admits these lofty pretensions of the United States, there is reason to fear that other powers will think she is already *swallowed up*, or that Mr. Tyler's *geographical line* is rubbed out."

Such were the feelings and language of the great European powers on reading President Tyler's message ; and, while they were charging him with dictatorial assumptions, they were actually dictating to Texas the course she should pursue, if she desired a continuance of their smiles. But President Houston "was as cool as a shoemaker's lapstone on Christmas-day," and thought the republic very happy in having so many good friends. As for the people of Texas, they were duly advised of the proceedings at Exeter hall, and of the influence exerted by the Mexican bondholders in London, and were not so patient as their chief magistrate. In their reminiscences, they went behind the period of December, 1842, to the times when they so much needed "aid and comfort" in men and money—and were not disappointed—to the time when, in the hour of their infancy and helplessness, they were told by Lord Palmerston that "her majesty's government would be justifiable in sending out a ship-of-war to Texas," to demand the payment of certain claims against the republic.\*

Let us recur for a moment to the efforts actually made by Great Britain in behalf of Texas, and the interest which she fancied she had in effecting a peace:—

1. By the Hamilton convention of November 14, 1840, Great Britain offered her mediation between the belligerent states, for the consideration that, if successful, Texas "would take upon herself a portion amounting to one million pounds sterling of the capital of the foreign debt contracted by Mexico, prior to the first day of February, 1835." This tender of the mediation of Great Britain was rejected by Mexico, of which Texas had due notice.

2. In 1842, Texas applied to the three great powers—the United States, Great Britain, and France—to interpose jointly

\* Palmerston to Henderson, November 12, 1839.

in her behalf, for the termination of the war. To this proposition France and the United States were willing to accede, but Great Britain preferred that each power should act separately. In the spring of 1843, Texas learned that these efforts were hopeless.

3. At the same time, Texas was informed that Mr. Doyle, the British *chargé d'affaires*, had been instructed to propose to Mexico a settlement of her difficulties with Texas, based upon the abolition of slavery in the latter. We are not advised what were the representations made by Mr. Doyle to Santa Anna, that brought about the proposition for a truce; but, consequent upon the truce, Messrs. Hockley and Williams had been sent to the Rio Grande, to negotiate an armistice. Pending this negotiation, Great Britain invited France to join her in the mediation. The United States were doubtless excluded on account of the slavery question, as also from the desire of those two powers to prevent the American Union from acquiring further territory and influence upon the gulf of Mexico.\*

The commissioners to negotiate the armistice proceeded to Sabinas, on the west side of the Rio Grande, where they met Señors Landeras and Jaunequi, commissioners appointed by General Woll, in pursuance of orders from Santa Anna, and the negotiation commenced. The first propositions presented by the Texan commissioners were fully in accordance with their instructions. The object of the government of Texas in this negotiation was, to procure an armistice of as great dura-

\* Messrs. Henderson and Van Zandt to Mr. Calhoun, April 22, 1844. Nor do we know whether Mr. Doyle stated, in his note to Captain Elliot, that Santa Anna's propositions were based on the paper sent to Texas by Robinson. One thing is certain, however—that, in the extract from Mr. Doyle's note furnished the Texan government by Captain Elliot, the Robinson propositions were neither named nor hinted at; nor were they referred to in Captain Elliot's letters. The latter had been informed that the Robinson propositions were wholly inadmissible.

tion as possible, and not to enter into a discussion of any of the questions to be afterward settled by commissioners to treat of peace. The instructions furnished General Woll by Santa Anna were of a general nature; but both governments required the agreement, when made, to be submitted for ratification or rejection. After some difficulties, the negotiation was cut short by information of proceedings in the United States and Texas in regard to annexation. The intelligence of these movements so exasperated the Mexicans, that the commissioners from Texas scarcely felt safe under the pledges of protection given. The latter signed the armistice on the 18th of February, 1844, and returned home. It was promptly rejected on the part of Texas, because it referred to her as a *department of Mexico*. "I did not deem it necessary," says President Houston, "to take any action upon the agreement signed by our commissioners, further than to reject it silently. I supposed that Santa Anna would calculate, as a matter of course, that some action would take place under it, and consequently that we would gain time by silence."\*

To return to the causes that disturbed the negotiations for an armistice. It is scarcely necessary to inquire who first proposed the question of annexation. We have already seen that it was predicted in general terms by the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, immediately after the American Revolution; and that it was alluded to more definitely by Captain Pike, in 1806; also that it was named by General Houston, directly after the battle of San Jacinto, and formally presented by the government of Texas in 1837. Afterward, in 1842, it was officially intimated as a question having vitality. But on the 6th of July, 1843, the subject was suspended by order of the Texan government. On the 18th of September following, that gov-

\* Houston to Van Zandt and Henderson, May 10, 1844.



erament was notified, through its *chargé d'affaires* at Washington, that Mr. Secretary Upshur brought up the subject in all his official interviews, stating that "it was the great measure of the administration, and that he was actively engaged, under the instructions of President Tyler, in preparing the minds of the people for it, and in learning the views of senators on the subject." He further informed Mr. Van Zandt that President Tyler contemplated early action upon the subject; and requested Mr. Van Zandt to make the same known to his government, in order that, if Texas desired to treat on that subject, she might clothe her representative with suitable powers. On the 16th of October, Mr. Upshur made a formal proposition to treat on the question; and Mr. Van Zandt transmitted it to Texas, asking the advice of his government.\* At this time, the young republic was most delicately situated. Many of her citizens were prisoners in Mexico, and it was desirable not to irritate that country until they were released. Vague propositions for peace were passing through the channel of the British ministers; and Texas thought she could treat for annexation on better terms if she could have her independence first acknowledged by Mexico. In addition to these considerations, should she enter into negotiations with the United States, and the treaty fail in the senate, she would lose the friendship of Great Britain and France, exasperate Mexico, and, what was worse than all, compromise her own dignity and self-respect. For these reasons, the Texan executive was wary, and suspended his action upon the propositions advanced by President

\* Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Jones, October 16, 1843. It would appear, from these facts, that President Tyler has the credit of having initiated the proposition on the part of the United States. But a very distinguished and reliable authority said (January 17, 1844): "General Jackson has done much to arouse up this administration to make the proposition. He, more than any man, is the basis of whatever has been proposed to your government."—*Letter of A. V. Brown.*

Tyler. The discussions on the subject among the people of the United States were daily growing in interest; and the backwardness of Texas in closing in with Mr. Upshur's proposals, only increased the excitement. What could President Houston mean? The public mind in both countries was on tiptoe; and the curiosity to look into the diplomatic notes that were supposed to be passing to and from the Texan government was hardly restrained within the bounds of good manners.

On the 18th of December, 1843, a resolution was adopted in the Texan senate of an extraordinary character. After referring in the preamble to the existing excitement, it proceeded to set forth that, "whereas, it is now understood that a special messenger has been despatched this morning to the government of the United States, charged with important matters connected with said negotiations, the same being secret from the representatives of the people; and, whereas, it is the especial duty of the members of this Congress to inquire into all matters in which their constituents are supposed to be deeply interested, and particularly in regard to those which have produced great excitement in the public mind: *Be it therefore resolved*, That the president be requested to recall said special messenger, and delay his departure, until the matters to be communicated through him shall have been made known to this Congress, and such action shall be had thereon as shall be deemed advisable." The president, in a very pointed message, refused to comply with this resolution.\* On the 22d of December, the representative branch of the Congress made another call; this also he declined.† Unable to get anything

\* Message to the Senate, December 20, 1843. Executive Record, p. 281.

† Message to the House, January 1, 1844. Executive Record, p. 294. General Jackson was very severe upon the Texan Congress for these calls. He says: "I have seen the impudent call upon you for all the correspondence between Great Britain and Texas, Mexico and Texas, and the United States and Texas;

from their president, they applied to General Murphy, the United States *chargé d'affaires* in Texas, for copies of the correspondence; but this he flatly refused. The president informed the house of representatives, in reply to its call, that, although it would not be proper to publish the correspondence, yet the speaker and the committee on foreign affairs, by calling at the state department, could read and examine it. They did so, and were so far satisfied. But what had already been done, had become public: the prospect of a favorable armistice with Mexico was blighted; the release of the Texan prisoners was postponed; Great Britain was aroused to ask for explanations; and the peace of the republic was jeopardized.

Before responding to the proposition of Mr. Upshur, the executive of Texas wished to assure himself of two things: first, that the treaty, when made, would be ratified by the United States senate—lest Texas should be humbled and made cheap by a failure; second, that Texas should be protected by the United States against her enemy, pending negotiations. On the first point, he was assured by the most intelligent and influential men in the United States that the treaty would be ratified. “I think I can lay my finger on forty senators,” says one, “who would vote for it, while, you know, thirty-five would be sufficient.”—“I have no doubt,” observed another, to whom for nearly a third of a century he had looked for advice\*—“I

and I have gloried in your firmness and wisdom in withholding it, under your present and existing circumstances. I now say to you, as I said to the organ of President Tyler, when he informed me that the president had thought of naming the subject of the annexation of Texas to the United States in his message—that this business should be transacted under the greatest secrecy; and the first public notice of this act should be when the treaty was concluded and laid before the senate for ratification; and then kept secret, if that were possible, till ratified.”—*Jackson to Houston, January 23, 1844.*

\* The intimate acquaintance of General Houston with General Jackson commenced in 1816, when the former was introduced by Colonel Thomas S. Jesup into the military family of the latter. Colonel Robert Butler, the adjutant-

have no doubt but the treaty will be ratified by the senate as, our friends write me that thirty-nine senators will vote for its ratification, while thirty-five are two thirds."

On the second point, Mr. Van Zandt inquired of Mr. Upshur, confidentially, whether, after the treaty was signed, and before it was ratified, the president of the United States would order a military and naval force to the proper points on the gulf of Mexico sufficient to protect Texas from foreign aggression.\* In reply, he was directed to assure the government of Texas that, the moment the treaty was signed, President Tyler would send a naval squadron upon the gulf, and a military force to the Texan borders, to act as circumstances should require; and, furthermore, the United States would then say to Mexico, "You must in nowise disturb or molest Texas."†

In anticipation of a satisfactory solution of these points, President Houston, on the 20th of January, 1844, sent to the Congress of Texas his secret annexation message.‡ As the proper assurances had not then been received from President Tyler, it was carefully guarded. He suggested to the Congress that, "if they evinced too much anxiety, it would be general of Jackson's division, was desirous of obtaining an assistant in his office, and wrote to Colonel Jesup on the subject. The answer of the latter will show how this intimacy first commenced:—

"HEADQUARTERS, BATON ROUGE, November 1, 1816.

"DEAR SIR: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th ult. Lieutenant Rodgers has just reported to me that he has declined a situation in your office. Lieutenant Houston, who is now at Maryville on furlough, would in all probability accept the situation were it offered to him. I am not acquainted with him, but I am told he is well qualified.

"I have the honor to be, &c.,

"THOMAS S. JESUP, *Colonel commanding 8th Military Department.*

"P. S.—Croghan spoke of him in the highest terms when he turned over the command to me.

"T. S. J.

"To Colonel ROBERT BUTLER, *Adjutant-General, Nashville, Tennessee.*"

\* Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Upshur, January 17, 1844.

† Mr. Van Zandt to Mr. Jones, January 23, 1844.

‡ Executive Record, p. 307.

regarded as importunity, and the voice of supplication, in such cases, seldom commanded great respect." The object of the message was an appropriation to cover the expenses of an additional agent to the United States, should certain contingencies happen. The appropriation was made; and, in the meantime, the assurances of protection came to hand. Having all things ready, and, as he supposed, the points well secured, President Houston wrote to General Henderson — the person he had appointed to co-operate with Mr. Van Zandt in forming a treaty — to come *immediately* to Washington on the Brasos, on his way to the United States.\* The commission was soon assembled at Washington city, and the business of forming a treaty immediately began.

In the meantime, Captain Elliot, the astonished witness of all that was made public, and one well qualified to conjecture what was secret, asked for explanations from the Texan government. The president and secretary of state both answered him very kindly; and it happened that they had some very cogent reasons to offer in justification of the course pursued. While they expressed the greatest confidence in the good will of her majesty's government, they reminded Captain Elliot that the armistice had failed, that the Texan prisoners were still held in bondage at Peroté, that the British minister at Mexico had suspended his functions, and consequently the influence of Great Britain as a mediator had become paralyzed; that the nations to whom Texas had appealed had given no pledge that Santa Anna should not invade her frontiers; that her situation was critical, and she had been worn down by ceaseless watching and anxiety; and, finally, that the proposition for annexation had been made by the government of the United States, and the required pledges given for the protection of Texas against

\* Houston to Henderson, February 10, 1844.

her enemy, and, for the sake of peace and future security, the republic had accepted them.\*

The instructions of Messrs. Henderson and Van Zandt were of a general character, referring to those given to General Hunt by Stephen F. Austin, secretary of state, in 1836. Two additional points, however, were named: they were to provide in the treaty that the territory of Texas might thereafter be divided into four states; and also, in regard to the Texan navy, that the national vessels should become the property of the United States, the latter paying the builders thereof the price agreed to be paid by Texas for them.† They were further instructed to regard the boundary of Texas as defined by her statute.‡

While these things were passing, the French and British governments united in a protest against the annexation of the young republic to the American Union.‖ Nevertheless, Texas, having embarked in the matter, was in earnest about it; and her commissioners, and all her friends who could use any influence, were engaged. The treaty was at length completed, on the 12th of April, 1844, signed by the Texan commissioners and Mr. Calhoun (who succeeded to the state department after

\* Captain Elliot to the President of Texas, March 8 and 22, 1844. President of Texas to Captain Elliot, March —, 1844.

† Mr. Jones to Messrs. Henderson and Van Zandt, February 25, 1844.

‡ President Houston, in pursuance of the secret act authorizing the sale of the Texan navy, had ordered the disposal of it at Galveston, in the latter part of 1843, but it was forcibly resisted by certain persons there. When, afterward, the annexation propositions of President Tyler were entertained, the prospect of including the navy and the debt due for it in the treaty, induced the Texan executive to recommend a repeal of the secret act authorizing its sale, which was done.

‖ Ashbel Smith to Anson Jones, February 29, 1844. This protest, which had been drawn up by the ministers of England and France, was countermanded — the protestants fearing that it might increase the excitement of the people of the United States, and unite them on the subject of annexation. — *Ashbel Smith to President Houston, August 31, 1844.*



the untimely death of Mr. Upshur), and sent by President Tyler to the American senate for ratification.

At the time this treaty was presented to the senate, there is little doubt but a majority of the people of the United States—and a large majority—were in favor of its ratification; but the senate, generally deliberate, grave, and just in its conclusions and advice, was at that time greatly agitated by the approaching presidential election. The popular voice in the United States, though slow in finding utterance, will always in the end be heard. This voice was more potent for annexation than the grave senators believed it to be. Of the two parties into which the people of the Union were divided, Henry Clay was the idol of the whigs, and the embodiment of their principles. Martin Van Buren was the favorite of the democrats; and it was confidently expected that they would each be nominated by their respective parties at the approaching conventions—that of the whigs to be held at Baltimore, on the 1st of May; and that of the democrats at the same place, on the 27th of the same month. They were both called upon for their views on the subject of annexation. Mr. Clay made public his opposition to the measure in a letter dated at Raleigh, North Carolina, on the 17th of April. Mr. Van Buren soon followed, taking the same position. So soon as these letters were published, those acquainted with the party ties which bound senators and citizens to their political chieftains were satisfied that the treaty would be rejected in the senate. Yet in the discussion in that grave body the influence of the public voice was manifest; for those whose party relations urged them in opposition, took that ground with a *saving clause*: they were in favor of annexation in the abstract, but the way, the form in which it had been brought up, did not suit them.

The whig convention nominated Mr. Clay on the 1st day of

May, as the candidate of that party for the presidency. This gave a party sanction to his Raleigh letter, and his leading friends took ground against the admission of Texas. A public functionary of the republic, then at Baltimore, and unacquainted with such scenes as he there witnessed, says: "In the immense concourse of persons assembled here during this week from the various parts of the Union, there was *not one* to be found to raise his voice in our behalf; and I declare to you that such a thing as sympathy for us as a nation, however pressing our difficulties, is totally unknown among this people: and whatever might be our fate, it would receive more derision than regret. The opinion very generally prevails that we are a nation of scoundrels, speculators, and adventurers, unworthy to occupy a place in this party-cursed country, and we are treated in accordance with this notion."

Between the 1st and the 27th of May, the democratic leaders had time to look over the ground, and take advantage of the response that came up from distant states. As calls had been made upon other public men for their views on this annexation question, and many had answered favorably, politicians of foresight were surveying this list in search of a friend to Texas who would do for a standard-bearer in the contest of November. However, no agreement was made before the assembling of the convention. Mr. Van Buren had been endeared to the democratic party by his earnest efforts to establish a constitutional treasury, free from the control of bank-corporations. When the convention met, however, and the pledges of delegates had been redeemed by casting their votes for Mr. Van Buren, and the untrammelled question was presented between that gentleman and annexation, he was rejected, and the nomination conferred on James K. Polk, of Tennessee, a civilian of considerable political talent, and of unexceptionable charac-

ter, who had already come out in favor of the annexation policy. George M. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, having similar views, was nominated for vice-president. Thenceforth the cry of "Polk, Dallas, Texas, and Oregon,"\* electrified the masses of the Union. It was the political *sirocco*, sweeping over the country, and winding up the public history of proud statesmen and conservative patriots.

To return to the proceedings of the American senate. That body discussed the treaty of annexation until the 8th of June. It was then rejected by a vote of sixteen to thirty-five. Mr. Benton was particularly severe upon President Tyler, and declared that this Texas question had been sprung on the eve of the Baltimore convention, to give second-rate politicians time to amend their answers. Yet, beneath all the political bitterness of that day, there was a strong current which Mr. Tyler, through wisdom or good fortune, discovered. He followed it up, and, though he had no party to raise him a second time to the presidency, he had the high honor to connect his name with one of the most important steps taken by the United States since their confederation. For this the pen of impartial history will do him justice.

The receipt of the news of the rejection of the treaty produced a painful sensation in the public mind in Texas. The people felt that they had been twice spurned by their natural parent, and that their heroic sufferings had all been lost upon

\* Among other proceedings of the Baltimore convention of May 27, 1844, they resolved that "the reoccupation of Oregon and the *reannexation* of Texas, at the earliest practicable period, are great American measures, which this convention recommends to the cordial support of the democracy of the Union."—*The Statesman's Manual*, vol. ii., p. 1426. The word "*reannexation*" was a great favorite with General Jackson. He used it in his letters. The idea was as old as the treaty with De Ouiz. The day after Houston left the convention at Washington on the Brasos, to take command of the army, he wrote back to Collingsworth, chairman of the military committee, advising that "Texas be declared a portion of Louisiana."

her. There were few men in the republic who had not at the moment resolved to banish for ever all affection for her, and seek among strangers and foreign nations a more congenial friendship and protection. For the sake of the mother-country Texas had turned the cold shoulder to Great Britain and France, and greatly exasperated Mexico; and yet, for all this, to be denounced by the political orators of the Union as a country of "scoundrels, speculators, and adventurers," and have her character and dignity made the football of factions, was too bad! Texas felt humbled: not that she had not done her duty, and acted in good faith with all nations, but because she had been deceived. She could not cast any blame upon her great friends, who had so earnestly and sincerely besought her to accept the propositions of President Tyler; but she did blame those in high places who withheld their hands to welcome her into the federal Union; and she rejoiced that their opposition to her had brought down upon them an avalanche, under which they were crushed!

General Murphy, the American *chargé d'affaires* in Texas, announced the result to the latter government in a few words. "The treaty," said he, "is rejected, and so is my nomination: the tail went with the hide!"\* The feelings and hopes of the friends of Texas in the United States are fully expressed in the following view taken of the matter by General Jackson: "The rejection of the treaty filled me with regret; but the effect of this movement brings the subject directly to the attention of the people: and we shall, in the course of a few months, be enabled to understand what their verdict will be. There is every reason now to believe that discussion and reflection are strengthening the views of the politicians who favor annexation; and that Mr. Clay, weakened by his position on this sub-

\* W. S. Murphy to the President of Texas, July 3, 1844.

ject, will be defeated by a large majority. So confident am I that this will be the case, that I am anxious you should be prepared for it, and not take any course for Texas which may create new embarrassment in the negotiation or legislation which will be necessary to carry into effect the measure of annexation.”\*

The public feeling in Texas at that time was perhaps well expressed in General Houston's reply to the above communication: “The moment I received your last letters, I did not respond to them, because I wished to await the further developments which have since taken place. I announce to you with pleasure that Texas is free from all involvements and pledges; and her future course, I trust, will be marked by a proper regard for her true interests. My decided opinion is, that she should maintain her present position, and act aside from every consideration but that of her own nationality. It is now the duty of the United States to make an advance that can not be equivocal in its character; and when she opens the door, and removes all impediments, it might be well for Texas to accept the invitation.”†

Texas, now finding herself alone—abandoned by the land of her origin—turned to the “lone star,” the beacon of former victories, and, with a proud though wounded spirit, determined to make it respectable. There was one consideration, however, that still withheld her arm: she was well advised that the voice of the American senate was not the voice of the people. Every state in that Union was represented by citizens in Texas; and from Maine to Louisiana their friends assured them that Polk would be elected, and all would be well.

Mexico received with pleasure the news of the rejection of

\* Jackson to Houston, July 19, 1844.

† Houston to Jackson, December 13, 1844.

the treaty of annexation, and Santa Anna made preparations for another marauding incursion to San Antonio; but domestic troubles changed the face of things, and induced him to countermand the order. By the terms of the armistice, if it had been ratified, it was to expire on the 1st of May, 1844, unless there was a prospect of a treaty of peace being made. The Mexican government waited until June, in order to receive further information from Texas, but, obtaining none, General Woll, on the 19th of that month, sent a notice to "General Houston" that "hostilities were renewed, and declared to exist from the 11th instant." He took occasion to state further, by order of Santa Anna, that his government "was highly indignant at the perfidious conduct of the said inhabitants of Texas toward Mexico" in regard to the armistice. To this note the president despatched to Santa Anna a suitable reply.\*

The Texan government inquired of President Tyler whether, since the rejection of the treaty, the American forces in the gulf of Mexico and on the borders of Texas would be withdrawn. The answer was, that they would still remain as they were; only, that they would correspond with the United States *chargé d'affaires* in Texas instead of the president of the republic. The naval squadron under Captain Conner, and the military force under General Taylor, although they would have had no power to act had Mexico invaded Texas, served nevertheless to overawe the former government. However, as has been already stated, Mexico had troubles at home, which prevented her from executing the bloody threats of General Woll.

The European governments, rejoiced that the senate of the United States had so far co-operated with them in preventing annexation, determined on a new effort to place the question on such ground as would for ever prevent its consummation.

\* Houston to Santa Anna, July 29, 1844.



The difference between Great Britain and Mexico about the flag was hastily patched up, and a new minister sent to the latter. Great Britain and France, in order to prevent the United States from obtaining Texas, were willing to waive the question of slavery, and united their efforts to procure from Mexico the recognition of the independence of Texas, provided the latter would agree to maintain her independent position. In this effort, they proposed to secure the United States as a joint guarantor. In the meantime, after the treaty had been made with President Tyler, General Henderson was recalled from Washington; and, after its rejection, Mr. Van Zandt was permitted to resign, and the relations of Texas with the American government were left in the hands of the secretary of legation.\*

The internal affairs of Texas were now comparatively prosperous. The increase in the revenue from customs had kept the government from starving. That from direct taxation had been badly managed—principally, however, for want of laws to enforce its collection. For the year 1843, of the sum of forty-nine thousand dollars assessed, only thirteen thousand dollars had been collected and paid in. The Texan tariff amounted to an average of twenty-four per cent. The Congress, in February, 1844, had passed a bill to reduce it to seventeen per cent.; but the president, in order to sustain the government, vetoed the act. Had it been approved, it would have reduced the annual income thirty thousand dollars. This indirect revenue, though exceedingly onerous to the western section of the country, was absolutely necessary to supply the wants of the government. It was more heavily felt in western Texas, because the facilities for smuggling along the line of the Sabine and Red rivers were such, that the eastern portion of the republic paid but a small amount of duties.

\* Anson Jones to Isaac Van Zandt, July 13, 1844.

The effects of immigration and improvement were visible over the whole country. The pacific policy of the administration had given comparative security to the frontiers, and immigrants were opening farms and laying out settlements high up in the valleys of the Texan rivers. Among the means employed by the government for hastening the settlement of its waste lands was that of *colony contracts*. In pursuance of an act of Congress, President Lamar entered into a contract, on the 30th of August, 1841, with W. S. Peters and others, for the introduction of six hundred families into Texas within three years.\* Afterward, two supplemental contracts were made, the time extended, and the number of families to be introduced increased to eight hundred.† Again, on the 20th of January, 1843, another contract was made with C. F. Mercer and others, as assignees of Peters and others. A year afterward, another contract was entered into with Mercer and his associates.‡ On the 15th of February, 1842, a contract was made with Henri Castro and John Jassaud for the introduction of six hundred families within three years.¶ On the 7th of June, 1842, a contract was concluded with Henry F. Fisher and Burchard Miller, to introduce a like number of families within the same time. It is scarcely necessary to say that, in all these contracts, with the exception of those of Castro and Jassaud, and Fisher and Miller, the government was badly treated. The contractors generally incurred no expense, and put themselves to little trouble, further than to give notice, which the government could have done with more effect. Yet the announcements thus made public, that lands would be given to colonists who

\* Act of January 4, 1841, section 4.

† Supplemental contracts of November 20, 1841, and July 26, 1842.

‡ January 29, 1844.

¶ By joint resolution, January 27, 1845, two years more were given for the performance of the contract.

should settle them, brought many immigrants to the Texan frontiers. Being unaided and unprotected by the contractors, who seemed only to be interested in their premium lands, the colonists did the best they could. The result of these contracts, upon the whole, has been unfavorable to Texas, especially since the act of annexation, as new immigrants have found the country encumbered with these old claims.

The election for president and vice-president of Texas was held, under the constitution, on the first Monday in September, 1844. The candidates before the people for the first office were Dr. Anson Jones, secretary of state under Houston's administration, and General Edward Burleson, the vice-president. Dr. JONES was elected. Colonel K. L. ANDERSON was chosen vice-president, with only a nominal opposition. The result was considered as a popular approval of the pacific policy of the pending administration, as that was made a question.

The Texan prisoners taken at Mier had been still suffering at Peroté. Occasionally, one or two were released, at the special request of some one; but on the 16th of September, 1844, the remainder, one hundred and four in number, were liberated by Santa Anna. He had recently lost his wife, and obtained permission from the Mexican Congress to retire for a while to *Manga de Clavo*, to mourn over his bereavement. He left the capital on the 12th of September; and it is probable that, on the way, his reflections upon the late severe visitation of his hearthstone inspired him with this act of mercy. The released captives returned to their homes, where they were joyfully received.

The republic of Texas, from a state of disorder and turmoil, had become peaceable and prosperous. The invasion by the Mexicans, so long threatened, had become a bugbear at which no one was alarmed. To the orderly disposition of the country,

however, there was one exception—the war of the “*Regulators*” and “*Moderators*.” Of the long list of worthies who had occupied the *neutral ground*, there was still a remnant left, living mostly in the county of Shelby and the adjoining territory of Louisiana. Their ranks had been increased by refugees from the United States, driven thence by the bankrupt-law of 1841, and by events connected with the presidential campaign of the previous year. After the opening of the Texan land-office in 1838, the profits arising from the sale of head-right certificates suggested the idea of their manufacture on a large scale. The board of land-commissioners for Shelby county were found suitable instruments for this business. It was not, however, confined to this county, but the focus of their operations was here. These operations were not limited to the sale of forged head-rights, but included the free circulation of counterfeit money, and depredations upon the property of other people. The first open outbreak occurred in 1842. Charles W. Jackson, formerly of Kentucky, who had been running a steamboat on the Mississippi and lower Red rivers, for some crime had disappeared from his business, and set up a mercantile house at Shreveport, Louisiana. A party of men, seeing a reward offered for Jackson, arrested him, and placed him on a vessel bound for New Orleans. He, however, made his escape, and returned to Shreveport before his captors, where he gathered his friends around him, and, when the former returned, a battle was fought between the parties, in which Jackson succeeded in killing some of his enemies and driving the others out of the place. To avoid further trouble, Jackson fled to Shelby county, in Texas, where he ran as a candidate for representative to Congress, but was defeated, as he declared, by the makers of the head-right certificates. He gave notice to the land-office at Austin of their dealings; in consequence of

which he received a letter from Joseph Goodbread, notifying him that, if he did not desist from meddling with what did not concern him, he would be killed ; and that, if no one else would do it, the writer would. Shortly afterward, Jackson presented the letter to Goodbread in the town of Shelbyville, and in a moment after shot him down. Jackson was called to answer for this offence, but moved the trial to the adjoining county of Harrison. As the cause produced great excitement, a large number of armed men attended the court, but mostly on Jackson's side. On the second day of the term, Judge Hansford, whose duty it was to try the cause, failed to make his appearance ; in fact, he had abandoned the court, leaving Jackson and his party masters of the field.\* The latter proceeded with his friends, and arrested the chief-justice of Panola county and some others, and sent them to Louisiana, to be tried for some offence committed there. After some other acts of this character in that section of the country, the law became only a passive looker-on, while men followed with impunity their own passions and appetites. Captain Jackson and his party had now associated together to *regulate* society, and to punish stealing, robbery, and like offences. But the offenders were men of genius : for their own protection, many of them joined the *regulators* ; and, as new converts are distinguished by their zeal, many honest men thus lost their property and their lives. To counteract the bad effect of these operations, a company of *moderators* was organized, and such of the desperadoes as had not joined the *regulators* fell into their ranks. Thus, in a short time, Shelby county, and portions of surrounding counties, together with a part of Louisiana, were arrayed against each other. The strife had gradually become more exciting for four years, when, in the summer and fall of 1844, it became neces-

\* Memoranda of Captain Ephraim Doggett.



sary for the government to interpose, to prevent civil war. President Houston accordingly ordered General Smith to raise a portion of the militia, and repair to the scene of anarchy. Some five hundred of the government forces assembled there; and, by a prudent and firm course of conduct, the belligerents were induced to lay down their arms and submit to the laws.\*

The presidential election in the United States resulted in the success of Polk and Dallas by a majority in the electoral college of sixty-five votes. This was to the world an assurance of the incorporation of Texas into the American Union. Accordingly, joint resolutions for the annexation of Texas to the United States passed the house of representatives on the 25th of February, 1845, by a vote of one hundred and twenty to ninety-eight. On the 1st of March, they passed the senate, by a vote of twenty-seven to twenty-five; and, on the same day, President Tyler had the high honor of giving them his official sanction.†

The result of this act on the part of the federal Congress had a happy effect on the public mind. Those who had opposed the measure began now to look at it with other eyes, and all

\* Wat Moorman was captain of the *regulators*, and John M. Bradley of the *moderators*. Moorman killed Bradley at the church-door in San Augustine, just at the close of divine service, one evening in the summer of 1844, and retired to Shelby county. A writ for his arrest was placed in the hands of the sheriff of that county. Moorman resisted, and was sustained by the *regulators*; the *moderators* rallied around the sheriff, to aid in his capture. Thus the two parties, numbering about one hundred and seventy-five on each side, were arrayed against each other. They fortified, and for some weeks were under arms, during which period there were about fifty persons killed and wounded. The militia, being ordered out, captured Moorman, and dispersed the combatants. Moorman was killed by Dr. Burns, two or three years afterward, as he was crossing the Sabine. — *Notes of Captain William M. Simpson.*

† Statesman's Manual, vol. ii., p. 1427. This was the first vote in the house. The resolutions were amended in the senate, and when returned to the house the amendment was concurred in on the 28th of February, 1845, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-two to seventy-six. — *C. H. Raymond to E. Allen, February 18, 1845.*



agreed that the United States could not do without Texas. Among those most rejoiced was the venerable ex-president Jackson. He had watched the struggle of the infant republic since 1835 with an earnest solicitude; and when the question of annexation came up, he viewed the act as necessary to carry out the "Monroe doctrine," and prevent foreign intermeddling with the affairs of this continent. When he received the news of the final passage of the resolutions, he thus wrote to General Houston: "I congratulate you, I congratulate Texas and the United States, on this glorious result, on which depended the safety and prosperity of both Texas and the United States. The Congress of the United States (with the president) has reannexed Texas to our glorious Union as far as she could without the consent of Texas, which all the democracy of this Union believe will be speedily yielded by the people of Texas, through her constituted authorities. I now behold the great American eagle, with her stars and stripes, hovering over the lone star of Texas, with cheering voice welcoming it into our glorious Union, and proclaiming to Mexico and all foreign governments, 'You must not attempt to tread upon Texas!'—that 'the united stars and stripes now defend her.' Glorious result! in which you, general, have acted a noble part; and your name is now recorded among the heroes, the patriots, and philanthropists.

"You have yet more to do: you have now to lay the basis, by proper legislation, and remodelling your constitution, for the future greatness, wealth, and prosperity, of your state—and first, by proper legislation, to guard and protect the morals of your people. *Keep us from temptation!*—this is the text. To this end, you must shut the door against all foreign grants for land, guarding all grants issued by the constituted authorities of Texas; all others to be barred by positive law. You

must with care husband your vacant land to meet your national debt; and, after that is paid, provide for the prosperity of your state by funds for education and the improvement of the country. By guarding your unappropriated lands against all frauds — by issuing scrip, bearing interest at three per cent., to the amount of your debt, it will soon be paid; by placing a minimum price on your lands, and granting, with proper guards and limitations, pre-emption rights to actual settlers, you will soon pay off your public debt, and have more wealth left than any state in our Union.

“ But, to protect your morals, and to cap the climax of your prosperity, and protect the labor of your country, you must provide in your constitution, by a *positive provision*, that your legislature never shall establish a bank, or any corporation whatever, with a power to issue paper; that no banks shall be established by the legislature except on a specie basis, and then only with the powers of receiving deposits, and exchange. There never was nor ever could be use for any other kind, except for speculators and gamblers in stocks, and this to the utter ruin of the labor and morals of a country. A specie currency gives life and action to the producing classes, on which the prosperity of all is founded.”\*

The people of Texas were not ungrateful to General Jackson for the interest he took in their welfare. By a joint resolution, approved on the 21st of June, 1845, the Texan Congress tendered him “ the unfeigned gratitude of a nation.” At that time, however, their illustrious friend had ceased to live.†

\* Jackson to Houston, March 12, 1845.

† At the close of the letter above quoted, General Jackson expressed a feeble hope of seeing General Houston and family at the Hermitage in the summer. The following letter to President Polk will explain the result:—

“ HERMITAGE, June 8, 1845—12 o'clock at night.

“ MY DEAR SIR: In deep sorrow I address you this hasty note. At six o'clock this evening, General Jackson departed this life. He retained his faculties to the

President Jones was inaugurated on the 9th day of December, 1844. Neither the president, nor the ninth Texan Congress, which adjourned its session on the 3d of February, 1845, said anything on the subject of annexation. Both parties probably believed it was in as good a condition as they could desire it. In the meantime, another change had occurred in Mexico, and General Herrera, who belonged to the federal and peace party, came to the presidency. He released Colonel Navarro, the only remaining Texan prisoner in the republic, and gave other indications of his desire for peace. At length, the Mexican Congress authorized Herrera to open negotiations and conclude a peace with Texas, on condition that she would not be annexed to the United States. This arrangement was brought about through the agency of the British and French governments; and, on the 19th of May, the preliminary articles were signed by the Mexican government, transmitted through the French minister in Mexico to Captain Elliot, the British *chargé d'affaires* in Texas, and by him laid before the Texan government on the 2d day of June. On the 4th, President Jones presented these facts to the people by his proclamation, at the

very last hour. I lament that I was denied the satisfaction of seeing him in his last moments. I was unfortunately delayed in ascending the Mississippi, so that I did not reach Nashville till half-past six this evening. I immediately procured a conveyance, and came out with my family—having understood that the general's health was exceedingly precarious, and being anxious to administer, if I could, some comfort in the closing scene of his eventful life. On my way, a few miles from the city, I met the family physician, who informed me that the general was no more.

“About three hours before his departure, he conversed for some time with his family, and took an affectionate leave of them, as also of his domestics. His physician represented the scene as most affecting, and remarked that he departed with perfect serenity, and with full faith in the promises of salvation through the Redeemer.

“I have seen the corse since my arrival; the visage is much as it was in life. His funeral will take place on Tuesday, at eleven o'clock, A. M. A nation will feel his loss, as a nation has received the fruits of his toils during the best years of his life.

Very truly your friend,

“SAM HOUSTON.”

same time declaring a cessation of hostilities between the two countries. On the 15th of May previous, he had called a convention of sixty-one delegates, to meet on the 4th of July ensuing, to consider the propositions for annexation; also an extra session of the ninth Congress, to meet on the 16th of June, in order to give the consent of the republic to the anticipated convention. The Congress, by a joint resolution, approved June 23, 1845, gave its consent to the joint resolutions of the American Congress; also to the convention, as called by President Jones. The latter body assembled, ratified the act of annexation, formed a constitution as a state of the Union, and submitted the whole to the Texan people. It was approved by them; and the lone star of Texas, after a struggle of ten years, was gathered under the folds of the glorious banner of the Union.

Here our labors end. Texas came into the Union for the love she bore it. While it prospers, Texas will prosper: their wars, their hopes, and their glory, are henceforth the same. And it is the ardent wish and prayer of every good man that the same God, who guided the young republic through so many trials, will continue to bless that Union of which she now forms a part.

# APPENDIX NO. I.

## OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE

### COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE TEXAN ARMY, IN 1835-'6.

[THE following is not an entire collection of the official correspondence of the commander-in-chief during the winter and spring of 1835-'6, but only of so much of it as is deemed most important, and which is not set out in the notes to this history.]

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**No. 1.**

*To Captain Wylie Martin.*

SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *November 24, 1835.*

MY DEAR SIR: In accordance with our last conversation, I take pleasure in explaining my views, if they can, in any possible event, be of service to our country or countrymen.

If, in the range of human occurrences, it shall be proper or even necessary for the army of the people before Bexar to fall back, because of the men not being prepared with proper clothing for winter, and the want of necessary artillery and munitions of war, I would suggest to you the advantage of retiring in good order, and sending the cannon, baggage, and sick, in advance, so that they can at least reach the Cibolo under conduct of a strong guard, and a vigilant officer to command it, before the enemy takes up his line of march. It would seem, then, that the army should be formed in two divisions,



one to pursue the route to La Bahia, and the other that of Gonzales. There ought to be a sufficient force left at La Bahia to make a firm defence at that place, and all possible means used for that purpose.

Gonzales being, in my opinion, the most important interior key to Texas (proper), should also be placed in a condition for defence, with a force of from one to two hundred placed there, under a firm and prudent commander, who will at once establish discipline and organization; and, using the greatest vigilance, retaining a few horses to keep out scouts. This, it seems to me, must be a rallying-point for Texas. . . . .

Your friend,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 2.**

*To the President and Members of the General Council of Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS, SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *December 4, 1835.*

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor very respectfully to call your attention to the first article of the organic law of Texas, which provides for a military force for the defence of Texas, to wit: "There shall be a regular army for the protection of Texas during the present war." The provisional government will at once perceive the impracticability of my discharging the duties devolving upon me, as the commander-in-chief of the army, until the officers of the several corps of the army are appointed, the bounty of the men established, and the volunteers placed on such footing as will inspire them with confidence in the cause of Texas.

I deem it of importance to the existence of the provisional government, as well as to the cause of Texas, that an immediate organization of the army should take place. Some time since, I had the honor to address the governor of Texas on the subject of a proclamation, which may be of importance to our internal as well as our auxiliary relations.

So soon as the army is organized by the council, I will delay no time in raising an army, and meet the enemy on the earliest day possible. Munitions of war, with provisions and supplies for the army to be organized, are not yet contracted for. . . . .

With great respect, I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant,

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of Texas.*

**No. 3.***To Mr. Thomas Hughes.*HEADQUARTERS, SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *December 4, 1835.*

SIR: . . . By the first of March next, or earlier if possible, I would, in behalf of the provisional government of Texas, be happy to accept the services of at least three thousand five hundred volunteers for during the war, or even for a less period.

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief, &c.***No. 4.***To the Public.*SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *December 5, 1835.*

I REGRET to learn that a report is on the road between this place and Nacogdoches, to the effect that there is no need of troops in the army at this time. Troops are and will be wanted at San Antonio, and on the frontiers, until the army can be filled, so as to open the campaign at the earliest day possible. . . . .

I hope San Antonio is already taken. If so, volunteers will be needed to keep it; as also to strengthen La Bahia. It will be well for the men to bring clothing with them.

It was also reported that provisions were not plenty in camp. This may have been true; but there are large quantities in the vicinity of San Antonio, of which our army has the control.

SAM HOUSTON.

**No. 5.***To His Excellency Henry Smith, Governor of Texas.*

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to call your attention to the subject of a speedy organization of the regular army. The organic law has provided for the immediate raising of such force, and the general council has said what corps shall compose the same. It is required of me to raise the regular army without delay. I feel the responsibility of my situation, at a time when every effort should be exerted and means used to accomplish an object so necessary to the defence, and, I apprehend, the salvation of Texas. I must remain

under the conviction, however, that all essential power to meet the requisitions of the organic law is withheld from me.

It is true the officers of the infantry regiment have been appointed by the general council, but the field-officers proper to command and superintend the several recruiting-stations have not been appointed.

The regiment of artillery, so necessary for the defence of our sea-coast, as well as for field-service, has no basis on which it can be raised. No officers are appointed, and it will be impossible for me ever to enlist the rank and file until that is done. An army never has been raised for regular service until the officers have been appointed. The regiments of the United States army were all completely officered before a man was enlisted in the ranks. It can not be objected that merit will be forestalled by filling the several corps at this time. It must have been contemplated by the framers of the organic law that the army would be immediately organized out of the materials then in Texas.

Unless the officers are appointed at an early day, it will be impossible to have an army at the opening of the campaign—which, in my opinion, can not be delayed, with safety to the country, longer than the 20th of February, or 1st of March, at farthest.

If only a portion of the officers should be appointed, I apprehend the organization of the army will be incomplete, and the intention of the law unanswered. The necessities of the country seem to require a complete organization. We must have an army, or abandon all hope of defending the country. The letters from Santa Anna and the functionaries of the central government, recently intercepted, are calculated to arouse every generous heart in Texas to active and obstinate resistance. An army of the enemy, amounting to ten thousand men, with suitable munitions of war, must be met and vanquished, or Texas will be overwhelmed for years to come. Union and confidence among ourselves, and a generous support of the army, will achieve everything that is desirable to freemen. Until a full complement of officers is appointed for the regular army, it is impossible that one can be raised.

I take pleasure in assuring your excellency that I will at all times hold myself accountable for the means placed at my disposal for the defences of the country, and the result of our cause. But it must be obvious to all that in the same ratio in which the necessary and proper means are withheld from me, so must my responsibility be diminished.

Permit me to implore you most earnestly to give your attention to the subjects herein very respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 6.**

*Proclamation of Sam Houston, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, TEXAS, December 12, 1835.

CITIZENS OF TEXAS: Your situation is peculiarly calculated to call forth all your manly energies. Under the republican constitution of Mexico, you were invited to Texas, then a wilderness. You have reclaimed and rendered it a cultivated country. You solemnly swore to support the constitution and its laws. Your oaths are yet inviolate. In accordance therewith you have fought with the liberals against those who sought to overthrow the constitution in 1832, when the present usurper was the champion of liberal principles in Mexico. Your obedience has manifested your integrity. You have witnessed with pain the convulsions of the interior, and a succession of usurpations. You have experienced in silent grief, the expulsion of your members elect from the state Congress.

You have realized the horrors of anarchy and the dictation of military rule. The promises made to you have not been fulfilled. Your memorials for the redress of grievances have been disregarded; and the agents you have sent to Mexico have been imprisoned for years, without enjoying the rights of trial agreeably to law. Your constitutional executive has been deposed by the bayonets of a mercenary soldiery, while your Congress has been dissolved by violence, and its members, either fled, or were arrested by the military force of the country. The federation has been dissolved, the constitution declared at an end, and centralism has been established. Amid all these trying vicissitudes, you remained loyal to the duty of citizens, with a hope that liberty would not perish in the republic of Mexico. But while you were fondly cherishing this hope, the dictator required the surrender of the arms of the civic militia, that he might be enabled to establish on the ruins of the constitution, a system of policy which would for ever enslave the people of Mexico. Zacatecas, unwilling to yield her sovereignty to the demand which struck

at the root of all liberty, refused to disarm her citizens of their private arms. Ill-fated state! Her power, as well as her wealth aroused the ambition of Santa Anna, and excited his cupidity. Her citizens became the first victims of his cruelty, while her wealth was sacrificed in payment for the butchery of her citizens. The success of the usurper determined him in exacting from the people of Texas submission to the central form of government; and, to enforce his plan of despotism, he despatched a military force to invade the colonies, and exact the arms of the inhabitants. The citizens refused the demand, and the invading force was increased. The question then was, "Shall we resist the oppression and live free, or violate our oaths, and bear a despot's stripes?" The citizens of Texas rallied to the defence of their rights. They have met four to one, and, by their chivalry and courage, have vanquished the enemy with a gallantry and spirit which is characteristic of the justice of our cause.

The army of the people is now before Bexar, besieging the central army within its wall. Though called together at the moment, the citizens of Texas, unprovided as they were in the necessary munitions of war and supplies for an army, have maintained a siege for months. Always patient and untiring in their patriotism and zeal in the cause of liberty, they have borne every vicissitude of season and every incident of the soldier, with a contempt of peril which reflects immortal honor on the members of the army of the people.

Since our army has been in the field, a consultation of the people, by their representatives, has met, and established a provisional government. This course has grown out of the emergencies of the country; the army has claimed its peculiar care. We are without law, and without a constitutional head. The provisional executive and the general council of Texas are earnestly engaged in the discharge of their respective duties, preparing for every exigency of the country; and I am satisfied, from their zeal, ability, and patriotism, that Texas will have everything to hope, from their exertions in behalf of the principles which we have avowed.

A regular army has been created, and liberal encouragement has been given by the government. To all who will enlist for two years, or during the war, a bounty of twenty-four dollars and eight hundred acres of land will be given. Provision has also been made for raising an auxiliary volunteer corps, to constitute part of the army of Texas, which will be placed under the command, and subject to the orders of the commander-in-chief. The field for promo-



tion will be open. The terms of service will be various. To those who tender their services for, or during the war, will be given a bounty of six hundred and forty acres of land; an equal bounty will be given to those who volunteer their services for two years; if for one year, a bounty of three hundred and twenty acres; and to those who may volunteer for a shorter period, no bounty of land will be given, but the same liberal pay, rations, &c., will be allowed them as other members of the army. The rights of citizenship are extended to all who will unite with us in defending the republican principles of the constitution of 1824.

Citizens of Texas, your rights must be defended. The oppressors must be driven from our soil. Submission to the laws and union among ourselves will render us invincible; subordination and discipline in our army will guaranty to us victory and renown. Our invader has sworn to exterminate us, or sweep us from the soil of Texas. He is vigilant in his work of oppression, and has ordered to Texas ten thousand men to enforce the unhallowed purposes of his ambition. His letters to his subalterns in Texas have been intercepted, and his plans for our destruction are disclosed. Departing from the chivalric principles of civilized warfare, he has ordered arms to be distributed to *a portion of our population*, for the purpose of creating in the midst of us a *servile* war. The hopes of the usurper were inspired by a belief that the citizens of Texas were disunited and divided in opinion; that alone has been the cause of the present invasion of our rights. He shall realize the fallacy of his hopes, in the union of her citizens, and their ETERNAL RESISTANCE to his plans against constitutional liberty. We will enjoy our birthright, or *perish in its defence*.

The services of five thousand volunteers will be accepted. By the first of March next, we must meet the enemy with an army worthy of our cause, and which will reflect honor upon freemen. Our habitations must be defended; the sanctity of our hearths and firesides must be preserved from pollution. Liberal Mexicans will unite with us. Our countrymen in the field have presented an example worthy of imitation. Generous and brave hearts from a land of freedom have joined our standard before Bexar. They have, by their heroism and valor, called forth the admiration of their comrades in arms, and have reflected additional honor on the land of their birth. Let the brave rally to our standard.

SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*



**No. 7.**

*To Governor Henry Smith.*

HEADQUARTERS, SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *December 17, 1835.*

SIR: On yesterday I had the honor to receive your order, directing the establishment of the headquarters of the army at Washington. It will give me pleasure to obey the order at the earliest possible moment.

In the meantime, I do most earnestly solicit the attention of your excellency to the subject of an appropriation to cover the recruiting contingencies of the army. And I would beg leave to suggest the necessity of establishing a system of accountability in all its disbursing departments; requiring ample security of all the officers, who may be intrusted with funds, agreeably to the system established in the United States, if the provisions of the organic law are not sufficient.

More than a month has now elapsed since the adjournment of the consultation, and the army is not yet organized; and, though I have ordered some officers on the recruiting service, it has been on my own responsibility.

It is extremely painful to me to feel what I am compelled to experience, and believe to exist. I have never failed to render any information, when called on by the chairman of the military committee, and to furnish such books as he wished for his instruction. Yet, I am constrained to believe that he has interposed every possible obstacle to the organization of the army; and, so far as I am identified with it, to delay the placing of Texas in a proper state of defence.

To arrive at this conclusion, it is only necessary to advert to a report which he made on the subject of the speedy organization of the army. In the report, he took the liberty (though entirely unnecessary) of using remarks of a personal character toward myself. The honorable the general council deemed them so indecorous that they were stricken out of the report. To account for this course on the part of the chairman is not necessary.

I am careless of whatever individual feelings may be entertained toward me: but as a functionary of the government, placed in the most responsible situation, and so necessary to the salvation of the country, I am constrained to invoke and to hope for the necessary

co-operation in discharge of the duties which I owe to the country and its laws. I am ready to make any and every sacrifice which my relations to the country may require of me.

This communication is induced by no other feeling than a sincere desire to point out the difficulties which are thrown in the way of all my exertions to promote the cause of the country ; and, at the same time, to vindicate myself against the charge of neglect of duty, or any want of the most devoted zeal in behalf of Texas.

I have the honor to be, with great consideration,

Your obedient servant,

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief, &c.*

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**No. 8.**

*To Colonel James Bowie.*

[Army Orders.]

HEADQUARTERS, SAN FELIPE, *December 17, 1835.*

SIR : In obedience to the order of his excellency Henry Smith, governor of Texas, of this date, I have the honor to direct that, in the event you can obtain the services of a sufficient number of men for the purpose, you will forthwith proceed on the route to Matamoras, and, if possible, reduce the place and retain possession until further orders. Should you not find it within your power to attain an object so desirable as the reduction of Matamoras, you will, by all possible means, conformably to the rules of civilized warfare, annoy the troops of the central army ; and reduce and keep possession of the most eligible position on the frontier, using the precaution which characterizes your mode of warfare. You will conduct the campaign. Much is referred to your discretion. Should you commence the campaign, you will, from time to time, keep the government advised of your operations, through the commander-in-chief of the army. Under any circumstances, the port of Copano is important.

If any officers or men, who have, at any time, been released on *parole*, should be taken in arms, they will be proper subjects for the consideration of a court-martial. Great caution is necessary in the country of an enemy.

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief.*

**No. 9.***To Governor Smith.*HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, *December 26, 1835.*

TO YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor of reporting my arrival here on yesterday, and my finding here Captain Wyatt, with a company or detachment, consisting of less than fifty-six men, from Huntsville, Alabama; also Captain King, with about eighteen men, from Paducah, Kentucky, with rifles—Captain Wyatt having fifty first-rate United States muskets. Under the restrictions of the law, I find myself under the most painful difficulties in accepting the services of these volunteers. I will do the best I can for the country, while I render justice to them. I found in the ranks great discontent, and a disposition to abandon our cause. To-day I have spent much time in explaining all matters to them. I hope they are satisfied. . . . .

To-day there has been an arrival in six days from San Antonio, which reports all quiet, but no discipline. Ere this I hope my order has reached them, and will have a proper effect with the command. It is said that Bowie will be here to-morrow. Should he come to San Felipe, I hope your excellency will be kind enough to order him to this point, as I can furnish him with a copy of the order which I forwarded to him by your excellency's order.

I have the honor, &amp;c.,

SAM HOUSTON, *Commander, &c.***No. 10.***To Colonel Powers.*WASHINGTON, TEXAS, *December 28, 1835.*

DEAR COLONEL: Colonel Wyatt, with two detachments of auxiliary volunteers, is on his way to the vicinity of Copano, for the purpose of protecting that point, so essential to the present posture of our affairs. I hope that you will afford him all possible intelligence, and render to him all necessary aid.

. . . . . Colonel Wyatt will relieve Captain Allen, who will repair to New Orleans, and return by the first of March. Say to our friends that, by the rise of grass, we will be on the march. . . . .

SAM HOUSTON.

## No. 11.

To Governor Henry Smith.

HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, *December 30, 1835.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose to you a muster-roll of Captain P. S. Wyatt, and one also from Captain King. Both the company and detachment are under the command and subject to the orders of Captain Wyatt. I have had much difficulty in getting them to volunteer for any definite period. But the ordinance left a discretion with me to accept their services for such time as I "might think the good of the service required." I did think it necessary to specify some certain time, and that time, I conceived, ought not to be less than three months; if so, it would be burdensome to the country, without any corresponding benefit. I think they will eventually all volunteer for during the war. They are all on the march for Copano, where I design they shall be stationed until further orders. To-day I sent despatches to Velasco and Matagorda, with orders to Lieutenant Eaton to act as assistant quartermaster-general, to furnish supplies to all troops landing on the gulf, on their way to Copano. I have herewith enclosed to your excellency a copy of the order, having sent a special order to Lieutenant Eaton of prior date.

I beg leave to remark that, by the time I can hold an Indian talk, and arrange matters for safety in the rear of the army, and return to this point, and spend a few days here, leaving a capable officer in command at this place, as also at other points, I will be ready, should there be the slightest necessity for my presence at Copano or on the frontier, to repair instantly to the point where I may be needed.

In the meantime, I pray that your excellency will not permit the suggestions of those who neither know nor can appreciate my duties (or the necessity of my occupying, until the campaign opens, a central position), to induce your excellency to believe that I can be necessary, and ought to be, where a subordinate can discharge every duty.

You may rely on it that a subaltern, whom I would leave in command at this point, would have more important duties devolving upon him than those which would be confided, at an outpost, to the major-general; while the general and the governor would be held

responsible to the country for any and every failure or delinquency which might occur to the detriment of the army, or the defence of the country.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S.—From news received to-day from the mouth of the Brasos (unofficial), I will be ready, on my return from the treaty, to set out with the staff of the army (with your excellency's order), in three days, for Copano, or Matamoras.

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**No. 12.**

*To Governor Henry Smith.*

HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to enclose to your excellency the report of Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Neill, of the artillery; and most respectfully request that you will render to the cause of Texas and humanity the justice of bestowing upon it your serious attention, and referring it to the general council of the provisional government, in secret session. These, I may be permitted to hope, you will attend in person, that all the essential functionaries of the government may deliberate, and adopt some course that will redeem our country from a state of deplorable anarchy. Manly and bold decision alone can save us from ruin. I only require orders, and they shall be obeyed. If the government now yields to the unholy dictation of speculators and marauders upon human rights, it were better that we had yielded to the despotism of a single man, whose ambition might have been *satisfied* by our unconditional submission to his authority, and a pronouncement, for which we were asked, in favor of his power.

In the present instance, the people of Texas have not even been consulted. The brave men who have been wounded in the battles of Texas, and the sick from exposure in her cause, without blankets or supplies, are left neglected in her hospitals; while the needful stores and supplies are diverted from them, without authority and by self-created officers, who do not acknowledge the only government known to Texas and the world.

Within thirty hours I shall set out for the army, and repair there with all possible despatch. I pray that a confidential express may meet me at Goliad; and, if I shall have left, that it may pursue me wherever I may be.

No language can express my anguish of soul. Oh, save our poor country!—send supplies to the wounded, the sick, the naked, and the hungry, for God's sake! What will the world think of the authorities of Texas? Prompt, decided, and honest independence, is all that can save them, and redeem our country. I do not fear—I will do my duty.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 13.**

*To Captain Cook, of the San Antonio Grays.*

HEADQUARTERS, GOLIAD, *January 17, 1836.*

SIR: I have the pleasure to acknowledge the tender of your services, and those of your company, to Texas, for the term of three months. The same are accepted, in behalf of Texas, with pleasure, for the term of three months. . . . .

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 14.**

*To Governor Henry Smith.*

HEADQUARTERS, GOLIAD, *January 17, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to send, for your information, the enclosed from Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Neill, under date of the 14th instant. Colonel Bowie will leave here in a few hours for Bexar, with a detachment of from twenty to fifty men. Captain Patton's company, it is believed, is now there. I have ordered the fortifications in the town of Bexar to be demolished; and, if you should think well of it, I will remove all the cannon and other munitions of war to Gonzales and Copano, blow up the Alamo, and abandon the place, as it will be impossible to keep up the station with the volunteers. The sooner I can be so authorized, the better it will be for the country. In an hour I will take up the line of march for Refugio mission, with a force of about two hundred and nine effective men, where I will await orders from your excellency. I do not believe that the army, of such a small force, should advance upon Matamoras, with a hope or belief that the Mexicans will co-operate with us.



I have no confidence in them : the disaster at Tampico should teach us a lesson to be noted in our future operations.

I have learned that Colonel Gonzales is somewhere on the Nueces with one hundred and seventy men, but accounts vary as to their actual number. I am told they are to co-operate in the eastern confederacy.

I will leave Captain Wyatt in command at this post, until I can relieve him with thirty-five regulars now at Refugio. I pray your excellency to cause all the regulars now enlisted to be formed into companies, and marched to headquarters. It will be impossible to keep up garrisons with volunteers. Do forward the regulars. Captain Smith had been relieved, and I met him on his way home. To-day, Captain Patton will return to the Lavaca country, and bring on a company as soon as possible. I have sent to Captain Dimit to raise one hundred or more men, and march to Bexar forthwith—if it should be invested; if not, to repair to headquarters with his command. Captain Patton will do likewise. I would myself have marched with a force to Bexar, but the Matamoras fever rages so high, that I must see Colonel Ward's men. You can have no idea of the difficulties I have encountered. Patton has told you of the *men* that make the trouble. Better materials never were in ranks. The government and all its officers had been misrepresented to the army.

I pray you send me copies of Austin's letters, or rather extracts. If the council are in session, I do wish they would say something about the confederacy. Please send me frequent expresses, and advise me of your pleasure.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 15.**

*To Major R. C. Morris.*

HEADQUARTERS, REFUGIO, *January 20, 1836.*

GENERAL HOUSTON will be happy to see Major R. C. Morris, at Captain Westover's, whenever it will suit his convenience, as he wishes to make some communications, through him, to the volunteers at this post.

## No. 16.

To Governor Henry Smith.

MUNICIPALITY OF WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report to you that, in obedience to your order under date of the 6th inst., I left Washington on the 8th, and reached Goliad on the night of the 14th. On the morning of that day I met Captain Dimit, on his return home with his command, who reported to me the fact that his *caballada* of horses (the most of them private property) had been pressed by Dr. Grant, who styled himself acting commander-in-chief of the federal army, and that he had under his command about two hundred men. Captain Dimit had been relieved by Captain P. S. Wyatt, of the volunteers, from Huntsville, Alabama. I was also informed by Major R. C. Morris that breadstuff was wanted in camp; and he suggested his wish to remove the volunteers farther west. By express, I had advised the stay of the troops at Goliad until I could reach that point.

On my arrival at that post, I found them destitute of many supplies necessary to their comfort on a campaign. An express reached me from Lieutenant-Colonel Neill, of Bexar, of an expected attack from the enemy in force. I immediately requested Colonel James Bowie to march with a detachment of volunteers to his relief. He met the request with his usual promptitude and manliness. This intelligence I forwarded to your excellency, for the action of government. With a hope that supplies had or would immediately reach the port of Copano, I ordered the troops, through Major R. C. Morris, to proceed to Refugio mission, where it was reported there would be an abundance of beef—leaving Captain Wyatt and his command, for the present, in possession of Goliad, or until he could be relieved by a detachment of regulars under the command of Lieutenant Thornton, and some recruits that had been enlisted by Captain Ira Westover. On the arrival of the troops at Refugio, I ascertained that no breadstuffs could be obtained, nor was there any intelligence of supplies reaching Copano, agreeably to my expectations, and in accordance with my orders of the 30th of December and 6th of January inst. directing the landing and concentrating all the volunteers at Copano. I had also advised Colonel A. Huston, the quartermaster-general, to forward the supplies he might obtain at New Orleans to the same point. Not meeting the command of

Major Ward, as I had hoped from the early advice I had sent him by Major George W. Poe, I determined to await his arrival and the command of Captain Wyatt. With a view to be in a state of readiness to march to the scene of active operations at the first moment that my force, and the supplies necessary, could reach me, I ordered Lieutenant Thornton with his command (total twenty-nine) to Goliad, to relieve Captain Wyatt; at the same time ordering the latter to join the volunteers at Refugio. I found much difficulty in prevailing on the regulars to march until they had received either money or clothing; and their situation was truly destitute. Had I not succeeded, the station at Goliad must have been left without any defence, and abandoned to the enemy, whatever importance its occupation may be to the security of the frontier. Should Bexar remain a military post, Goliad must be maintained, or the former will be cut off from all supplies arriving by sea at the port of Copano.

On the evening of the 20th, F. W. Johnson, Esq., arrived at Refugio, and it was understood that he was empowered, by the general council of Texas, to interfere in my command. On the 21st, and previous to receiving notice of his arrival, I issued an order to organize the troops so soon as they might arrive at that place, agreeably to the "ordinance for raising an auxiliary corps" to the army. A copy of the order I have the honor to enclose herewith. Mr. Johnson then called on me, previous to the circulation of the order, and showed me the resolutions of the general council, dated 14th of January, a copy of which I forward for the perusal of your excellency.

So soon as I was made acquainted with the nature of his mission, and the powers granted to J. W. Fannin, jr., I could not remain mistaken as to the object of the council, or the wishes of individuals. I had but one course left for me to pursue (the report of your being deposed had also reached me), which was, to return, and report myself to you in person—inasmuch as the objects intended by your order were, by the *extraordinary* conduct of the council, rendered useless to the country; and, by remaining with the army, the council would have had the pleasure of ascribing to me the evils which their own conduct and acts will, in all probability, produce. I do consider the acts of the council calculated to protract the war for years to come; and the field which they have opened to insubordination, and to *agencies* without limit (unknown to military usage), will cost the country more useless expenditure than the necessary

expense of the whole war would have been had they not transcended their proper duties. Without integrity of purpose, and well-devised measures, our whole frontier must be exposed to the enemy. All the available resources of Texas are directed, through *special* as well as *general agencies*, against Matamoras; and must, in all probability, prove as unavailing to the interest as they will to the honor of Texas. The regulars at Goliad can not long be detained at that station, unless they should get supplies; and now all the resources of Texas are placed in the hands of *agents* unknown to the government in its formation, and existing by the mere will of the council; and will leave all other objects, necessary for the defence of the country, neglected, for the want of means, until the meeting of the convention in March next.

It was my wish, if it had been possible, to avoid for the present the expression of any opinion which might be suppressed in the present crisis. But since I reported to your excellency, having had leisure to peruse all the documents of a controversial nature growing out of the relative duties of yourself and the general council to the people of Texas, a resolution of the council, requiring of me an act of insubordination and disobedience to your orders, demands of me that I should inquire into the nature of that authority which would stimulate me to an act of treason, or an attempt to subvert the government which I have sworn to support. The only constitution which Texas has is the "organic law." Then any violation of that law, which would destroy the basis of government, must be treason. Has treason been committed? if so, by whom, and for what purpose? The history of the last few weeks will be the best answer that can be rendered.

After the capitulation of Bexar, it was understood at headquarters that there was much discontent with the troops then at that point, and that it might be necessary to employ them in some active enterprise, or the force would dissolve. With this information was suggested the expediency of an attack on Matamoras. For the purpose of improving whatever advantages might have been gained at Bexar, I applied to your excellency for orders, which I obtained, directing the adoption of such measures as might be deemed best for the protection of the frontier and the reduction of Matamoras. This order was dated 17th of December; and on the same date I wrote to Colonel James Bowie, directing him, in the event he could obtain a sufficient number of volunteers for the purpose, to make a descent

on Matamoras; and, if his force would not justify that measure, he was directed to occupy the most advanced post, so as to check the enemy, and by all means to place himself in a situation to command Copano. Colonel Bowie did not receive the order: having left Goliad for Bexar, he was not apprized of it until his arrival at San Felipe, about the first of January instant. My reason for ordering Colonel Bowie on the service was, his familiar acquaintance with the country, as well as the nature of the population through which the troops must pass, as also their resources; and to this I freely add that there is no man on whose forecast, prudence, and valor, I place a higher estimate than Colonel Bowie.

Previous to this time, the general council had adopted a resolution requiring the governor to direct the removal of the headquarters of the army, and I had been ordered to Washington, for their establishment, until further orders. I had been detained, awaiting copies of the ordinances relative to the army. Their design was manifest, nor could their objects be misapprehended, though the extent to which they were then carrying them was not known. Messrs. Hanks and Clements were engaged in writing letters to individuals at Bexar, urging and authorizing a campaign against Matamoras; and, that their recommendation might bear the stamp of authority, and mislead those who were unwilling to embark in an expedition not sanctioned by government, and led by private individuals, they took the liberty of signing themselves members of the military committee; thereby deceiving the volunteers, and assuming a character which they could only use or employ in the general council, in proposing business for the action of that body. They could not be altogether ignorant of the impropriety of such conduct, but doubtless could easily find a solid justification in the bullion of their patriotism and the ore of their integrity. Be their motive whatever it might, many brave and honorable men were deluded by it, and the campaign was commenced upon Matamoras, under Dr. Grant, as "acting" commander-in-chief of the volunteer army—a title and designation unknown to the world. But the general council, in their address to the people of Texas, dated January 11th, state that "they never recognised in Dr. Grant any authority whatever as an officer of the government, or army, at the time." They will not, I presume, deny that they did acknowledge a draft, or order, drawn by him, as *acting commander-in-chief*, amounting to seven hundred and fifty dollars. But this they will doubtless justify, on the ground



that your excellency commissioned General Burleson, and, of course, the appointment of Dr. Grant, as his aide-de-camp, would authorize him to act in the absence of General Burleson. It is an established principle in all armies that a staff-officer can claim no command in the line of the army, nor exercise any command in the absence of the general, unless he holds a commission in the line. In the absence of General Burleson, the senior colonel—or, in the absence of the colonel, the major—or, in his absence, the senior captain—would have the command; but in no event can the *aide*, or staff-officer, unless he holds a commission in the line of the army, have any command; and his existence must cease, unless he should be continued or reappointed by the officer of the line who succeeds to the command, in the absence of his superior. When General Burleson left the army, his aide had no command, but the field-officer next in rank to himself. Then, who is Dr. Grant? Is he not a Scotchman, who has resided in Mexico for the last ten years? does he not own large possessions in the interior? has he ever taken the oath to support the organic law? is he not deeply interested in the hundred-league claims of land which hang like a murky cloud over the people of Texas? is he not the man who impressed the property of the people of Bexar? is he not the man who took from Bexar, without authority, or knowledge of the government, cannon and other munitions of war, together with supplies necessary for the troops at that station, leaving the wounded and the sick destitute of needful comforts? Yet this is the man whose outrages and oppressions upon the rights of the people of Texas are sustained and justified by the acts and conduct of the general council!

Several members of that body are aware that the interests and feelings of Dr. Grant are opposed to the independence and true interests of the people of Texas. While every facility has been afforded to the meditated campaign against Matamoras, no aid has been rendered for raising a regular force for the defence of the country, nor one cent advanced to an officer or soldier of the regular army, but every hinderance thrown in the way. The council had no right to project a campaign against any point or place. It was the province of the governor, by his proper officers, to do so. The council had the right of consenting or objecting, but not of projecting. The means ought to be placed at the disposition of the governor; and if he, by himself, or his officers, failed in their application, while he would be responsible for the success of the armies



of Texas, he could be held responsible to the government, and punishable: but what recourse has the country upon agents who have taken no oath, and given no bonds to comply with the powers granted by the council?

The organic law declares, in article third, that "the governor and general council have power to organize, reduce, or increase, the regular forces;" but it delegates no power to create army-agents, to supersede the commander-in-chief, as will be seen by reference to the second article of the "military" basis of that law. After declaring that there shall be a regular army for the protection of Texas during the present war, in the first article, it proceeds in the second to state the constituents of that army: "The regular army of Texas shall consist of one major-general, who shall be commander-in-chief of all the forces called into public service during the war." This, it will be remembered, is a law from which the council derive their powers; and, of course, all troops in service since the adoption of this law, and all that have been accepted, or to be accepted during my continuance in office, are under my command. Consequently, the council could not create an *agency* that could assume any command of troops, so as to supersede my powers, without a plain and palpable violation of their oaths. New names given could not change the nature of their obligations: they had violated the "organic law."

I will now advert to an ordinance of their own body, entitled "an ordinance and decree to organize and establish an auxiliary volunteer corps of the army of Texas," &c., passed December 5, 1835. The ordinance throughout recognises the competency of the governor and commander-in-chief as the only persons authorized to accept the services of the volunteers, and makes it their especial duty to do so. It also gives the discretion to the commander-in-chief to accept the services of the volunteers for such term as "he shall think the defence of the country and the good of the service require." It is specified that muster-rolls shall accompany the reports of volunteers, and, when reported by the commander-in-chief to the governor, that commissions shall issue accordingly. Where elections take place in the volunteer corps, the ordinance declares that they shall be certified to the commander-in-chief, and by him forwarded to the governor. The third section of the law declares that when controversies arise in relation to the rank of officers of the same grade, they shall be determined "by drawing numbers, which

shall be done by order of the commander-in-chief of the army." This law was enacted by the general council, and they can not allege that any misconstruction could arise out of it; for it plainly points out the duties of the governor and commander-in-chief, as defined by themselves. Yet, without the repeal of this law, they have proceeded to appoint agents to exercise the very powers declared by them to belong to the governor and commander-in-chief! This they have done, under the impression that a *change of names* would enable them to put down the governor and the commander-in-chief, not subject to them for their places, but created by the consultation, and both of whom are as independent of the council as the council is of them—the commander-in-chief being subject to the organic law, and all laws conformable thereto, under the orders of the governor. I have obeyed the orders of your excellency as promptly as they have met my knowledge; and had not the council, by acts as outrageous to my feelings as they are manifestly against law, adopted a course that must destroy all hopes of an army, I should yet have been on the frontier, and, by all possible means, I would at least have sought to place it in a state of defence.

It now becomes my duty to advert to the subject of the powers granted by the general council to J. W. Fannin, jr., on the 7th of January, 1836; and at a time when two members of the military committee, and other members of the council, were advised that I had received orders from your excellency to repair forthwith to the frontier of Texas, and to concentrate the troops for the very purpose avowed in the resolutions referred to. The powers are as clearly illegal as they were unnecessary. By reference to the resolutions, it will be perceived that the powers given to J. W. Fannin, jr., are as comprehensive in their nature, and as much at variance with the organic law and the decrees of the general council, as the decrees of the general Congress of Mexico are at variance with the federal constitution of 1824, and really delegate to J. W. Fannin, jr., as extensive powers as those conferred by the Congress on General Santa Anna. Yet the cant is kept up, even by J. W. Fannin, jr., against the *danger* of a regular army; while he is exercising powers which he must be satisfied are in open violation of the organic law. J. W. Fannin, jr., is a colonel in the regular army, and was sworn in and received his commission on the very day that the resolutions were adopted by the council. By his oath he was subject to the orders of the commander-in-chief, and, as a subaltern, could not, without

an act of mutiny, interfere with the general command of the forces of Texas; yet I find, in the "Telegraph" of the 9th inst., a proclamation of his, dated on the 8th, addressed, "Attention, volunteers," and requiring them to rendezvous at San Patricio. No official character is pretended by him, as his signature is private. This he did with a knowledge that I had ordered the troops from the mouth of the Brasos to Copana, and had repaired to that point to concentrate them. On the 10th inst., F. W. Johnson issued a similar proclamation, announcing Matamoras as the point of attack. The powers of both these gentlemen were derived, if derived at all, from the general council, in opposition to the will of the governor; because certain purposes were to be answered, or the safety and harmony of Texas should be destroyed.

Colonel Fannin, in a letter addressed to the general council, dated on the 21st of January, at Velasco, and to which he subscribes himself, "J. W. Fannin, jr., agent provisional government," when speaking of anticipated difficulties with the commander-in-chief, allays the fears of the council, by assuring them that, "I shall never make any myself;" and he then adds, "The object in view will be the governing principle, and should General Houston be ready and willing to take command, and march direct ahead, and execute your orders, and the volunteers to submit to it, or a reasonable part of them, I shall not say nay, but will do all in my power to produce harmony." How was I to become acquainted with the orders of the council? Was it through my subaltern? It must have been so designed—as the council have not, up to the present moment, given me any official notice of the orders to which Colonel Fannin refers. This modesty and subordination on his part, is truly commendable in a subaltern, and would imply that he had the right to "say nay." If he has this power, whence is it derived? Not from any law,—and contrary to his sworn duty as my subaltern, whose duty is obedience to my lawful commands, agreeably to the rules and regulations of the United States army, adopted by the consultation of all Texas. If he accepted any appointment incompatible with his *obligation* as a colonel in the regular army, it certainly increases his moral responsibilities to an extent which is truly to be regretted.

In another paragraph of his letter, states: "You will allow that we have too much division, and one cause of complaint is this very expedition, and that it is intended to remove General Houston." He then assures the council that no blame shall attach to him, but

most dutifully says to them, "I will go where you have sent me, and will do what you have ordered me, if possible." The order of the council, as set forth in the resolutions appointing Colonel Fannin agent, and authorizing him to appoint as many agents as he might think proper, did most certainly place him above the governor and the commander-in-chief of the army—nor is he responsible to the council, or the people of Texas. He is required to report, but he is not required to obey the council. His powers are as unlimited and absolute as Cromwell's ever were. I regard the expedition, as now ordered, an individual, and not a national measure. The resolutions passed in favor of J. W. Fannin, jr. and F. W. Johnson, and their proclamations, with its original start—Doctor Grant—absolve the country from all responsibility for its consequences. If I had any doubt on the subject, previous to having seen, at Goliad, a proclamation of J. W. Fannin, jr., sent by him to the volunteers, I could no longer entertain one, as to the campaign, so far as certain persons are interested in forwarding it. After appealing to the volunteers, he concluded with the assurance that "*the troops should be paid out of the first spoils taken from the enemy.*" This, in my opinion, connected with the extraordinary powers granted to him, by the council, divests the campaign of any character save that of a piratical or predatory war.

The people of Texas have declared to the world, that the war in which they are now engaged, is a war of principle, in defence of their civil and political rights. What effect will the declaration above referred to have on the civilized world, when they learn that the individual who made it has since been clothed with absolute powers by the general council of Texas; and that, because you refused to ratify their acts, they have declared you no longer the governor of Texas? It was stated by way of inducement to the advance on Matamoras, that the citizens of that place were friendly to the advance of the troops of Texas upon that city. They, no doubt, ere this, have J. W. Fannin's proclamation (though it was in manuscript), and if originally true, what will now be their feelings toward men who "are to be paid out of the first spoils taken from the enemy"? The idea which must present itself to the enemy, will be, if the city is taken it will be given up to pillage; and when the spoils are collected, a division will take place. In war, when spoil is the object, friends and enemies share one common destiny. This rule will govern the citizens of Matamoras in their

conclusions, and render their resistance desperate. A city containing twelve thousand souls will not be taken by a handful of men who have marched twenty-two days without bread-stuffs, or necessary supplies for an army. If there ever was a time when Matamoras could have been taken by a few men, that time has passed by. The people of that place are not aware of the high-minded and honorable men who fill the ranks of the Texan army. They will look upon them as they would look upon Mexican mercenaries, and resist them as such. They too will hear of the impressment of the property of the citizens of Bexar, as reported to your excellency, by Lieutenant-Colonel Neill, when Doctor Grant left that place for Matamoras, in command of the volunteer army.

If the troops advance upon Matamoras, there ought to be a cooperation by sea, with the land forces, or all will be lost; and the brave men who have come to toil with us in our marches, and mingle in our battles for liberty, will fall a sacrifice to the selfishness of some who have individual purposes to answer, and whose influence with the council has been such as to impose upon the honest part of its members; while those who were otherwise, availed themselves of every artifice which they could devise, to shield themselves from detection.

The evil is now done, and I trust sincerely, that the first of March may establish a government on some permanent foundation, where honest functionaries will regard and execute the known and established laws of the country, agreeably to their oaths. If this state of things can not be achieved, the country must be lost. I feel, in the station which I hold, that every effort of the council has been to mortify me individually, and, if possible to compel me to do some act which would enable them to pursue the same measures toward me, which they have illegally done toward your excellency, and thereby remove another obstacle to the accomplishment of their plans. In their attempts to embarrass me, they were reckless of all prejudice which might result to the public service from their lawless course.

While the council was passing resolutions affecting the army of Texas, and transferring to J. W. Fannin, jr. and F. W. Johnson the whole control of the army and resources of Texas, they could order them to be furnished with copies of the several resolutions passed by that body, but did not think proper even to notify the major-general of the army of their adoption; nor have they yet caused



him to be furnished with the acts of the council relative to the army. True it is, that they passed a resolution to that effect, but it never was complied with. Their object must have been to conceal, and not to promulgate their acts. "They have loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil."

I do not consider the council as a constitutional body, nor their acts lawful. They have no quorum agreeably to the organic law, and therefore I am compelled to regard all their acts as void. The body has been composed of seventeen members, and I perceive that the act of "suspension," passed against your excellency, was by only ten members present; the president *pro tem.* having no vote. Only ten members remain, when less than twelve members could not form a quorum agreeably to the organic law, which required two thirds of the whole body. I am not prepared to violate either my duty or my oath, by yielding obedience to an act manifestly unlawful, as it is, in my opinion, prejudicial to the welfare of Texas.

The lieutenant-governor, and several members of the council, I believe to be patriotic and just men; but there have been, and when I left San Felipe there were, others in that body on whose honesty and integrity the foregoing facts will be the best commentary. They must also abide the judgment of the people.

I have the honor to be, your excellency's

Obedient servant,

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*

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**No. 17.**

*Army Orders.*

CONVENTION HALL, WASHINGTON, *March 2, 1836.*

WAR is raging on the frontiers. Bexar is besieged by two thousand of the enemy, under the command of General Sesma. Reinforcements are on their march to unite with the besieging army. By the last report, our force in Bexar was only one hundred and fifty men. The citizens of Texas must rally to the aid of our army, or it will perish. Let the citizens of the east march to the combat. The enemy must be driven from our soil, or desolation will accompany their march upon us. *Independence is declared; it must be*



maintained. Immediate action united with valor, can alone achieve the great work. The services of all are forthwith required in the field.

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*

P. S. It is rumored that the enemy are on their march to Gonzales, and that they have entered the colonies. The fate of Bexar is unknown. The country must and shall be defended. The patriots of Texas are *appealed to in behalf of their bleeding country.*

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**No. 18.**

*To Colonel J. W. Fannin, commanding at Goliad.*

HEADQUARTERS, GONZALES, *March 11, 1836.*

SIR: On my arrival here this afternoon, the following intelligence was received through a Mexican, supposed to be friendly, though his account has been contradicted in some parts by another, who arrived with him. It is therefore only given to you as rumor, though I fear a melancholy portion of it will be found true.

Anselmo Borgara states that he left the Alamo on Sunday, the 6th inst.; and is three days from Arroche's *rancho*: that the Alamo was attacked on Sunday morning at the dawn of day, by about two thousand three hundred men, and carried a short time before sunrise, with a loss of five hundred and twenty-one Mexicans killed, and as many wounded. Colonel Travis had only one hundred and fifty effective men out of his entire force of one hundred and eighty-seven. After the fort was carried, *seven men* surrendered, and called for Santa Anna and for quarter. They were *murdered* by his order. Colonel Bowie was sick in bed, and also murdered. The enemy expect a reinforcement of fifteen hundred men under General Condelle, and a reserve of fifteen hundred to follow them. He also informs us that Ugartachea had arrived with two millions of specie for payment of the troops. The bodies of the Americans were burnt after the massacre. Alternate layers of wood and bodies were laid together and set on fire. Lieutenant Dickinson, who had a wife and child in the fort, after having fought with desperate courage, tied his child to his back and leaped from the top of a two story building. Both were killed by the fall.

I have little doubt but that the Alamo has fallen—whether the

above particulars are all true may be questionable. You are therefore referred to the enclosed order.

I am, sir, &c., SAM HOUSTON.

In corroboration of the truth of the fall of the Alamo, I have ascertained that Colonel Travis intended firing signal guns at three different periods each day until succor should arrive. No signal guns have been heard since Sunday, though a scouting party have just returned who approached within twelve miles of it, and remained there forty-eight hours.

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**No. 19.**

[ORDER REFERRED TO ABOVE.]

*To Colonel J. W. Fannin, commanding at Goliad.*

HEADQUARTERS, GONZALES, *March 11, 1836.*

SIR: You will, as soon as practicable after the receipt of this order, fall back upon Guadalupe Victoria, with your command, and such artillery as can be brought with expedition. The remainder will be sunk in the river. You will take the necessary measures for the defence of Victoria, and forward one third the number of your effective men to this point, and remain in command until further orders.

Every facility is to be afforded to women and children who may be desirous of leaving that place. Previous to abandoning Goliad, you will take the necessary measures to blow up that fortress; and do so before leaving its vicinity. The immediate advance of the enemy may be confidently expected, as well as a rise of water. Prompt movements are therefore highly important.

SAM HOUSTON,

*Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*

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**No. 20.**

*To Captain Philip Dimit.*

HEADQUARTERS, TEXAS, *March 12, 1836.*

SIR: You are ordered with your command to this place—bring all your disposable force—and, should there be any companies, or

troops, at Victoria, whose services are not indispensable to the present emergencies of that section of the frontier, you will notify them that it is my order that they forthwith repair to this point. Colonel J. W. Fannin is ordered to fall back on Victoria, after blowing up La Bahia. You will send expresses to headquarters as often as practicable.

I am, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 21.**

*To James Collingsworth, Chairman of the Military Committee.*

HEADQUARTERS, GONZALES, *March 13, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report to you my arrival at this place, on the 11th inst., at about four o'clock, P. M. I found upward of three hundred men in camp, without organization, and who had rallied on the first impulse. Since then the force has increased to more than four hundred. I have ordered their organization at ten o'clock this morning; and hope to complete it, and prepare to meet the enemy.

The enclosed statement, which came here a few moments after my arrival, has induced me to adopt a course very different from that which I intended before the information was received. The enclosed order to Colonel Fannin will indicate to you my convictions, that, with our small, unorganized force, we can not maintain sieges in fortresses, in the country of the enemy. Troops pent up in forts are rendered useless; nor is it possible that we can ever maintain our cause by such policy. The want of supplies and men, will insure the success of our enemies.

The conduct of our brave men in the Alamo was only equalled by Spartan valor.

I am informed that Colonel Fannin had about seven hundred men under his command; and, at one time, had taken up the line of march for the Alamo, but the breaking down of a wagon induced him to fall back, and abandon the idea of marching to the relief of our last hope in Bexar. Since then, he has written letters here, indicating a design to march upon San Patricio, and also the occupation of Copano. So that I am at a loss to know where my express will find him. From the Colorado I forwarded, by this place, an ex-

press to him to meet me, with all his disposable force, on the west side of the Cibolo, with a view to relieve Bexar. The news of the fall of Bexar, corroborated by so many circumstances, compelled me to change my plan, as the enclosed order will indicate. On seeing the various communications of Colonel Fannin at this point, I could not rely on any co-operation from him. The force under my command here was such as to preclude the idea of my meeting the enemy—supposing their force not to exceed the lowest estimate which has ever been made of it. My reason for delaying my despatch until the present, was, the assurance of Captain Seguin, that two men had been sent by him to his *ranch*o, and would return on last night. They have not returned; and the belief is, that they have been taken by the enemy, or deserted. I am using all my endeavors to get a company to send in view of the Alamo; and, if possible, arrive at the *certainty* of what all believe—its fall. The scarcity of horses, and the repulse of a party of twenty-eight men, the other day, within eighteen miles of Bexar, will, I apprehend, prevent the expedition.

This moment, Deaf Smith and Henry Karnes have assured me, that they will proceed in sight of Bexar; and return within three days. The persons, whose statement is enclosed for your information, are in custody; and I will detain them, for the present, as spies.

I beg leave to suggest the great importance of fortifications on Live-Oak point and Copano, and the defence of Matagorda and Lavaca bays.

You may rest assured that I shall adopt and pursue such course of conduct as the present emergencies of the country require, and as the means placed at my disposal may enable me to do, for the defence of the country and the protection of its inhabitants.

The projected expedition to Matamoros, under the *agency* of the council has already cost us over two hundred and thirty-seven lives; and where the effects are to end, none can foresee. Doctor Grant's party, as well as Colonel Johnson's, have been murdered. Major Morris, as reported, was struck down with a lance, while gallantly fighting. Doctor Grant surrendered, and was tied by the enemy. Be pleased to send all possible aids to the army; and keep an eye to the coast.

Intelligence from the seat of government, if favorable, has a most happy effect upon the spirits of the men. Frequent expresses sent to me, may be highly beneficial to the army. I will, as often as

possible, report by express the movements of the enemy, and the army. I fear La Bahia (Goliad) is in *siege*.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S. I have this moment learned that Captain Byrd's company, from the Brasos, consisting of one hundred men, will join me to-morrow.

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**No. 22.**

*To James Collingsworth, Chairman of Military Committee.*

CAMP AT NAVIDAD, *March 15, 1836.*

SIR: Since I had the honor to address you from Gonzales, the lady of Lieutenant Dickinson, who fell at the Alamo, has arrived, and confirms the fall of that place, and the circumstances, pretty much as my express detailed them. She returned in company with two negroes—one the servant of Colonel Travis, the other a servant of Colonel Almonté. They both corroborate the statement first made and forwarded to you. Other important intelligence arrived at Gonzales—that the army of Santa Anna had encamped at the Cibolo on the night of the 11th inst., after a march of twenty-four miles that day. The army was to encamp on the 12th at Sandy, and proceed direct to Gonzales. The number of the enemy could not be ascertained, but was represented as exceeding two thousand infantry. Upon this statement of facts, I deemed it proper to fall back and take post on the Colorado, near Burnham's, which is fifteen miles distant from this point. My morning report, on my arrival in camp, showed three hundred and seventy-four effective men, without two days' provisions, many without arms, and others without any ammunition. We could have met the enemy, and avenged some of our wrongs; but, detached as we were, without supplies for the men in camp, of either provisions, ammunition, or artillery, and remote from succor, it would have been madness to hazard a contest. I had been in camp two days only, and had succeeded in organizing the troops. But they had not been taught the first principles of the drill. If starved out, and the camp once broken up, there was no hope for the future. By falling back, Texas can rally, and defeat any force that can come against her.

I received the intelligence of the enemy's advance between eight and nine o'clock at night; and, before twelve, we were on the march

in good order, leaving behind a number of spies, who remained and were reinforced next morning by a number of volunteers and brave spirits from Peach creek. H. Karnes, R. E. Handy, and Captain Chenowith, have been very active. Only about twenty persons deserted the camp (from the first *sensation* produced by the intelligence) up to this time. I intend desertion shall not be frequent; and I regret to say that I am compelled to regard as deserters all who have left camp without leave; to demand their apprehension; and that, whenever arrested, they be sent to me at headquarters for trial. They have disseminated throughout the frontier such exaggerated reports, that they have produced dismay and consternation among the people to a most distressing extent.

I do not apprehend the immediate approach of the enemy upon the present settlements; I mean those on the Colorado, for the country west of it is an uninhabited waste. This season the grass refuses to grow on the prairies.

When the approach of the enemy was known, there were but two public wagons and two yoke of oxen in camp, and the few horses we had were very poor. I hope to reach the Colorado on to-morrow, and collect an army in a short time. I sent my aide-de-camp, Major William T. Austin, to Columbia this morning, for munitions and supplies, to be sent me immediately; and to order the troops now at Velasco to join me, provided they had not been previously ordered by you to fortify Copano and Dimit's landing. I am fearful Goliad is besieged by the enemy. My order to Colonel Fannin, directing the place to be blown up, the cannon to be sunk in the river, and to fall back on Victoria, would reach him before the enemy could advance. That they have advanced upon the place in strong force, I have no doubt; and when I heard of the fall of the Alamo, and the number of the enemy, I knew it must be the case.

Our forces must not be shut up in forts, where they can neither be supplied with men nor provisions. Long aware of this fact, I directed, on the 16th of January last, that the artillery should be removed, and the Alamo blown up; but it was prevented by the expedition upon Matamoros, the author of all our misfortunes.

I hope that our cruisers on the gulf will be active, and that Hawkins and —— may meet the notice of the government. Let the men of Texas rally to the Colorado!

Enclosed you will receive the address of General Santa Anna, sent by a negro to the citizens. It is in Almonté's handwriting.



Santa Anna was in Bexar when the Alamo was taken. His force in all, in Texas, is, I think, only five or six thousand men—though some say thirty thousand! This can not be true. Encourage volunteers from the United States—but I am satisfied we can save the country. Had it not been for the council, we would have had no reverses. We must have the friendship of the Camanches and other Indians.

Gonzales is reduced to ashes!

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON, *Commanding General.*

**No. 23.**

*To James Collingsworth, Chairman of Military Committee.*

BURNHAM'S, COLORADO, *March 17, 1836.*

SIR: To-day, at half-past four in the afternoon, I reached this point with about six hundred men, including my rear-guard, which is a few miles behind with the families, which were not known to be on the route as the army marched, and for which the guard were sent back.

It pains my heart that such consternation should have been spread by the deserters from camp. We are here; and, if only three hundred men remain on this side of the Brasos, I will die with them, or conquer our enemies. I would most respectfully suggest the assemblage of the troops at this point. It covers more of the country than any other known to me. When they are assembled, I will detach suitable numbers to each point as I may deem best. The Mexican army will not leave us in the rear. If they do, and find San Felipe in ashes, it will astound them. I am assured that the mules and horses of their army are miserably poor; and that there are several hundred women and children with the army, with a view to colonize Texas. If La Bahia was blown up, previous to their march upon it, I should be satisfied.

As to the state of the seaboard—keep the navy busy. To it we must look for *essential* aid. Would it not be well to send a special active agent to the United States—one who will act efficiently and promptly? Appeal to them in the holy names of liberty and humanity!

Our own people, if they would act, are enough to expel every

Mexican from Texas. Do let it be known that, on close examination, and upon reflection, the force of Santa Anna has been greatly overrated. He must have lost one thousand, or perhaps more, at the Alamo. It is said the officers have to whip and slash the soldiers on the march. And, if they should advance to the Colorado, it will be some time, as there is such scanty subsistence for animals. I have had the impression that the advance upon the Cibolo was to prevent our co-operation with Fannin, and hold us in check.

If you can by any means soothe the people, and get them to remain, they shall have notice, if I deem it necessary. Let them entertain no fears for the present. We can raise three thousand men in Texas, and fifteen hundred can defeat all that Santa Anna can send to the Colorado. We would then fight on our own ground, and the enemy would lose all confidence from our annoyance. Let the men from the east of the Trinity rush to us! let all the disposable force of Texas fly to arms! If the United States intend to aid us, let them do it now!

I shall raise a company of spies to-morrow, to range the country from this to Gonzales. Send all the good horses you can get for the army. If possible, let it be done speedily; and send ammunition for fifteen hundred men: but first send eight hundred men. I will do everything in my power for Texas.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S.—It is reported that General Woll, an Englishman, is to head the army into the colonies. I entertain a belief that Santa Anna has returned to Mexico, but it will not be known to the troops. In the attack upon the Alamo, the ramparts were swept twice, and the enemy as often repulsed; but Santa Anna was by, and urged the troops. He was not in danger. There was not a man in the Alamo but what, in his death, honored the proud name of an American. Let the men of Texas avenge their deaths! Rouse the Redlanders to battle! Ratify the Indian treaty; and let the Camanches be approached, and their friendship secured. A campaign from St. Louis, by way of Santa Fé, might be set on foot against Chihuahua. Remember Coxe's point, Dimit's landing, and Copano. They are important.

I know the government will do all in its power for the army. We want arms, and need stationary.

**No. 24.**

*To Colonel J. W. Fannin.*

[Army Orders.]

HEADQUARTERS, COLORADO RIVER, *March 17, 1836.*

COLONEL J. W. FANNIN, jr, will take a position on the bay of Lavaca, or any other point best calculated for the protection of the provisions, ammunition, &c., at Coxe's point and Dimit's landing. The army now near Burnham's, on the Colorado, will remain for a time, and, according to circumstances, fall down the river. Colonel Fannin will therefore hold himself in constant readiness to join the commander-in-chief. The Redlanders are already in motion, and will join the army as soon as possible. Regulars and volunteers are also on their march to headquarters.

If Colonel Fannin can not maintain his position, he will fall back on the main army—the object of the movement now ordered being only for the protection of the arms, ammunition, &c. The present force on the Colorado numbers four hundred and twenty effective men.

Should a permanent fortification be necessary on the bay of Lavaca, or other point, for the protection of the stores, &c., Colonel Fannin will judge of the expediency (with the command under him) of erecting them. The commanding general, not having a detailed report of his force, can only order that such measures shall be taken as will be best for the good of the service and the protection of the country.

Stock of all descriptions will be driven to the east side of the Colorado.

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 25.**

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR BEASON'S, *March 21, 1836.*

SIR: I am ordered by the commander-in-chief to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated 16th and 17th inst., and to inform you of the movement of the army to this place. I have also the pleasure to add that, on yesterday, a detachment of our spies, under Captain Karnes, fell in with a reconnoitring-party of the enemy at Rocky creek, about twenty miles from this place, consisting of

twelve men. They were immediately pursued, one man killed, one taken prisoner, and three horses, with some arms, captured; also a pair of saddle-bags, containing a small portion of clothing, of some one murdered in the Alamo. Captain Karnes had with him, at the time, but five men. The prisoner states that one thousand men are on their march to this point, and will probably be near us to-night. A detachment of the army of the enemy has also marched from San Antonio to attack Goliad. Our army are in fine spirits and good health, not having one on our sick-list. They are eager to meet the enemy. To check their impetuosity is all that will be required. The enemy have three light pieces of artillery with them.

The commander-in-chief directs me to assure you of the vigilance and caution which will be used, and of his entire confidence in the army, and in its ability to render a good account of the enemy. Our spies are active and vigilant, and the enemy can gain no advantage over us. I am also directed to inform you of the pleasure he feels in reporting the complete subordination of the troops: it has never been surpassed by any army of like description in any country. Their anxiety to retrieve the misfortunes of the past is heard and witnessed throughout the camp. A detachment of a hundred men are now crossing the river to meet the enemy's advance, and every confidence may be placed in their entire success. Enclosed you will find Colonel Fannin's letter to me of — inst.

I have the honor, &c.,

G. W. HOCKLEY,

*Inspector-General of the Army.*

P. S.—The prisoner reports that General Santa Anna has left San Antonio for Mexico.

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**No. 26.**

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP NEAR BEASON'S, *March 23, 1836.*

SIR: The commander-in-chief of the army directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th inst., and inform you that he still maintains the position at this place, commanding the crossing of the Colorado at Mosely's, above Beason's, and *Atasco sito* below, and that he intends to remain stationary, unless offensive operations shall be justified by circumstances or reinforcements.

Captain Teal, of the regulars, with his command, arrived here yesterday; and a small detachment of volunteers, reinforcements, and supplies, are hourly expected. The party of spies, named in the communication to the war department, have been constantly on the alert. The company stationed at Mosely's have captured three of the enemy, who are now on their way to camp.

The enemy are undoubtedly near to the opposite bank, and will probably soon attempt crossing the Colorado; but, from our present position, we can effectually command any point at which he may attempt it. A detachment of two hundred men are now at Mosely's crossing. The camp will be reformed in a thick wood on the bank of the river, and in a position highly favorable for observation and defence, its present flanks and front being well protected by felled trees, brush, and timber.

The general further directs me to state the good order and discipline which have been observed since the formation of this encampment. The strict silence at night, the obedience and discipline now maintained, are unexampled in any troops of like description, and highly creditable to the officers and men. We have now upward of seven hundred men, and not one of them on the sick-list, but all in high spirits, and anxious to meet the foe. One wagon, with arms, ammunition, &c., has just arrived, which has increased their anxiety and confidence, as they now find the promised supplies.

The army are much in need of good horses; and, if sabres and pistols could be forwarded, we could furnish the material for an efficient corps of cavalry.

Since writing the above, two of the prisoners mentioned therein have been examined separately. They agree very nearly in their statements, an outline of which is as follows:—

“That General Sesma is on the opposite side of the river, about three miles from our encampment, with five or six hundred men—a hundred and fifty cavalry—and two small pieces of artillery. His troops are badly clad, and the state of the weather such as to render them almost ineffectual from cold. They are building a boat, and intend crossing near us.”

They are evidently checked by the skirmish with our spies (named in a previous letter). The prisoners say that General Sesma halted the next day to rest. With our reinforcements, we shall be able to anticipate any the enemy may receive.

24/h.—General Gregory, of North Carolina, Colonel Nibbs, and  
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some other gentlemen from Washington, have this moment arrived in camp with Major Poe. They report about two hundred men on their march, who will join to-morrow.

I have the honor, &c.,

G. W. HOCKLEY,

*Inspector-General of the Army.*

**No. 27.**

[NOT OFFICIAL.]

*To Colonel Thomas J. Rusk.*

CAMP NEAR BEASON'S, *March 23, 1836.*

DEAR COLONEL: To-day I had the pleasure to receive your two letters by Mr. Walker. I thank you for them, and snatch a moment from the press of business to say a few things in compliance with your request, as well as to gratify my personal feelings. I have had no aid or assistance but my friend Hockley, who now fills your former station. By-the-by, I offer you my congratulations on your advancement. I trust you will find in me a worthy subaltern. You know I am not easily depressed, but, before my God, since we parted, I have found the darkest hours of my past life! My excitement has been so great, that, for forty-eight hours, I have not eaten an ounce, nor have I slept. I was in constant apprehension of a rout; a constant panic existed in the lines: yet I managed so well, or such was my good luck, that not a gun was fired in or near the camp, or on the march (except to kill beef), from the Guadalupe to the Colorado. All would have been well, and all at peace on this side of the Colorado, if I could only have had a moment to start an express in advance of the deserters; but they went first, and, being panic-struck, it was contagious, and all who saw them breathed the poison and fled. It was a poor compliment to me to suppose that I would not advise the convention of any necessity which might arise for their removal. I sent word and advices, the first moment of leisure, to the convention; and all was calm in my communications to Mr. Collingsworth. I had to advise troops and persons of my falling back, and had to send one guard thirty miles for a poor blind widow (and six children), whose husband was killed in the Alamo. The families are now all on this side of the Guadalupe.



These things pained me infinitely, and, with the responsibility of my command, weighed upon me to an agonizing extent.

This moment an express has arrived, and states that Fannin took up his retreat on Saturday last (19th), and, a few miles from La Bahia, he was attacked by the Mexican army and surrounded about an hour and a half before sundown. The battle continued in the night, and the result is not known. The express states that Colonel Ward's command had not returned. I am at a loss to know how matters stand. I will try and make a good report for the future. The Matamoros policy, I hope, is now run out; and the evils, growing out of the conduct of the council, ended.

Changing this from a familiar to an official character, I must say that, if we are to meet an accession of force, which must be the case if Fannin is cut off, we must have the strength of the country. Arms and ammunition have just reached camp, and I hope what men we have will be well armed and supplied with fighting-materials.

Two spies have been taken to-day, and they report the force of the enemy in this quarter less than I had before heard it. Let the Mexican force be what it may, if the country will turn out, we can beat them. The retreat of the government will have a bad effect on the troops, and I am half-provoked at it myself. The Mexicans can not fight us upon anything like fair terms. . . . I will get any advantage I can if I fight. If what I have heard from Fannin be true, I deplore it, and can only attribute the ill luck to his attempting to retreat in daylight in the face of a superior force. He is an ill-fated man.

Do all you can. The troops are in fine spirits, but how this news will affect them I know not. Our spies have taken two of the enemy to-day, but I have not yet had time to examine them. I will in a few moments.

24th.—I have examined the spies, and they represent the enemy much weaker than all former reports. They say Sesma has not more than seven hundred men, and one says six hundred.

I truly hope you will appoint Major Lewis agent for the Cherokees, and do it directly. . . . Why do you keep more than a sergeant's or lieutenant's guard at Washington? Men are flocking to camp, and I expect, in a day or two, to receive two hundred volunteers and regulars. Forty-eight muskets and a supply of ammunition came opportunely last night. In a few days my force will be highly respectable. I am writing in the open air. I have no tent,

and am not looking out for the luxuries of life. I am only looking out to be useful to my country and the cause of liberty. Do devise some plan to send back the rascals who have gone from the army and service of the country with guns. Oh, why did the cabinet leave Washington? . . . . .

I wish you would send A. M'Laughlin to the United States. Write to the board, and ratify the treaty. We must act now, and with great promptness. The country must be saved. Oh, curse the consternation which has seized the people! I must make many appointments for the present—*all special I will refer to you.* I am so busy, I must close. May God bless you! This morning I hear of men from the mouth of the river: they are on the march—you will hear from us.

Ever yours truly,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 28.**

*To Captain B. J. White.*

CAMP AT BEASON'S FERRY, *March 23, 1836.*

SIR: If men can be obtained, you are ordered to repair to Coxe's point, or Dimit's landing, and remove or secure the supplies at those places. You are ordered to use and command all the means of the country in securing supplies, and removing the families, and placing them on the east side of the Colorado. You have much discretion left with you, and I hope you will employ it to the best advantage for the preservation of the country.

Of the army at this point, and in the neighborhood, Mr. Noble can tell you. The enemy are about fifteen miles from us. Their force is supposed to be only about a thousand.

Reinforcements are arriving daily, and more on the march.

Your obedient servant,

SAM HOUSTON,

I am informed that Colonel Wharton has sailed for Coxe's point, with some one hundred and fifty or two hundred men.

**No. 29.**

*To R. R. Royal, Chairman of the Committee at Matagorda.*

CAMP NEAR BEASON'S, *March 24, 1836.*

SIR: Your letter, under date of March 18th, is received. All the means you can command ought to be employed for the protection of the country, and families. Anything that can be done to this effect will meet my approbation.

All the troops that can be raised I wish placed at my disposal, as on the Colorado I make my stand, and it is deemed necessary to concentrate all the effective force at this point for the present.

Having the greatest confidence that, with the means you can control, you can defend that point, even in case of an attack,

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 30.**

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

CAMP NEAR MILL CREEK, *March 29, 1836.*

SIR: On my arrival on the Brasos, had I consulted the wishes of all, I should have been like the ass between two stacks of hay. Many wished me to go below, others above. I consulted none—I held no councils-of-war. If I err, the blame is mine. I find Colonel Hockley, of my staff, a sage counsellor and true friend. My staff are all worthy, and merit well of me.

There was on yesterday, as I understood, much discontent in the lines, because I would not fall down the river. If it should be wise for me to do so, I can cross over at any time, and fall down to greater advantage and safety. I apprehend, in consequence of my falling back, that the enemy may change their route to Matagorda. I ordered all the men residing on the coast, and those arriving from the United States at or south of Velasco, to remain and fortify at some safe point; and, on yesterday, I sent Colonel Harcourt, as principal engineer of the army, down to the coast, to erect fortifications at the most eligible point of defence. I placed at his disposal the resources of the lower country for its defence and protection.

I pray God that you would get aid, speedy aid, from the United States; or, after all inducements, we must suffer. I hope to-day to

receive ninety men from the Red-lands. I can not now tell my force, but will soon be able. The enemy must be crippled by the fights they have had with our men. I have ordered D. C. Barrett and E. Gritton to be arrested and held subject to the future order of the government. I do think they ought to be detained and tried as traitors and spies.

For Heaven's sake, do not drop back again with the seat of government! Your removal to Harrisburg has done more to increase the panic in the country than anything else that has occurred in Texas, except the fall of the Alamo. Send fifty agents, if need be, to the United States. Wharton writes me, from Nashville, that the ladies of that place have fitted out, at their own expense, no less than two hundred men. . . . .

If matters press upon us, for God's sake let the troops land at Galveston bay, and by land reach the Brasos! Let no troops march with baggage-wagons, or wagons of any kind.

Truly, &c., SAM HOUSTON.

To-day I send Captain Smith to you, agreeably to your order. Great prosperity to you and the country, &c.

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**No: 31.**

*To Colonel William Christy, New Orleans.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP MILL CREEK, *March 29, 1836.*

DEAR SIR: I have ordered Captain David N. Burke and Edward Conrad to New Orleans, to procure men for the army of Texas. The present is probably the most important moment we have to experience. We now stand before the world as a nation, and stand almost alone. But for the assistance upon which we confidently rely from our brethren in the United States, we shall not be enabled to maintain the position we have assumed. With equal confidence I look to *you* for the immediate use of all the influence in your power to sustain our cause. I look to you as the most efficient and zealous agent of our country. Do exert all the talent and means you can command, for now is the time of need. Captain Burke and Mr. Conrad will bear this letter to you, with my orders: be good enough to render them all the assistance in your power.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

## No. 32.

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *March 31, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to report to you my arrival at this point, with a view to receive reinforcements and supplies. It is the best and nearest route to Harrisburg, or the Bay, at which I could have struck the Brasos, and it will prevent the whole country passing the Trinity. The force of the enemy has been greatly exaggerated, I have no doubt. But the deserters have spread universal alarm throughout the country.

I wish you to send flour, sugar, and coffee, on pack-horses, to this point, as soon as possible. Don't send by wagons; and let the pack-horses be well hopped at night. My horses and baggage-wagons in camp give me all the care I have, except my general solicitude. One of my spies has just returned from a scout, and reports that he went ten miles beyond St. Bernard, on the road to Beason's, and saw nothing of the enemy. Two others went on, and said they would see the enemy if they had to cross the Colorado. Mr. E. Smith (Deaf) is out, and, if living, I will hear the truth and all important news.

For Heaven's sake, do allay the fever and chill which prevails in the country, and let the people from the east march to the camp! Supplies are needed on the route from Nacogdoches to this point. The enemy would have been beaten at the Colorado. My intention was, to have attacked him on the second night after the day on which the news of Fannin's destruction was reported by Kerr—but for that news, and the march of strong reinforcements, probably arriving that night, to the enemy. Previous to that, the troops were in fine spirits, and keen for action.

The reinforcements promised to our army never arriving, has kept us in a mood not so enviable as could be wished for. Send daily expresses to me, and do let me know what to rely upon. I must let the camp know something, and I want everything promised to be realized by them. I hope I can keep them together; I have, thus far, succeeded beyond my hopes. I will do the best I can; but, be assured, the fame of Jackson could never compensate me for my anxiety and mental pain.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S.—I have somewhere between seven and eight hundred effective men. Two nights since, when it was reported that the enemy were on this side of the Colorado, the citizens of San Felipe reduced it to ashes. There was no order from me for it.\* I am glad of it, should the enemy march there. Our troops have suffered much from heavy rains and dreadful roads.

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**No. 33.**

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP ON BRASOS, *April 1, 1836.*

SIR: I am directed by the commander-in-chief to inform you of the movement of the army to this place since the last communication to the department of war. From the detention in crossing Mill creek, the army did not reach this encampment until last evening. It is now, however, in a secure and effective position, with excellent water from a lake immediately ahead, and a most beautiful spot of the Brasos timber, about three fourths of a mile ahead, on the road leading to Groce's ferry. The weather for the last few days has been wet; from that circumstance, and the fact that the roads are in many places impassable for our wagons, the men have undergone great fatigue.

So soon as they can wash their clothing, and arrange their arms, &c., an entire organization of camp duty and discipline will be established, and the encampment reformed in order of battle, and camp rule and duty performed. This, in some degree, has been omitted since our march, as it has been in several instances a forced one. It has, however, been conducted, under the circumstances of the case, with much credit to the exertions of the officers and obedience of the men.

The steamboat *Yellowstone*, Captain ——, is at Groce's landing, taking in cotton. The commander-in-chief directed her to be taken in charge for the use of the army, in case it should be necessary rapidly to descend the river to act upon the enemy. Major Cook and a sufficient guard are now on board, and she will be detained until her services can safely be dispensed with. She is nearly loaded with cotton.

\* "It has been said you ordered the burning of San Felipe. I have contradicted it. I would like to be fully satisfied on the subject."—*David Thomas Acting Secretary of War, to General Houston, April 8, 1836.*



Last evening the commander-in-chief received information from Captain Mosely Baker, who has command at San Felipe, of the arrival of two of his spies, who report that the enemy have crossed the Colorado river at *Atasco sito* crossing, and were then in order of march. This information roused the army to an enthusiasm, which showed with what feeling they would meet his approach. But, late last night, other spies arrived at this encampment, who were also near that point; and, from their report, the major-general is led to believe that some mistake has occurred as to the persons seen being the enemy. Should the report prove to be correct, he can not reach this point, if such is his intention, for some days, because of the situation of the roads and starved condition of his horses and cattle. He has undoubtedly crossed the Colorado. About eighty men from the Red-lands are all that have arrived, and what hope to entertain of aid from that quarter it is impossible to say. The effective force now here is seven hundred and fifty to eight hundred men. One death only has occurred—caused by great exposure to wet and cold when crossing Mill creek. The troops are in good health.

From information received the evening after leaving San Felipe, the commander-in-chief ordered Peter Kerr—the individual who brought the intelligence of the defeat of Colonel Fannin into camp on the Colorado—to be taken. A guard was sent to San Felipe, and he was brought into camp next morning. A further communication from the major-general on this subject will accompany this.

I have the honor, &c.,

G. W. HOCKLEY,

*Inspector-General.*

A few cases of measles have been reported. A hospital has been established the other side of the Brasos, and the men sent over to it.

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**No. 34.**

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 3, 1836.*

SIR: I arrived at this place on the first instant, and pitched my encampment in a secure position, in hopes that I should receive supplies, and more so, that I would be enabled to meet the enemy at any time, and under any circumstances which propriety might dictate. Since my location, rains have fallen; and it is possible the

water may invade my encampment, and compel me to remove, either back to the prairie, or to pass over the river to the east side. If I do pass, it will only be to make my camp on a healthy site, secure from water, and to defend our horses from the enemy; for I find that no care whatever will be taken of horses, and if they fall into the enemy's hands it would add to his facilities.

My spies return and report the enemy only about one thousand strong on the Colorado, without pickets, and only a small campground. My opinion is, that a detachment I sent to reconnoitre the enemy, will attack him to-night. The detachment was twenty in number, under the command of Major Patton, my aid-de-camp. They are among the best hearts of the army.

If I should pass the river, my design will be, should I quit a position opposite to this point, to drop down opposite Fort Bend, or some point below. The enemy would not have it in their power to pass the river for at least a month to come; and we could only cross with the aid of a steamboat, which I have pressed, and will retain till I can dispense with it.

If I should pass the river, I will leave my most effective cavalry on this side. I send you, in charge of Mr. Este, two prisoners, Peter Kerr, and Beregado, a Mexican. I have nothing pointed against them; but suspicion has fallen upon them, and they are to be secured. You may rest easy at Harrisburg; the enemy will never cross the Brasos, and I hope the panic will soon subside. People are planting corn on the east side of this river.

Mr. Zavala has arrived and reported for duty. I am glad of it. He informed me that I should have the pleasure of seeing you; and indeed it would give me pleasure to do so. I have ordered the troops below to occupy some defensible positions below on the river, or coast, and check the enemy. Rumors from the Mexican interior of wars, or difficulty in passing the Colorado, have caused them to delay; and at this time it is almost impossible for them to pass the prairies, owing to the rains that have fallen since we passed—then it was only possible for us to pass with our wagons. If they come, their artillery must come. They must raft it over the Colorado, which is very high, as I am informed. It must be out of its banks.

I have looked for an express from you for several days. Eighty Redlanders have arrived, and are on the opposite bank. The arrival of others is daily expected.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

## No. 35.

*To Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 4, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that, by an express which reached me last night, I received intelligence that Colonel Fannin and his command had been attacked by a large body of Mexican cavalry and infantry, in the prairie, about eight miles east of San Antonio river, on his march from La Bahia to Victoria. The enemy were several times repulsed; the battle lasting until in the night. On the next morning the enemy fired several cannon-shots and hoisted a flag of truce, which was met by a corresponding signal from Colonel Fannin. The commanders met, and stipulated that the Americans, on condition of a surrender, should be treated as prisoners-of-war, and in eight days sent to New Orleans on parole. On the eighth day the prisoners were marched out under a guard (after having been kept in close confinement), a file of soldiers on each side of the prisoners. The guard then doubled files on the right of the prisoners, killing all but one, who made his escape. The enemy are said to have lost a thousand men in the action. . . . .

Will not our friends rush to the conflict, and at once avenge the wrongs which have been inflicted on our dauntless comrades? The day of just retribution ought not to be deferred. Send expresses to the coast and to the United States. The army is just organizing, and will soon be prepared. The last advices report that the enemy can not cross the Colorado—except a part of it—on account of high waters. Their delay is said, by others, to be owing to some difficulties in the interior, and a want of supplies.

San Felipe was reduced to ashes, but not by my order.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S. It was reported in camp, that you were coming to the army. As it is so reported, you had best come if possible. It will inspirit the troops. No express has reached me for some five days from Harrisburg. The army is in good spirits.

**No. 36.***To Captain Mosely Baker.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 5, 1836.*

SIR: I have heard, with extreme regret, complaints from various sources, of the destruction and waste of goods, stores, and public property, at San Felipe, and under your command. They may, perhaps, have been exaggerated; but every means in your power should have been used to preserve and protect the stores, until such were ordered to be destroyed; as it was totally impossible to send back the wagons across Mill creek. Captains Kimbrough and Bryant have been ordered to co-operate with you; and the utmost harmony of action, subordination, and discipline, must be observed. The safety of the country requires it, and the commanding general orders a rigid adherence to it.

SAM HOUSTON.

**No. 37.***To David Thomas, acting Secretary of War.*CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 6, 1836.*

SIR: Your letters of the 4th and 5th instant have this moment been received by express. Colonel Rusk arrived in camp on the evening of the 4th instant, and will probably remain for a few days longer. I am pleased to learn of the supplies being forwarded for the use of the army. They will be particularly acceptable. The present position of the army is one of strength and security, and from which the movements of the enemy can be vigilantly watched. My spies are remarkably active and intelligent, and shall be kept in constant action. They are much in want of good horses.

A deserter from the enemy was brought into camp last night. He confirms the report previously received, of the miserable condition of their troops; and adds, that much dissatisfaction prevails in their ranks, from the severity of treatment and deprivation of the necessaries of life. He shall be closely looked to, and the first favorable moment seized with avidity to effect his total defeat.

Intercepted documents received last winter, showed that Edward Gritton was a spy of Santa Anna, but that he had lost their confidence in part. These papers were seen by me after their seizure and translation. I have the honor, &c., SAM HOUSTON.

**No. 38.**

*To Captain J. N. Allen.*

CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 8, 1836.*

SIR: Your communication under date of 4th instant is received. I am pleased to find you are on your march to join the army; and wish you to use all possible expedition in reinforcing us with your command and the cannon.

Assure the inhabitants generally that the army will not cross the Brasos, unless to act with more effect against the enemy; and that the most certain way of securing their property and families, is to repair to the army and drive the invader from the soil. Those who refuse to join us will have their property confiscated, and be regarded as deserters from our cause.

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 39.**

*To David Thomas, acting Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 9, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that Peter Kerr, who was sent to Harrisburg some days since, had in his possession a letter from on board the Montezuma, written by a lieutenant, recommending said Kerr to general favor of Mexican officers; and stating that Kerr had befriended the Mexicans, but did not set forth particulars. These facts were known to many present in camp at the time, but never reached me until this moment. I do hope that all prisoners sent by me may be carefully kept, and, at least, prevented from mischief. It is unfortunate for us that the waters are so high as to prevent us from that activity which would be desirable. The enemy are not in such great force as was expected. Our numbers increase; and I hope you will hear well of us.

The enemy are firing at San Felipe to-day. I reinforced the post by forty-five men. They will now have at least one hundred and fifty men; and in the Brasos bottom they can not be driven back. The enemy have no idea of our force there, and can not suppose it to exceed, at that point, fifty men. To-day I send out a small party well versed in the use of the horse; and I hope to hear well of them.

Colonel Rusk is still here, and will, probably, remain during the crisis. To-day I am in good spirits, and hope to be in better. I have now organized two regiments, and doubt not but a brigade will be formed under orders of the secretary of war. I look for the waters to fall in the course of a day or so. The camp is healthy. The enemy is confident; and, I hope, so much the better for us. Wells, a spy, returned to-day; and after examining the signs, parade-ground, and every indication possible, reports the number of the enemy at six or seven hundred men.

Tell our people never again to give way to a *panic*; but to do their duty.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

P. S. Keep all the prisoners safe.

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**No. 40.**

*To David Thomas, acting Secretary of War.\**

CAMP WEST OF BRASOS, *April 11, 1836.*

SIR: I have the honor to send you a Mr. Powell, and I have given him a letter of introduction. This I did from policy. You will find him a panic-maker, and, in my opinion, a spy. I hope you will send him to Colonel Morgan, and let him be watched so closely that he can do no harm, if he should be so disposed. I assure your excellency that we must manage to keep suspicious persons safe. From them, in my opinion, and none else, we may apprehend all danger. I pray you not to think me too rigorous in these matters. I consult the secretary of war, who has a knowledge of facts, as well as myself; and my course is in accordance with his views. Major Wyley Martin wrote to me about this same man, and said his statements were "*lies*." For the sake of Texas, have him kept safe; and it might be best to send him to Colonel Morgan, where he can be watched without suspecting it. Lynn and Kerr ought to be well watched. I pray you be vigilant. I have ordered spies everywhere. Though Powell says Urrea (general) is on his way to the lower country, how could Powell pass by the enemy, as he has done, unless he has some assurance of their favor? I think Powell is sent to scare us, while the enemy are pretty badly scared them-

\* This letter was probably directed to President Burnet. See No. 42.



selves. I hope they will soon be as much hurt. The high waters have interrupted us much. May Heaven prosper you and the country.

I have the honor, &c., SAM HOUSTON.

I do not deem it necessary to make formal charges. Policy will, at least, justify his detention. Words of the accused are cheap—bear this in mind, I pray you.

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**No. 41.**

*To the Citizens of Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP ON BRASOS, *April 13, 1836.*

YOU have suffered panic to seize you, and idle rumor to guide you. You will now be told that the enemy have crossed the Brasos, and that Texas is conquered. Reflect, reason with yourselves, and you can not believe a part of it. The enemy have crossed the Brasos, but they are treading the soil on which they are to be conquered. That he has not been already beaten, has been caused by the tardiness of some, and the apathy of others. The force of the enemy does not exceed nine hundred men. With a semblance of force sufficient to meet him, his fate is certain. If, then, you wish your country saved, join her standard. Protect your wives, your children, and your homes, by repairing to the field, where alone, by discipline and concert of action, you can be effective. The presence of the small force now in the field has divided his army. Our *spies* have once checked his career. Then march forward; and with the confidence of men determined to conquer, join the troops now in the field, and your enemy is certainly in your power. Twenty men in number checked the force of the enemy in crossing the Brasos at Fort Bend. The rumor that is circulated about the Mexicans being on the Trinity, was reported at the falls of the Brasos three weeks ago. A gentleman is in camp who says no enemy had passed there: so, like other reports, it must be unfounded. Come and free your country at once; and be *men*!

Let those who are on the march, advance to the army. Those who do not aid Texas in her present struggle, but flee and forfeit all the rights of citizens, will deserve their fate.

SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief.*

## No. 42.

*To David Thomas, acting Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP AT GROCE'S, *April 13, 1836.*

SIR: This moment yours of yesterday has reached me. I have the honor to remark, that taunts and suggestions have been gratuitously tendered to me; and I have submitted to them without any disposition to retort either unkindness or imputation. What has been my situation? At Gonzales I had three hundred and seventy-four efficient men, without supplies, even powder, balls, or arms. At Colorado with seven hundred men, without discipline or time to organize the army. Two days since, my effective force in camp was five hundred and twenty-three men (aggregate). I had authorized Captain Martin to detain a force there of at least two hundred men. I had sent to the bottom opposite San Felipe one hundred and fifty men: and had reason to expect the attack would be made, and an effort made to cross the river at San Felipe, or at the point at which I was, as the prairie, at the latter point, approached nearer to the river, and the bottom was better than at any other point on the river. The cannonade was kept up at San Felipe until yesterday morning; and as the river was very high, and it was reported to me that the enemy were preparing rafts at that point, I had every reason to suppose that they intended to cross there, if possible.

On the previous night, in consultation with the secretary of war, we concluded to pass the river to this side. At ten o'clock, A. M., yesterday, I commenced crossing the river, and from that time till the present (noon) the steamboat and yawl (having no ferry-boat) have been engaged. We have eight or ten wagons, ox-teams, and about two hundred horses, belonging to the army; and these have to pass on board the steamboat, besides the troops, baggage, &c. This requires time; but I hope in one hour to be enabled to be in preparation. I had sent an express evening before last to all the troops of Washington and above this point to meet me here by a rapid march. On yesterday morning I ordered all the command below to unite with the main body, so as to act promptly and efficiently when most necessary. It was impossible to guard all river passes for one hundred miles, and at once concentrate the force so as to guard any one point effectually, unless where the main body might be stationed. An invading army marches with everything

necessary to conquest. I would at once have fallen back on Harrisburg, but a wish to allay the panic that prevailed, induced me to stop at the Brasos, contrary to my views of military operations. I had assurances of reinforcements by remaining on the Brasos—of which I will say nothing at present.

When I assured the department that the enemy should not pass the Brasos, I did not intend to convey the idea that either the army or myself possessed powers of ubiquity; but, that they should not pass through my encampment. I do hope that my last envelope to his excellency the president, will show you on *whom* to rely, and on *whom*, for a while, the burden must rest.

I beg leave to assure you that I will omit no opportunity to serve the country, and to serve it for the love of it, without ambition, or ulterior views into which selfishness can enter. I have, under the most disadvantageous circumstances, kept an army together, and where there has not been even murmuring or insubordination; but I can not perform impossibilities. These remarks are not in anger, nor are they intended to be in the least personal to you, but arise out of the pressure of difficulties which you can not appreciate, because they are unexplained to you. Again I beg leave to assure you, that I have for you the most high and friendly consideration, and will regard with pleasure every manifestation of public confidence arising from a proper estimate of your worth. I write in much haste, pressed by business, and engaged in the contemplation of matters, I hope, not distant.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 43.**

*To Colonel Nathaniel Robbins.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP AT GROCE'S, *April 13, 1836.*

SIR: You are hereby ordered and commanded to seize all arms and guns, and such weapons of war as may be useful to the army, or necessary to the defence of Texas, giving receipts for the same, and holding them subject to the orders of the government.

You will arrest all *deserters* from the army, and pass them over to commands on their march to the army. All persons who have not furnished substitutes, and have left the army without furloughs or

discharges, or whose furlongs have expired, are deserters, and as such must be registered and reported to the government, if not apprehended and sent back.

SAM HOUSTON.

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**No. 44.**

*To Colonel Henry Raguet, of Nacogdoches.*

CAMP AT HARRISBURG, *April 19, 1836.*

SIR: This morning we are in preparation to meet Santa Anna. It is the only chance of saving Texas. From time to time I have looked for reinforcements in vain. The convention adjourning to Harrisburg struck *panic* throughout the country. Texas could have started at least four thousand men. We will only have about seven hundred to march with, besides the camp-guard. We go to conquer. It is wisdom growing out of necessity to meet the enemy now; every consideration enforces it. No previous occasion would justify it. The troops are in fine spirits, and now is the time for action.

Adjutant-General Wharton, Inspector-General Hockley, Aide-de-Camp Horton; Aides-de-Camp W. H. Patton, Collingsworth; Volunteer Aides Perry, Perry; Major Cook, assistant inspector-general — will be with me.

We shall use our best efforts to fight the enemy to such advantage as will insure victory, though the odds are greatly against us. I leave the result in the hands of a wise God, and rely upon his providence.

My country will do justice to those who serve her. The rights for which we fight will be secured, and Texas free.

SAM HOUSTON, *Commander, &c.*

P. S.—Colonel Rusk is in the field.

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**No. 45.**

*To David G. Burnet, President of the Republic of Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SAN JACINTO, *April 25, 1836.*

SIR: I regret extremely that my situation, since the battle of the 21st, has been such as to prevent my rendering you my official report of the same previous to this time.

I have the honor to inform you that, on the evening of the 18th inst., after a forced march of fifty-five miles, which was effected in two days and a half, the army arrived opposite Harrisburg. That evening a courier of the enemy was taken, from whom I learned that General Santa Anna, with one division of his choice troops, had marched in the direction of Lynch's ferry, on the San Jacinto—burning Harrisburg as he passed down.

The army was ordered to be in readiness to march early on the next morning. The main body effected a crossing over Buffalo bayou, below Harrisburg, on the morning of the 19th, having left the baggage, the sick, and a sufficient camp-guard, in the rear. We continued to march throughout the night, making but one halt in the prairie for a short time, and without refreshments. At daylight we resumed the line of march, and in a short distance our scouts encountered those of the enemy, and we received information that General Santa Anna was at New Washington, and would that day take up the line of march for Anahuac, crossing at Lynch's ferry. The Texan army halted within half a mile of the ferry, in some timber, and were engaged in slaughtering beeves, when the army of Santa Anna was discovered to be approaching in battle array, having been encamped at Clopper's point, eight miles below. Disposition was immediately made of our forces, and preparation for his reception. He took a position with his infantry, and artillery in the centre, occupying an island of timber, his cavalry covering the left flank. The artillery, consisting of one double-fortified medium brass twelve-pounder, then opened on our encampment. The infantry, in column, advanced with the design of charging our lines, but were repulsed by a discharge of grape and canister from our artillery, consisting of two six-pounders. The enemy had occupied a piece of timber within rifle-shot of the left wing of our army, from which an occasional interchange of small-arms took place between the troops, until the enemy withdrew to a position on the bank of the San Jacinto, about three quarters of a mile from our encampment, and commenced fortification.

A short time before sunset, our mounted men, about eighty-five in number, under the special command of Colonel Sherman, marched out for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy. While advancing, they received a volley from the left of the enemy's infantry, and, after a sharp rencounter with their cavalry, in which ours acted extremely well, and performed some feats of daring chivalry, they



retired in good order, having had two men severely wounded, and several horses killed. In the meantime, the infantry under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Millard, and Colonel Burleson's regiment, with the artillery, had marched out for the purpose of covering the retreat of the cavalry, if necessary. All then fell back in good order to our encampment about sunset, and remained without ostensible action until the 21st, at half-past three o'clock, taking the first refreshment which they had enjoyed for two days. The enemy in the meantime extended the right flank of their infantry, so as to occupy the extreme point of a skirt of timber on the bank of the San Jacinto, and secured their left by a fortification about five feet high, constructed of packs and baggage, leaving an opening in the centre of the breastwork, in which their artillery was placed, their cavalry upon their left wing.

About nine o'clock on the morning of the 21st, the enemy were reinforced by five hundred choice troops, under the command of General Cos, increasing their effective force to upward of fifteen hundred men, while our aggregate force for the field numbered seven hundred and eighty-three. At half-past three o'clock in the evening, I ordered the officers of the Texan army to parade their respective commands, having in the meantime ordered the bridge on the only road communicating with the Brasos, distant eight miles from our encampment, to be destroyed—thus cutting off all possibility of escape. Our troops paraded with alacrity and spirit, and were anxious for the contest. Their conscious disparity in numbers seemed only to increase their enthusiasm and confidence, and heightened their anxiety for the conflict. Our situation afforded me an opportunity of making the arrangements preparatory to the attack without exposing our designs to the enemy. The *first* regiment, commanded by Colonel Burleson, was assigned to the centre. The *second* regiment, under the command of Colonel Sherman, formed the left wing of the army. The artillery, under the special command of Colonel George W. Hockley, inspector-general, was placed on the right of the first regiment; and four companies of infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Millard, sustained the artillery upon the right. Our cavalry, sixty-one in number, commanded by Colonel Mirabeau B. Lamar (whose gallant and daring conduct on the previous day had attracted the admiration of his comrades, and called him to that station), placed on our extreme right, completed our line. Our cavalry was first despatched to the



front of the enemy's left, for the purpose of attracting their notice, while an extensive island of timber afforded us an opportunity of concentrating our forces, and deploying from that point, agreeably to the previous design of the troops. Every evolution was performed with alacrity, the whole advancing rapidly in line, through an open prairie, without any protection whatever for our men. The artillery advanced and took station within two hundred yards of the enemy's breastwork, and commenced an effective fire with grape and canister.

Colonel Sherman, with his regiment, having commenced the action upon our left wing, the whole line, at the centre and on the right, advancing in double quick time, raised the war-cry, "*Remember the Alamo!*" received the enemy's fire, and advanced within point-blank shot, before a piece was discharged from our lines. Our line advanced without a halt, until they were in possession of the woodland and the enemy's breastwork—the right wing of Burleson's and the left of Millard's taking possession of the breastwork; our artillery having gallantly charged up within seventy yards of the enemy's cannon, when it was taken by our troops.

The conflict lasted about eighteen minutes from the time of close action until we were in possession of the enemy's encampment, taking one piece of cannon (loaded), four stand of colors, all their camp-equipage, stores, and baggage. Our cavalry had charged and routed that of the enemy upon the right, and given pursuit to the fugitives, which did not cease until they arrived at the bridge which I have mentioned before—Captain Karnes, always among the foremost in danger, commanding the pursuers. The conflict in the breastwork lasted but a few moments; many of the troops encountered hand to hand, and, not having the advantage of bayonets on our side, our riflemen used their pieces as war-clubs, breaking many of them off at the breech. The rout commenced at half-past four, and the pursuit by the main army continued until twilight. A guard was then left in charge of the enemy's encampment, and our army returned with their killed and wounded. In the battle, our loss was two killed and twenty-three wounded, six of them mortally. The enemy's loss was six hundred and thirty killed, among whom was one general officer, four colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, five captains, twelve lieutenants; wounded two hundred and eight, of which were five colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, two second lieutenant-colonels, seven captains, one cadet; prisoners seven hundred and thirty

—President-General Santa Anna, General Cos, four colonels, aides to General Santa Anna, and the colonel of the Guerrero battalion, are included in the number. General Santa Anna was not taken until the 22d, and General Cos yesterday, very few having escaped. About six hundred muskets, three hundred sabres, and two hundred pistols, have been collected since the action. Several hundred mules and horses were taken, and nearly twelve thousand dollars in specie.

For several days previous to the action, our troops were engaged in forced marches, exposed to excessive rains, and the additional inconvenience of extremely bad roads, badly supplied with rations and clothing; yet, amid every difficulty, they bore up with cheerfulness and fortitude, and performed their marches with spirit and alacrity—there was no murmuring.

Previous to and during the action, my staff evinced every disposition to be useful, and were actively engaged in their duties. In the conflict I am assured that they demeaned themselves in such a manner as proved them worthy members of the army of San Jacinto. Colonel T. J. Rusk, secretary of war, was on the field. For weeks his services had been highly beneficial to the army. In the battle, he was on the left wing, where Colonel Sherman's command first encountered and drove in the enemy: he bore himself gallantly, and continued his efforts and activity, remaining with the pursuers until resistance ceased.

I have the honor of transmitting herewith a list of all the officers and men who were engaged in the action, which I respectfully request may be published, as an act of justice to the individuals. For the commanding general to attempt discrimination as to the conduct of those who commanded in the action, or those who were commanded, would be impossible. Our success in the action is conclusive proof of their daring intrepidity and courage; every officer and man proved himself worthy of the cause in which he battled, while the triumph received a lustre from the humanity which characterized their conduct after victory, and richly entitles them to the admiration and gratitude of their general. Nor should we withhold the tribute of our grateful thanks from that Being who rules the destinies of nations, and has, in the time of greatest need, enabled us to arrest a powerful invader while devastating our country.

I have the honor, &c.,

SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief.*

## No. 46.

*Report of Thomas J. Rusk, Secretary of War.*

[This report of the closing scene of the Texan campaign is added here as an important historical document, throwing much light upon the action of the 21st of April.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF TEXAS, }  
SAN JACINTO RIVER, *April 22, 1836.* }

*To His Excellency David G. Burnet, President of Texas.*

SIR: I have the honor to communicate to your excellency a brief account of a general engagement with the army of Santa Anna, at this place on the 21st instant.

Our army, under the command of General Houston, arrived here on the 20th instant. The enemy, a few miles off at New Washington, apprized of our arrival, committed some depredations upon private property, and commenced their line of march to this point. They were unconscious of our approach until our standard was planted on the banks of the San Jacinto. Our position was a favorable one for battle. On the noon of the 20th, the appearance of our foe was hailed by our soldiers with enthusiasm. The enemy marched in good order, took a position in front of our encampment, on an eminence, within cannon-shot, where they planted their only piece of artillery, a brass nine-pounder; and then arrayed their cavalry and infantry a short distance on the right, under the shelter of a skirt of woods. In a short time, they commenced firing upon us; their cannon in front, their infantry on our left, and their cavalry changing their position on the right. A charge was made on the left of our camp by their infantry, which was promptly repelled by a few shots from our artillery, which forced them to retire. I have the satisfaction of stating that only two of our men were wounded, one very slightly, the other (Colonel Neill, of the artillery) not fatally.

The attack ceased; the enemy retired and formed in two skirts of timber, and remained in that position, occasionally opening their cannon upon us, until just before sunset, when they attempted to draw off their forces. Their artillery and cavalry were removed to other points. Colonel Sherman, with sixty of our cavalry, charged upon theirs, consisting upward of one hundred, killing and wounding several. Their infantry came to the assistance of their cavalry, and opened upon us an incessant fire for ten or fifteen minutes, which

our men sustained with surprising firmness. Too much praise can not be bestowed upon those who were engaged in this charge, for never was one of equal peril made with more courage, and terminated with less loss. Two of our men were severely wounded, but none killed. This terminated the movements of the day.

Early next morning, about nine o'clock, the enemy received a reinforcement of five hundred men, under the command of General Martin Prefecto de Cos, which increased their strength to fourteen or fifteen hundred men. It was supposed that an attack upon our encampment would now be made; and, having a good position, we stationed our artillery, and disposed of the forces, so as to receive the enemy to the best advantage. At three o'clock, however, the foe, instead of showing signs of attack, was evidently engaged in fortifying. We determined, therefore, immediately to assail him; and, in half an hour, we were formed in four divisions: the first, intended as our right wing, composed of the regulars under Colonel Millard, and the second division, under command of Colonel Sydney Sherman, formed our left wing. A division, commanded by Colonel Burleson, formed our centre. Our two six-pounders, under the command of Colonel Hockley, Captains Isaac N. Moreland and Stillwell, were drawn up on the right of the centre division. The cavalry, under command of Colonel Mirabeau B. Lamar, formed upon the right. At the command to move forward, all the divisions advanced in good order and high spirits. On arriving within reach of the enemy, a heavy fire was opened, first with their artillery on our cavalry. A general conflict now ensued. Orders were given to charge. Colonel Sherman's division moved up, and drove the enemy from the woods occupied by them on their right wing. At the same moment, Colonel Burleson's division, together with the regulars, charged upon and mounted the breastwork of the enemy, and drove them from their cannon; our artillery, the meanwhile, charging up and firing upon them with great effect. The cavalry, under Colonel Lamar, at the same time fell on them with great fury and great slaughter. Major-General Houston acted with great gallantry, encouraging his men to the attack, and heroically charged, in front of the infantry, within a few yards of the enemy, receiving at the same time a wound in his leg. The enemy soon took to flight, officers and all, some on foot and some on horseback. In ten minutes after the firing of the first gun, we were charging through the camp, and driving them before us. They fled in confusion and dismay down the river,

followed closely by our troops for four miles. Some of them took the prairie, and were pursued by our cavalry; others were shot in attempting to swim the river; and in a short period the sanguinary conflict was terminated by the surrender of nearly all who were not slain in the combat. One half of their army perished; the other half are prisoners, among whom are General Santa Anna himself, Colonel Almonté, and many other prominent officers of their army. The loss of the enemy is computed at over six hundred slain, and above six hundred prisoners; together with a *caballada* of several hundred mules taken, with much valuable baggage. Our loss, in point of numbers, is small, it being seven slain and fifteen wounded.

This glorious achievement is attributed, not to superior force, but to the valor of our soldiers and the sanctity of our cause. Our army consisted of seven hundred and fifty effective men. This brave band achieved a victory as glorious as any on the records of history, and the happy consequences will be felt in Texas by succeeding generations. It has saved the country from the yoke of bondage; and all who mingled in it are entitled to the special munificence of government, and the heartfelt gratitude of every lover of liberty. The sun was sinking in the horizon as the battle commenced, but, at the close of the conflict, the sun of liberty and independence rose in Texas, never, it is to be hoped, to be obscured by the clouds of despotism. We have read of deeds of chivalry, and perused with ardor the annals of war; we have contemplated, with the highest emotions of sublimity, the loud-roaring thunder, the desolating tornado, and the withering simoom of the desert; but neither of these, nor all, inspired us with emotions like those felt on this occasion! The officers and men seemed to be actuated by a like enthusiasm. There was a general cry which pervaded the ranks—“*Remember the Alamo! remember La Bahia!*” These words electrified all. “Onward!” was the cry. The unerring aim and irresistible energy of the Texan army could not be withstood. It was freemen fighting against the minions of tyranny, and the result proved the inequality of such a contest.

In a battle where every individual performed his duty, it might seem invidious to draw distinctions; but, while I do justice to all in expressing my high admiration of the bravery and gallant conduct of both officers and men, I hope I may be indulged in the expression of my highest approbation of the chivalrous conduct of Major James Collingsworth in almost every part of the engagement. Colonel

Hockley, with his command of artillery, Colonel Wharton, the adjutant-general, Major Cook, and, in fact, all the staff-officers; Colonel Burleson and Colonel Somervell on the right, Colonel Millard in the centre, and Colonel Sherman, Colonel Bennett, and Major Wells, on the left, and Colonel Lamar on the extreme right with the cavalry—led on the charge and followed in the pursuit with dauntless bravery. All have my highest approbation. With such men, sustained as we shall be by the patriots and lovers of liberty in our mother-country, hateful Despotism can not find a resting-place for the sole of her foot on the beautiful plains of Texas! A volume would not contain the deeds of individual daring and bravery. Each captain has been required to make report, and I hope justice will be done to all the brave spirits who mingled in the glorious achievement of yesterday. My aide-de-camp, Dr. Motley, of Kentucky, fell near me, mortally wounded, and soon after his spirit took its flight to join the immortal Milam and others in a better world.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

THOMAS J. RUSK, *Secretary of War*

P. S.—Since writing the above, General Cos has been brought in a prisoner by our cavalry.

T. J. RUSK.



## APPENDIX NO. II.

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### DOCUMENTS

IN RELATION TO

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE TEXAN ARMY.

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### GENERAL CONSULTATION.

“SAN FELIPE DE AUSTIN, *November 13, 1835.*

“OF THE MILITARY.

“ARTICLE 2. The regular army of Texas shall consist of one major-general, who shall be commander-in-chief of all the forces called into public service during the war.

“ARTICLE 3. The commander-in-chief of the regular army of Texas shall be appointed by the convention, and commissioned by the governor.”—*Journal*, p. 48.

“The house met at the expiration of the time for which it adjourned—

“When, on motion by Mr. Everitt, they went into an election for major-general.

“The rule in this case being suspended—

“On motion of M. W. Smith, S. HOUSTON was elected major-general of the armies of Texas.”—*Journal*, p. 36.

“*To Sam Houston, Esquire:—*

“IN the name of the people of Texas, free and sovereign: We, reposing special trust and confidence in your patriotism, valor, con-

duct, and fidelity, do, by these presents, constitute and appoint you to be major-general and commander-in-chief of the army of Texas, and of all the forces now raised or to be raised by it, and of all others who shall voluntarily offer their service and join the said army, for the defence of the constitution and liberty, and for repelling every hostile invasion thereof; and you are hereby vested with full power and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the service.

“And we do hereby strictly charge and require all officers and soldiers under your command to be obedient to your orders, and diligent in the exercise of their several duties.

“And we do also enjoin and require you to be careful in executing the great trust reposed in you, by causing strict discipline and order to be observed in the army, and that the soldiers be duly exercised, and provided with all convenient necessaries.

“And you are to regulate your conduct in every respect by the rules and discipline of war adopted by the United States of North America, or such as may hereafter be adopted by this government; and punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this or a future government of Texas.

“This commission to continue in force until revoked by this or a future government.

“Done at San Felipe de Austin, on the fourteenth day of November, eighteen hundred and thirty-five.

“HENRY SMITH, *Governor.*

“P. B. DEXTER, *Secretary of Provisional Government.*”

“COUNCIL-HALL, SAN FELIPE, *January 3, 1836.*

“THE president [of the council] submitted a communication from F. W. Johnson, for himself and other volunteers, for authority to proceed to Matamoras; which was read, and referred to the committee on military affairs, with instructions to report this afternoon at three o'clock.”—*Journal*, p. 247.

“COUNCIL-HALL, SAN FELIPE, *January 6, 1836.*

“JAMES BOWIE exhibited to the council orders from the commander-in-chief of the army, to proceed against Matamoras, and took leave of the council for his departure.”—*Journal*, p. 265.

“COUNCIL-HALL, *January 6, 1836, 3 o'clock, P. M.*

“MR. HANKS, from the select committee appointed to wait on James Bowie, to obtain a copy of his orders,\* reported and presented a copy of the same, which was ordered to be filed.”—*Journal*, p. 266.

“COUNCIL-HALL, *January 7, 1836, 9 o'clock, A. M.*

“SECTION 1. *Be it resolved*, by the general council of the provisional government of Texas, That J. W. Fannin be and he is hereby appointed and empowered as an agent, for and in behalf of the provisional government of Texas, to raise, collect, and concentrate, at or near the port of Copano, as convenience and safety will admit, all volunteer troops willing to enter into an expedition against Matamoros, wherever they may be found, at the mouth of the Brasos, city of Bexar, or elsewhere, whether in Texas or arriving in Texas; and, when thus collected and concentrated, to report either to the *commanding general*, or to the *governor or council*, as he may prefer, agreeably to the seventh section of an ordinance and decree, passed the 5th of December, 1835, for raising an auxiliary corps to the regular army; and to continue to report, from time to time, as the expedition may progress.”

“SECTION 6. *Be it further resolved, &c.*, That the aforesaid agent, J. W. Fannin, shall be authorized and empowered to appoint such special agent or agents under him as he shall deem necessary to carry into effect the object of these resolutions.”—*Journal*, pp. 273, 274.

*Extract from the Message of Governor Henry Smith to the President and Members of the Council, January 11, 1836.*

“IF the appointment of general agents with latitudinarian powers, with the power of substitution, and many other things equally inconsistent and ridiculous, which have been engendered in and emanated from your caucusing, intriguing body recently, does not show a want of respect for my department, and a total neglect of the sacred oaths and pledges solemnly made by you, I must admit I am no judge.”—*Journal*, p. 292.

“EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS, SAN FELIPE, *January 28, 1836.*

“SIR: You are hereby furloughed until the 1st day of March next, for the purpose of adjusting your private business, preparatory

\* See Appendix I., No. 8, p. 454.

to your necessary absence, hereafter, from home, in the country's service.

"Your absence is permitted in part by the illegal acts of the council in superseding you, by the unauthorized appointment of agents to organize and control the army, contrary to the organic law, and the ordinances of their own body.

"In the meantime, you will conform to your instructions, and treat with the Indians.

"Respectfully yours, &c.,

"HENRY SMITH, *Governor, &c.*

"To General SAM HOUSTON, *Commander-in-Chief of the Army.*"

"IN CONVENTION, FRIDAY MORNING, 9 o'clock, March 4, 1836.

"THE convention met pursuant to adjournment, and was called to order by the president.

"Mr. Collingsworth introduced the following resolution:—

"*Whereas*, we are now in a state of revolution, and threatened by a large invading army from the central government of Mexico; and *whereas*, our present situation, and the emergency of the present crisis, render it indispensably necessary that we should have an army in the field; and *whereas*, it is also necessary that there should be one superior head, or commander-in-chief, and a due degree of subordination defined, established, and strictly observed; therefore,

"*Be it resolved*, That General Sam Houston be appointed major-general, to be commander-in-chief of the land-forces of the Texan army, both regulars, volunteers, and militia (while in actual service), and endowed with all the rights, privileges, and powers, due to a commander-in-chief in the United States of America; and that he forthwith proceed to take command, establish headquarters, and organize the army accordingly—

"And that General Sam Houston retain such command until the election of a chief magistrate; and continue in such office, unless suspended by order of the government *de facto*, until the general organization agreeably to the constitution, being always amenable to the laws and civil authorities of the country.

"Which was read, approved, and adopted, in convention, at Washington, on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1836, and second day of the Independence of Texas.

"RICHARD ELLIS, *President.*

"Test., H. S. KEMBLE, *Secretary of the Convention.*"

“WASHINGTON, *March 6, 1836.*”

“*Major-General Sam Houston:—*”

“SIR: As commander-in-chief of the Texan army, you are ordered forthwith to repair to such place on the frontier as you may deem advisable. You will proceed to establish headquarters, and organize the army. You will require all officers of the army, of whatever grade, to report to you. And, as it is impossible, at this time, to determine any particular point of concentration, you will act according to the emergencies of the occasion and the best dictates of your own judgment, for the purpose of protecting our frontier, and advancing the best interests of our country.

“You will, as often as you may deem advisable, inform this body, or such other authority as they may establish, of both your acts and the situation of the army.

“JAMES COLLINGSWORTH,

“*Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.*”

“RICHARD ELLIS,

“*President of the Convention.*”

## APPENDIX NO. III.

### NAMES, AGE, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND FORMER RESIDENCE, OF THE SIGNERS OF THE TEXAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

MARCH 2, 1836.

NAMES.	AGE.	PLACE OF BIRTH.	FORMER RESIDENCE.
Richard Ellis .....	54	Virginia .....	Alabama.
C. B. Stewart .....	30	South Carolina.....	Louisiana.
James Collingsworth...	30	Tennessee.....	Tennessee.
Edwin Waller.....	35	Virginia .....	Missouri.
Asa Brigham .....	46	Massachusetts.....	Louisiana.
J. S. D. Byrom.....	38	Georgia .....	Florida.
Fras. Ruis .....	54	Bexar, Texas.....	_____.
J. Ant <sup>o</sup> . Navarro.....	41	Bexar, Texas.....	_____.
J. B. Badgett.....	29	North Carolina.....	Arkansas Territory.
W. D. Lacy.....	28	Kentucky .....	Tennessee.
William Menifee.....	40	Tennessee.....	Alabama.
John Fisher.....	36	Virginia .....	Virginia.
M. Coldwell.....	38	Kentucky.....	Missouri.
W. Motley.....	24	Virginia .....	Kentucky.
L. D. Zavala.....	47	Yucatan .....	Mexico.
George W. Smyth.....	33	North Carolina.....	Alabama.
S. H. Everitt.....	29	New York.....	New York.
E. Stapp.....	53	Virginia .....	Missouri.
Clas. West.....	36	Tennessee .....	Louisiana.
W. B. Scates.....	30	Virginia .....	Kentucky.
M. B. Menard.....	31	Canada .....	Illinois.
A. B. Hardin .....	38	Georgia .....	Tennessee.
J. W. Bunton .....	28	Tennessee .....	Tennessee.
Thomas G. Gazeley .....	35	New York .....	Louisiana.
R. M. Coleman.....	37	Kentucky .....	Kentucky.
S. C. Robertson*.....	50	North Carolina.....	Tennessee.
George C. Childress*...	32	Tennessee .....	Tennessee.
B. Hardiman .....	41	Tennessee .....	Tennessee.
R. Potter.....	36	North Carolina.....	North Carolina.

\* Not present at the signing.



NAMES.	AGE.	PLACE OF BIRTH.	FORMER RESIDENCE.
Thomas J. Rusk.....	29	South Carolina.....	Georgia.
Charles S. Taylor.....	28	England.....	New York.
John S. Roberts.....	40	Virginia.....	Louisiana.
R. Hamilton.....	53	Scotland.....	North Carolina.
C. McKinney.....	70	New Jersey.....	Kentucky.
A. H. Lattimer.....	27	Tennessee.....	Tennessee.
James Power.....	48	Ireland.....	Louisiana.
Sam Houston.....	43	Virginia.....	Tennessee.
David Thomas.....	35	Tennessee.....	Tennessee.
E. Conrad.....	26	Pennsylvania.....	Pennsylvania.
Martin Parmer.....	58	Virginia.....	Missouri.
E. O. Legrand.....	33	North Carolina.....	Alabama.
S. W. Blount.....	28	Georgia.....	Georgia.
James Gaines.....	60	Virginia.....	Louisiana.
W. Clark, jr.....	37	North Carolina.....	Georgia.
S. O. Pennington.....	27	Kentucky.....	Arkansas Territory.
W. C. Crawford.....	31	North Carolina.....	Alabama.
John Turner.....	34	North Carolina.....	Tennessee.
B. B. Goodrich.....	37	Virginia.....	Alabama.
G. W. Barnett.....	43	South Carolina.....	Mississippi.
J. G. Swisher.....	41	Tennessee.....	Tennessee.
Jesse Grimes.....	48	North Carolina.....	Alabama.
S. Rhoads Fisher*.....	41	Pennsylvania.....	Pennsylvania.
Samuel A. Maverick*..	29	South Carolina.....	South Carolina.
John White Bower*....	27	Georgia.....	Arkansas Territory.
James B. Woods*.....	34	Kentucky.....	Kentucky.
Andrew Briscoe*.....	—	.....	.....
John W. Moore*.....	—	.....	.....
Thomas Barnett.....	—	.....	.....

The above is from a statement furnished in the convention, to Dr. B. B. Goodrich, by the members themselves.

\* Not present at the signing.

# APPENDIX NO. IV.

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## DOCUMENTS

IN RELATION TO THE

MASSACRE OF COLONEL FANNIN AND HIS COMMAND, ON SUNDAY  
MORNING, MARCH 27, 1836, AT GOLIAD.

### *Extracts from the Diary of General Urrea.\**

“*March 20.* . . . . The instant the fire was opened, and the movement I had ordered was taking place, the enemy, without offering any resistance, raised the white flag. I immediately ordered the firing to cease, and despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Holzinger, and my adjutant Don José Gonzales, to learn the enemy’s intention. The former soon returned, stating that they proposed to capitulate. My reply simply was, that I could accede to nothing else than an unconditional surrender, and Señors Morales and Salas hastened to communicate the same to the enemy’s commissioners, who had already come forth from their entrenchments. Some communications passed; but desirous to terminate the affair as promptly as possible, I repaired to the spot, and repeated to the head of the deputation the impossibility on my part, to accede to any other thing than a surrender on the terms I had already proposed, feeling obliged to refuse subscribing the capitulation in three articles, for which they asked.”

\* The translations of *Urrea’s Diary*, and *Santa Anna’s Manifesto*, as furnished by the *Democratic Review* of 1838, are used in this appendix.

*The Articles.*

“ARTICLE 1. The Mexican troops having planted their artillery at the distance of one hundred and seventy paces, and having opened their fire, we raised the white flag, and instantly there came Colonels Morales and Holzinger, and to them we proposed to surrender at discretion, on the terms they should judge suitable.

“ARTICLE 2. That the wounded, and that the commander, Fannin, be treated with all possible consideration, it being proposed that we should lay down our arms.

“ARTICLE 3. That all the detachment shall be treated as prisoners-of-war, and placed at the disposal of the supreme government.

“The plain on the Coleta river, Between Victoria and La Bahia, March 20, 1836.

“B. C. WALLACE, *Major*,

“J. M. CHADWICK,

“Approved, J. W. FANNIN, *Commander.*”

[Added by General Urrea.] “When the enemy raised the white flag, I sent to inform their leader that I could admit of no other terms than those of surrendering at discretion, without any modification whatever, as agreed upon through the medium of those gentlemen, leaders of the party, therein named; nor can the other requests made by the subscribers to that surrender be received. Such was the declaration I before made, which must be complied with, since neither can I, nor ought I to grant any other thing.

“JOSE URREA.”

“Then turning to Fannin and his companion, in presence of Señors Morales, Salas, Holzinger, and others, I definitely replied: ‘If you are willing to surrender at discretion, the thing is concluded; if otherwise, I will return to my post, and the attack shall continue.’ Painful to me as was this reply, and desirous as I might have felt to offer them the guaranties which humanity might have prescribed, it was not within the limit of my powers; had it been so, I should have guarantied their lives at least, on the spot. Fannin was a respectable man, and a man of courage, a quality reciprocally prized by soldiers in the field. His manners conciliated my esteem, and had it been in my power to save him, as well as his companions, I should have felt gratified in so doing. All the assurance I could

make him was, that I would interpose in his behalf with the general-in-chief, which I accordingly did, in a letter from Victoria.

“After my ultimatum, the leaders of the enemy’s forces conferred together, and the result of their deliberations was to surrender upon the terms proposed. They at the same time gave orders to those under their command to come forth and pile their arms. Nine pieces of artillery, three standards, more than a thousand muskets, a quantity of pistols, rifles, and dirks, of superior quality, a number of wagons, and a considerable quantity of provisions, together with about *four hundred* prisoners, remained in the hands of the army, among whom were ninety-seven wounded, Fannin and others of the leading men being among the number. I gave orders that the whole of them, with their baggage, should march to Goliad, guarded by two hundred infantry, and that such of the wounded as were unable to proceed, should be conveyed in carts, wagons, and other vehicles found in the enemy’s camp. Twenty-seven of their dead, of the day previous, were interred, together with *eleven* of our own. We had *forty-nine* soldiers wounded, and *five* officers, among whom was Captain Ballasteros, severely.”

“*March 21.*—At daybreak I continued my march, and at seven o’clock took possession of Victoria.

“*March 22.*—I marched, with two hundred foot and fifty horse, to a mountain pass called *Las Juntas*. Here I met with four men from Ward’s company, who were in search of provisions, and from them I learned that the whole band *was in ambush* in a neighboring wood. I immediately surrounded it, and sent in one of the prisoners to announce to his leader and companions, that unless they surrendered at discretion they would be cut to pieces. Mr. Ward, known under the title of their colonel, desired to speak with me; and after a few minutes’ conversation, he with his troop of *one hundred* men surrendered at discretion.

“*March 23.*—In this place I received advice that eighty-two of the enemy had surrendered in Copano, with all their arms, ammunition, and provisions.”

“*To General Urrea, Commander, &c.*:—

[Official.] “In respect to the prisoners of whom you speak in your last communication, you must not fail to bear in mind the circular of the supreme government, in which it is decreed, that ‘foreigners invading the republic, and taken with arms in their hands,

shall be judged and treated as pirates;' and as, in my view of the matter, every Mexican guilty of the crime of joining these adventurers loses the rights of a citizen by his unnatural conduct, the five Mexican prisoners whom you have taken ought also to suffer as traitors."

[Unofficial.] "In regard to foreigners who make war, and those unnatural Mexicans who have joined their cause, you will remark that what I have stated to you officially is in accordance with the former provisions of the supreme government. An example is necessary, in order that those adventurers may be duly warned, and the nation be delivered from the ills she is daily doomed to suffer.

"ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

"GENERAL QUARTERS, BEJAR, *March 3, 1836.*"

"*To General Urrea, &c.:*—

"Under date of the present, I have stated to the commandant of the post of Goliad, as follows:—

"By a communication made to me by Colonel D. F. Garay, of that place, I am informed that there have been sent to you by General Urrea, *two hundred and thirty-four* prisoners, taken in the action of *Encinal del Perdido* (Coleta), on the 19th and 20th of the present month; and as the supreme government has ordered that all foreigners taken with arms in their hands, making war upon the nation, shall be treated as pirates, I have been surprised that the circular of the said supreme government has not been fully complied with in this particular; *I therefore order, that you should give immediate effect to the said ordinance in respect to all those foreigners* who have yielded to the force of arms, having had the audacity to come and insult the republic, to devastate with fire and sword, as has been the case in Goliad, causing vast detriment to our citizens; in a word, shedding the precious blood of Mexican citizens, whose only crime has been their fidelity to their country. I trust that, in *reply* to this, you will inform me that *public vengeance has been satisfied* by the punishment of such detestable delinquents. I transcribe the said decree of the government for your guidance, and that you may strictly fulfil the same, in the zealous hope that, for the future, the provisions of the supreme government may not, for a moment, be infringed.'

"HEADQUARTERS, BEJAR, *March 23, 1836.*

"ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA."

*From the Commandant at Goliad to General Urrea.*

“In compliance with the definitive orders of his excellency the general-in-chief, which I received direct, at four o'clock to-morrow morning the prisoners sent by you to this fortress will be shot. I have not ventured to execute the same sentence on those who surrendered to Colonel Vara, at Copano, being unacquainted with the particular circumstances of their surrender; and I trust you will be pleased to take upon yourself to save my responsibility in this regard, by informing me what I am to do with them.

“J. N. DE PORTILLA.

“GOLIAD, *March 26, 1836.*”

*Further from the Diary of General Urrea.*

“*March 24–27.*—These days were passed in necessary regulations, in refitting the troops, and in the care of the sick and wounded. On the 25th I sent Ward and his companions to Goliad. On the 27th, between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, I received a communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Portilla, military commandant of Goliad, informing me that he had received an order from his excellency the commander-in-chief, to shoot all the prisoners there, and that he had resolved to comply with the same. The order in question was received by Portilla at seven o'clock on the evening of the 26th; he communicated it to me the same date, but necessarily it only came to my knowledge after the execution had taken place. Every soldier in my division was confounded at the news; *all was amazement and consternation.* I was no less struck to the heart than my companions in arms, who stood there the witnesses of my sorrow; let one of those present at that painful moment deny the fact. More than *a hundred and fifty* of those who fortunately remained with me, escaped this catastrophe, consisting of those who had surrendered at Copano, together with the surgeons and young men whom I had placed to tend on the hospitals, whose services, as well as those of many of the prisoners, were very important to the army.

“The melancholy event of which I here speak has caused a more than ordinary sensation, not only among my own countrymen, but among strangers the most distant from us. Nor have those been wanting who would fix the fearful responsibility on me, although



nothing could be more clear and unequivocal than my conduct in regard to this horrid transaction.

“Nothing could be more painful to me than the idea of sacrificing so many gallant men, and particularly the amiable, spirited, and soldier-like Fannin. They certainly surrendered in the full confidence that Mexican generosity would not be sterile in their regard; they assuredly did so, or otherwise they would have resisted to the last, and sold their lives as dearly as possible.

“Should an attempt be made to convict me in another quarter, by asking why I did not guaranty the lives of those unhappy men, when it was in my power, by granting them a capitulation when they surrendered to me at Coleta, my reply would be, that it was not within the scope of my powers to do so, nor would it have been honorable to the arms of the nation, or to myself. Again, *I should have rendered myself liable to a court-martial* for so doing, inasmuch as having, on that day, the advantage of the enemy, in both numbers and position, I could admit of no other proposition than that of surrendering at discretion, or trying the fortune of the field. I feel conscious of having acted, in this affair, in such manner as duty demanded, and of which the result was not in my power. As to those who have presumed to say that I offered guaranties to the party surrendering to me, they have said so without any knowledge of the facts.”

*Extract from the Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Portilla, Com-  
mandant at Goliad.*

“*March 26, 1836.*—At seven o’clock in the evening arrived a courier extraordinary from Bexar, from his excellency General Santa Anna, notifying me that the whole of the prisoners who had surrendered by force of arms were immediately to be shot, with regulations as to the manner in which it was to be executed. I deferred it, for both myself and Colonel Gary to whom I communicated it, thought of nothing less than such a thing. At eight the same evening came a courier extraordinary from Victoria, from General Urrea, who said to me, among other things, ‘Treat the prisoners with consideration, and particularly their leader, Fannin. Let them be employed in repairing the houses, and erecting quarters, and serve out to them a portion of the rations which you will receive from the mission of Refugio.’ How cruel is my state of uncertainty, my mind vacilla-

ting between these conflicting orders! I passed the whole night restless and uneasy in mind.

“*March 27.*—At daybreak I came to a determination to fulfil the orders of his excellency the commander-in-chief, considering him as the superior I ought to obey. I gave orders for the whole garrison to form, and awaken the prisoners (four hundred and forty-five in number), who were still asleep. (I ordered the eighty of the class who had come from Copana, to be separated from the rest, inasmuch as their fate demanded consideration, because, when invading our territory, they were not taken with arms in their hands.) We formed ourselves into three divisions—the first under the orders of the first adjutant Don Augustin Alcerrica; the second under those of Captain Luis Balderas; and the third, of Captain Antonio Ramirez. To these officers I intrusted the execution of the order of the supreme government, and of the general-in-chief. *It was executed.* A great struggle of feelings among the officers and soldiers—a profound silence! Sad at heart, I wrote to General Urrea, expressing my regret at having been concerned in so painful an affair. I also sent an official account of what I had done, to the general-in-chief. The eighty prisoners of Copano are still alive, and I asked for instructions from the general-in-chief as to what was to be done with them.”

*Commandant at Goliad to General Urrea.*

“MY DEAR GENERAL: I feel much distressed at what has occurred here; a scene enacted in cold blood having passed before my eyes which has filled me with horror. All I can say is, that my duty as a soldier, and what I owe to my country, must be my guaranty. My dear general, by you was I sent here; you thought proper so to do, and I remain here in entire conformity to your wishes. I came, as you know, voluntarily, with these poor Indians, to co-operate, to the best of my humble means, for my country’s good. No man is required to do more than is within the scope of his abilities; and both they and myself have doubtless been placed here as competent to *the purposes you had in view.* I repeat it, that I am perfectly willing to do anything, save and excepting the work of a public *executioner* by receiving orders to put more persons to death. And yet, being but a subordinate officer, it is my duty to do what is commanded me, even though repugnant to my feelings.

“I am, general, your devoted and sincere friend,

“J. N. DE LA PORTILLA.

“GOLIAD, *March 27, 1836.*”

*Extract from the Manifesto of Santa Anna.*

“This last event [the surrender of Fannin and his followers] has been productive of much evil to myself, and it is therefore necessary that I would make a short digression respecting it. To avoid repetition, I make this observation once for all—the war of Texas was not only just on the part of Mexico, but imperatively called for by the undisguised character of the hostility which provoked it. It is notorious that the soldiers of Travis in the Alamo, those of Fannin at Coleta, the riflemen of Doctor Grant, and Houston himself and the troops of San Jacinto, with very few exceptions, came from New Orleans and other points of the neighboring republic, exclusively to support the rebellion in Texas, having had no previous relation with the colonists or their enterprises.

“This country was soon invaded, not by a nation recognised as such, coming to vindicate rights positive or supposed; nor yet by Mexicans, led away by a political fanaticism to defend or attack the public administration of their country; no, it was invaded by men hurried on by the lust of conquest, with rights far less apparent and plausible than Cortes and Pizarro. As for those who raised the standard of revolt throughout the immense territory which Mexico possesses from Bexar to the Sabine, what name shall I give them, or how treat them? The laws, ever in vigor, and whose strict observance the government earnestly enforces, term them pirates and banditti; and the nations of the world would never have forgiven Mexico had she treated such men with the respect which is due only to the honorable, the upright, the respecters of the rights of nations. Till then [the massacre at Goliad], I had enjoyed among my fellow-citizens the reputation—preferable in my mind to that of a brave man—the reputation of being humane after victories won. So completely unfortunate was I destined to become, that even the solitary virtue, which my bitterest enemies never denied me, is now disputed. I am represented as more ferocious than the tiger; I, who was ambitious to be distinguished by nothing so much as by my clemency, in a country that yields to no other in humane and generous feeling. The execution of Fannin and his followers, is the ground on which they accuse me of having been barbarous and sanguinary. . . . The prisoners at Goliad stood condemned by the law, by a universal law, by the right of self-protection, which every nation and every individual enjoys. They did

not surrender under the form of capitulation, as General Urrea has shown; how then could I turn the sword of justice from their heads without directing it against my own? Let it be said (though I confess that such is not my opinion) that the law is unjust; yet to impute the homicide to the mere instrument, and not to the hand that directs it, can there be greater blindness? The prisoners were in the highest degree embarrassing to the commandant at Goliad; before taking to flight they had set fire to the place; and nothing was left us but the church to house the sick and wounded. The sole security of the garrison consisted of perpetual vigilance, being greatly inferior in number to the prisoners; our provisions were barely sufficient for our own people; we were without cavalry to conduct them as far as Matamoras. All these considerations, *urged by the commandant of the place*, weighed heavily on my mind, and tended to bias my resolution.

“It has been said that a capitulation was made; and although the conduct of General Urrea contradicts the assertion, I addressed the supreme government on the subject, begging that an inquiry might be instituted, to show that neither officially nor confidentially was any knowledge of the same communicated to me; that had such been the case, though General Urrea had no power to grant it, I should have been induced, on the score of humanity, to appeal to the sovereign pity of Congress to deliver Fannin and his soldiers from death. With less motive, and taking advantage of their medical skill, several doctors were saved from death, as well as forty prisoners who were employed in the construction of different useful things. In fine, eighty-six men taken in Copano were saved, I having drawn up a statement, that it appeared certain that they never made use of their arms, nor had committed any depredation, though taken with arms in their hands; and having submitted the same to Congress, I entreated their clemency.”

*From the Notes of Captain John Shackleford.*

“WE then raised a white flag, which was responded to by the enemy. Major Wallace was then sent out, together with one or two others who spoke the Mexican language. They shortly returned, and reported that the Mexican general could capitulate with the commanding officer only. Colonel Fannin, although quite lame, then went out with the flag. When he was about to leave our lines,

the emotions of my mind were intense, and I felt some anxiety to hear the determination of the men. I remarked to him that I would not oppose a surrender, provided we could obtain an *honorable capitulation*—one on which he could rely; that, if he could not obtain such, ‘come back—our graves are already dug—let us all be buried together!’ To these remarks the men responded in a firm and determined manner, and the colonel assured us that he never would surrender on any other terms. He returned in a short time thereafter, and communicated the substance of an agreement entered into by General Urrea and himself. Colonel Holzinger, a German, and an engineer in the Mexican service, together with several other officers, then came into our lines to consummate the arrangement. The first words Colonel Holzinger uttered, after a very polite bow, were, ‘*Well, gentlemen, in eight days, liberty and home!*’ I heard this distinctly. The terms of the capitulation were then written in both the English and Mexican languages, and read two or three times by officers who could speak and read both languages. The instruments which embodied the terms of capitulation as agreed on were then signed and interchanged in the most formal and solemn manner, and were in substance as follows:—

“1. That we should be received and treated as prisoners-of-war, according to the usages of the most civilized nations.

“2. That private property should be respected and restored; that the side-arms of the officers should be given up.

“3. That the men should be sent to Copano, and thence to the United States in eight days, or so soon thereafter as vessels could be procured to take them.

“4. That the officers should be paroled, and return to the United States in like manner.

“I assert most positively that this capitulation was entered into, without which a surrender never would have been made.”

“Here let me remark that I have read General Urrea’s pamphlet. . . . On this point, as well as his denial of any capitulation, I never read a more villanous *falsehood* from the pen of any man who aspired to the rank of general.”—*Ib.*

“On passing from one part of their wounded to another, I made it convenient to see Fannin, and stated to him how badly we were



treated. He immediately wrote to General Urrea, adverting to the terms of the capitulation, and to our treatment." — *Ib.*, *March 23.*

*Urrea to Portilla, in answer to the above.*

"TREAT the prisoners with consideration, and particularly their leader Fannin." — *March 26.*

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*Remarks on the foregoing.*

THE character of Dr. John Shackelford for truth and integrity is unquestionable. He is sustained by the statements of others, who survived that transaction; he is also sustained by the circumstances themselves. From a careful view of all the facts and documents, we are led to the following conclusions:—

1. Santa Anna is responsible for the several assassinations of prisoners, from the taking of San Patricio on the 27th of February, 1836. He is also responsible for the decree of the Mexican Congress to that effect; for it was notorious, in and out of Mexico, that he dictated and violated the laws at pleasure.

2. The order of the 3d of March, to Urrea, advised him fully of his duty as public executioner. He asked for no further orders as to the prisoners taken at Agua Dulce, Refugio, or elsewhere. He kept no prisoners!

3. Urrea's diary exhibits so many falsehoods, that it utterly discredits him. For instance, as to the number of his killed and wounded at the Coleta, and as to the number of prisoners by him there taken.

4. Urrea agreed to the *capitulation* with Fannin, intending at the time to violate it, for which reason his intercourse was with Fannin himself. His force was five times that of Fannin, and he feared a court-martial if he adhered to the capitulation; and he feared the result of a renewal of the battle if he did not agree to it. Hence *treachery* was resorted to.

5. The Indian colonel Portilla knew for what purpose he and his Indian command had been sent to Goliad, and wrote to Urrea as if the latter knew.

6. The diary of Urrea, that of Portilla, and the manifesto of Santa Anna, were all manufactured *after* the civilized world had pronounced upon the atrocity of these assassinations.



7. There is very strong circumstantial evidence to show that Santa Anna knew there had been a capitulation before he sent the order to Portilla to execute the prisoners. One circumstance was, the violation of a well-known military rule, in sending the order directly to Portilla, and not to Urrea, one of the parties to the capitulation. Another was, the statement of Santa Anna himself that, if he had known it, he would have petitioned the Congress, on the score of humanity, and not of good faith.

## APPENDIX NO. V.

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TREATY OF VELASCO, MAY 14, 1836.

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### PUBLIC AGREEMENT.

*Articles of Agreement entered into between His Excellency DAVID G. BURNET, President of the Republic of Texas, of the one part, and His Excellency General ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA, President-General-in-Chief of the Mexican Army, of the other part:—*

ARTICLE 1. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna agrees that he will not take up arms, nor will he exercise his influence to cause them to be taken up, against the people of Texas, during the present war of independence.

ARTICLE 2. All hostilities between the Mexican and Texan troops will cease immediately, both on land and water.

ARTICLE 3. The Mexican troops will evacuate the territory of Texas, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte.

ARTICLE 4. The Mexican army, in its retreat, shall not take the property of any person without his consent and just indemnification, using only such articles as may be necessary for its subsistence, in cases where the owners may not be present, and remitting to the commander of the army of Texas, or to the commissioners to be appointed for the adjustment of such matters, an account of the value of the property consumed, the place where taken, and the name of the owner, if it can be ascertained.

ARTICLE 5. That all private property, including horses, cattle, negro slaves, or indentured persons of whatever denomination, that may have been captured by any portion of the Mexican army, or may have taken refuge in the said army, since the commencement of the late invasion, shall be restored to the commander of the Texan army, or to such other persons as may be appointed by the government of Texas to receive them.

ARTICLE 6. The troops of both armies will refrain from coming into contact with each other; and, to this end, the commander of the army of Texas will be careful not to approach within a shorter distance of the Mexican army than five leagues.\*

ARTICLE 7. The Mexican army shall not make any other delay on its march than that which is necessary to take up their hospitals, baggage, &c., and to cross the rivers. Any delay, not necessary to these purposes, to be considered an infraction of this agreement.

ARTICLE 8. By express, to be immediately despatched, this agreement shall be sent to General Filisola, and to General T. J. Rusk, commander of the Texan army, in order that they may be apprized of its stipulations; and, to this end, they will exchange engagements to comply with the same.

ARTICLE 9. That all Texan prisoners now in possession of the Mexican army, or its authorities, be forthwith released, and furnished with free passports to return to their homes; in consideration of which a corresponding number of Mexican prisoners, rank and file, now in possession of the government of Texas, shall be immediately released. The remainder of the Mexican prisoners, that continue in possession of the government of Texas, to be treated with due humanity: any extraordinary comforts that may be furnished them to be at the charge of the government of Mexico.

ARTICLE 10. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna will be sent to Vera Cruz, as soon as it shall be deemed proper.

The contracting parties sign this instrument for the above-mentioned purposes, by duplicate, at the port of Velasco, this the 14th day of May, 1836.

DAVID G. BURNET,  
ANT<sup>o</sup>. LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

JAMES COLLINGSWORTH, *Secretary of State.*  
BAILEY HARDEMAN, *Secretary of the Treasury.*  
P. H. GRAYSON, *Attorney-General.*

\* Nearly thirteen and one sixth miles.

## SECRET AGREEMENT.

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA, *General-in-Chief of the Army of Operations, and President of the Republic of Mexico, before the Government established in Texas, solemnly pledges himself to fulfil the Stipulations contained in the following Articles, so far as concerns himself:—*

ARTICLE 1. He will not take up arms, nor cause them to be taken up, against the people of Texas, during the present war for independence.

ARTICLE 2. He will give his orders that, in the shortest time, the Mexican troops may leave the territory of Texas.

ARTICLE 3. He will so prepare matters in the cabinet of Mexico, that the mission that may be sent thither by the government of Texas may be well received, and that by means of negotiations all differences may be settled, and the independence that has been declared by the convention may be acknowledged.

ARTICLE 4. A treaty of commerce, amity, and limits, will be established between Mexico and Texas, the territory of the latter not to extend beyond the Rio Bravo del Norte.

ARTICLE 5. The present return of General Santa Anna to Vera Cruz being indispensable for the purpose of effecting his solemn engagements, the government of Texas will provide for his immediate embarkation for said port.

ARTICLE 6. This instrument, being obligatory on one part as well as on the other, will be signed in duplicate, remaining folded and sealed until the negotiations shall have been concluded, when it will be restored to his excellency General Santa Anna; no use of it to be made before that time, unless there should be an infraction by either of the contracting parties.

PORT OF VELASCO, *May the 14th, 1836.*

ANT<sup>o</sup>. LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA,  
DAVID G. BURNET.

JAMES COLLINGSWORTH, *Secretary of State.*

BAILEY HARDEMAN, *Secretary of the Treasury.*

P. H. GRAYSON, *Attorney-General.*

*Ratification of the Public Agreement by FILISOLA, in accordance with the Provision of the 8th Article.*

RIVULET OF MUGERERO.

ON the 26th day of the month of May, of the current year, Benjamin F. Smith, colonel in the army of Texas, and Henry Teal, captain of the same, having presented themselves in the tent of his excellency Vicente Filisola, general-in-chief of the Mexican army of operations, and delivered a paper, which was directed, through them, to said General Filisola, by his excellency the president-general Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna; and Colonel Smith, at the same time, making known that he came competently authorized (according to his credentials, which he exhibited for the purpose, signed by his general, Thomas J. Rusk), in order to ratify in his name the fulfilment of the papers referred to, which contain the treaty of armistice concluded between General Santa Anna and the government of Texas, on the 14th instant: in consequence, General Filisola, on receiving these documents, named, for their examination and explanation with the commissioners, Eugene Tolsa, general of the Mexican army, and Colonel Augustine Amat, who, after having fulfilled their commission in the terms specified, informed his excellency; and he, after having heard them, agreed on his part religiously to comply, as far as in the ten articles of which it consists, it has reference to the army—in the same manner as the general and army of the Texans are bound on their part.

Both contracting parties also agreed that some commissioners might be named on the part of General Rusk, who should march, either with or separately from the Mexican army, with the necessary information, in order that they might make proper remonstrances, conformably to what is expressed in the said treaties, with the understanding that everything belonging to them, that exists in the army of operations, shall be delivered to them. And, for the evidence and compliance by both parties, the two belligerent parties agreed to extend in duplicate the present document with the commissioners.

EUGENE TOLSA,	HENRY TEAL,
AUGUSTINE AMAT,	BENJAMIN F. SMITH,
VICENTE FILISOLA.	

## APPENDIX NO. VI.

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### GEN. SANTA ANNA TO GEN. SAM HOUSTON

[TRANSLATION.]

ORAZIMBA, *November 5, 1836.*

*To His Excellency General Sam Houston:—*

MY ESTEEMED SIR: Through the channel of your commissioners, and by my conversation with you on the 2d instant, I have manifested to you the importance of my visit to Washington city, to adopt the most effectual mode of terminating the Texan question; and, as time is passing, without any definite action, when it is most precious, I am desirous that you, who are so deeply interested in the welfare of this country, should expedite the final determination of this question—using, if you should deem it advisable, the following reasons:—

When the treaty of the 14th of May was entered into, it was based upon the principle that Texas should form an independent nation, and should acquire a legal existence by means of the acknowledgment of Mexico. But, as that basis has been changed by the recent declaration of the people of Texas in favor of annexation to the United States of the North, it appears to me that, by this declaration, the question is much simplified; because, in future, it will appertain to the cabinet at Washington to regulate this matter, and with whom Mexico will not hesitate to enter into explanations, as a definite treaty is desired.

The mode of effecting this important object, without loss of time, is what I hope to attain by my conference with the cabinet at Washington, at the same time conciliating all interests. Convinced as I



am that Texas will never reunite with Mexico, I am desirous, on my part, to improve the advantages which may offer, and avoid the sacrifices which will occur should an imprudent attempt be made to reconquer this country, which has hitherto proved more detrimental than beneficial: consequently reducing the Texan question to this single point—*the regulation of the limits between the United States and Mexico (al arreglo de limites entre los Estados Unidos y Mexico)*, which, you are aware, has been pending many years, and may be fixed at the Nueces, del Norte, or any other boundary, as may be decided on at Washington. Thus, disagreeable discussions, which might delay the definite termination of this question, or cause a difference between two friendly nations, will be avoided.

This, in substance, is a plain, safe, and speedy mode of terminating this important matter; and, as all are interested, it becomes necessary that you facilitate my journey to Washington with the least possible delay.

In regard to the stipulation in the secret treaty, that my journey should be direct to Vera Cruz, there will be no surprise when the reasons why I first go to Washington city are known; and, should I be sent the latter route, I would like that Messrs. Hockley, Patton, and Bee, should accompany me. Should it meet your approbation, you can commission them for that purpose.

I conclude by repeating to you what I have said, both verbally and in writing—that my name, already known to the world, shall not be tarnished by any unworthy action. Gratitude is my characteristic; so you will have nothing, on your part, to repent. To you I owe my existence, and many favors of which I am deeply impressed; and these I will endeavor to reciprocate as they so justly deserve.

I have the honor to remain

Your most obedient servant,

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

P. S.—If you have no use for General Jackson's letter, I will thank you to return it by Major Patton.

L. DE STA. ANNA.

## APPENDIX NO. VII.

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### SKETCH OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS OF CHRISTIANS IN TEXAS.

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#### PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH.\*

PRIOR to the year 1838, no effectual effort seems to have been made by the protestant episcopal church in the United States to introduce and establish her polity and worship in a region so recently gained from the power of popery. True, there had been instances of *professed* clergymen speaking in her name; but they were *hirelings*, whose voice the sheep knew not. No missionary had yet been sent forth with power from her organized agencies to gather and provide spiritually for the scattered sheep of her fold who had found a home in the young republic. Her rulers seem hardly to have awakened to the growing importance of the country. In that year, however, the Rev. Caleb S. Ives, a devoted and faithful preacher and teacher, arrived as a missionary at Matagorda, where he soon gathered a congregation, established a flourishing school, and built a church. He continued his unwearied efforts until 1849, when he died, leaving a large congregation of Christian worshippers as the result of his labors.

In the fall of 1838, another clergyman, Rev. R. M. Chapman, was

\* From a statement furnished by Peter W. Gray, Esq.

stationed at Houston, the seat of government, as a missionary. He, too, was zealous and faithful, but from his youth and inexperience was unequal to the demands of his position. He, however, organized a parish, and officiated for eight or nine months at Houston and neighboring places. Early in 1840 his place was temporarily supplied by Rev. Henry B. Goodwin, who, being on a visit to the country, acted as rector of the new parish for several months, and visited the interior as far as Austin.

In the spring of 1840, the Rt. Rev. Leonidas Polk (now of Louisiana), then missionary bishop, in company with the Rev. Dr. Page, visited many of the most prominent points between the Trinity and Colorado. He made a favorable report to the church, of the prospects of the country, and, in the general convention of 1841, urged the appointment of a bishop for Texas. In January of that year, the Rev. Benjamin Eaton was sent out as a missionary to Galveston and Houston. For some time he officiated alternately at the two places; but having, in 1842, organized a parish and built a church at the former place, he settled there as rector of that parish.

In the spring of 1843, the parish at Houston was again supplied by the Rev. Charles Gillette. He had been sent as a missionary, and by his faithful labors soon gathered a strong congregation, and erected a church, of which he became rector.

In 1844, Bishop Polk again visited the churches in Texas, and in the fall of that year again urged upon the general convention the importance of sending a bishop for the supervision of the interests of the church in Texas, which was increasing in numbers and influence. This measure, which had miscarried in 1841, now met with more favor, and was partially effected by the election and consecration of the Rt. Rev. George W. Freeman as missionary bishop of Arkansas, &c., "with supervision over the churches in the republic Texas." Bishop Freeman has, accordingly, visited the churches of Texas annually, and greatly to their advantage, from the time of his appointment.

During the years 1846, 1847, and 1848, the number of ministers was increased by the appointment of three missionaries for Brazoria, Washington, and San Augustine and Nacogdoches.

On the 1st of January, 1849, the several churches and parishes, represented by their ministers and lay-delegates, met in convention at Matagorda, in pursuance of the call of Bishop Freeman, and there organized a separate diocese under the constitution and canons of

the protestant episcopal church of the United States. This organization was approved, and the diocese admitted into union with the general convention at its triennial meeting in October, 1850. At the time of this organization there were six clergymen of this church in Texas, six organized parishes, and three churches built, two only of which supported their ministers without aid from the missionary fund.

In 1853, there were reported ten clergymen (four more were added in 1854), sixteen parishes, four of which are self-supporting, nine churches, and five hundred communicants. Over fifteen thousand dollars were contributed for church purposes (other than ministers' salaries); and there has been established a diocesan school at Anderson, under the control of the convention of the church, having, by charter, collegiate powers. At this school there were, in 1854, one hundred students.

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### PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.\*

THE presbyterian church can hardly be claimed as a pioneer church in the occupation of Texas. About the year 1838, the Rev. Hugh Wilson arrived in the new republic. He was among the first, if not the very first, presbyterian minister upon her soil. He organized a presbyterian church in San Augustine shortly after his arrival, and the year following another church at Independence. He was a single-hearted, laborious, apostolic man; his usefulness, sacrifices, perseverance, and real worth, place him in an honorable position among the first ministers of the gospel in Texas.

A few months later the Rev. Daniel Baker landed as a missionary on Galveston island, for which purpose he had, with the approbation of his presbytery, resigned the pastoral care of the church in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. He found in Galveston the Rev. John M'Culloch, who, under great disadvantages, had been preaching as he had opportunity. At that time the moral foundation of society upon the island was just being laid. A sabbath-school had been organized, and was in successful operation. For some weeks, Dr. Baker preached in the place, and frequently united and conducted public worship at the military station, and among the naval forces of the republic, and had the pleasure to see one of the soldiers make a profession of religion.

\* Old school. — From notes furnished by Rev. William M. Baker.

This is believed to have been the first instance of a profession of religion ever made on the island. On the last sabbath of his stay there, the sacrament of the Lord's supper was administered, it having been, for the first time, administered two weeks before by a minister of another denomination. On this occasion some six or seven professed conversion, two of whom were publicly baptized according to the form of the presbyterian church. These were the first ever baptized in Galveston. Shortly after Dr. Baker's departure, a church was organized by Rev. John M'Culloch.

From Galveston, Dr. Baker visited and labored in Houston. He had been preceded there by Rev. William Y. Allen, a presbyterian minister, who had been for some time faithfully preaching there, though under great discouragement. From Houston, Dr. Baker visited Columbia and Washington. In the latter place, he found the magistrate holding court on sabbath morning! In the afternoon and at night, however, the place of worship was well attended. It seems that, at that time, there was not a single professor of religion in the town. The Rev. R. Alexander, a most excellent methodist minister, had been preaching there occasionally, but it was with some opposition. The people generally were not at all religiously inclined; some were exceedingly wicked. In proof of this, "mock prayer-meetings" were held. At one of these meetings a shocking accident occurred. While the mock-worship was going on, and one half-drunk was mimicking a certain preacher, and the audience laughing immoderately, a pistol was accidentally discharged, which killed one of them—so suddenly that, the features not having time to relax, he presented the appearance of a laughing corpse! The beautiful churches, now adorning that place, bear witness to the happy change in Washington.

From Washington, Dr. Baker proceeded to Independence. There, at the Chrisman schoolhouse, on the 3d of April, 1840, was organized the presbytery of Brasos—the first presbytery in Texas. It was composed of Rev. Hugh Wilson, presbytery of south Alabama; Rev. John M'Culloch, Newton presbytery, New Jersey; Rev. William Y. Allen, presbytery of the western district of Tennessee; Mr. John M'Farland, ruling elder from the church at Independence; and Rev. Daniel Baker, present as corresponding member.

For a time the presbytery remained independent of the general assembly in the United States, but finally united with it. Soon after this the Rev. William C. Blair, Rev. P. H. Fullenwider, Rev.

J. J. Henderson, and Rev. Francis Rutherford, arrived and united with the presbytery.

In 1846 the presbytery was received in connection with the synod of Mississippi. In 1850 it was divided into three presbyteries, for the purpose of being organized into a synod of Texas, which met in Austin city in 1851. Since then the growth of the church in the state has been steady. In 1854 the presbytery of central Texas was organized. Churches have been organized and ministers established in all parts of the state, and the future opens brightly.

The educational movements of the presbyterian church commenced early. Previous to 1840, Rev. William L. McCalla, a minister of the church, had travelled extensively over the state, having in view the establishment of a university at Galveston. In 1844 an institution of learning at Nacogdoches was taken under the care of the church. In 1846 steps were taken to establish an institution of a high character in western Texas, and Rev. John McCulloch visited the United States as agent for it. In 1849 Austin college was established at Huntsville, through the instrumentality of Dr. Baker, and is now in a flourishing condition. Earnest efforts are being made to build up another at Goliad.

In education, as in the organization of churches, the presbyterian interest may seem slow in its operations; but it is *sure*. The denomination, like the Texas live-oak, gradually, almost imperceptibly, extends its branches to the light, the air, and the dew; but it tends to a sturdy magnificent growth, whose evergreen-glory, by the blessing of God, knows no alternation of season.

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### THE BAPTIST CHURCH.\*

THE first Baptist minister who preached in Texas was the Rev. Joseph Bays, who emigrated from Missouri, in company with Joseph Lindley, and preached on Peach creek, on the west side of the Brasos, in 1826. In the latter part of 1827 he removed to San Augustine, where he continued his labors until he was compelled by the Mexican authorities to leave.

In 1829, Rev. Thomas Hanks, from Tennessee, preached at Moses Shipman's, on the west side of the Brasos. Here the wife of James Allcorn, a deacon in the baptist church, made a profession

\* From a statement furnished by Rev. J. W. D. Creath.



of religion. Mr. Hanks yet lives in Houston county—an old pioneer, who, having gone forth at an early day to scatter the seeds, has lived to see them grow and ripen into an abundant harvest.

In 1830 and 1831, Elders George Woodruff and Skelton Allphine emigrated to Texas, and immediately commenced preaching the gospel.

A number of baptists who had emigrated from New York, established in 1829, at San Felipe, a sabbath-school—the first in Texas. It was taught by T. J. Pilgrim, now of Gonzales, but then interpreter of the Spanish language in Austin's colony. The same year a similar school was opened at Matagorda, and the year following on "Old Caney"—all under the auspices of the members of the baptist church.

After this, baptist ministers and members came in with the constantly flowing tide of emigration, and participated with other emigrants in the joys and privations of a new country.

At this time (1853) there are eleven associations of missionary baptists, and about one hundred and fifty churches, and a like number of ministers. The anti-mission baptists have three associations, forty churches, and a like number of ministers. The oldest of these associations is the *Union*, organized in 1840. It now numbers thirty-five churches and one thousand seven hundred and eleven members. The first baptist church organized in Texas was in 1833; the second in 1834-'35. The number of communicants in the baptist church in Texas is between nine and ten thousand.

A charter was granted for the Baylor university, by the Texas legislature in 1845. It is located at Independence, and is under the control of the baptist church. Its first session opened in July, 1846, with twenty students and one teacher. It has now (1853) eight professors and one hundred and seventy-five students. It has invested in buildings and an endowment fund, between forty and fifty thousand dollars. The Rev. Mr. Burleson is the worthy president of this institution.

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## METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH.\*

THE first methodist preacher in regular standing that visited and preached in Texas, was the Rev. Henry Stephenson, whose memory

\* From a statement of Rev. Robert Alexander.

is yet cherished by some of the early settlers. He was a man of deep piety and ardent zeal, and abundant in labors and usefulness in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. He preached in what is now Red river county, but then claimed by the United States, as early as 1818. The Rev. J. P. Sneed, then of Mississippi conference, but now living on the Brasos, fixes the first visit of the Rev. Mr. Stephenson to Texas proper in 1822. It is probable he did not visit western Texas until 1824. At that time he preached the first protestant sermon west of the Brasos near San Felipe. There were four families present. He also preached about the same time where the town of Washington now stands.

The first camp-meeting held in Texas was in 1833, ten miles east of San Augustine. James Stephenson, Enoch Talley (of the Mississippi conference), and Sumner Bacon, were the preachers on the occasion. There were about eighty persons present; a few professed religion, a church was organized, and a leader appointed. This was the first methodist, if not the first protestant church organized in Texas proper.

In 1834, Rev. Mr. Stephenson was directed to devote one half his time to Texas and the other to Louisiana. This year he held a second camp-meeting in the same place as the first, assisted by J. P. Sneed, Whately, Bacon, English, and one other minister. At this meeting there were twelve tents, some two hundred persons in attendance, and twenty conversions. Colonel M'Mahon was appointed class-leader, which duty he performed with fidelity. Subsequently he and his two sons-in-law became ministers of the gospel. At this camp-meeting a whiskey-shanty was set up, but the audience, with great unanimity, drove the owner, with his liquors, away. In the same year (1834) a camp-meeting was held in Austin county, on one of the west branches of Little Caney creek. It commenced on the 3d of September, under the direction of Rev. H. Stephenson and J. W. Kenney, assisted by Rev. Henry Fullenwider and others. There were eight or ten conversions, and eighteen joined the church by letters. There are many yet living who delight in talking of this camp-meeting. Another was held in the same place in 1835, a quarterly conference organized, of which Dr. William P. Smith was secretary, and the methodist episcopal church memorialized to send regular missionaries to Texas. This was published in the New York Christian Advocate, and, no doubt, called the attention of the church to this field of labor. The revolution, however, delayed efficient

action; but in the fall of 1836, a call was made for volunteers. Rev. Dr. M. Ruter was the first to urge the importance of the call, and the first to volunteer. Rev. Littleton Fowler and Rev. Robert Alexander also sent their names to the board of missions. Dr. Ruter had been president of Alleghany college, Littleton Fowler agent for La Grange college, and R. Alexander had occupied Natchez station. The latter set out early in August, 1837, for Texas, and preached as he went, commencing near Gaines's ferry. He spent a month in the Redlands, organized a circuit and quarterly conference, and held a camp-meeting in the M'Mahon settlement. In this he was assisted by the local preachers English, Crawford, Johnson, and Henry Stephenson, jr. The meeting was interesting, the congregation showing an intense desire to hear all the preachers had to say. During the service the rain fell gently for an hour on the unsheltered audience, yet no one left. As an evidence of their eagerness, Mr. Alexander had been invited to preach at Mr. Hale's, a few miles west of San Augustine. After preaching at some length to a crowded house, he dismissed them, and retired to lie down — for he was in feeble health, and nearly exhausted. In about an hour, to his surprise, he was waited on by Mr. Hale, and informed that the congregation were waiting to hear another sermon.

From San Augustine, Rev. R. Alexander proceeded to Washington, where he found some who held themselves as methodists and baptists, but the population was recklessly wicked. Thence he went to Little Caney and arranged for a camp-meeting to commence on the 19th of October. With a few friends he cleared off a place in a handsome grove, made a few rough seats of logs and poles, and a preacher's stand. They had a cheering meeting; twenty or thirty professed religion. In the work, Mr. Alexander was assisted by Revs. J. W. M'Kenney, A. Roark, and A. J. M'Gown, the two latter of the Cumberland presbyterian church. A few days after this meeting, Mr. Alexander met his colleague, Littleton Fowler, who had been detained by sickness. Mr. Fowler was a bland, affable, and dignified man, and not only did his work efficiently, but gave character and influence to all his plans and operations. He was a man of strong determination, sanguine, fearless, full of faith and zeal; he was a revivalist. Among his abundant labors he raised a subscription for a methodist church in San Augustine. On the 17th of January, 1838, he attended the ceremony of laying the cornerstone of the building. General Thomas J. Rusk delivered an ad-

dress on the occasion. It was the corner-stone of the first protestant church ever erected west of the Sabine. He continued his labors in Texas till the 29th of January, 1846, when he died in great peace, leaving the savor of a good name among the early settlers of Texas.

Rev. R. Alexander, after preaching through middle Texas, extending his labors into Robertson's colony, returned to attend the Mississippi conference at Natchez. At Gaines's ferry he met Dr. Ruter, superintendent of the Texas mission, just entering the republic. Dr. Ruter was a man of fine learning, and had left a pleasant situation to enter on the privations and hardships of the Texas mission. The distant spectator may have fancied something of romance in travelling over the Texan prairies; but to the itinerant, with fierce northers, swimming creeks, scanty fare, sleeping out of doors, with the necessity of a sharp look-out for one's horse and scalp, the romance gave place to very solemn reflections. But Dr. Ruter had counted the cost, before offering himself for the Texas work. He made himself at home everywhere, and as he went he preached to congregations, or families. In the short space of five months he had visited the towns and settlements as far as the Colorado. But his labors were too great for him, and he fell a martyr at an early day of his mission. He was buried on a piece of ground in Washington, that he had procured for the purpose of erecting on it a church. The church has since been built by his grave, and bears the name of the venerable missionary.

Dr. Ruter was well known in the United States, and the melancholy news of his death aroused a missionary spirit in the methodist church, which brought scores of her ministry to the great field of labor in Texas. Thus the work was so extended as to have preaching in every settlement. Among these missionaries was Paul Denton, a remarkable man. Left an orphan, and placed in one of the most degraded families in Arkansas, he performed the meanest work of a servant such as cooking, washing, and scouring. Until he was twelve years of age he was a stranger to a hat or shoes. So soon as he got old enough to see his ignorant and wretched condition, he fled from his oppressors, and wrought for himself. At a very early age he married; and besides the labor of supporting his family, he learned the alphabet, and then to read. He became a licensed preacher. His powers were unknown to himself as well as to the world, until both were astonished alike at his success. He was a

man of good personal appearance, agreeable manners, and dignified deportment. In his sermons he rose with his subject: his figures were original, drawn from nature, and always apposite. His selection of words was the very best; and in his ornate flights he seemed to test the strength of the English language. Mingled with his lofty imagery was a strength of intellect equal to the importance of his subject. Paul Denton's first efforts were in the Redlands of eastern Texas; but he subsequently removed to the northern part of the republic. To drive back the savages he raised a company and marched against them. In a battle fought with them he was killed. Texas has honored his name by giving it to one of her northern counties.

On December, 25th 1839, the Texas conference was organized at Ruttersville, Fayette county, Bishop Waugh of Baltimore presiding. In 1844 the Texas conference was divided, and the Eastern Texas conference laid off. The following table will exhibit the numbers, &c., at the periods stated:—

STATISTICS OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN TEXAS.

Year.	No. Members.	Local Ministers.	Increase of Members.	Increase of Loc.Min'rs.	Remarks.	
1840	1,853	25	—	—	Conference divided.	
1841	2,759	36	906	11		
1842	3,698	40	939	4		
1843	4,970	55	1,272	15		
1844	6,090	64	1,120	9		
1845	6,624	68	534	4		
1846	6,989	93	365	25		
1847	8,150	125	1,161	32		
1848	—	—	—	—		No report from Conference of Eastern Texas.
1849	12,154	173	4,004	48		
1850	12,614	188	460	15		
1851	13,356	217	742	29		
1852	14,573	217	1,217	—		
1853	18,316	243	3,743	26		

In the above table the travelling preachers are not given. In 1840 they were about twenty in number: in 1853, about one hundred and thirty-five. Total members in 1853, eighteen thousand six hundred and ninety-four.

The methodist church in Texas have in their charge the following institutions of learning:—

1. Ruttersville College, Fayette county.—Wm. Halsey, president.
2. Chapel Hill Male and Female Institute.—A. Ruter, president.
3. Andrew Female College, Huntsville.—Dr. Follansbee, president.



4. Bastrop Male and Female Academy.—Mr. Hancock, principal.
5. Fowler Institute, Henderson.
6. Paine Female Academy, Goliad.
7. Young Men's High School, Red River county.—Rev. Mr. M'Kenzie, president.
8. Cedar Mountain Academy.—Rev. R. Crawford, principal.

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### CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.\*

THIS comparatively modern branch of the church has not been wanting in zeal in the movement toward Texas. As early as 1828, Rev. Sumner Bacon penetrated as far as San Felipe. He was a native of Massachusetts, had served his period of enlistment in the United States army, and then became a minister of the gospel. In his journeyings through Texas he preached wherever he could. He was a man of scrupulous honesty, of untiring energy, and punctual in all his engagements and promises. Though of a rough exterior, he had a soul of love, and was utterly fearless of all danger. He continued preaching in Texas until 1832, when he obtained the appointment of bible agent. He scattered the word of God from San Antonio to the Sabine. On one occasion, in the Tanahaw settlement, he was surrounded by a gang of rowdies, who took him, and proposed instantly to put him to death. He asked his captors that they should first join him in prayer. They refused to do this; but while he alone addressed the throne of grace, they were silent. When he had concluded they went away and left him. On another occasion, while he was distributing the Bible, Colonel James Gaines reported him to Colonel Bean, then acting as commandant at Nacogdoches. Hearing of the charge, he went to see Bean, and admitted it. Bean told him to go on and distribute as many as he chose, so he did not disturb the peace.

While Bacon and others were preparing to hold a meeting, not far from San Augustine, it was understood that certain persons would break it up. Colonel Bowie, hearing of it, went to the place where the meeting was to be held, and making a sign of the cross on the ground, informed them that he was captain in those parts, and that the meeting should be held. They knew Bowie, and the meeting proceeded quietly.

\* From notes furnished by Rev. A. J. M'Gown.



About the year 1833, Rev. Milton Estill came to Texas, and established the first church of this order, in Red River county—then supposed to be Miller county, Arkansas. In 1836 Bacon organized another church, in San Augustine county. In the fall of that year he repaired to the Mississippi synod of the Cumberland presbyterian church, and applied for and obtained an order to organize a presbytery in Texas, so soon as three of their ministers were present. On his return he organized several churches in eastern Texas.

In the spring of 1837, Revs. Amos Roark and Mitchell Smith came to Texas. In the winter of that year the first presbytery was organized, five miles east of San Augustine. In 1838, Revs. James M'Donald, Milton Moore, and Samuel W. Frazier, came to Texas. The latter, who was chaplain to the Texan Congress, died that winter. Between 1838 and 1841, a number of other churches were organized. In the last-named year three presbyteries were formed out of Texas presbytery. They were called *Texas*, *Red River*, and *Colorado*.

In the fall of 1842, a synod was organized near Nacogdoches, at which Rev. Sumner Bacon presided. Shortly afterward this good man died. By the year 1849, there were six presbyteries in Texas. This induced the church during that year to organize the Brasos synod. In 1853, Brasos synod was divided into Brasos and Colorado synods.

At present (1854) there are three synods, ten presbyteries, over a hundred ministers, and over four thousand communicants.

This church has under its patronage Chapel Hill college, in Titus county, of which Rev. William E. Beason is president, Seguin high school, lately purchased, and some other schools of minor character.

## APPENDIX NO. VIII.

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### LETTER FROM HOUSTON TO SANTA ANNA.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF HOUSTON, *March 21, 1842.*

*To His Excellency Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, President of Mexico :*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: Your communications to Mr. Bee and General Hamilton, dated at the palace of the government of Mexico, have been recently presented to my notice. At the first convenient leisure, I have not failed to appropriate my attention to the subjects embraced within the scope of your remarks.

They would have met a more ready attention had it not been for a marauding incursion made by a Mexican force upon the defenceless town of San Antonio, on the inhabited frontier of Texas. Apprehending that the force had some other character than that of bandits and plunderers—commanded, as it was by regular officers—it produced a momentary excitement, and claimed the attention of the executive; but, as the bandits have withdrawn, characterizing their retreat by pillage and plunder, as has been usual with Mexicans, I am left at leisure to resume in tranquillity the duties of my station.

In reference to your correspondence with Mr. Bee and General Hamilton, I have no remark to make in reference to the communications which those gentlemen assumed the individual responsibility of making to you. The very nature of the correspondence manifests the fact that it was not done under the sanction of this government, but rests solely upon their action as individuals. Had your response regarded them in the light in which they were presented

to you, it would have superseded the necessity of any notice from me; but, as you have thought proper to laud my conduct as an individual, and refer to transactions connected with this country with which I had official identity—and which I also at this time possess—and as you have taken the liberty, to an unwarrantable extent, to animadvert upon circumstances connected with Texas as a nation, I feel myself impelled by a sense of duty to refute a portion of the calumnies which you have presented to the world, under the sanction of your official averment.

You appear to have seized upon the flimsy pretext of confidential communications, unknown to the officers of this government, and unknown to the world, until divulged by you, for the purpose of manufacturing a capital of popularity at home, and which you have submitted to the world as a manifesto in behalf of what you are pleased to term the rights of a great nation, “by so many titles respectable.”

Whatever opinions you may have entertained in relation to the difficulties existing between Mexico and Texas, can not materially vary the facts and principles involved, nor will they materially influence the decision of mankind upon the justice of our cause.

Decency and self-respect, at least, should have induced on your part the pursuit of a course different from that which you have adopted. The abuse and ribald epithets which you have applied to the citizens of this country, as well as those of the Mississippi valley of the United States, are doubtless characteristic of the individual who gave them utterance. So far as the people of this country are concerned, I shall refer mankind to a history of facts and circumstances connected with the settlement of the country. I shall pass, with slight notice, your remarks relative to the people of the United States. So far as our origin is connected with them, and a unity of sympathy exists, we are proud to hail them as our kindred—kindred in blood, kindred in laws, kindred in all the ennobling attributes of humanity. They will hear your idle taunts of defiance with the same contempt and derision that Texans regard your silly gasconade. If they have heretofore sympathized with us in our struggle for liberty and independence, it was from a knowledge of the fact that we had been deceived and oppressed by Mexico, and that the cause in which we were engaged was that of humanity struggling against usurpation and despotism.

The people of Texas were invited to immigrate to this country for the purpose of enjoying equal rights and constitutional liberty.

They were promised the shield of the constitution of 1824, adopted by Mexico. Confiding in this pledge, they removed to the country to encounter all the privations of a wilderness, under the alluring promise of free institutions. Other reasons operated also. Citizens of the United States had engaged in the revolution of Mexico in 1812. They fought gallantly in the achievement of Mexican independence; and many of them survive, and to this day occupy the soil which their privations and valor assisted in achieving. On their removal here, they brought with them no aspirations or projects but such as were loyal to the constitution of Mexico. They repelled the Indian savages, they encountered every discomfort, they subdued the wilderness, and converted into cultivated fields the idle waste of this now-prolific territory. Their courage and enterprise achieved that which the imbecility of your countrymen had either neglected or left for centuries unaccomplished. Their situation was not, however, disregarded by Mexico; though she did not, as might have been expected, extend to them a protecting and fostering care, but viewed them as objects of cupidity, and at last of jealousy.

The Texans, enduring the annoyances and oppressions inflicted upon them, remained faithful to the constitution of Mexico. In 1832, when an attempt was made to destroy that constitution, and when you, sir, threw yourself forward as its avowed champion, you were sustained with all the fidelity and valor that freemen could contribute. On the avowal of your principles, and in accordance with them, the citizens put down the serviles of despotism at Anahuac, Velasco, and Nacogdoches. They treated the captives of that struggle with humanity, and sent them to Mexico, subject to your orders. They regarded you as the friend of liberty and free institutions; they hailed you as the benefactor of mankind. Your name and your actions were lauded, and the manifestations you had given in behalf of the nation were themes of satisfaction and delight to the Texan patriots.

You can well imagine the transition of feeling which ensued on your accession to power. Your subversion of the constitution of 1824, your establishment of centralism, your conquest of Zacatecas, characterized by every act of violence, cruelty, and rapine, inflicted upon us the deepest astonishment. We realized all the uncertainty of men awaking to reality from the unconsciousness of delirium. In \*succession came your order for the Texans to surrender their private arms. The mask was thrown aside, and the monster of despotism

displayed in all the habiliments of loathsome detestation. Then was presented to Texans the alternative of tamely crouching to the tyrant's lash, or exalting themselves to the attributes of freemen. They chose the latter. To chastise them for their presumption, induced your advance upon Texas with your boasted veteran army, a force in number nearly equal to the whole population of the country at that time. You besieged and took the Alamo—but under what circumstances? Not those, surely, which should characterize a general of the nineteenth century. You assailed one hundred and fifty men, destitute of every supply requisite for the defence of the place. Its brave defenders, worn down by vigilance and duty beyond the power of human nature to sustain, were at length overwhelmed by a force of nine thousand men, and the place taken. I ask you, sir, what scenes followed? Were they such as should characterize an able general, a magnanimous warrior, and the president of a great nation, numbering eight millions of souls? No!—manliness and generosity would sicken at the recital of the scenes incident to your success; and Humanity herself would blush to class you among the chivalric spirits of the age of vandalism! This you have been pleased to class in the “succession of your victories”—and, I presume, you would next include the massacre at Goliad. Your triumph there, if such you are pleased to term it, was not the triumph of arms: it was the success of perfidy! Fannin and his brave companions had beaten back and defied your veteran soldiers. Although outnumbered more than seven to one, their valiant, hearty, and indomitable courage, with holy devotion to the cause of freedom, foiled every effort directed by your general to insure his success by arms. He had recourse to a flag of truce; and, when the surrender of the little patriot-band was secured by the most solemn treaty stipulations, what were the tragic scenes that ensued to Mexican perfidy? The conditions of their surrender were submitted to you, and—though you have denied the facts—instead of restoring them to liberty, according to the conditions of the capitulation, you ordered them to be executed, contrary to every pledge given them, contrary to the rules of war, and contrary to every principle of humanity! Yet, at this day, you have the effrontery to animadvert upon the conduct of Texans relative to your captivity after the battle of San Jacinto!

You have presumed to arraign the conduct of the then existing cabinet, and to charge it with bad faith; and, though you are pleased

to commend the conduct of the illustrious Stephen F. Austin, the father of Texas, and myself, for acts of generosity exercised toward you, you take much care to insinuate that we only were capable of appreciating your proper merits. That you may no longer be induced to misconstrue acts of generosity and appropriate them to the gratification of your self-complacent disposition, I will inform you that they were acts of magnanimity characteristic of the nation to which we belong. They had nothing to do with your merits or demerits. The perfidy and cruelty which had been exercised toward our companions-in-arms did not enter into our calculation. Your sacrifice would not restore to our gallant companions their lives, nor to our country their services. Although the laws of war would have justified retaliation by your execution, yet it would have characterized the acts of the nation as influenced by passion and revenge; and would have evinced to the world that individuals, who had an influence on the destinies of a people, were subject to the capricious impulses of vengeance, of which you had so recently set an example. So far as I was concerned in preserving your life, and in your subsequent liberation, I was only influenced by considerations of mercy, humanity, and the establishment of a national character. Humanity was gratified by your preservation; the magnanimous of all nations would have justified your release, had they known how little your influence was dreaded by the Texans. If, upon your return to Mexico, you should have power and a disposition to redeem the pledges you had *voluntarily* made to myself, as well as this government, of an earnest disposition to see the independence of Texas recognised by Mexico, I believed it would have a tendency to restore peace to the two nations, diminish the aggregate sufferings of their citizens, and promote the prosperity of both countries. In the event you were not disposed to redeem the pledges thus given, but to urge the prosecution of the war by Mexico against us, I wished to evince to mankind that Texans had magnanimity, resources, and confidence, sufficient to sustain them against all your influence in favor of their subjugation.

Your liberation was induced by principles such as these; and, though you tendered pledges, doubtless to facilitate and procure your release, they were received, but not accepted as a condition. I believed that pledges made in duress were not obligatory upon the individual making them; and if you intended to exercise the influence which you declared you would do, that unconditional



liberty extended to you would interpose no obstacle to their fulfilment.

Without any advertence to any treaty stipulations which you had made with the cabinet of Texas, I gave you your entire liberty, and safe conduct to the city of Washington.

You have asserted to the world that you have given no pledge whatever to the Texan government of your disposition in favor of its separation from Mexico. That the tribunal to which you have appealed may judge of the validity of your assertion, I shall submit, with this communication, a letter of yours addressed to me at Columbia, dated the 5th of November, 1836,\* *after my determination to give you your liberty had been communicated.* I shall present it in the original, accompanied with its translation into English. I will also give publicity to a veto which I communicated to the senate, in consequence of a resolution of that honorable body respecting your detention as a prisoner.

You have spoken of events subsequent to the battle of San Jacinto, and endeavor to convey the idea that promises had been extorted from you "under the rifles of a tumultuous soldiery." I am at a loss to comprehend your meaning in this reference. When you were brought into the encampment as a prisoner, the day after the battle, you were conducted to the presence of the commander-in-chief—not amid noise and tumult, nor did any exist. When the character of the prisoner was known to the army, much curiosity was excited; but there was no menace used, or violence offered. You were treated with calmness, and every courtesy extended to you that our situation would afford. Had you been a private gentleman and friend, you could have received no greater facilities than those that were extended to you. As you desired, you were placed near my person, and not sent with the balance of the prisoners. You were informed that you could have your camp-bed and marquee brought to my quarters, where I lay confined with my wound. You were permitted to command the services of your attendants; you were informed also that your baggage should be selected from the spoils taken by the army on the field, which was accordingly done, and never inspected. These privileges were granted by my order. Your aide-de-camp, Colonel Almonté, and your private secretary, were permitted to remain with you in your marquee. A guard was detailed for the purpose of allaying any apprehensions you might

\* See a translation of this letter in Appendix No. VI., p. 530, of this volume

have for your personal safety, and every liberty extended to you except your absolute release.

You submitted propositions to me, embracing the questions of the recognition of Texan independence and the termination of our struggle. I unequivocally refused the acceptance of any offer upon the subject of a treaty—alleging, as reasons, that we had a constitutional government, and the subject would properly come before the cabinet of Texas, the members of which would be present in camp within a few days. You urged the further consideration of your propositions upon me, declaring that you would rather enter into stipulations with a general of the army than with the civil authorities of the country. I positively declined taking any further action upon them; and they were referred to the cabinet, on its arrival. Declining the consideration of your proposals myself, I required you to issue orders forthwith, to the general next in command, to evacuate Texas with the troops composing the Mexican army, and to fall back with them to Monterey. Orders to this effect were issued by you to General Filisola, and despatched by an express, which could not, however, overtake him until he had reached the Colorado, on his retreat, conducted in the greatest panic and confusion. Owing to his precipitate flight, and your execution of my orders, the Mexicans were permitted to leave Texas without further molestation.

In the meantime, General Adrian Woll, of the Mexican army, came into the encampment at San Jacinto, without my knowledge, and not “upon my word of honor;” nor was I apprized of his presence until I learned that he, together with his aide, had been traversing our lines. So soon as I was advised of this fact, I ordered them to my presence, and had them instructed that such conduct would not be tolerated, and caused them to be placed under vigilance. This reason I deemed sufficient to detain General Woll as a prisoner of war. His subsequent conduct to Captain Dimit was such as to justify any unfavorable opinion which I had formed of his character. He had rendered himself so obnoxious to the army, that, from a desire for his personal security, I did not permit his release until he could go in perfect safety. In no respect had the prisoners taken on that occasion reason of complaint. Their lives were all forfeited to the laws of war, conformably to the precedent which you had exhibited. General Cos, who had surrendered, in 1835, a prisoner of war at San Antonio—where one hundred and ninety-five Texans stormed and took the Alamo, with the town, when it was

defended by seventeen hundred regular troops of Mexico—was again taken prisoner at San Jacinto, after he had violated his parole of honor, by which he had forfeited his life to the law of arms. Yet, such was the lenity of the Texans, that even *he* was spared, thereby interposing mercy to prevent reclamation being made for the brave Texans perfidiously massacred.

From the 5th of May (1836), I had no connection with the encampment, nor with the treatment which the prisoners received, until the month of October, when I was inducted into the office of chief magistrate of the nation. It is true that you were chained to an iron bar; but not until an attempt had been made to release you, with your knowledge and assent. A vessel had arrived at Orazimba, on the Brasos, where you were confined. In possession of its captain were found wines and other liquors mixed with poison, for the purpose of poisoning the officers and guard in whose charge you were, thereby insuring your escape. In consequence of the sensation produced by this circumstance, you were confined and treated in the manner you have so pathetically portrayed.

While confined by my wound in San Augustine, I learned that it was the intention of the army to take you to the theatre of Fannin's massacre, and there to have had you executed. Upon the advertisement of this fact, I immediately sent an express to the army, solemnly protesting against any such act, and interposing every possible obstacle against your further molestation, or any action which might not recognise you as a prisoner of war.

Your recent communications have necessarily awakened advertency to these facts; otherwise they would have remained unrecited by me. Any part which I bore in these transactions is not related in the egotistical style of your communication: it is done alone for the purpose of presenting the lights of history. You have sought to darken its shades, and appeal to the sympathies, and would command the admiration of mankind, and have even invoked the "prismatic tints of romance."

Now, the tribunal to which you have appealed will have an opportunity of contrasting the treatment which you and the prisoners taken at San Jacinto received, with that of those who have fallen within your power, and particularly those perfidiously betrayed on a recent trading-excursion to Santa Fé. You have endeavored to give that explanation the complexion of an invading movement upon the rights of Mexico. To believe you serious in the idle display of

words made on this occasion, would be presenting an absurdity to the common sense of the age. Your fears may have given it a character different from that to which it was entitled. Examine the circumstances accompanying it. It was not an act of Texas; Congress had refused to sanction any enterprise of the kind. A number of individuals were anxious to open a lucrative trade—as they believed it would be—with Santa Fé. Such a commerce has been carried on for years by the citizens of the United States, from Missouri; and the preparations, connected with the fact that the citizens took with them a considerable amount of merchandise, show that their enterprise was not one of conquest or invasion. You may allege that it had connection with the government, from the fact that the president identified himself with it, by furnishing arms to those connected with the project. This may have induced you to characterize the expedition as you have in your tirade against Texas. Whatever part the president bore in this transaction was contrary to law and in violation of his duty. A large portion of the people of Texas were not apprized of the existence of such an enterprise. You doubtless would insist that it had means of offence against Mexico. So far as their preparation could give character to the undertaking by carrying with them artillery and other munitions of war, it can be accounted for most readily. They had to pass through a wilderness six hundred miles from the frontier of Texas before they could reach Santa Fé. It was reasonable to suppose they would encounter many hostile tribes of Indians; and it was proper and necessary that they should be in a situation to repel any attack made upon them; and, as their objects were pacific, they were justified in resisting aggression from any quarter. The instructions given to them by the president did not contemplate hostilities, but that the enterprise would terminate without bloodshed or violence. Scientific gentlemen from Europe and the United States accompanied them, not for warlike purposes, but for the purpose of adding rich stores to the treasury of science. It had likewise been communicated to the people of Texas, that all the inhabitants east of the Rio Grande were anxious to enjoy the benefits of our institutions. You can not allege that you were not willing to admit the justice of our claims to the Rio Grande, or that you were not anxious to facilitate the object. Your communication to me on that subject is conclusive; Texans were apprized of it from your repeated declarations to that effect, while in this country, and on your way to Washington city.

At the time the expedition started, no hostilities were carried on between this country and Mexico. Commissioners from General Arista were at Austin at the time the party started from Santa Fé. They were kindly received, and made the most sincere professions of amity and reconciliation with this government. They were treated with kindness, and corresponding commissioners appointed to General Arista. To them every civility was extended, and they were permitted to return without molestation. This was the attitude of the two countries at that time. Will you allege that this was not sanctioned by your government?—or will you insist that it was a trick of diplomacy? For myself, I would not have been deluded by any professions which might have been tendered to Texas by Mexico, when a departure from the most solemn pledges would result in injury to the former, and benefit to the latter. That the ministers of General Arista played their parts with fidelity to their instructions, I have no doubt; and that all the information which could be derived, in relation to the trading company, was faithfully transmitted to the government of Mexico. Nor do I doubt but that the population of the northern parts of your country, so soon as the intelligence was received, were thrown into the utmost consternation; and a nation numbering eight millions of people, inhabiting “valleys, mountains, towns, and large cities,” “by so many titles respectable,” was convulsed at the apprehended approach of three hundred Texan traders. But what has been the sequel of this expedition? On their approach to the settlements of the Rio Grande, they obtained supplies from the inhabitants, not as a hostile and marauding party, but paid a valuable consideration for every supply which they obtained. They were met by the Mexican authorities with overtures of peace, assurances of friendship, and pledges of security, provided they would give up their arms, for the purpose of tranquilizing the Mexican population. Detached, as the company was, into parties remote from each other, and deluded by pledges, they acquiesced in the wishes of the authorities of the country; thereby evincing to them, that they had no disposition to disturb the tranquillity of the inhabitants, and that their objects were pacific. But no sooner were they in the power of the authorities, than they were stripped of their clothing, deprived of everything valuable, treated in the most barbarous manner, and marched like convicts to the capital of Mexico. On their route every act of inhumanity, cruelty, and hatred, was evinced. When their sick and helpless condition re-



quired the assistance of Christian charity and humanity, it was denied them. They were barbarously shot, their bodies mangled, and their corpses left unburied. The butchery of M'Allister, Galphin, Yates, and others, appeals to Heaven and this nation for retribution on the heads of their inhuman murderers. You may allege that you did not authorize the perpetration of these outrages, committed upon men who had violated no rule of law known to this civilized age. This will be no excuse for you; your sanction to these acts is as culpable as their perpetration was degrading to their authors. Their detention, by you, as prisoners, may gratify the malignity of little minds; but the just, the chivalric, the brave and generous of all nations, may pity, but must despise your conduct.

Had it not been for the faithless professions tendered to them, and their two credent belief, they could have maintained their position against all the forces of northern Mexico; and, if necessary, could have made good their retreat to their homes, defying the "generous effort of the people of New Mexico." Your conduct on this occasion will present your humanity and sense of propriety in very awkward contrast with the treatment extended to you and your followers after the victory of San Jacinto—being, not as you suppose, one of the "freaks of fortune," but one of the accompaniments of that destiny which will mark the course of Texas until the difficulties between the two countries shall be satisfactorily adjusted.

But you declare that you will not relax your exertions until you have subjugated Texas; that you have "weighed its possible value," and that you are perfectly aware of the magnitude of the task you have undertaken; that you "will not permit a colossus within the limits of Mexico;" that our title is that of "theft and usurpation;" and that the "honor of the Mexican nation demands of you the reclamation of Texas;" that, "if it were an unproductive waste, useless, sterile, yielding nothing desirable, and abounding only in thorns to wound the feet of the traveller," you would not permit it to exist as an independent government, in derision of your national character, your hearths, and your individuality. Allow me to assure you that our title to Texas has a high sanction; that of purchase—because we have performed our conditions; that of conquest—because we have been victorious. It is ours, because you can not subdue us; it has been consecrated ours, by the blood of martyred patriots; it is ours, by the claims of patriotism, superior intelligence,



and unsubduable courage. It is not a sterile waste, or a desert ; it is the home of freemen ; it is the land of promise ; it is the garden of America.

Every citizen of Texas was born a freeman, and he would be a recreant to the principles imbibed from his ancestry, if he would not freely peril his life in defence of his home, his liberty, and his country. Although you are pleased to characterize our occupation of Texas and defence of our imprescriptable right, as the "most scandalous robbery of the present age," it is not one fourth of a century since Mexico perpetrated a similar robbery upon the rights of the crown of Spain. The *magnitude* of the theft may give dignity to the robbery ; in *that* you have the advantage. That you should thus have characterized a whole nation, I can readily account. Heretofore you entertained the opinion that Mexico could never conquer Texas ; that if it were possible for her to drive every Texan from the soil, Mexico could not maintain her position on the Sabine ; and the retreat of her army would be the signal for the return of the Anglo-Saxon race, who would re-occupy their homes, and pursue the Mexicans as far as the Rio Grande ; and that Mexico, in preservation of the integrity of the territory she then possessed, would gain an advantage by abandoning all hope of conquering Texas, and directing her attention to the improvement of her internal condition. Your recent opinions, as declared by you, appear to be at variance with these speculations ; and are most vehemently avowed. It is an attribute of wisdom to change opinions upon conviction of error, and perhaps, for it you are justifiable—at least, I discover you have one attribute of a new convert ; you are quite zealous and wordy in the promulgation of the doctrine you have espoused.

Sir, from your lenity and power Texas expects nothing—from your humanity less ; and when you invade Texas you will not find thorns to wound the foot of the traveller ; but you will find opposed to Mexican breasts, arms wielded by freemen, of unerring certainty, and directed for a purpose not to be eluded. Texans war not for gewgaws and titles. They battle not to sustain dictators or despots. They do not march to the field unwillingly ; nor are they dragged to the army in chains, with the mock title of volunteers. For a while they lay by the implements of husbandry, and seize their rifles. They rally in defence of their rights, and when victory has been achieved, they return to the cultivation of the soil. They have

laws to protect their rights; their property is their own. They do not bow to the will of a despot; but they bow to the majesty of the constitution and laws. They are freemen indeed. It is not so with your nation; from the *alcalde* to the dictator, all are tyrants in Mexico; and the community is held in bondage, subject, not to the law, but the will of a superior, and confined in hopeless subjection to usurpation.

In an individual so intelligent as yourself, it does seem to me that you have evinced very bad taste in adverting to the subject of slavery in the internal affairs of this country. Your opinions, while here, on this subject, were freely and frankly avowed. You then believed that it would be of great advantage to Mexico to introduce slave-labor into that country; that it would develop her resources, by enabling her to produce cotton, sugar, and coffee, for purposes of exportation; and that, without it, she would be seriously retarded in her march to greatness and prosperity. Your sympathy and commiseration, at present expressed, are no doubt very sincere; and I only regret that they partake so little of consistency. You boast that Mexico gave the noble and illustrious example of emancipating her slaves. The fact that she has the name of having done so, has enabled you to add another flourish to your rhetoric; but the examination of facts, for one moment, will disclose the truth. The slaves of Mexico, you say, were emancipated: Did you elevate them to the condition of freemen? No, you did not—you gave them the name of freemen, but you reduced the common people to the condition of slaves. It is not uncommon in Mexico for one dignitary, upon his *hacienda*, to control from one hundred to ten thousand human beings in a state of bondage more abject and intolerable than the negroes on any cotton plantation in this country. If any individual in Mexico owes but twenty-five cents, the creditor, by application to an *alcalde*, can have him, with his family, decreed to his service, and remain in that state of slavery until he is able to pay the debt from the wages accruing from his labor—after being compelled to subsist his dependent family. This you call *freedom*; and graciously bestow your sympathy upon the African race. The abolitionists of the present day will not feel that they are indebted to you for your support of their cause. Had some one else than the dictator of Mexico, the self-styled “Napoleon of the West,” the subverter of the constitution of 1824, the projector of centralism, and the man who endeavors to reduce a nation to slavery,

become their advocate, they might have been more sensible of their obligation. So far as its increase can be prevented, our constitution and laws have presented every obstacle. They will be maintained to the letter; and, on account of slavery, Texas will incur no reproach.

You touchingly invite "Texas to cover herself anew with the Mexican flag." You certainly intend this as a mockery. You denied us the enjoyment of the laws under which we came to the country. Her flag was never raised in our behalf; nor has it been seen in Texas except when displayed in an attempt at our subjugation. We know your lenity—we know your mercy—we are ready again to test your powers. You have threatened to plant your banner on the banks of the Sabine. Is this done to intimidate us? Is it done to alarm us? Or do you deem it the most successful mode of conquest? If the latter, it may do to amuse the people surrounding you. If to alarm us, it will amuse those conversant with the history of your last campaign. If to intimidate us, the threat is idle. We have desired peace—you have annoyed our frontier; you have harassed our citizens; you have incarcerated our traders, after your commissioners had been kindly received, and your citizens allowed the privileges of commerce in Texas without molestation. You continue aggression; you will not accord us peace. *We will have it.* You threaten to conquer Texas; we will war with Mexico. You pretensions with ours you have referred to the social world, and to the God of battles. We refer our cause to the same tribunals—the issue involves the fate of nations. Destiny must determine—its event is only known to the tribunal of Heaven. If experience of the past will authorize speculations of the future, the attitude of Mexico is more "problematical" than that of Texas.

In the war which will be conducted by Texas against Mexico, our incentive will not be a love of conquest; it will be to disarm tyranny of its power. We will make no war upon Mexicans, or their religion. Our efforts shall be made in behalf of the liberties of the people; and directed against the authorities of the country, and against *your* principles. We will exalt the condition of the people to representative freedom. They shall choose their own rulers—they shall possess their property in peace; and it shall not be taken from them to support an armed soldiery for purposes of oppression.

With these principles we will march across the Rio Grande, and —believe me, sir—ere the banner of Mexico shall triumphantly float on the banks of the Sabine, the Texan standard of the Single Star, borne by the Anglo-Saxon race, shall display its bright folds, in Liberty's triumph, on the isthmus of Darien.

With the most appropriate consideration, I have the honor to present you my salutations.

SAM HOUSTON.

## APPENDIX NO. IX.

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### LIST OF THE GOVERNORS OF TEXAS.

[THIS list is not given as perfect. Many of those acting as governors, in the early history of the country, were the commandants of the Presidio of Bexar, and officiating *ad interim*.]

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#### I.—FRENCH DOMINATION.

Robert Cavalier, the Sieur de la Salle .....	1685
The Sieur Barbier .....	1687

#### II.—SPANISH DOMINATION.

Domingo Teran de los Rios (Coahuila and Texas until 1725) .....	1691
Don Martin D'Alarconne .....	1718
Marquis of San Miguel de Aguayo .....	1720
Fernando Perez de Almazan .....	1723
Melchior de Mediavilla y Arcona (Texas alone until 1824).....	1725
Juan Antonio Bustillos y Cevallos.....	1731
Manuel de Sandoval .....	1734
Carlos de Franquis .....	1736
Prudencio de Oribio de Bastera .....	1738
Justo Boneo .....	1740
Jacinto de Barrios y Jaurequi .....	1756
Antonio de Martos y Navarrete.....	1762
Juan Maria Baron de Ripperda.....	1770
Domingo Cabello .....	1778
Rafael Pacheco.....	1789
Manuel Muñoz .....	1790
Juan Bautista Elguezabal .....	1803
Antonio Cordero .....	1806
Manuel de Salcedo.....	1810

Juan Bautista Casas assumed the command of the Province, and was confirmed in the same by General Matias Ximenes, one of Hidalgo's Lieutenants, January 22.....	1811
A Spanish Provisional Junta, under the Presidency of the Sub-Deacon Juan Manuel Zambrano, overthrew Governor Casas, and reinstated Manuel de Salcedo .....	1811
Salcedo killed by the Republican General Bernardo Gutierrez, in 1813, and Texas in a disorganized condition until after the Battle of Medina.	
Christoval Dominguez.....	1813
Antonio Martinez.....	1818

### III.—MEXICAN DOMINATION.

Trespalacios .....	1822
By the Decree of the Sovereign Junta of January, 1822, Texas came under the Government of the Eastern Captaincy-General, in which position it remained until the State of "COAHUILA AND TEXAS" was organized under the Constitution of 1824.	
Don Luciana Garcia (acting).....	1823
Rafael Gonzales ( <i>ad interim</i> —Coahuila and Texas united until 1835) . . . .	1824
Victor Blanco.....	1826
José Maria Viesca .....	1828
José Maria Letona.....	1831
Francisco Vidauri y Villaseñor (acting).....	1834
A Civil War broke out in the State of Coahuila and Texas.—Saltillo <i>pronounced</i> , and, on the 19th of July, 1834, appointed José Maria Goribar as Governor.—On the 30th of August, 1834, the Party of Monclova appointed Juan José Elguezabal Governor.—The matter was referred to Santa Anna, who ordered a new Election.	
Augustin Viesca.....	1835
Revolutionary Councils until November 13.....	1835
Henry Smith, Provisional Governor until March 17.....	1836

### IV.—INDEPENDENT DOMINATION.

David G. Burnet, President ( <i>ad interim</i> ) .....	1836
Sam Houston, " (constitutional).....	1836
Mirabeau B. Lamar, " " .....	1838
Sam Houston, " " .....	1841
Anson Jones, " " .....	1844






Juan Bautista Casas assumed the command of the Province, and was confirmed in the same by General Matias Ximenes, one of Hidalgo's Lieutenants, January 22. . . . .	1811
A Spanish Provisional Junta, under the Presidency of the Sub-Deacon Juan Manuel Zambrano, overthrew Governor Casas, and reinstated Manuel de Salcedo . . . . .	1811
Salcedo killed by the Republican General Bernardo Gutierrez, in 1813, and Texas in a disorganized condition until after the Battle of Medina.	
Christoval Dominguez. . . . .	1813
Antonio Martinez. . . . .	1818

### III.—MEXICAN DOMINATION.

Trespalcacios . . . . .	1822
By the Decree of the Sovereign Junta of January, 1822, Texas came under the Government of the Eastern Captaincy-General, in which position it remained until the State of "COAHUILA AND TEXAS" was organized under the Constitution of 1824.	
Don Luciana Garcia (acting) . . . . .	1823
Rafael Gonzales ( <i>ad interim</i> —Coahuila and Texas united until 1835) . . . .	1824
Victor Blanco. . . . .	1826
José Maria Viesca . . . . .	1828
José Maria Letona . . . . .	1831
Francisco Vidauri y Villaseñor (acting) . . . . .	1834
A Civil War broke out in the State of Coahuila and Texas. — Saltillo <i>pronounced</i> , and, on the 19th of July, 1834, appointed José Maria Goribar as Governor. — On the 30th of August, 1834, the Party of Monclova appointed Juan José Elguezabal Governor. — The matter was referred to Santa Anna, who ordered a new Election.	
Augustin Viesca. . . . .	1835
Revolutionary Councils until November 13. . . . .	1835
Henry Smith, Provisional Governor until March 17. . . . .	1836

### IV.—INDEPENDENT DOMINATION.

David G. Burnet, President ( <i>ad interim</i> ) . . . . .	1836
Sam Houston, " (constitutional). . . . .	1836
Mirabeau B. Lamar, " " . . . . .	1838
Sam Houston, " " . . . . .	1841
Anson Jones, " " . . . . .	1844




EXPLANATIONS.  
 Rail Roads  
 Common Roads  
 State Capital  
 Cities  
 County Towns  
 Villages, etc. & Forts



# TEXAS

PREPARED FOR YOUNG'S HISTORICAL TEXAS & MISSISSIPPI MAPS BY WM. H. WAINMAN & CO. N. Y. 1855.





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THE END.















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